72 S.E. 1049 | N.C. | 1911
This proceeding was commenced by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by S. S. Watson, in behalf of his minor son, Richard Watson, restrained in the Stonewall Jackson Manual Training and Industrial School since 27 August, 1909, by virtue of a conviction on that date in the recorder's court of the city of Charlotte for the crime of vagrancy, said petition being also made by S. S. Watson on his own behalf to regain he custody and care of his son. The petition was addressed to Mr. Justice Walker, under date of 27 July, 1911.
It was not denied that, at the time of the arrest and trial of Richard Watson for vagrancy, his father, the petitioner, was in jail and was then an unfit person to have the custody of his child. From refusal (349) to discharge, petitioner and Richard Watson appealed. The principal questions considered in the able and carefully prepared brief of counsel for the petitioner are that the detention of Richard Watson is illegal, for that:
The act establishing the Stonewall Jackson Training School is unconstitutional, because (1) it provides for imprisonment as a punishment for crime, and in excess of that fixed by statute for vagrancy, and for such a length of time that it is cruel or unusual; (2) under it he is deprived of his liberty without due process of law; (3) that his detention, under the statute, amounts to involuntary servitude.
The duty is imposed on the courts of passing on the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature when the question is presented, and this duty arises from the obligation to declare what the law is.
The courts recognize the principles declared in the Constitution, that it is "ordained and established" by the people of the State, and "that all political power is vested in and derived from the people," and when a statute, which is the work of legislators, who are agents of the people, is contrary to its provisions, they sustain the will of the people as expressed in the Constitution, and not the will of their agents.
Respectful regard, however, for a coordinate department of the Government demands that the duty shall not be lightly undertaken, and that in its performance all reasonable doubts shall be resolved in favor of the legality of legislation.
The principle is so declared by Chief Justice Clark in Sutton v.Phillips,
Applying these rules of construction, can it be said that the act is unconstitutional?
In determining, this question, we must consider the purpose for which the act was passed, and the grounds upon which the State can rightfully exercise the power to detain minor children.
It is not an unlimited and arbitrary power, and is justified only upon the idea that the child is without parental care, and that his environment is such that he may reach manhood without restraint or training and under corrupting influences, unless the State, as parens patriae, performs the duty which devolves primarily on the parent.
Outside of the humanitarian idea, which properly has its influence on courts and legislatures, and considered solely from the materialistic view, each citizen is interested in having men and women honest and law-abiding, because this conduces to the safety of his person and property; and a system which does no more than measure the days and years, which must be paid by him who has violated law, "to satisfy justice," is a survival of the days when the only object of punishment was vengeance.
Under this system, society receives no protection, except as the example deters others from the commission of crime; no hope is held out to the convict, and he is imprisoned with other criminals with the knowledge that, in all probability, at the end of his term he will be turned loose upon society, an expert in crime.
It has always been a perplexing question how far society has the right to demand a day or an hour of his life as an example, when he has been permitted to live amid surroundings that nourish and stimulate the criminal tendency.
The purpose of the act before us is to meet, in some measure, the duty imposed upon society, for its own protection and for the good of the child.
When we turn to the Constitution, we find that the establishment of a reformatory is not only not prohibited, but that it is expressly authorized by Article XI, sec. 4, which says: "The General Assembly may provide for the erection of houses of correction (351) *276
where vagrants and persons guilty of misdemeanors shall be restrained and usefully employed," and a house of correction, "as its name indicates, is designed for the reformation of youthful criminals, those who have not yet become hardened in crime." Ex parte Moore,
If, then, the Legislature has the power to establish a reformatory, has it rightfully exercised this power, or has it, under the guise of reformation, made it possible to imprison as a punishment for crime?
If the latter construction is adopted, the restraint of the son of the petitioner is illegal, because the punishment for vagrancy, the charge made against the son, cannot exceed imprisonment for thirty days, under the statute now in force, and the act under which a child might be held five years for the offense would be violative of section 14 of the Bill of Rights, which prohibits "cruel or unusual punishment."
The question as to the extent to which a child's constitutional rights are impaired by a restraint upon its freedom has arisen many times with reference to statutes authorizing the commitment of dependent, incorrigible, or delinquent children to the custody of some institution, and the decisions appear to warrant the statement, as a general rule, that, where the investigation is into the status and needs of the child, and the institution to which he or she is committed is not of a penal character, such investigation is not one to which the constitutional guaranty of a right to trial by jury extends, nor does the restraint put upon the child amount to a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of the Declaration of Rights, nor is it a punishment for crime.
In McLean County v. Humphreys,
And in Jarrad v. State,
In Ex parte Ah Peen,
In Reynolds v. Howe,
In Ex parte Liddell,
In Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. (Pa.), 11, which was approved in Roth v.House of Refuge,
In some of the statutes on this subject provision is made for the detention of the child, when the parent is unworthy, although no charge of crime is preferred, while in others the basis of the order of commitment is a verdict of guilty, and in all the principle on which the authority for legislative interference rests in that the child may be saved and that society may be protected.
It is also usual to require notice to issue to the parent, and to give him an opportunity to be heard; and when this is not done, the parent may have the legality of the detention of the child inquired into, upon a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Upon the hearing of such petition, he will be required to show that he has applied to the authorities in charge of his child for his release; that he was a fit and proper person to have care of the child at the time of his commitment, and is still such. When it is remembered that if he was an unworthy parent when his child was taken charge of by the State, he had abdicated his parental authority, it is not unreasonable to say to him that the interest of the child and society have become paramount, and that these must be considered in passing upon his application for the custody of the child.
Let us, then, consider the terms of the statute.
The counsel for the petitioner contends that because only persons under the age of 16, who have been convicted of a criminal offense, can be admitted to the training school, and that the judicial officer is required to sentence such person, are conclusive evidences that the institution is penal and the object punishment.
The word "convicted" is sometimes used to embrace the judgment upon a verdict of guilty, but usually it refers to the verdict itself, and it is in this sense it is used in the statute. Bugbee v. Boyce,
"Sentence" in its ordinary acceptation refers to a judgment of imprisonment, but it means more than this, and describes any judgment of a criminal court. Allen v. Delaware,
If, therefore, these words stood alone, the contention of the petitioner could be sustained, but imprisonment or a punishment for crime is not necessarily inferred from their use, and when considered in connection *280 with other parts of the statute, it is a reasonable construction that conviction is merely an evidence that the child needs the care and nurture of the State, and that the sentence is an order of detention.
The act (chapter 116a, Pell's Revisal) is entitled "Stonewall Jackson Manual Training and Industrial School," and it is "for the training and moral development of the criminally delinquent children of the State"; the superintendent is "intrusted with the authority for correcting and punishing any inmate thereof to the same extent as a parent may, under the law, impose upon his own child"; the judicial officer is not authorized to commit a child, under 16, because he has been convicted, but only in the event that, after conviction, he "shall be of the opinion that it would be best for such person, and the community in which such person may be convicted, that such person should be so sentenced"; and it is made the duty of the officers in charge of the school to see that the children committed to it are instructed "in such rudimentary branches of useful knowledge as may be suited to their various ages and capacities"; to teach them useful trades and give them manual training, and also to teach "the precepts of the Holy Bible, good moral conduct, how to work, and to be industrious."
These are the obligations of the benign Christian parent, who does not punish or restrain the child except for its good.
We conclude, therefore, that when the act is considered as a whole, detention under its provisions is not imprisonment as a punishment for crime, and that it is constitutional.
If constitutional, the order of detention was authorized, and the courts would not discharge the child because of irregularities in the order or in the commitment.
"The writ of habeas corpus is not designed to fulfill the functions of an appeal or a writ of error. It is not intended to bring into review mere errors or irregularities, whether relating to substantive (357) rights or to the law of procedure, committed by a court having jurisdiction over person and subject-matter." 21 Cyc., 285.
In S. v. Armistead,
This clearly recognizes the principle that if one is restrained of his liberty under a judgment authorizing his detention, that he will not be *281 discharged upon a petition for a writ of habeas corpus because the commitment or mittimus is irregular.
The age of the child was a material inquiry upon the hearing, and it was proper for the court to hear evidence upon it.
It is advisable for notice to be given to the parent before an order of detention is made, when this can be done, and for the order to include a finding as to notice and of the age of the child, and that it is made after investigation and because it is for the best interests of the child and of the community in which he is convicted.
We find no error, and the judgment of Mr. Justice Walker is
Affirmed.
(358)