History
  • No items yet
midpage
In Re White
467 A.2d 1148
Pa.
1983
Check Treatment

*3 CAVANAUGH, Before MONTEMURO, BECK and JJ. CAVANAUGH,Judge: appeal

The instant an order the is from of court below dismissing exceptions order granting petition to an the Valley Bank resign Juniata as trustee and denying the petition of a under the beneficiary Ray- trust remove mond as an trustee. In order White individual put focus, history in the court below petitions two trust The inter vivos trust must be reviewed. of the wife, Flo B. White and his by was established C.A. question thirteen White, in of their primarily 1965 for the benefit deed of trust The trustees named grandchildren. sons, settlor, (now deceased), his J. two were C.A. White White, son-in-law, Roy his A. Raymond Nevin White and (now the Valley and the National Bank Wingate, Juniata Bank). assets of the trust Valley principal The Juniata totalling over three thousand were two tracts timberland agreement provided acres. The trust establishment was to receive separate grandchild trusts for each who Principal the trust remained in existence. income while grandchild to made to each as follows: distribution was and the age twenty-five one-half when he reached principal age thirty. Appropriate provisions at balance grandchild prior were made in the event of the death of a complete principal. distribution years developed policies a conflict investment

Over Bank which Valley between Juniata White culminated in 1980 threat to sue the bank disputes it these the Junia- resigned. unless As a result of the court to Roy Wingate petitioned ta Bank and filed resign as trustees. Subsequently, one of the under requesting beneficiaries White cause he should not be removed why show as trustee. a trustee under Orphans’ Court remove Probate, Code, authority Estates and Fiduciaries *4 § 508, 164, 30, 1972,

Act of P.L. No. 20 3182 June Pa.C.S.A. jeopardized when interests of the trust are likely be in the continuation of the trustee office.1 Removal of a is a proof trustee drastic action and need of this Estate, 188, 482 remedy must be clear. Croessant Pa. 393 Probate, 1. While Section 3182 of the Estates and Fiduciaries Code specifically grounds personal representative refers for removal of a estate, provides grounds of an Section 7121 that the Code for removal of a as those for trustee shall the same removal of a representative. personal 106 (1978). Nevertheless, 443 “[wjhile

A.2d removal of a is resting largely trustee a matter within the discretion of trust, having jurisdiction court over it is equally clear that an abuse discretion renders its subject exercise Estate, 187, 190, 340 review.” Pa. 16 A.2d Crawford’s Estate, supra; See Croessant 521, (1940). Scien- also 523 Hohensee, Living, Inc. v. 280, 440 Pa. 270 A.2d 216 tific Trust, (1970); La Rocca (1965). Pa. 213 A.2d 666 In opinion our history review the trust reveals court that below abused its discretion in denying the to remove as White a trustee. recent years Raymond was insistent that engage in speculative investments notwithstanding they would produce not income for the beneficiaries and involved sub- risks. basis for stantial His investments as gold, such foreign coins and and calls was puts that he had made a great deal of in money speculating and reason saw no in the trust should not invest like manner with trust assets.2 apparently He no risking saw difference between his own in money speculative risking ventures and the assets of the trust.

It is that a clear mere error of is judgment not grounds removal “All trustee. the courts prudence common require skill, of a trustee is common Estate, and common caution.” Barnes’ 88, 94, 339 Pa. (1940). In A.2d this ease Raymond manifested lack and prudence common caution and the Juniata Valley Bank alone acted as a restraining force on desires his speculate. Raymond buy wanted to food canned as an investment and store it. He was interested buying wheat, corn, oats and other commodities as as well live pressured stock. He the bank as trustee to invest corn, food, respect gold, 2. With to the desired investments in com- modities, livestock, calls, puts and etc. lower stated: improper The controversial investments would have been because, only they speculative, because but they were also while very appreciated value, substantially well in some case such, producing would not have been income but rather capital. would have to increase amounted *5 marks. and German as francs currencies such Swiss foreign francs and German I own Swiss His was “... justification no And I have broken today, years. marks and have them. by owning breaking that I’m no laws laws and see And I do not of them. many in my money And I’ve doubled (Em- or investment.” poor risky count it as a investment added). phasis “it is probably out that correctly pointed

The court below deterring impro- in most influence exerted the true bank this assessment accepts and the dissent prieties” de- respect Raymond’s regard, this with situation.3 would range far of what go beyond sires for the trust to investments, his trust considered reasonable and be in brief: appeal appellate counsel on states much if has not learned as Raymond even Finally, he is nevertheless might hoped, about trust law be is clear that the one of three co-trustees. While it only overriding Ray- in Bank exerted the most control record is no evidence mond’s there suggestions, co- remaining two bully was able to added). (Emphasis alleged appellants.4 trustees as continuation past performance, Raymond’s Based on interest of trustee adverse to the best likely the role will in unorthodox of the trust. His desire to involve the trust based on his speculative undoubtedly and investments is almost unlimited that the trustees were vested with belief power under the deed of trust to do what absolute opinion states: 3. The court below its also of action has White’s insistence on certain courses appropriate deviated from what this Court would consider to be of action the law and the instrument of trust. Clear- courses ly, under corporate fiduciary resisting was correct in force- silver, suggestions gold, pennies should invest in ful that the trust increases, calls, puts underground value be stored until their canned foods and commodities. Raymond also had conflicts with his 4. The record indicates that brother-in-law, Wingate, petitioned Mr. who individual co-trustee and together Bank. withdraw as co-trustee with the Juniata hearing except at the None of the individual co-trustees testified Raymond moving clearly reflects that he was the force and the record the conflict with the bank. wanted One is his property. example stated *6 timberland, belief that the trustees could value the the main trust, figure asset in the at any they wanted whether principal sale or to respect with distribution. He was of opinion dollar, if they even valued land at a although valuation, it a ridiculous might they had the power concerning speculative to do so.5 His beliefs invest- notwithstanding ments continued of his objection co- trustee, Bank, Juniata based on an opinion letter of its The letter opinion part counsel. stated that: “[t]he governing gives instrument in this case the trustees a broad power to invest and reinvest such they investments deem best for the beneficiaries and the trust. Neverthe- less, provision does go so far as to specifically investments, permit speculative especially when considered respect by 5. With to the valuation of the timberland owned the trust Raymond testified as follows: Well, they of course realized that that would be a case in which very nobody it’s hard because would be satisfied that if one of the bought beneficiaries a tract of timber that it would be fair. And way you're going get people agree. there’s no thirteen It was trust, they my discussed there that would write the and it is written, understanding that this trust is so that the trustees have the say, they final and even if sold the tract of timber for what would be dollar, price, price a ridiculous and the most ridiculous would be a legal. that it would still be Q. sir, is, important thing you The did believe it? A. Sure I believed it. Q. you today? Do believe it way, you A. I believe that the trust is written that and until can tell me, explain me where it is written different ... and then I think power saying the trustees have the to decide. I’m not that the going trustees are Q. to sell it for a dollar. you they power But believe have the to do so? they quite power A. I probably believe here and if bit insane, foolish, thing they would do such a would be called today. be in court—the same as I am here Collectively they power have the to sell the timber. At what price you. dollar, you tell you cannot Now want to make it a you thousand, make it a dollar. If you want to make it a hundred want; figure you my judgment do whatever but in the trustees have power price they to sell that timber (Emphasis at the decide. added). provide the stated of the trust which is to purpose ‘regular grandchildren.” income’ for the settlor’s law firm concluded that the proposed investments copper pennies for the trust and lumber would not be they probably investments because would be speculative. deemed example

An self proposed dealing by individual co-trustees, White, Raymond and Nevin is illustrated purchase desire to from for the lumber Nevin agree trust. The bank would not to this as it it believed dealing respect involved self and a breach of trust. With this transaction testified:

Q. you brought proposition Now to bank? *7 bank; A. more than it to brought agreed We it was on. The trustees all in agreed my on it recollection and the Trust Committee put stop They to it. it, vetoed as vetoed they things dozens and dozens of on this trust.

Q. they you Did tell why they particular— vetoed that Yes, A. the very thing Groninger same as Mr. was

trying explain you.

Q. is that? What A. That it wasn’t lawful. And I’d like to know under laws and

what whose. You’re an attorney, you me; tell I’ll might listen.

Q. explained Was it ever to you that this is a form of

self-dealing and it might illegal on that basis? A. The price was at the market price and was not I illegal

considered and consider it illegal, not and the trust is so If you get written. will the trust out and read—Please read to people here it says what self-dealing. about you get Would those paragraphs read it? and White,

Q. you Mr. can do your reading— own A. right, reading That’s can do I can’t do my own but thinking.6

my own The record reflects that the would two individual trustees gone along Raymond concerning his intention brother, co-trustee, his buy lumber from his desire to and buy gold. Raymond testified:

Q. you saying Are that three of the four would trustees just

vote in favor of and then something the bank do would not it? in exactly right. That’s The three trustees voted bought;

favor lumber and there was no lumber in gold voted favor of the and there was no gold bought.

It incongruous was for the recognize court below to the bank very properly approving acted Raymond’s speculative it was investments most influential “deterring improprieties” and then deny remove as a Raymond resign trustee and allow the bank to reality trustee. The bank was in the only restraining bank, influence on and it his threat to sue the resign, if it triggered did not the bank’s resignation. obtaining conduct was more to directed bank’s acquiescence furthering his demands then Further, interests of the trust. while wanted trust to invest in assets that an very he as individual could *8 in, properly risk, no matter invest what were suitable as trust investments. The court erred in below denying the petition Raymond remove as a trustee.

The aspect second of this that is very troubling case is the order of March approving resignation of Concerning 6. dealing concerning the valuation of the self land and purchase of lumber court below stated: resisting appeared also bank was correct what on to be at suggestion dealing respect least one a occasion that self occur with lumber, just taking contrary as the certain Bank was correct in position concerning placed the valuation that could be on the share any given beneficiary.

Ill Valley aspect Juniata Bank.7 This of the case must be considered in light permitting the court’s Raymond to continue as a trustee knowing full well that the corporate was the reason fiduciary only did not invest in assets which were unsuitable for a trust. The primary reason for resignation the bank’s was threat to if bring resign. suit it did not opinion our the court below abused its discretion in permitting the bank to resign in these circumstances. The presence bank’s as a trustee is clearly more beneficial to the trust than Raymond’s continu- settlor, ing White, as a trustee. The C.A. had presi- been dent of the Juniata Bank and during his lifetime was insistent that the bank continue corporate fiduciary. A meeting was held in May, between White and his brother Nevin White and the bank’s respon- officers sible for the administration of the Groninger, trust. Mr. director of the and bank member of the committee, present at the meeting and told Raymond and Nevin about their father’s wishes. Mr. Groninger testified as follows:

Q. And what was it you told them at time? A. Their father had come to me individually other —and directors, bank but he talked to us individually

made us commit to him that we would never re- sign, stay in and represent the grandchildren in the to the best the bank’s ability under future the laws and I banking, made him pledge some years ago.

Q. When you say father, their are you referring to C.A.

White? White,

A. yes. C.A. (Emphasis added).

Mr. Groninger further testified:

Q. You mentioned that Mr. White was on the board— A. president He was at the time. appears

7. ruling There to have been no formal concerning entered Roy Wingate Apparently, it was in effect opinion denied as in the in the court below the court refers to the remaining “three co-trustees.”

Q. Of the Juniata Bank? Right. A. When the bank had actually considered re-

signing some years back. Q. you Were on the board of the bank at that time? IA. was on the board of the at bank time. And he

talked to individual members of the bank to not vote getting favor of rid of his trust. Q. explain Did he to you why he did not want the bank resign at that time? No, anymore than he bank; had a lot of faith in the

he president of the bank— great settlor had confidence in corporate fiduci- ary and his confidence placed was well until the bank as a resigned result of harassment and threats to sue. The court in interpreting below erred the deed of expressly allowing trust as any trustee to The deed provided:

The Trustees shall the power appoint have their Successor Trustees. If any of the Trustees named herein die, shall resign, become incapacitated, or refuse to act hereunder, further as Trustee having appointed without Trustee, Successor the other Trustees named herein may, to, shall required but not be appoint a Successor Trus- tee. ..”

Juniata Valley resign Bank could not solely based on the trust, terms of the agreement as the trust give did not trustee right the absolute to resign. The court below erroneously decided that the deed of gave the bank the right resign. Therefore, it did not really any exercise discretion in permitting resignation since it felt resig- nation was allowed terms of the deed of trust. Discretion cannot be exercised by a court unless it recog- nizes that it has discretion to act in a particular situation. Clark, See Louis v. Pa.Super. 547, (1974). 323 A.2d 298 The court below indicated that might beneficiaries well cause for concern that the corporate fiduciary, the one trustee personal with no interest business, the lumber *10 picture, to be of going was out the but felt that this was not enough deny petition resign. reason to the bank’s to This ip is conclusion unwarranted of especially view the denial to remove Raymond White as trustee. Bank, appellee, The court below and relied Valley Juniata Estate, (1912) on Nixon’s 235 Pa. to support 83 687 the contention that Valley Juniata Bank was al- properly Estate, lowed to supra, Nixon’s an individual permitted trustee was to in- resign objections over an beneficiary. Supreme come The Court stated at Pa. 83 A. 688: general

The rule is that a may trustee relieve himself from arising the liabilities from a trust by relation sub- mitting the to administration the trust the jurisdiction of the court. In our right State the of a trustee to be is discharged recognized by provide statutes which procedure. Appellant method of complied has with the requirements statutory everything and has done that the law requires to be done antecedently asking be, discharge. are, There may and no there doubt cases in which a refusing court would be in justified dis- charge, as where there has not been an or accounting, benefits, on where trustee account of accruing himself had undertaken do things, certain or other reasons, sufficient the time had arrived the termi- for. nation of the trust relation. nothing But we see of this in character the present case.

There nothing is in this record to indicate that the remaining trustees not fully are competent manage estate, or the trust are to do unwilling so. The trust will estate be as in their hands it was safe preceded hands those who them in manage- its ment. The argument que that the cestuis trustent will lose some advantage the trustee be discharged is if added). (Emphasis without merit. Bank,

Appellee, Juniata also Ortlip relies on Trust, 24 1973) Fid.Rep. (Montgomery County in which Orphans’ permitted Court resignation eighty- an year five old failing health, trustee who appoint was in the matter controlling Neither case is

ed trustees. new not involved Nix corporate fiduciary A was before us. Trust, Ortlip Estate or on’s there importance, and of more would be to indicate that the beneficiaries nothing of the trustee. discharge harmed Probate, provides Code Estates and Fiduciaries final account and distribution after the confirmation discharged by may a trustee appropriate parties, to the § 3184, 20 20 Pa.C.S.A. liability. from further the court § 7121(3). (Second) of Trusts The Restatement Pa.C.S.A. resign and a trustee the situation which deals with 106: in Section provides

§ Resignation of Trustee. resign trust cannot accepted has the

A trustee who except, court; or of the

(a) permission with trust; or the terms (b) in accordance with beneficiaries, if they have (c) the consent of all the consent. give to such capacity the resign entitled to on trustee was not corporate The Trusts, (Second) of Section the Restatement the basis of properly if the court 106(b) (c) must determine or and we (c) to Comment Section to granted permission “It is (Second) part: Trusts states of of the Restatement to allow a trustee of the court whether the discretion within resign to allowed a trustee will be resign. Ordinarily to if to detrimental the unduly will not be resignation such trust, particularly the administration if it would be of him to act as a compel to to the trustee unduly burdensome Scott, II, A. W. added). As stated (Emphasis trustee.” § 1967) “It (3rd Edition, page 838: 106.1 The of Trusts Law or not to the court whether discretion of is within the sound it would be where resign to ... [b]ut permit [the Trustee] trust, the the to the administration disadvantageous of to permission the trustee court resign(Em refuse Valley Bank as added). resignation of Juniata phasis trust. The than detrimental to this other trustee cannot be to continue as to the settlor made a commitment bank standing preclude trustee. While its this alone would addition, In it is a the resignation, factor be considered.8 longer reluctance of the serve as trustee no bank to should upon In this Raymond exist of as a trustee. removal case, may it to retain well be disastrous permit Valley as a trustee Bank Raymond Juniata resign.9 manifestly We abused believe the below interest of allowing its discretion this. The best require Valley beneficiaries of this trust that Juniata Bank continue as a trustee White removed as a trustee. appeal

An of was also taken from the order the court 1981, of March directing below to pay trustees fee Kusic, counsel to Arthur for Esq., attorney $12,759.39. E. and J. White Nevin White amount decision, view our this case aspect of the will be remanded to the court below further consideration of the appropriateness payment princi- of counsel fee from amount, the trust in pal any and to the proper determine amount, if any, to be awarded. granting

Order Juniata Bank to reversed, resign denying petition and order Ray- remove mond E. White as an individual trustee The order reversed. 9, of March directing payment of counsel fee is reversed and the matter remanded for determination *12 fee, amount of if paid. counsel any, be

MONTEMURO,J., dissenting opinion. files corporate fiduciary greater believe 8. We that a must show cause for resignation Corporate represent that an individual. fiduciaries that through departments they greater their trust skill than individu- managing impartiality als in financial matters and have an perpetual existence that individuals do not. of Because this are having selected to often act as executor trustee. Once under- and/or continue, duty corporate fiduciary this a taken should unless the court resignation adversely is convinced that its will not affect the benefici- corporate and the fiduciary aries circumstances are such the that justifies the termination of its duties. should be noted except 9. It has no this interest in trust principal beneficiary He as trustee. is not an income or nor is he a contingent or vested remainderman. 116

MONTEMURO, Judge, dissenting: I must respectfully dissent. 1) questions: are here two whether

We confronted co-trustee, as a Raymond White should have been removed and; 2) resign as co- appellee bank’s whether holds that granted. majority trustee should have been above, court, permitting trial of the abused its the both us, the basis of the record discretion. On before review, I have conclud- keeping scope ever mindful our of the affirmed. ed that the decision court below should be above, addressing Before either of the stated issues reiterate, matter, scope preliminary a our should first reviewing reversing are limited to review. As a we if or of law on the there abuse of discretion error only Croessant, In Re: 188, court. 482 Pa. 393 part the trial Estate, 187, (1978); 443 340 16 A.2d A.2d Pa. Crawford’s (1940). 521 § 3182(5) 20 removal of provides

Title for the Pa.C.S.A. likely be trustee “when interests of estate are Supreme his continuance office.” Our jeopardized by following statutory has added the refinements to the Court long held that removal scheme. It has been need fiduciary proof a drastic action and that of the is Croessant, supra; be clear. Estate of must remedy Estate, 435 Corr DiMarco 428, (1969); 257 A.2d Pa. Estate, 591, (1948). is especially 358 Pa. 58 A.2d 347 This trustee has personally appointed so where the been Croessant, supra; of Nassar, settlor. Estate Estate (1976). Pa. A.2d 773 It has held that where been settlor, power enjoyed the trustee confidence the estate only to remove him should exercised when is endangered protect and intervention is necessary Trust, Holmes’ 392 Pa. 139 A.2d 548 property. (1958).

Appellants argue White’s con- vigorously presence as a co-trustee severely jeopardizes tinued *13 direct support argument they trust assets. of their

117 to testimony court of instances where White has suggested producing investments non-income property, urged and appellants what would characterize as self-deal- ing in the trust assets. These instances are thoroughly opinion. discussed in majority question There is no suggestions however fact that none of these has been been, If implemented. conclusion, had my proba- court, bly the conclusion of the trial would have been influenced fact. I greatly accept this the trial court’s assessment that "... it probably is true the exerted bank in deterring (R. 62a). most influence improprieties ...” Nevertheless, require very would not drastic remedy 1) of removal for suggestions mere are when: there two capable other co-trustees resisting preventing any and; 2) court, improprieties, the trial opportu- which had an nity personally hear the testimony Raymond White that, and observe his demeanor specifically “Indeed, found Raymond has indicated that he now understands neces- sity of first securing approval for the policies he 62a) formerly (R. advocated.”

I now turn to what I issue, believe is the more difficult whether the appellee permitted resign bank should be co-trustee. While there governing proce- are statutes § 7121(3), dure for resignation, e.g. Pa.C.S.A. Pa.C. § 3184, S.A. there is none specifically which dictates circum- resignation may permitted. stances which a or trial court’s decision this in large on issue abased (Second) measure on the Specifical- Restatement of Trusts. ly, section 106 states that:

§ A106 who accepted resign trustee has the trust cannot except,

(a) permission court; with or (b) in trust; accordance with the terms of the or (c) beneficiaries, the consent of all the if they give capacity such consent. § (Second) (1959). Restatement of Trust Contrary to the majority’s assertion that “the court below erroneously decided that the deed of trust gave the bank *14 any exercise Therefore, really it did not right

the to ”, court below resignation ... the permitting discretion believe, b, a and we subsection actually decided that “both (R. 62a). with agree We to instant situation.” apply the do of trust not that the terms the majority’s the assessment (b). resign, per to as subsection any trustee expressly allow (a) the of provision, such a subsection In the absence of the permission the of indicates that restatement becomes, question then on The court must be obtained. permission? grant court or withhold this what basis does a law, least at a dearth of case at Unfortunately, there is Although I level, on this question. appellate the majority, to the same authorities the many of looked opposite the result. suggesting these as interpret would of by parties case cited all the The one which was appellate issue, by relied the trial heavily on and which was on this Estate, is the case Nixon’s 83 A. 687 of 235 Pa. court case, the Nixon one of three (1912). appellant the filing under the testator’s will. After appointed co-trustees discharge. he for a accounting applied a final to court reversed application refused such but was The lower court Specifically, on the court stated: appeal. may a rule is that trustee relieve general

The himself by a trust relation arising the liabilities from from juris- to administration the trust submitting the of In our State the a trustee right diction the court. discharged recognized provide be is statutes which procedure. the method Appellant complied has requirements everything and has done statutory antecedently asking to be done to the requires the law be, are, and no doubt there cases discharge. There a justified refusing would be dis- in which accounting, an charge, as where there has been or accruing the trustee on account benefits where or for things, himself had undertaken do certain other reasons, time had termi- not arrived sufficient the trust relation. nation of nothing But see we this record to indicate remaining are not competent trustees fully manage estate, trust or unwilling are to do so. The estate will as safe in be their hands as it was in the preceded hands those who them in management. its argument that the que cestui trust will lose some advantage if the trustee discharged is without merit. added). (Emphasis

Nixon, supra 235 Pa. at at 688. has say

Scott this to on resignation of a trustee: *15 It is within the sound of discretion the court whether or permit not to him to resign. Where the [the trustee] good trustee has a reason wishing resign, to he will ordinarily permitted be to resign ...” though Even the trustee has no special reason for resigning, other than his desire to be relieved offurther responsibility in administering trust, the court mil usually give permission him But where it resign. be disadvantageous to the administration of the trust, court refuse trustee permission to added). (Emphasis § Scott, II A.W. (3rd The Law 106.1 1967) Trusts ed. p. of 838.

inMuch spirit same is the following from Handbook the Law Trusts. of of

Naturally, a accepted trustee who has a trust but finds administration it has become burdensome or the interest of the beneficiaries should be able to rid duties____ himself of the trust The predominant consid- eration is the welfare of the beneficiaries.

A reluctant trustee is not desirable. § G.G. Bogert, Trusts, Handbook (1973) Law 31 p. 103.

Appellants argue that the welfare of the beneficiaries requires the court to refuse appellee resignation. bank’s Their arguments on this issue are not lacking appeal, I might have been persuaded them by acting were as a here. As was my is not function This however

factfinder. & E.I. duPont de Numours our court stated explicitly Studios, Inc., Berm Co. v. 236 A.2d 555 Pa.Super. (1967): judge record of a trial before a review of the

Appellate is to a determination whether limited jury without supported by are of fact of the court below findings court whether or not the lower evidence and competent error law. committed Berm, supra, 354, 236 v. Pa.Superior

E.I. duPont atCt. A.2d at 556. standard, although is it clear that of the above view appealing, they are misdirected. arguments are

appellants’ by the below. be demonstrated discussion This will specifically trial issue the is relevant this As that: found trustee White’s pointed out that correctly

It is from certain courses of action has deviated insistence on courses appropriate this would consider Court what trust. the instrument under the law and of action resisting was correct Clearly, corporate fiduciary should suggestions forceful *16 underground silver, pennies in to be stored gold, invest calls, increases, canned foods puts and until their value resisting in also The bank was correct and commodities. suggestion a on at least one occasion appeared be what lumber, just to certain self-dealing respect occur with contrary taking position in the Bank was correct as on the share placed the valuation that could be concerning given beneficiary. any improper been would have The controversial investments because, also but only they speculative, because were not in case appreciated some very may well they while value, not income in would have been substantially such, amounted rather would have but producing capital. in increase still cannot

However, could not act alone and true the exerted probably it is bank alone. While act most influence in deterring improprieties there is no why reason the remaining individual trustees cannot the future cause investment policies to remain within proper Indeed, Raymond boundaries. has indicated that he understands now necessity securing first Court policies for approval he formerly advocated. Certainly, there can be no excuse for the remaining trustees conduct the investment policies of the trust inappropriate- For ly. example, should a situation arise where the trustees deem some degree of self-dealing to be beneficial trust, to the there can be no excuse for failing bring the plan before the Court for its prior review to imple- (R. it. menting 61a-62a)

Appellants specific make five assertions or subarguments in regard to this issue. Each will be set forth and disposed of briefly.

Appellants first assert gold, silver, investments pennies, calls, puts currencies, and foreign foods, canned commodities and are lumber not investments for the C.A. and Flo B. White Trust. Secondly, appellants assert the trustees of the C.A. White Flo B. White Trust determine arbitrarily valuation of shares for distri- bution or engage self-dealing. Certainly legal- these are § 7302 et seq ly correct statements. See 20 Pa.C.S.A. (R. 8a-17a). Trust Agreement addition, In it cannot seri- ously disputed that co-trustee Raymond White has sug- gested these measures past. There is no evidence however that such improprieties have in fact occurred. the absence of any requiring case law the suggestion of improprieties part on the of one co-trustee is a circum- stance in which the court should refuse resignation on the part co-trustee, another there is no misapplication of law here. so,

This being resolution of this issue then becomes a question third, of credibility. Appellants fourth and fifth *17 assertions are that Raymond White would sug- continue to gest such improprieties, the remaining individual co- trustee would not resist Raymond White’s improper sugges-

tions, and treat White would beneficiar- unfairly. competent ies There is evidence to the contrary, (See as careful of the record has indicated. examination 186a, 279a) R. R The trial court had the e.g. opportunity parties. and examine each of the As the personally observe indicate, the trial portions opinion included court’s it testimony favoring appellee’s position decided that greater weight, entitled to and therefore ruled that endangered was not such that it welfare beneficiaries appellee should refuse bank’s We are in a as an position appellate re-determine questions credibility. reasons, I hold appel-

For above stated would lants have not demonstrated an abuse of discretion as the trial court’s justify would a reversal decision. affirm. would 467 A.2d 1159 Pennsylvania COMMONWEALTH of v. OWENS, Appellant. R.

Otis Superior Pennsylvania. Court of May

Submitted 1983. Filed Nov. 1983.

Case Details

Case Name: In Re White
Court Name: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Date Published: Nov 4, 1983
Citation: 467 A.2d 1148
Docket Number: 103 and 104
Court Abbreviation: Pa.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.