98 F. 404 | N.D.N.Y. | 1899
The issues presented have been carefully examined by the referee. His report will be found in 2 Hat. Bankr. H. Ho. 1, p. 11. The bankrupt is charged with having made a false oath in verifying his schedules with certain property, which, it is alleged, he owned in Iowa, omitted. The referee finds that two years prior to the filing of the petition herein the bankrupt transferred this property to a creditor to whom it was pledged as security for a debt of equal or greater amount and that at the time the schedules were verified the bankrupt had no interest therein. This finding is sustained by the proof. The main accusation against the bankrupt is based upon the alleged fact that he was guilty of a fraudulent disposition of his property with intent to prefer creditors in the year 1896, two years before the passage of the bankruptcy act. It is also argued that in swearing to schedules with the property so transferred omitted he was guilty of taking a false oath. A bank-
In Re Moore, Fed. Cas. No. 9,751, the court said:
“It must be remembered that this transaction took place in 1863, prior to the passage of the bankrupt act, and although I am well satisfied that the bankrupt at the time of his giving this mortgage was well aware of'his insolvency and intended to secure and prefer the debt to Storer, and place his estate beyond the reach of his creditors, acts which are now prohibited by the bankrupt act and which would deprive him of his discharge, if committed subsequently to the passage of this act, yet it is quite clear that the bankrupt law cannot be made to have a retroactive effect and punish a party by refusing him a discharge for acts committed by him prior to the passage of the law. A fraudulent preference or transfer of the debtor’s property, by the act, is made an offense for which the punishment proscribed by the act, is a failure to obtain his discharge. To thus punish a parly the offense for which the punishment is invoked must have been committed since the passage of and in violation of the law then in force. * ⅞ ⅜ Neither a fraudulent conveyance made, nor a. fraudulent preference given before the passage of the bankrupt act, is good ground upon which to oppose a discharge; and a specification alleging such a conveyance or preference should bo stricken out on moüon.”
In addition to the authorities cited by the referee a number of cases bearing upon this question will be found in Re Lieber, reported in the same volume of the Bankruptcy News as the case at bar, at page 21. The subject is so fully treated in the report of the referee that further discussion is unnecessary. The report is confirmed and the discharge is granted.