4 N.Y.S. 761 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1889
As to the personal property specifically bequeathed to the widow, Susan Wagner, with remainder to Norman L., it is plain that the executrix and executors had nothing to do but to deliver it to the life-tenant. The remainder-man, Norman L., was entitled to have from her an inventory. Perhaps in a proper case he might have security from her. But the duty of the executrix and executors of William Wagner was performed when they delivered the property to the widow. The paper signed by the widow and Norman L. is proof, until contradicted, that that specific legacy was properly delivered. If Norman L. or his widow, the petitioner, seeks to obtain that property, they must proceed against the executors of Susan Wagner’s will. As to the rest of the property, the question, briefly stated, is this: When the executors of a will have fully accounted and settled with all the legatees, and have paid them their respective shares, and have been discharged by such legatees out of court, can the administratrix of one of those legatees, without proof of any fraud, compel the tiling of an inventory? There certainly seems to be no reason, upon principle, why the parties in interest should not, without any proceeding in court, examine an executor’s inventory and account, and settle the same, and give him a full discharge. The provisions for filing an inventory, and for having accounts, are for the benefit of the persons interested, not for the satisfaction of the public or of the assessors; and, if such persons prefer to settle their affairs privately, such settlement should have the same conclusive effect as a similar settlement in any other matter. That view is especially strong in the present case, because the petitioner is the representative of one of the executors who (it is to be presumed) had and knew of the inventory of property, and the accounts of the executors, and who distributed to himself and the other legatees his and their respective shares, according to the instrument of March 7, 1885. There is no doubt that, in some court, relief 8an be had by the petitioner against that instrument if it was obtained by fraud. But the question here is whether, notwithstanding the settlement, of which, at present, that instrument is evidence, she has a right to compel the filing of an inventory.
The petitioner cites several cases which we must examine. Thomson v. Thomson, 1 Bradf. Sur. 24. In this case it turned out on examination that the inventory had been filed. Therefore there could be no decision as to the right to compel its filing. Burwell v. Shaw, 2 Bradf. Sur. 322, was not a case in regard to an inventory, but in regard to granting letters. Creamer v. Waller, 2 Dem. Sur. 351, was the case of a creditor whose debt was disputed.
It is worth nothing here that the surrogate in his opinion says that, after an accounting is had, should the petitioner proceed to ask a decree against the executor in respect to any portion of the funds of the estate, it may then be necessary to determine the validity of the release and its effect. How, as the filing of an inventory and the having an accounting are of no use unless the petitioner can have a decree for some funds, and as the surrogate cannot try the validity of the release, it would seem that this proceeding must be of no avail. That is, suppose an inventory be filed and an accounting had, and thereupon it should appear that the value of the estate on the 7th of March, 1885, was more than six times the amount received by Herman L. Wagner, what, then, is to be done? An action must be brought to set aside the release on the ground of fraud. If that action should be unsuccessful, then the filing of an inventory and the accounting would have been useless. But it is-strongly urged that the inventory and the accounting should be had in order to furnish facilities for the plaintiff to prove' that the settlement of March, 1885, was fraudulent. But all this can substantially be obtained in an action to set aside the settlement. The plaintiff can in such an action examine the defendant, and compel the exhibition of all the inventory and accounts which
The petitioner further relies on section 2514, Code Civil Proc. subd. 11. The note informs us that this is intended to settle a question. It is quite as likely to unsettle. If it means that any person who will verify a petition that he is interested, however false the allegation may be, can compel inventories and accountings in an estate in which he has no shadow of interest, it has introduced a most dangerous principle. Such should not be its construction. No person should, without reasonable evidence of interest, interfere in the settlement of an estate; and, where there has been a voluntary settlement and release by all the parties interested, the representative of one of those parties should have such settlement and release set aside in a legal manner before the matter should be reopened. The court should not discourage parties from voluntarily making a full settlement in the case of estates of deceased persons any more than in any other matters of trust. The order of the surrogate should be reversed, with costs. The same also as to the order for an accounting.
Ingalls, J., concurs. Land on, J., dissents.