AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION
This Memorandum Opinion now addresses the appeals of final judgments of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (“the Bankruptcy Court”) related to the United States Bankruptcy Code Chapter 11 reorganization of Appellee W.R. Grace & Co., et al. (“Grace”).
Presently before the Court are two separate but related matters: (1) approval of the aforementioned Settlement Agreement; and (2) confirmation of the Joint Plan. The Court has carefully and fully considered the parties’ objections and has completed an extensive review of nine separate court dockets, approximately 2,000 pages of party briefing, 460 pages of oral argument testimony before this Court, and several thousand pages of the supporting record. Having now reviewed several thousand pages of party briefing and having had the benefit of two oral arguments, the Court finds that the parties’ Objections are denied, and (1) the Settlement Agreement between Grace and the CNA Companies is approved; and (2) the Joint Plan is confirmed in its entirety.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellee Grace is an expansive corporation engaged in the manufacture of chemicals and construction materials. Grace operates in both the domestic and global markets, and has diversified and extensive business activities. One component of its business involves the physical extraction of natural resources from the earth. Grace also refines these natural resources, and converts them through a process known as “expansion” into manufactured materials utilized for building construction and insulation. Despite its vast size and multifarious business activities, Grace has experienced serious financial difficulty as a result of its involvement in multiple tracks of extensive and expensive protracted litigation over the years, which cumulatively lead to Grace filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2001.
A. The Personal Injury Asbestos Litigation
From 1963 until 1990, Grace owned and operated a mine in Montana. The mine was located seven miles northeast of Libby, a small town situated in a narrow valley enclosed by tall mountains. Miners at the Libby mine extracted vermiculite, a natural mineral composed of shiny flakes that has since been linked to an especially carcinogenic form of asbestos. Following extraction, the vermiculite was processed using a procedure that generated a substantial degree of airborne dust. It was subsequently determined that the milling process used at the Libby mine emitted up to 5,000 pounds of asbestos per day into the atmosphere. The. Libby residents were significantly exposed to asbestos due to the town’s close proximity to the mine and its geographic location in a valley, which had the effect of concentrating vermiculite particles in the atmosphere. As a
Beginning in the 1970s, persons alleging injuries from exposure to asbestos in Libby (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Libby Claimants”) filed suit against Grace. The volume and amount demanded on such claims drastically surged between 1999 and 2000, due to a series of events in the tort system that highlighted Grace as a litigation defendant.
B. The State of Montana Duty to Warn Litigation
The State of Montana (“Montana”) conducted various state inspections over the course of the mine’s operation to monitor the site’s safety and health conditions. The Libby mine failed every state inspection between 1956 and 1974, and state inspectors found that the mine exhibited unsafe and unsanitary conditions. During these failed inspections, Montana allegedly informed Grace of the dangers of asbestos and its connection to pleural disease. A majority of Libby residents and Grace employees, however, remained unaware of the potential danger. As a result, Montana has been named as a defendant in over 180 cases filed in various Montana state courts, alleging that the State undertook affirmative duties when it performed the inspections and failed to warn former Grace employees and Libby residents of the asbestos risks associated with the nearby mine. More than fifty of these lawsuits allege that Montana “aided and abetted” Grace in its operation of the mine.
On or about March 25, 2003, Montana began to file Proofs of Claims against Grace’s bankruptcy estate before the Bankruptcy Court for contribution and indemnification related to the pending state court actions. On December 14, 2004, the Montana Supreme Court held that under state law, Montana had a duty to provide Libby residents with public health-related information, and remanded the case to the state trial court to determine whether Montana had in fact breached that duty.
C. BNSF Railway Company Litigation
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway (“BNSF”) is a railroad company that entered into leases and agreements with Grace over the years related to operation of the Libby mine and shipment of Grace’s asbestos-contaminated products. Specifically, BNSF leased property to Grace that was adjacent to the railroad. On this BNSF property, Grace built a suspension bridge and loading dock, which it used to transport vermiculite from the mine to railroad cars. Once the vermiculite was loaded onto the cars, it was shipped throughout the country on tracks owned by BNSF. Moreover, under the terms of several of the aforementioned leases and agreements, Grace agreed to indemnify BNSF for any asbestos-related personal injury claims that could be asserted against BNSF.
After the harmful effects of the vermiculite were discovered in Libby, personal injury claims were filed against BNSF, claiming that it should be held strictly liable for Grace’s handling of asbestos-contaminated materials on BNSF property, or, in the alternative, that BNSF negligently allowed Grace to handle hazardous materials on its property. BNSF now contends that it has the right to be fully
D. The Property Damage Litigation
Grace has also been involved in numerous property damage class action disputes related to asbestos. This litigation is of two different types: (1) “traditional” property damage claims; and (2) Zonolite Attic Insulation (“ZAI”) property damage claims.
Traditional property damage claimants allege that building and insulation materials manufactured by Grace contained asbestos and were used in the foundational structure of many public and private buildings. Over 4,000 such traditional property damage claims were filed against Grace alleging damages for costs incurred in the removal and replacement of asbestos products from buildings. Over a period of many years, Grace attempted to settle the traditional property damage claims. Approximately 1,136 of the initially filed 4,000 claims were withdrawn or dismissed as improperly filed. Litigation ultimately reduced the remaining amount of claims, and Grace was able to negotiate and settle approximately 407 claims for a total of $147 million.
The second type of asbestos property damage litigation is ZAI property damage claims. The basis of these claims is that Grace manufactured a loose-fill insulation product containing traces of asbestos, ZAI, that was subsequently used in the attics of many private homes. The affected class of plaintiffs claim damages for allegedly reduced property values and costs associated with the removal of ZAI from their homes. The ZAI property damage litigation has proven to be extremely time-consuming and expensive, including a separate “science trial” to determine certain highly-technical scientific claims.
E. The Canadian Class Action Litigation
Grace’s ZAI insulation products were also used in buildings in Canada. There are currently ten class action suits pending in Canada that relate to: (1) the cost of removal of asbestos from homes and buildings, diminutions of property values, and economic loss caused by ZAI products; and (2) personal injuries allegedly caused by exposure to ZAl. Additionally, the Canadian Province of Manitoba has brought suit for healthcare costs incurred or to be incurred in relation to the treatment of class members that were exposed to ZAI products. Both Grace and Her Majesty the Queen in the Right of Canada (hereinafter “the Crown” or “Canada”) have been named as defendants in these class actions. The proposed representative class action plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that the Crown breached its duty to. warn them of the dangers associated with ZAI products and asbestos.
F. Estate Asset and Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation with Former Affiliates
In the 1990s, Grace spun off various of its business activities to two of its affiliates, Sealed Air Corporation and Cryovac, Inc. (“Sealed Air”) and Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc. (“Fresenius”). Both companies were involved in litigation alongside Grace alleging successor liability and fraudulent transfer of estate assets. Specifically, it was alleged that Grace had fraudulently transferred its assets to Sealed Air and Fresenius to the detriment of creditors holding asbestos claims against Grace. The amount of disputed assets totaled billions of dollars. Additionally, both Sealed Air and Fresenius were also named as co-defendants alongside Grace in thousands of ongoing asbestos personal injury cases nationwide, and both corporations sought indemnification from Grace pursuant to their respective contracts.
Grace and its affiliates entered into settlements shortly after Grace filed its bankruptcy petition in 2001. Under the terms of the settlements, Sealed Air and Freseni-us agreed to contribute over $1.1 billion to Grace’s asbestos trusts in exchange for their release from any future liability related to Grace’s asbestos litigation.
G. Garlock Sealing Technologies LLC Litigation
Garlock Sealing Technologies LLC (“Garlock”) is a manufacturer of engineered industrial products. Some products that Garlock previously manufactured contained asbestos. These products were utilized by several large corporations, including Grace.
When the harmful effects of asbestos were discovered, Garlock was named as a defendant alongside Grace in thousands of personal injury lawsuits claiming liability for asbestos-related injuries. Garlock has expended millions of dollars in defense costs and settlement agreements, paid approximately $1.37 billion in indemnity payments, and exhausted over $1 billion in insurance coverage. To date, approximately 100,000 asbestos personal injury claims remain pending against Garlock.
Garlock is seeking contribution and set-off from Grace for many of these claims in which both corporations serve as co-defendants. When Grace filed for bankruptcy in 2001, Garlock’s attempts to recover these funds were stayed pending Grace’s corporate reorganization. Unable to satisfy its massive liabilities, Garlock filed its own Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in 2010.
H.Insurance Coverage Litigation
Grace has also experienced a multitude of other ongoing business and financial litigation, including disputes with its insurers: the CNA Companies, Government Employees Insurance Company (“GEI-CO”), Republic Insurance Company n/k/a Starr Indemnity & Liability Company (“Republic”), AXA Belgium, as Successor to Royale Beige SA (“AXA Belgium”), Maryland Casualty Company (“MCC”), Arro-wood Indemnity Company (“Arrowood”), and Travelers Casualty and Surety Company (“Travelers”). Grace previously claimed that these insurers owed it coverage for its asbestos-related liability under
1. The Grace-CNA Settlement Agreement
Particularly relevant to the present litigation is the Settlement Agreement entered into between Grace and the CNA Companies in 2010. Over the years, the CNA Companies were among the many insurance entities that issued primary and excess liability insurance coverage to Grace. CNA issued primary liability insurance policies to Grace granting coverage for asbestos claims between June 30, 1973 to at least June 30, 1985. These primary policies provided coverage for both “products-completed operations claims” (“products claims”), and “premises operation claims” (“non-products claims”). Products claims were subject to both per-occurrenee and aggregate limits, while non-products claims were only subject to a per-occurrence limit. CNA also issued sixteen excess liability insurance policies at various attachment levels to Grace during this timeframe. These excess policies provided coverage for when the specified limits of the underlying policies were exhausted.
For nearly three decades, both before and after Grace’s bankruptcy petition, Grace and the CNA Companies have been engaged in various disputes regarding CNA’s coverage under its insurance policies related to asbestos liability. Over the course of the years, the two companies entered into several agreements to settle these disputes. Prior to Grace’s 2001 bankruptcy petition, Grace and CNA settled their disputes related to coverage for products claims under the primary policies. The parties had not, however, resolved their differences regarding coverage for non-products claims prior to Grace filing for bankruptcy. As a result of Grace’s bankruptcy declaration, all litigation regarding non-products coverage was stayed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362. During its corporate reorganization, Grace
2. AXA Belgium, GEICO, and Republic Excess General Liability Insurance Policies with Grace
Over the course of several years prior to Grace’s bankruptcy petition, insurance companies AXA Belgium, GEICO, and Republic
I. Bank Lender Pre-Petition Litigation
In 1998 and 1999, Grace entered into two Credit Agreements with a consortium of bank credit facilities (collectively referred to hereinafter as the “Bank Lenders”). Under these Credit Agreements, Grace owed the Bank Lenders an aggregate principal of $500 million, plus interest accruing thereon.
As a result of all these legal disputes and its massive liabilities, Grace’s financial stability as a corporation was seriously impaired. No longer able to satisfy the claims asserted against it, Grace ultimately filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on April 2, 2001. In filing the bankruptcy petition, Grace sought to reorganize its basic corporate structure so that it could better handle its outstanding liabilities, as well as its ongoing and future litigation, while moving forward as a “going concern.”
Shortly after Grace filed its bankruptcy petition, it began to negotiate the basic structure of its reorganization plan. Grace therefore requested that the Bankruptcy Court grant it injunctive relief from its ongoing and future asbestos litigation liabilities while it underwent corporate reorganization. On May 3, 2001, the Bankruptcy Court entered a preliminary injunction barring the commencement of new actions related to Grace’s asbestos liability. In January of 2002, the Bankruptcy Court modified the injunction to include additional parties and claims, and appointed a legal representative for all future asbestos-related personal injury claims to protect the interests of persons who may later assert claims against Grace. The Official Committee of Equity Security Holders (“Equity Committee”) and the Official Committee of Asbestos Personal Injury Claimants (“Asbestos PI Committee”) were also formed at approximately the same time.
The Joint Plan went through several preliminary versions and revisions over the years. Notably, proposed Plans were initially filed in 2004 and 2005, but neither proposed Plan was confirmed. After several years of extensive discovery, complex litigation, and negotiations, the parties filed the present Joint Plan of Reorganization on September 19, 2008. The Plan was thereafter again modified, and its finalized version was filed on February 27, 2009. The final version of the Joint Plan, which is now on appeal before this Court, was confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court on January 31, 2011.
The Joint Plan sets forth detailed procedures for how and when claims are to be submitted, valued, and paid, and includes mechanisms that allow for future claimant recovery. The central tenants of the Joint Plan are two trusts, the Asbestos Personal Injury Trust (hereinafter “PI Trust” or “personal injury trust”) and the Asbestos Property Damage Trust (hereinafter “PD Trust” or “property damage trust”), and corresponding channeling injunctions that enjoin all present and future asbestos-related claims against Grace and its protected third parties. It has been agreed that injunctive relief should extend to all parties that made contributions to the trust.
Under the Joint Plan, claimants are divided into nine classes (one of which, Class 7, is comprised of two subclasses). Each of these nine classes is further delineated as either an “impaired” or “unimpaired” class.
K. Bank Lender Post-Petition Litigation
At the time of Grace’s bankruptcy petition, Grace still owed the Bank Lenders the $500 million principal of its loans, as well as several million dollars in accrued pre-petition interest, an amount which remains in dispute between the parties.
The Bank Lenders are general unsecured creditors of Grace. Under the Joint Plan, the Bank Lenders are classified in Class 9 — the General Unsecured Creditors class — along with all other generally unsecured creditors of Grace. As part of Grace’s reorganization, the United States Trustee created and appointed The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (“the Committee”) to represent the interests and negotiate on behalf of Grace’s general unsecured creditors. Mr. Thomas Maher was appointed as Chairperson of the Committee. Mr. Maher also served as the Bank Lenders’ Administrative Agent.
In 2004, Grace began to focus its reorganization efforts on garnering the full support of its general unsecured creditors and equity holders for the Joint Plan. In Janu
In late 2005, Mr. Maher contacted Grace requesting an amendment to the Letter Agreement based on a national upward trend in short-term interest rates. Following a new round of negotiations, a modified agreement was reached in 2006, and was also memorialized in a Letter Agreement (“the 2006 Letter Agreement”). Under the 2006 Letter Agreement, Grace modified the post-petition interest rate for the Bank Lenders so that the 6.09% rate would convert to a floating Prime Rate of interest on January 1, 2006. The previously-negotiated interest rates for the other general unsecured creditors were unaffected by the 2006 Letter Agreement. It remains in dispute whether the terms of the 2005 and 2006 Letter Agreements were meant to bind the Bank Lenders. The Bank Lenders contend that they do not. Grace, on the other hand, claims that the Bank Lenders were bound by the Agreements, and that it therefore repeatedly and publicly relied upon the Letter Agreements, including adjusting its internal books and records, SEC filings, monthly operating reports submitted to the Bankruptcy Court, and settlements, to reflect the terms of the Letter Agreements.
Throughout 2007 and 2008, Grace focused its reorganization efforts on resolving its asbestos liabilities. This required negotiations with major constituencies
Entitlement to the default interest rate was litigated before the Bankruptcy Court in September of 2008. On May 19, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court issued its decision on the issue, finding that the Bank Lenders had no legal right to the post-petition default rate under the Credit Agreements. See In re W.R. Grace & Co., Bankr.No. 01-1139,
L. The Bankruptcy Court Proceedings
After five hearings and the resolution of numerous objections, the Bankruptcy Court initially approved the Joint Plan on March 9, 2009. The Bankruptcy Court then held a Confirmation Hearing so that all parties could have the opportunity to be heard and raise any additional objections. Forty-three objections were filed by thirty-nine parties at this time. After a sixteen-day hearing and the review of over I,100 pages of objections, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order confirming the Joint Plan on January 31, 2011. In issuing its confirmation order and accompanying memorandum, the Bankruptcy Court resolved a substantial majority of the original forty-three objections to the Joint Plan. Presently before the Court are the remaining unresolved objections to the Joint Plan.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Standard of Review Regarding Approval of the Settlement Agreement
Bankruptcy Rule 8013 provides that a district court “may affirm, modify, or reverse a bankruptcy judge’s judgment, order, or decree or remand with instructions for further proceedings.” Fed. R. Bankr.P. 8013. “An abuse of discretion standard applies where the Bankruptcy Court has exercised discretion in making its determination, such as in approving a proposed settlement.” In re Hudson’s Coffee, Inc., No. Civ. A. 08-cv-5133, 2009
The Bankruptcy Court’s order approving the Settlement Agreement between Grace and the CNA Companies constitutes a final order, and thus will be reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. All parties to the Settlement Agreement and those objecting to its entry agree that this is the applicable standard of review here. Accordingly, this Court will review the Bankruptcy Court’s findings and determine whether it abused its discretion based on “a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to fact.” Id. The Court will examine the Bankruptcy Court’s findings of fact for clear error, and its conclusions of law de novo.
B. Standard of Review Regarding Confirmation of the Joint Plan
The parties dispute the proper standard of review to be applied by this Court in reviewing the Bankruptcy Court’s confirmation of the Joint Plan. Grace contends that this Court should apply the clear error test to the Bankruptcy Court’s findings of fact, but should review its conclusions of law de novo. Four of the twelve Appellants disagree, claiming that the proper standard of review is de novo review of both the Bankruptcy Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law because entry of a channeling injunction is a non-core matter under 28 U.S.C. § 157.
Section 157 of the United States Code provides that “[bjankruptcy judges may hear and determine ... all core proceedings arising under title 11[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). The Third Circuit has held that “[i]n core matters, the District Court reviews the Bankruptcy Court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.” In re Anes,
In line with this Third Circuit precedent, the Court finds that appellate analysis of
III. THE GRACE AND CNA COMPANIES’ SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
The Court first considers the objections filed in response to the Bankruptcy Court’s approval of the Settlement Agreement reached between Grace and the CNA Companies. The Court considers this matter first because certain provisions of the Joint Plan rely on terms and conditions reached in the aforementioned Settlement Agreement. Thus, confirmation of the Joint Plan cannot be accomplished absent a full and accurate consideration of the Settlement Agreement.
As previously mentioned, Grace and the CNA Companies entered into a Settlement Agreement in November 2010.
After extensive briefing and oral argument, the Bankruptcy Court approved the Settlement Agreement on January 22, 2011. In entering its Approval Order and corresponding findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Bankruptcy Court found that the Settlement fully satisfied the requirements of both Third Circuit precedent and relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Nevertheless, Appellants BNSF and the Libby Claimants object to the Settlement Agreement. Specifically, both Appellants claim that they are entitled to the proceeds of Grace’s insurance policies with CNA, and that they therefore have additional rights that are infringed upon by entry of the Settlement Agreement.
A. Application of the Martin Factors
Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure provides that, after appropriate notice and a hearing, the court may approve a compromise or settlement. See Fed. R. Bankr.P. 9019(a).
(1) the probability of success in litigation; (2) the likely difficulties in collection; (3) the complexity of the litigation involved, and the expense, inconvenience, and delay necessarily attending it; and (4) the paramount interest of the creditors.
See id. (internal citations omitted).
In applying the four Martin factors to the instant dispute, it is evident to the Court that the Bankruptcy Court properly applied and analyzed the Settlement Agreement under the applicable legal standard, and, more importantly, did not abuse its discretion because “on balance, the settlement benefits the estate.” In re Hudson’s Coffee, Inc., No. Civ. A. 08-cv-5133,
The second Martin factor requires the Court to consider the likely difficulties surrounding the collection of any recovery. Grace is no longer a highly solvent company, but rather has only limited assets available to satisfy all of its outstanding liabilities. If the Settlement Agreement was not in place, the parties would continue to litigate and Grace would need to overcome significant roadblocks to recover any proceeds of the insurance policies. It is uncertain when, if ever, Grace would see the proceeds from this collection. The Settlement Agreement, however, provides for Grace’s guaranteed collection of up to $84 million to fund its PI Trust. Thus, the Court further finds that the second Martin factor is satisfied.
Finally, under the fourth and final Martin factor, the Court must consider the effect that the Settlement would have on the creditors of Grace’s bankruptcy estate. On this particular point, BNSF claims that the Settlement does not treat it fairly, and thus is not in its best interest, because the injunction that would be called for upon approval of the Settlement may enjoin claims against CNA that BNSF could assert. On this point, the Court first notes that the reach of the channeling injunction is an issue that relates to confirmation of the Joint Plan, not approval of the Settlement. Even with this fact aside, however, BNSF’s argument still fails because “[w]hile the objectors’ status as creditors is to be taken into consideration, it is not, by itself, determinative of the fairness of the proposed settlement.” Jasmine,
Based on the above reasoning, it is evident to the Court that the Bankruptcy Court exercised good judgment — far from an abuse of discretion — in its analysis of the Martin factors regarding approval of
B. Fairness of the Settlement Agreement Related to Appellants’ Purported Rights to the Disputed Insurance Policies
Despite the fact that all four Martin factors are satisfied, the Libby Claimants and BNSF maintain that the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion in approving the Settlement Agreement based on their purported rights as “additional insureds” under Grace’s insurance policies.
1. BNSF’s Objections
Over the years, BNSF and Grace entered into several contracts and leases by which Grace agreed to fully indemnify BNSF for any asbestos-related liability it may incur due to exposure to Grace Asbestos.
The Court, however, disagrees with BNSF’s assertion that it is an “additional insured” under Grace’s insurance policies with CNA. The Grace-CNA insurance agreements make no mention of BNSF as a named recipient of insurance proceeds under the policies. BNSF was not a subsidiary or employee of Grace. Nor did it ever own a financial interest in Grace or engage in any type of transaction in which Grace would have owed it some type of legal duty. While BNSF did have contractual indemnification agreements in place with Grace, these contracts make no mention of BNSF as an intended beneficiary of Grace’s insurance coverage. Rather, it appears that Grace’s insurance was merely intended to benefit Grace, not unnamed third parties, in the event it incurred any liabilities for which it would be responsible. Thus, the Court agrees with the Bankruptcy Court’s assessment that BNSF is not an “additional insured” to any of the insurances policies between Grace and CNA.
Moreover, the Court notes that Grace previously purchased entirely separate insurance policies awarding insurance to BNSF under which BNSF was explicitly named as a recipient of insurance proceeds. BNSF has provided no explanation to the Court as to why Grace would provide it with duplicative coverage in its own insurance policies with CNA, or why it would directly name BNSF as a named
2. The Libby Claimants’ Objections
The Libby Claimants allege that under Montana state law they have rights to Grace’s insurance coverage that “vested” at the time of their injuries, and that such “vested rights” cannot be terminated by the Settlement reached between Grace and CNA. For the following reasons, the Court disagrees with this assertion.
“It has long been the rule in th[e] [Third] Circuit that insurance policies are considered part of the property of a bankruptcy estate.” ACandS, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co.,
The Libby Claimants assert that, while the Grace-CNA insurance policies became part of Grace’s estate upon filing for bankruptcy, the proceeds of these policies are not property of the estate, and the Libby Claimants are entitled to collect a portion of these insurance proceeds. This assertion, however, directly contradicts the general rule followed by most jurisdictions, including the Third Circuit, that the proceeds of a debtor’s liability insurance policies are considered property of its bankruptcy estate. See In re Nutraquest, Inc.,
Moreover, the Libby Claimants’ reliance on the holdings of Houston v. Edgeworth,
In the present case, the proceeds of the Grace-CNA insurance policies are payable to Grace, not the Libby Claimants. The Libby Claimants are not listed as named insureds under any of these policies. Moreover, the Libby Claimants were in no way involved in the contract negotiations, purchasing of, or decisions to continue this insurance coverage. All such decisions were solely made between Grace and CNA. Thus, the Libby Claimants’ citation
Alternatively, the Libby Claimants maintain that, regardless of whether the proceeds of the Grace-CNA insurance policies are included in the bankruptcy estate, they have a “vested right” under Montana state law to collect a portion of these proceeds
The Libby Claimants primarily rely on the Montana Supreme Court’s forty-four-year-old decision in McLane v. Farmers,
Meanwhile, McLane had filed suit against Roberts on June 24, 1964 seeking compensation for liability related to the collision. Id. at 117,
The findings in MeLane, however, substantially differ from the present scenario for three primary reasons. First, it is important to note that the Montana Supreme Court did not explicitly hold that a third party’s rights to insurance proceeds vest at the time of injury, but rather merely stated that the rights vested before Farmers attempted to rescind the coverage. The court left open to inquiry whether this vesting occurred at the time of injury or at the time of Farmer’s actions implying waiver. Thus, the Libby Claimants’ firm reliance on MeLane to establish that their state law rights to the insurance proceeds vested at the time of their injuries is based upon nothing more than indecisive dicta by the Montana Supreme Court.
Second, and more importantly, in MeLane, the injured party claiming against the insurance company had obtained a judgment entitling him to the insurance proceeds. It is a well-recognized principle that “[i]n the liability insurance context ... a tort plaintiff must first establish the liability of the debtor before the insurer becomes [ ] obligated to make any payment.” Edgeworth,
The Court instead finds guidance on this point from the language of the court in In re Dow Corning Corp.,
Even more troubling is the situation ... where at the time of the proposed settlement there are injured party claimants who are not yet known. If each unknown claimant could later sue the insurer and not be estopped by a fully litigated judgment against its insured or by a fair and equitable settlement, there would be no finality to litigation and no realistic likelihood of settlement.
Id. at 242. The Court finds this language to be highly persuasive. Just like in Dow Coming, there are hundreds of claims that may be asserted against Grace in the future but that are not yet known or able to be ascertained. Meanwhile, there is only a limited amount of funds available to satisfy both present and future claims. Prior to the entry of this Settlement Agreement, Grace and CNA were involved in expensive and time-consuming litigation for over three decades. Rather than expending more funds on this litigation that could be included in the pool of recovery for personal injury claimants, the Settlement Agreement would put an end to these disputes and infuse the trust with over $84 million. Thus, not only can the Libby Claimants not cite to any judgment upon which entitlement to the insurance proceeds could be premised, but they also cannot argue that the Settlement Agreement would not be in their best interests as personal injury claimants.
A third critical difference between the holding of McLane and the circumstances present in this case is the fact that McLane was based upon a motor vehicle liability policy, while the Libby Claimants’ argument is based upon general liability insurance policies. The two are not the same. Party liability under motor vehicle insurance policies in Montana is codified in a state statute, Montana State Code Annotated (“MCA”) § 61-6-103, which provides that the liability of the insurer becomes absolute when the injury or damage covered by the motor vehicle liability policy takes place.
Finally, given that the Libby Claimants’ alleged rights to the insurance proceeds cannot be premised on a state statutory provision or a judicial opinion, the Court considers whether Montana has a public policy that would favor such a finding. Montana has no public policy in place that protects individuals claiming third-party rights to insurance proceeds under a general liability policy prior to obtaining a judgment or settlement upon which liability may be premised. Montana does, however, have a long-established public policy favoring settlements. See Miller v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.,
To grant an injured party more than an expectation before receipt of judgment would inhibit legitimate settlements. An insurer would never be able to settle a coverage suit with its insured without impleading the known injured party. It is axiomatic that the more parties involved, the more difficult it is to settle ... Therefore, it is not surprising that there appears to be no case where a fair and reasonable settlement entered into in good faith between an insurer and insured was subsequently undone by a court.
Id. at 242. Nothing in the record indicates that Grace’s Settlement Agreement with CNA was entered into in bad faith or for deceptive purposes. In fact, as discussed extensively above, the record highlights the numerous benefits, both monetary and non-monetary, that the Settlement will confer upon not only Grace and CNA, but also third parties such as personal injury claimants.
The Court therefore finds that the Libby Claimants are not entitled to the proceeds of Grace’s insurance policies with
Based on all the above, the Court denies the appeals of BNSF and the Libby Claimants to the Grace-CNA Settlement Agreement, and finds that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in entering its Approval Order affirming the Settlement. The Settlement Agreement is therefore affirmed.
IV. CONFIRMATION OF THE JOINT PLAN
Various Appellants raise numerous objections to the Joint Plan’s confirmation. The Court considers each challenge separately below.
A. The Good Faith Requirement
Appellants AMH and Montana challenge the Joint Plan on the grounds that it was not proposed in good faith. Under § 1129(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, a court may only confirm a reorganization plan if it finds that the plan was “proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law.” 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3). While the Bankruptcy Code does not define “good faith,” it has been established that a determination of good faith associated with a Chapter 11 reorganization plan requires a factual inquiry into a totality of the circumstances surrounding the plan’s proposal. Brite v. Sun Country Dev., Inc.,
The Third Circuit has stated that the “touchstone” of the good faith inquiry is “the plan itself and whether it will achieve a result consistent with the objectives and purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.” In re Frascella Enter., Inc.,
(1) fosters a result consistent with the [Bankruptcy] Code’s objectives, (citations omitted); (2) has been proposed with honesty and good intentions and with a basis for expecting that reorganization can be effected, (citations omitted); and (3) [exhibited] a fundamental fairness in dealing with the creditors (citations omitted).
Genesis Health Ventures, Inc.,
An analysis of the totality of the circumstances shows that the first factor— whether the reorganization plan is consistent with the general objectives of the Bankruptcy Code' — has been satisfied. The Supreme Court of the United States has specifically identified two purposes of Chapter 11 as: (1) preserving going concerns; and (2) maximizing property available to satisfy creditors. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship,
The second factor requires that the plan have been proposed with honesty and good intentions, and that it have “a reasonable hope of success.” Sun Country,
In stark contrast to the debtor’s actions in Frascella, however, nothing in the present record indicates that Grace has engaged in any such comparable behavior. There is no evidence that Grace was dishonest or had ulterior motives when it proposed the Joint Plan. Nor is there any indication that Grace intended to abuse the judicial process. Rather, the record shows that the Joint Plan was the result of years of litigation and extensive arms-length negotiations. See In re U.S. Mineral Prods. Co., Bankr.No. 01-2471,
The third and final factor courts should consider when considering a debtor’s good faith is if the debtor exhibited a fundamental unfairness when dealing with its creditors. In order to satisfy this requirement, the plan must treat all parties fairly and ensure that its confirmation comports with due process. See Mount Carbon Metro.,
First, AMH asserts a lack of good faith and unfairness because it was allegedly singled out for disparate treatment by Grace in comparison to other property damage claimants. A lack of good faith is evident when “the debtor seeks to delay or frustrate the legitimate efforts of creditors to enforce their rights.” Sound Radio,
Moreover, courts have found that different treatment of a creditor, by itself, does not necessarily run afoul of the good faith standard. See Mount Carbon Metro.,
The Court next addresses Appellant Montana’s claim that Grace did not act in good faith because the asbestos personal injury claims were settled without Montana’s participation in settlement negotiations.
B. Asbestos Liability Trusts Under Section 524(g)
The second issue addressed by the Court regards objections raised by AMH as a challenge to the two trust structure of Grace’s Joint Plan. For purposes of clarity and completeness, the Court first generally reviews the basic structure of the trusts under the Joint Plan, and then considers the merits of AMH’s objections.
1. The Two Trust Structure of the Joint Plan
Section 524(g)
The PI Trust operates according to criteria established in a claims matrix. The matrix attempts to organize the personal injury claims brought against Grace by creating separate, delineated categories of pleural diseases related to asbestos, and assigning a set amount of recovery — • known as a “Scheduled Value” — to each level. In this sense, the matrix is similar to a chart in which each claimant will receive a predetermined set value for his claim if the severity of his disease matches defined medical criteria in a category under the matrix. In addition to the Scheduled Value, the matrix also provides a “Maximum Value” for each claim within a particular category. To obtain the Maximum Value of a claim under the PI Trust, claimants need to meet certain individualized criteria (such as having numerous de-pendants or being a higher-wage earner) that would entitle them to more recovery. The intent in creating the Scheduled Value and Maximum Value scheme is to ensure that all personal injury claimants will receive an award under the trust roughly equal to the amount they would have received outside of bankruptcy.
The property damage trust is vastly similar to the personal injury trust. This second trust assumes Grace’s liabilities related to property damage claims. It is funded by the assets of Reorganized Grace, as well as by the proceeds of the settlement agreements reached between Grace and its former affiliates, Sealed Air and Fresenius.
Under the structure of the PD Trust, traditional property damage claims in Class 7A are distributed in accordance with the Case Management Order (“CMO”) put forth by the Bankruptcy Court in 2009, as amended in 2010. (Case Management Order for Class 7A Asbestos PD Claims (“CMO”), Ex. 25, Joint Appendix (“JA”) 000804.) The CMO provides a centralized procedure for the resolution of all traditional property damage claims in Class 7A that were not previously resolved by settlements, as well as governing rules and timelines. American ZAI property damage claims in Class 7B follow a separate distribution procedure under the Plan. The Payment of American ZAI claims is governed by the Asbestos PD Trust Agreement and the ZAI TDP for Claims Agreement.
2. Requirements of a Proper Trust Under Section 524(g)
AMH, however, objects to the structure of the Joint Plan on the grounds that the property damage trust is not a “genuine” trust. AMH claims that the PD Trust lacks specific procedures for determining and valuing claims, and instead merely “operates as nothing other than a check-writing facility for Class 7A Claimants.” (AMH Br. 49.) The Court disagrees.
Section 524(g) provides, in relevant part, that a trust created pursuant to a plan of reorganization must:
(I) assume the liabilities of a debtor ... [that] has been named as a defendant in personal injury, wrongful death, or property-damage actions seeking recovery for damages allegedly caused by the presence of, or exposure to, asbestos or asbestos-containing products; (II) be funded in whole or in part by the [debt- or’s] securities ...; (III) ... own, or ... be entitled to own if specified contingencies occur, a majority of the voting shares of: (aa) each such debtor; (bb) the parent corporation of each such debtor; or (cc) a subsidiary of each such debtor that is also a debtor; and (IV) is to use its assets or income to pay claims and demands[.]
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i). Only if a trust satisfies all four of these requirements will it be considered proper under the statute.
In the instant case, the Court finds that Grace’s PD Trust satisfies all four requirements set forth under § 524(g). The first element is met because Grace is a corporate defendant involved in personal injury and property damage lawsuits related to asbestos exposure. Moreover, upon the Plan’s execution, the trusts will assume Grace’s liabilities for these legal actions. The second element is satisfied because the PD Trust is funded in part by its own securities. Specifically, the PD Trust is largely funded by the Class 7A Deferred Payment Agreement,
C. The Section 524(g) Channeling Injunction
The next set of objections that the Court considers involves the injunction within Grace’s Joint Plan that will channel all asbestos-related claims to the aforementioned trusts.
In conjunction with the creation of a trust under § 524(g), the bankruptcy court issues an injunction that acts as a nationwide stay against both current and future litigation in federal and state court related to the debtor’s asbestos liability. During the period of corporate reorganization, creditors of the corporation can file proofs of claims in the bankruptcy court within the time frame specified by court order or the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. See 11 U.S.C. § 501 (giving creditors authority to file proofs of claims); Fed. R. Bankr.P. 3003 (listing requirements for filing a proof of claim in a Chapter 11 reorganization case). Rather than asserting claims against the debtor corporation itself, however, the injunction “channels” all claimants to pursue any remedies that they may have against the trust, which will be resolved in accordance with the debtor’s plan of reorganization. In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc.,
In the instant case, several Appellants raise objections to the channeling injunction within the Joint Plan, including: (1) the scope of the channeling injunction; (2) the fairness and equality of the channeling injunction; and (3) the effect of the channeling injunction on releases from liability under the Plan. The Court considers each objection in turn.
1. The Scope of the Channeling Injunction
a. Extension of the Channeling Injunction to Independent Insurer Wrongdoing Claims
The Libby Claimants allege that the scope of § 524(g) channeling injunction is improper because it is too ambiguous to be enforced. While they acknowledge that the injunction clearly enjoins them from pursuing Grace’s insurers on claims related to insurer derivative liability, they contend that the injunction is vague as to whether they may assert claims against insurers for their alleged independent tor-
The Court first considers the alleged ambiguity of the injunction. According to the Libby Claimants, the channeling injunction runs afoul of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d). Rule 65(d) provides that “[e]very order granting an injunction ... must state the reasons why it is issued; state its terms specifically; and describe in reasonable detail — and not by referring to the complaint or other document — the act or acts restrained or required.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d)(1). The basic purpose of Rule 65(d) is to ensure that enjoined individuals are on notice of what conduct is precisely outlawed or permitted by the injunction. Schmidt v. Lessard,
The channeling injunction in the instant case meets the specification requirements of Rule 65(d). The terms of the Joint Plan specify that the injunction and its corresponding trust are issued pursuant to § 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 524(g), in turn, provides that channeling injunctions can extend to “identifiable” third parties who are “directly or indirectly liable” for the debtor’s conduct, including alleged liability “aris[ing] by reason of ... the third party’s provision of insurance to the debtor[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii)(III). As the record makes abundantly clear, Grace’s channeling injunction incorporates the statutory requirements of § 524(g). The injunction
Claim ... or Demand against, or any present or future, debt, liability, or obligation of, any of the Debtors or the Asbestos Protected Parties ... arising out of ... (a) death, wrongful death, personal or bodily injury ... sickness, disease, loss of consortium, survivorship, medical monitoring, or other [damages] ... caused, or allegedly caused [by] ... directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, acts or omissions of ... the Debtor; and (b) the presence of or exposure at any time to asbestos or any products or materials containing asbestos that were mined, processed, consumed, used, stored, manufactured, designed, sold, assembled, supplied, produced, specified, selected, distributed, disposed of, installed by, or in any way marketed by ... the Debtorf.]
(Joint Plan § 1.1(34).) Those parties covered by the injunction — “Asbestos Protected Parties” — are likewise clearly listed in Section 1.1(51) of the Joint Plan. (Id. at § 1.1(51).) Subsection (d) of this Section directly states that insurers with whom Grace has reached settlements and who have agreed to contribute funds to the asbestos trust — referred to as “Settled Asbestos Insurance Companies” — are encompassed within the Asbestos Protected Party definition. (Id. § 1.1(51)(d).) Thus, Grace’s channeling injunction is not ambiguous.
Quite to the contrary and consistent with Rule 65(d), the channeling injunction provides enough specificity and reasonable detail, without any reference to a complaint or other documents, that is sufficient to put all involved parties on notice of what is prohibited — the pursuit of an Asbestos PI Claim against Grace or any Asbestos Protected Party for its derivative liability, including those insurers with whom Grace previously settled. By necessity, the injunction uses sufficiently broad language because it was crafted to encompass the hundreds of potential asbestos claims that may be filed in the future. Such a “sweeping injunction” is permissible if it is “clearly necessary to protect the assets of the bankrupt’s estate.” Kremen v. Blank,
Finally, if the Bankruptcy Court had addressed these claims, it may have unintentionally crossed into the unconstitutional territory of advisory opinions. It is firmly established in our judicial system that federal courts cannot issue advisory opinions. See Hayburn’s Case,
Herein lies the flaw in the Libby Claimants’ argument — there is no actual dispute, nor are the claims presented with “clear concreteness ... precisely framed and necessary for decision[.]” Flast,
b. Extension of the Channeling Injunction to BNSF
As set forth above, § 524(g) authorizes extension of the channeling injunction to certain third parties in limited situations. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii)(I-IV). BNSF now asks this Court to extend to it the protections afforded by the § 524(g) injunction. In its briefing presented to the Court, however, its rationale for making this request is unclear.
In its brief, BNSF asserts that “[c]laims by personal injury plaintiffs against non-debtors such as BNSF asserting derivative liability are ‘indirect’ claims against the Debtors that seek to recover damages caused by the presence of asbestos, and fall within the claims authorized to be channeled ... In essence, claims asserted against BNSF constitute indirect claims against the Debtor’s Estate[.]” (BNSF Br. 32.) This statement mischar-acterizes the definition of an “indirect claim” under Grace’s Joint Plan. Under the Plan, an “Indirect PI Trust Claim” is a claim made against Grace by an indirect claimant for indemnification, contribution, or subrogation for damages it paid to a personal injury plaintiff exposed to asbestos for which Grace is liable. (Joint Plan § 1.1(144).) Another Section of the Joint Plan provides that such claims shall be enjoined pursuant to the § 524(g) injunction. (Id. at § 8.2.1.) In this scenario, the indirect claim under the Plan that could be enjoined would be any claim for indemnity and/or contribution that BNSF could seek from Grace. It would not be, as BNSF categorizes it, a claim by a personal injury claimant asserted directly against BNSF. Only the indirect claim brought by BNSF against Grace could be enjoined and chan
The Court now considers extension of the channeling injunction to enjoin claims against BNSF for actions brought against it that are allegedly derivative of Grace’s conduct. On this point, the Court must consider the holding of Combustion Engineering, as it is directly relevant here. In that case, the Third Circuit clarified the scope of a § 524(g) channeling injunction, holding that:
[Section] 524(g) limits the situations where a channeling injunction may enjoin actions against third parties to those where a third party has derivative liability for the claims against the debtor ... [B]oth the plain language of the statute and its legislative history make clear [that] § 524(g) provides no specific authority to extend a channeling injunction to include third-party actions against non-debtors where the liability alleged is not derivative of the debtor.
Id. at 234, 236. In so holding, the Third Circuit recognized the four instances under which third-party liability could arise under the Code in a Chapter 11 reorganization case: (1) a third party’s ownership of a financial interest in the debtor; (2) a third party’s involvement in management of the debtor; (3) a third party’s provision of insurance to the debtor or a related party; or (4) a third party’s involvement in a transaction changing the debtor’s corporate structure, or in a loan or other financial transaction affecting the financial condition of the debtor. Id. at 235; see also 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii)(I-IV). If the third party does not fall into one of these four categories, then its claims will not be considered derivative of the debtor’s liability, and thus are not eligible to be enjoined. Combustion Eng’g,
Moreover, § 524(g) injunctive relief is “closely tied to the value being contributed to the plan.” In re Congoleum Corp.,
c. AMH’s Objections to the Scope of the Channeling Injunction
AMH alleges that the scope of the channeling injunction sweeps too broadly in violation of § 524(g) in regards to property damage claims. AMH claims that there is no need to channel property damage claims at all because such claims are unimpaired and fully paid under the TDP. (AMH Br. 50.) In making its argument, AMH asks this Court: “If Property] Dfamage] Claims are unimpaired and are to be paid 100% ... what is the purpose of channeling such claims to a trust?” (Id.)
The answer, of course, is that the purpose of channeling these claims is ensure the payment of both current and future property damage claims. Section 524(g)
2. The Fairness and Equality of the Channeling Injunction
a. Application of the Channeling Injunction to MCC
Prior to filing for bankruptcy, Grace had reached a settlement agreement with one of its insurers, MCC. Pursuant to that agreement, MCC made substantial monetary contributions to Grace to assist in the coverage of its asbestos-related liability. In exchange, Grace terminated MCC’s previous obligations and agreed to indemnify MCC against all future asbestos-related claims. After filing for bankruptcy, Grace entered into settlements with several other insurers. These settlements, as well as Grace’s own contributions, will be used to fund the PI Trust. As a result, these other insurers and MCC were all designated as Settled Asbestos Insurance Companies under the terms of the Joint Plan, meaning that they were entitled to injunctive relief under § 524(g). The Libby Claimants now allege that extending this injunctive relief to MCC violates the “fair and equitable” requirement of § 524(g) because MCC did not make a direct financial contribution to the trust, but is nonetheless still protected from asbestos-related litigation. Grace and MCC claim that the statute has not been violated because MCC’s financial contribution is indirectly included in the overall trust amount since Grace’s own contributions to the trust are, in part, due to MCC’s previous contribution.
Section 524(g) provides, in relevant part, that a channeling injunction pro-
As previously mentioned, the trust in this case is funded by both Grace’s own contributions and the contributions of several third parties. MCC and Grace entered into their settlement agreement at a time when Grace was already experiencing financial difficulty as a result of the increased number of asbestos claims filed against it. The settlement payments made by MCC substantially increased Grace’s available funds. After the bankruptcy filing, the remainder of these funds became part of Grace’s bankruptcy estate. Subsequently, during its period of corporate restructuring, Grace formulated the Joint Plan under which it agreed to directly pay substantial value to the trust largely from the remainder of the assets and funds available in its bankruptcy estate. Thus, the contributions to the asbestos trust directly made by Grace include, to some degree, an amount originally contributed by MCC. Without MCC’s previous payments, Grace would not be able to donate as much as it presently can to the trust. As such, Grace’s direct contributions to the trust reflect, as provided for in § 524(g), an amount made “on behalf of’ MCC. Therefore, extending injunctive protection to MCC is fair and equitable under these circumstances. In fact, not enjoining future claims against MCC could render a potentially unfair result since MCC could actually be responsible for double the amount of any other party given its previous significant monetary contribution to Grace.
For these reasons, the requirements of § 524(g) are satisfied, and the findings of the Bankruptcy Court on this matter are therefore affirmed.
In separate but related arguments, both BNSF and the Libby Claimants object to Grace’s aforementioned Settlement Agreement with CNA, which categorizes CNA as a Settled Asbestos Insurance Company entitled to § 524(g) injunctive relief, because it allegedly violates the “fair and equitable” requirement of the statute,
i. BNSF’s Objections
According to BNSF, the Bankruptcy Court erred because it did not make a specific finding as to whether the Libby Claimants’ aforementioned post-bankruptcy, independent insurer wrongdoing tort claims against CNA would be covered by the channeling injunction, and that therefore entry of the injunction was not “fair and equitable” to those parties, i.e., the Libby Claimants, whose future claims might be enjoined. BNSF further asserts that the Grace-CNA Settlement Agreement is unfair because the entire value of CNA’s contribution under the Agreement would be included in the trust’s overall pool — an amount set to be distributed among all asbestos personal injury claimants — without regard as to whether or not the claimant has a direct claim against CNA. Thus, BNSF claims that the current structure of the Joint Plan cannot be affirmed because it fails to account for the fact that the Libby Claimants are the only Class 6 claimants that could arguably bring direct claims against CNA for the insurer’s alleged independent tort liability (assuming they could do so under applicable state law), and that allowing other Class 6 claimants who cannot assert such independent claims against CNA to recover the same amount is unfair and inequitable.
At the outset, BNSF lacks the standing to raise these claims.
ii. The Libby Claimants’ Objections
The Libby Claimants also object to the channeling injunction on the grounds that it does not satisfy the fair and equitable requirement of § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii).
An analysis of the record indicates that the fair and equitable requirement is clearly satisfied here. At trial, an expert witness estimated that claims against the PI Trust will have a total value ranging between $6.3 and $7.4 billion. As discussed at length above, Grace’s Settlement Agreement with CNA injects significant monetary and non-monetary value into Grace’s bankruptcy estate. Under that Agreement, CNA will contribute up to $84 million to the PI Trust for the sole benefit of personal injury claimants, a significant percentage of which are Libby Claimants. Additionally, the Settlement requires that both CNA and Grace give up prior obligations owed to and claims asserted against each other, and resolves all issues related to coverage, retrospective premiums, and indemnity rights. Given that Grace and CNA have been intensely litigating these various issues for over three decades, the value of putting an end to this litigation can hardly be overstated. Thus, in “examin[ing] the contributions ... in the context of the overall bankruptcy scheme,” it is evident to the Court that the benefits provided to the trust by CNA and Grace are fair and equitable to any persons that might subsequently bring any asbestos-related claims. There is a clear relationship between the value provided by CNA’s significant contributions and the benefit of injunctive relief it retains under the Settlement and Joint Plan. Section 524(g) does not require mathematical precision, and the case law does not indicate that an individualized valuation to differentiate between products and non-products claimants is necessary under these circum
3. The Effect of the Channeling Injunction on Releases from Liability Under the Joint Plan
The Libby Claimants argue against confirmation of the Joint Plan on the grounds that it impermissibly releases Grace’s former affiliates, Sealed Air and Fresenius, from future claims related to Grace’s asbestos liabilities by extending injunctive protection to them. They claim that third parties cannot be released from liability without the affirmative agreement of all creditors involved in the debtor’s reorganization, and that because the Libby Claimants did not vote in favor of the Joint Plan, it was erroneous for the Bankruptcy Court to allow the release of Sealed Air and Fresenius from liability.
In order for a reorganization plan that includes an injunction barring third-party claims against non-debtors to be approved, the injunction must be “both necessary to the reorganization and fair” under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
Second, the injunction in this case is also fair to Grace’s creditors. As detailed above in regards to the injunction’s necessity, as well as continuously throughout this Opinion, there are only a narrow range of claims barred by the injunction for the distinct purpose of effectuating settlements to fund the Joint Plan and Grace’s reorganization. All other creditor claims will be assumed and paid by Grace after it has completed reorganization. Moreover, both this Court and the Bankruptcy Court have previously considered the fairness of the Fresenius and Sealed Air Settlement Agreements. The District Court previously approved the settlements, finding that the releases were fair to Grace’s bankruptcy estate and its creditors. The Bankruptcy Court expressly adopted these findings in its 2011 Confirmation Order. See In re W.R. Grace & Co.,
D. Classification of Creditor Claims
Section 1129(a)(1) of the Code provides that a Chapter 11 reorganization plan may only be confirmed if “[t]he plan complies with the applicable provisions of [Title 11].” 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (1). Montana and the Crown
1. The Section 1122(a) Classification Requirement
Section 3.1.6(a) of the Joint Plan classifies all personal injury claims resulting from exposure to Grace Asbestos in Class 6, Asbestos PI Claims.
any Claim ... or Demand against the Debtors ... held by any Entity ... who has been, is, or may be a defendant in an action seeking damages for ... personal injuries ... to the extent caused or allegedly caused, directly or indirectly, by exposure to asbestos or asbestos-containing products for which the Debtors have liability ... [and] on account of alleged liability of the Debtors for payment, repayment, reimbursement, indemnification, subrogation, or contribution of any portion of any damages such Entity has paid or may pay to the plaintiff in such aetion[.]
(Joint Plan § 1.1(144).) Both the claims of Montana and the Crown fall within the definition of Indirect PI Trust Claims under the Plan because they seek indemnity and/or contribution from Grace.
Montana and the Crown, however, object to the classification of their claims in Class 6 on the basis that their claims are of a different nature. Specifically, they argue that claims for indemnity and contribution do not belong in Class 6 because they are not personal injury claims. Furthermore, they allege that their claims are rooted in a failure to warn theory, rather than liability based on asbestos production, and therefore are different than the remainder of the claims in Class 6. Thus, they believe that § 1122(a) is violated on these grounds.
Section 1122(a) of the Code governs the classification of claims, providing that “a plan may place a claim or an interest in a particular class only if such claim or interest is substantially similar to the other claims or interests of such class.” 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a). In analyzing whether claims within a given class are substantially similar, “the focus of the classification [should be on] the legal character of the
It is clear to the Court that, in exercising their broad discretion under the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Court and the Plan Proponents properly classified Montana and the Crown’s indirect claims in Class 6. Both direct and indirect claims under the Plan exhibit a similar effect on Grace’s bankruptcy estate' — they seek recovery from the trust for actions related to Grace’s asbestos liability. It makes no difference whether this recovery is sought directly by an individual plaintiff or indirectly through indemnity and/or contribution, or what the applicable legal theory is that underlies the claim, because, after all is said and done, all these claims “relate to the assets of the debtor” in substantially the same way. AOV Indus.,
It is also evident that the classification of Montana and the Crown’s claims in Class 6 is reasonable. Both direct claims brought by injured plaintiffs and indirect claims brought by Montana arise out of exposure to Grace Asbestos in Libby, Montana. Similarly, both the direct claims of injured plaintiffs and indirect claims brought by the Crown arise out of exposure to Grace Asbestos from ZAI products
2. Circumvention of the Section 524(g) Injunction
The § 524(g) channeling injunction in the instant litigation enjoins both the direct and indirect claims brought against Grace, and channels all such claims within Class 6 to the Grace trust. Montana and the Crown contend that their claims against Grace should not enjoined because their indemnity and contribution claims are based on a failure to warn theory that is different than all other claims in Class 6. Having already decided that Montana and the Crown’s claims are not substantially different from other indirect claims within Class 6, the Court likewise declines to pull back the curtain of injunctive protection and expose Grace to liability for these claims.
Section 524(g) provides that an injunction may “enjoin entities from taking legal action for the purpose of directly or indirectly collecting ... [on] any claim or demand that ... is to be paid in whole or in part by [the] trust[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(1)(B) (emphasis added). The primary purpose of § 524(g) is to “facilitate] the reorganization and rehabilitation of the debtor” while simultaneously promoting “the equitable resolution of asbestos-related claims.” In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc.,
Grace’s Joint Plan, established pursuant to the requirements of § 524(g), properly categorizes the claims of Montana and the Crown as Indirect PI Trust Claims. As such, they are properly enjoined and channeled to the trust. To hold otherwise would be a fallacy. If the channeling injunction only plugged the hole in Grace’s bankruptcy estate left open as a result of direct personal injury claims, then Grace would still sink from the flood of indirect claims that could permissibly be brought against it. This is not the result that was contemplated by Congress in its creation of this statutory section. See 140 Cong. Rec. 6, 8,021 (1994) (statements of Senator Brown); 140 Cong. Rec. S. 4523 (Apr. 20, 1994) (statements of Senator Heflin and Senator Graham); Collier on Bankruptcy § 111 (2011) (discussing statements of Senator Heflin). Rather, “[bjecause Indirect PI Trust Claims ... relate to direct Asbestos Personal Injury Claims, they are appropriately channeled to the Asbestos PI Trust and have historically been channeled to trusts established in connection with asbestos related chapter 11 cases.” In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc.,
3. Definitional Requirements of “Claims” and “Demands” Under the Bankruptcy Code
Montana and the Crown further allege that their claims do not fall within the definitions of “claims” and “demands” under the Code, and that therefore they should not be subject to the § 524(g) channeling injunction.
Montana and the Crown allege that their requests for contribution and indemnity against Grace are not “claims” because they arose after Grace’s 2001 bankruptcy petition, and that therefore they should not be channeled to the trust. In response, Grace contends that Montana and the Crown’s claims fall precisely within the definition of a “claim” as recently interpreted by the Third Circuit, and that, as a result, Appellants’ contribution and indemnity claims are properly channeled to Grace’s trust to await payment.
The Court begins its analysis with the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of a “claim”:
[a] right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured^]
11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (emphasis added). In adopting this definition, Congress intended the term to have an expansive and all-encompassing definition so as to “permit! ] the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy court.” H.R. Rep: No. 95-595, at 309 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266, at 21; see also In re Jadczak, Bankr.No. 10-11804,
The Third Circuit put an end to this debate in its recent precedential opinion of Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s, Inc.),
On appeal, the Third Circuit, sitting en banc,
The Court finds that, despite Appellants’ statements to the contrary, Grossman’s is directly applicable to this case and that Montana and the Crown’s indirect claims for contribution and indemnity constitute “claims” under its holding. It is undisputed that the Libby Claimants and the Canadian plaintiffs in the ZAI class action suits were exposed to Grace Asbestos long before Grace’s filing of its bankruptcy petition in 2001. Grace owned and operated the mine in Libby, Montana between 1963 and 1990.
Finally, the Court is unconvinced by Montana and the Crown’s arguments that their requests for indemnity and contribution are still too contingent to be deemed “claims” because their rights to assert those claims have not yet accrued. This
b. Demands under the Bankruptcy Code
In the alternative, Montana and the Crown also allege that their requests for indemnity and/or contribution do not constitute “demands” under the Bankruptcy Code because their requests for payment have not yet become due, and that therefore their claims should be exempt from the § 524(g) channeling injunction.
Section 524(g) defines the term “demand” in the context of Chapter 11 reorganization plans related to asbestos liability as a “demand for payment” that is either “present or future” and that “arises out of the same or similar conduct or events that gave rise to the claims addressed by the injunction.” 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(5)(B). Thus, the straightforward reading of the statute would appear to be that a demand is a claim that is either already present or may arise at some point in the future. Montana and the Crown’s requests for indemnity and/or contribution fit neatly within the parameters of this definition — they are claims against Grace seeking reimbursement for personal injury lawsuits related to Grace Asbestos that Appellants defended or will defend in the future. Thus, the Court finds that Appellants’ indemnity and/or contribution requests also satisfy the definitional requirements of “demands” under the Bankruptcy Code.
For all the aforementioned reasons, the claims made by Montana and the Crown fall within the definitions of “claims” and “demands” under the Code. Therefore, these claims and demands are properly subjected to the § 524(g) injunction and are properly channeled to the trust to await payment.
E. Feasibility of the Joint Plan
Section 1129(a)(11) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that:
(a) The Court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following requirements are met:
(11) Confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan, unless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11). The debtor bears the burden of proof on this inquiry, and must show by a preponderance of the evidence that a reorganization plan is feasible. Corestates Bank, N.A. v. United Chem. Techs. Inc.,
The purpose of the feasibility requirement is to prevent court confirmation of “visionary schemes.” In re Solange D. Chadda, Bankr.No. 07-12665,
The bankruptcy court can consider a wide array of factors in determining a plan’s feasibility, including assessment of the debtor’s capital structure, the earning power of the business, economic conditions, and the ability of the corporation’s management. See In re Landmark at Plaza Park, Ltd.,
In the instant case, the record clearly reflects that the Bankruptcy Court considered evidence concerning estimates of Grace’s future earning capacity, capital structure, earning power, and current economic conditions. The Bankruptcy Court particularly credited the two-day expert testimony of Ms. Pamela Zilly, a vastly experienced investment banker and financial adviser that has previously been retained to work on other mass tort bankruptcy cases. The record also indicates that the Bankruptcy Court considered several financial reports and exhibits that were entered into evidence, as well as additional witness testimony. After careful consideration of all the evidence before it, the Bankruptcy Court found that “[i]n light of Grace’s past performance, its ability to obtain exit financing, and its reasonable and conservative projections, we find that Reorganized Grace will be able to pay its debts as they come due.” In re W.R. Grace & Co.,
This Court finds ample evidence in the voluminous record before it to support the Bankruptcy Court’s finding. Given her extensive prior experience and expertise in mass tort bankruptcies, Ms. Zilly was more than qualified to testify as to Grace’s future earning capacity, capital structure, and earning power. Ms. Zilly testified that, in her expert opinion, Grace could emerge from bankruptcy as a financially strong corporation that would continue to steadily grow and garner significant profits that would enable it to satisfy its outstanding liabilities. Ms. Zilfys expert opinion was well supported and properly based on her analysis of Grace’s corporate structure, internal records and historical precedent, financial reports of Grace’s current business performance, financial projections of its future earning capacity, review of cost-cutting measures and productivity programs implemented since Grace entered bankruptcy, and analysis of a $37.3 million reserve established by Grace to cover its unsettled property damage claims and allocate payment for future claims. This evidence indicated that Grace’s sales had doubled between 2000 and 2008, a time period that spanned several cycles of the chemical industry and troubling economic times. Ms. Zilly also analyzed and testified that Grace’s Core EBITDA
Therefore, based on the extensive evidence before it, the Court believes that there is more than a “reasonable probability” that the Joint Plan would be successful. The evidence is credible, well supported, reasonable, and appropriately provides the Court with an accurate depiction of Grace’s current and future financial status. Following confirmation, it is likely that “the things which are to be done ... can be done as a practical matter under the facts.” South Canaan Cellular,
Nevertheless, two Appellants, AMH and Montana, object on the grounds that the feasibility requirement is not satisfied under the present structure of the Plan. For the sake of clarity and finality, the Court considers each Appellant’s arguments in turn.
1. AMH’s Feasibility Claims
AMH contends that Grace failed to meet its burden of proving the Joint Plan’s feasibility because it did not present sufficient evidence to establish how its anticipated liabilities would be dealt with under the Plan’s provisions. To support its argument, AMH points to a number of alleged deficiencies on Grace’s part, including the fact that a formal loan commitment document was not introduced as evidence of Grace’s ability to obtain exit financing, Grace’s alleged failure to introduce sufficient evidence that the trust could pay its outstanding property damage liabilities in the future, and the Plan’s alleged failure to account for AMH’s class claim.
The Court first considers AMH’s allegation that Grace’s introduction of evidence indicating that it could receive exit financing was deficient because it was based on “the confidence of its own investment advisor” and was not supported by any “concrete evidence” such as a formal loan commitment document. (AMH Br. 62.) Both parts of this argument lack merit. Ms. Zilly’s testimony regarding Grace’s ability to obtain exit financing is not unreliable merely because she was Grace’s own financial advisor. In fact, her familiarity with Grace makes her even more qualified to accurately inform the Court about Grace’s financial stability. Absent a lack of foundation to testify about the matter in question or a ground for impeachment, the Federal Rules of Evidence make clear that Ms. Zilly’s testimony was proper.
Additionally, AMH’s argument also fails because neither the Code nor federal caselaw require Grace to submit any specific documents proving the Plan’s feasibility. All that is required is that the debtor satisfy its burden of proof by showing that “a reasonable assurance of commercial viability” is possible. Chadda,
The Court next considers AMH’s allegation that Grace allegedly failed to substantiate its belief that it could satisfy its outstanding property damage liabilities. AMH claims that the only evidence offered on this point was Ms. Zilly’s testimony that Reorganized Grace would be able to provide the PD Trust with approximately $1.6 billion over the course of twenty-five years. AMH asserts that the $1.6 billion figure has not been substantiated in any way, and that the Plan does not provide the means for Grace to stretch out its liabilities over a twenty-five year period.
The Court, however, finds ample evidence in the record before it to find that Grace would be able to satisfy its outstanding property damage liabilities over this twenty-five year period. In reaching her conclusion on this point, Ms. Zilly testified that, after an extensive analysis of Grace’s financial records and corporate structure, she estimated Grace’s unresolved and future property damage claims to be approximately $37 million. In account of this estimate, Grace established a $37.3 million reserve for the purpose of satisfying both
Finally, AMH also argues that the Plan is not feasible, and thus cannot be confirmed, because it fails to take into account the possibility that AMH’s putative class action claims may be allowed at some point in the future. This argument fails for several reasons. First, both this Court and the Bankruptcy Court have previously ruled that AMH’s class action claim has little or no value. See In re W.R. Grace & Co., No. Civ. A. 08-118,
Moreover, AMH premises its argument on In re Harbin,
2. Montana’s Feasibility Claims
Montana
Additionally, this hypothetical claim remains mere conjecture at this point. Montana has provided no evidence indicating a “reasonable likelihood” that such a claim could actually be asserted against Grace’s bankruptcy estate or when this would occur. South Canaan Cellular,
Finally, even if Montana’s reliance on this testimony was proper, its argument would still fail because it does not account for how its indemnity and contribution claims would be handled by the TDP. Under the terms of the Joint Plan, Montana’s indirect claims for contribution and indemnity will be channeled to the PI Trust to await distribution. No payments will be made until Grace has successfully reorganized. Therefore, any claims asserted against Grace’s bankruptcy estate at this time would not affect the viability of Reorganized Grace, or inevitably lead to liquidation or a second reorganization. Accordingly, Montana’s objections to the Plan’s feasibility are likewise overruled.
F. Equality of Treatment Among Creditors
“ ‘Equality of distribution among creditors is a central policy of the Bankruptcy Code.’ ” In re Combustion Eng’g.,
Section 524(g) explicitly requires that an asbestos trust value and pay all “present claims and future demands that involve similar claims in substantially the same manner.” 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(B)(2)(ii)(V). The Third Circuit has expressly recognized the importance of equality of treatment among creditors under Chapter 11, stating that “a plan of reorganization [must] provide similar treatment to similarly situated claims.” Combustion Eng’g,
Similarly, a Chapter 11 reorganization plan must also meet the requirements of § 1123(a)(4) of the Code. Section 1123(a)(4) requires a plan to “provide the same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class.” 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4). Federal caselaw construing this provision of the Code has interpreted equal treatment to mean that: (1) all class members must be subject to the same process for claim satisfaction, In re Cent. Med. Ctr.,
The Third Circuit has instructed courts analyzing a reorganization plan’s equality of distribution to “consider the bankruptcy scheme as an integrated whole in order to evaluate whether Plan confirmation is warranted.” Combustion Eng’g,
1. The Libby Claimants’ Discrimination Claims
The Libby Claimants allege that the Joint Plan impermissibly discriminates against them in violation of §§ 524(g) and 1123(a)(4) in three ways: (1) the proposed trust distribution procedures (“TDP”) set the bar too high for many Libby Claimants to qualify for more severe Disease Levels, and therefore obtain greater recovery; (2) the Joint Plan pays the Libby Claimants less than their pre-bankruptcy settle
a. The TDP Criteria for Category IV-B
Personal injury claims under the Joint Plan are categorized according to their nature (ie., the specific type of pleural disease suffered) and level of severity. These categorizations establish the amount of payment a claimant may obtain under Expedited Review — an accelerated form of claims-processing designed to encourage settlement and conserve resources through the establishment of different levels of pleural disease. The Joint Plan currently has eight asbestos-related “Disease Levels.” Each Disease Level is defined by specific medical and compensation criteria derived from medical research and applicable tort system considerations. If a claimant meets the criteria for a specific Disease Level, he can obtain an automatic settlement offer — referred to in the Plan as a “Scheduled Value” — representing a set value associated with that particular level, multiplied by a payment percentage. Those suffering from “severe disabling pleural disease” are assigned Category IV-B under the Plan. The Libby Claimants assert that Category IV-B’s criteria is discriminatory because it includes “add-ons” (ie., additional criteria to the standard diagnostic criteria) that make it very difficult for otherwise-eligible Libby residents to qualify for Category IV-B severe disabling pleural disease (and consequently greater compensation payments under the TDP). Thus, they allege that this disparate treatment violates §§ 524(g) and 1123(a)(4) because it does not provide the same treatment for each claim or interest among the asbestos personal injury claimants within Class 6.
In support of their argument, the Libby Claimants provide the Court with a myriad of statistics from a mortality study conducted by the Center for Asbestos-Related Disease (“CARD”) in Libby, Montana. The CARD study attempts to show that the current categorizations under the Joint Plan would exclude significant percentages of Libby residents because they would not meet the heightened criteria of the add-ons. However, the Bankruptcy Court already addressed this evidence at the Confirmation Hearing, and found that the study was not reliable and did not follow accepted methodology.
Additionally, the Court is not convinced that the Category IV-B criteria discriminates against the Libby Claimants because they have failed to establish that similar
Finally, the Libby Claimants’ discrimination argument also fails because of the Individual Review safeguard put in place by the Joint Plan. Under the Individual Review process, a personal injury claimant may still be able to recover up to the Maximum Value of his claim, even if he otherwise failed to meet the criteria to qualify for a specific Disease Level under Expedited Review. Individual Review was established to safeguard claims that are viable, but that may have otherwise slipped between the cracks of the eight Expedited Review categories. The Individual Review process allows claimants that are displeased with their recovery or categorization under Expedited Review to present their claims and any supporting evidence to a panel of trustees representing the asbestos trust. The panel may award such claimants liquidated settle
The Libby Claimants allege that the Individual Review process itself is discriminatory because a significant percentage of Libby residents would not qualify for Category rV-B under Expedited Review, and would therefore be “shunted” to the as-of-yet undeveloped process of Individual Review “by reason of discriminatory medical criteria.” (Libby Br. 20.) Again, this argument fails on the same grounds — Appellants have failed to show how exactly they would be treated differently than other similarly situated claimants. There is no evidence in the record indicating that the Libby Claimants in particular would be afforded different treatment during the Individual Review process. In fact, Individual Review would actually allow the displeased Libby Claimants the possibility to recover even more than they otherwise could under the structure of the Joint Plan. Merely because the process of Individual Review has not yet been fully developed does not mean that the trustees will make their review decisions in a discriminatory fashion. Therefore, the Court finds that Individual Review would cure any discrepancies that could possibly occur under Expedited Review, and that all similarly-situated claimants would be treated in substantially the same manner under the Joint Plan.
In viewing the Joint Plan as an “integrated whole,” the record shows that equality of distribution among creditors is satisfied here. The Court therefore affirms the Bankruptcy Court’s finding that the claim processing mechanisms of the TDP comply with §§ 524(g) and 1123(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, and that the Libby Claimants have not proven any unfair discrimination.
b. Pre-Bankruptcy Settlements
The Libby Claimants also allege that the Joint Plan discriminates against them by paying them at a rate less than what Libby residents received in pre-bank-ruptcy settlements with Grace. Prior to filing for bankruptcy, the average asbestos-related lawsuit against Grace in Libby settled for approximately $268,000. The Libby Claimants allege that under the current structure of the Joint Plan, they stand to receive substantially less compensation. Grace counters that the personal injury claim values utilized by the Joint Plan reflect Grace’s pre-bankruptcy settlement history, adjusted to bring them current. Under the Plan’s structure, each of the
Sections 524(g) and 1123(a)(4) only require that an asbestos trust value and pay “present claims and future demands that involve similar claims in substantially the same manner,” 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(B)(2)(ii)(V), and that a reorganization plan “provide the same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class.” 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4). Although “procedures may vary somewhat between classes,” all that is required by these provisions of the Code is that “the primary treatment is unquestionably the same for each claimant” within each class. In re Dow Corning Corp.,
The TDP values for asbestos personal injury claims under Grace’s Joint Plan were set using national averages that reflected claimants’ exposure to Grace Asbestos in all states, not just Montana. This was done to ensure uniform treatment among claimants nationwide and to conserve trust resources. Thus, the Joint Plan purports to lump together claimants that share similar diagnoses and levels of pleural disease severity so that similarly situated individuals receive the same treatment. Nothing in the record indicates that the Libby Claimants would be singled out for disparate treatment from others within Class 6. In fact, all the claimants within Class 6 — including those from Libby and elsewhere — will have an equal opportunity to present their claims for categorization purposes under the Joint Plan. Each of these claimants will be analyzed under the same categorization criteria. Dependent upon the nature and severity of their disease, each will be assigned to a specific Disease Level associated with a specific dollar amount. Once liquidated, every payment within Class 6 will then be multiplied by the same payment percentage. Nothing in this process indicates that the Libby Claimants are earmarked for disparate treatment within Class 6. To the contrary, this procedure clearly indicates that the Libby Claimants will receive the same treatment as all other claimants within Class 6. This equality of treatment is all that is required by §§ 524(g) and 1123(a)(4).
As previously discussed, Grace’s insurance provides it with both “products” and “non-products” coverage. Products coverage covers Grace’s liability for injuries from manufactured asbestos-containing products, while non-products coverage applies to liabilities resulting from exposure to Grace Asbestos in particle form. The Libby Claimants hold non-product claims because their exposure to Grace Asbestos was primarily due to inhaling vermiculite from the Libby mine. Grace’s products insurance includes aggregate limits on the total amount insurance companies are required to pay per claim. On the other hand, Grace’s non-products coverage has no limit, but rather permits payment of an unlimited amounts of claims, provided that such claims do not exceed the per occurrence limit on the policy. According to Appellants, Grace’s insurance covers 100% of its non-products claims, while only covering approximately 7% of its products claims as a result of the aggregate limitations. Appellants argue that, as non-products claimants, they hold “stronger insurance rights” than their product claimant counterparts because Grace’s insurance permits greater coverage for its non-products claims. Essentially, Appellants’ argument is that because Grace’s insurance covers a greater percentage of its non-products than products claims, the non-product claimants are more important and are entitled to greater compensation. They argue that the two groups should not be held to the same standards, and that doing so results in discriminatory treatment.
In order for the Libby Claimants to receive any additional compensation under Grace’s insurance policy, they would first need to prove that they possess a right to the non-products insurance proceeds. As explained in detail above, the general rule of the Third Circuit is that insurance policies which provide liability coverage become part of the debtor’s estate upon filing for bankruptcy. See ACandS, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co.,
Due to the fact that the Libby Claimants hold no direct rights to the insurance proceeds, the only other way that they could receive any additional insurance proceeds would be to show that they hold a particular interest in the policy. “While federal law defines the limits of what is property of the estate, it is state law which determines a debtor’s interest in particular property.” In re Warrington,
The Libby Claimants, however, have failed to show this Court how Grace is hable to them. Instead, they merely repeat their blanket statement that “[u]nder state law the Libby Claimants have the right to collect from Grace’s insurers,” (Libby Br. 28), without providing any direct evidence or legal citation as to why such liability is warranted. There has been no underlying judgment or settlement with Grace post-bankruptcy upon which liability may be premised. See Lough v. Ins. Co. of N. Am.,
In sum, the Libby Claimants have not established that the Joint Plan impermissi-bly discriminates against them. Rather, the Court is satisfied that the Joint Plan “provide[s] reasonable assurance that the trust will value, and be in a financial position to pay, present claims and future demands that involve similar claims in substantially the same manner.” 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V). Therefore, the Bankruptcy Court’s determination that the Joint Plan is not discriminatory toward the Libby Claimants is affirmed.
2. BNSF’s Discrimination Claims
BNSF also argues that some of its claims are treated substantially differently than other claims within the same class. Thus, BNSF asserts that the Joint Plan cannot be confirmed because it contravenes § 1123(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, and its established procedure unfairly increases BNSF’s administrative costs. Each argument is considered separately
a. Equal Treatment Under Section 1123(a)(4)
The current structure of the Joint Plan accounts for both direct and indirect claims against Grace. For all intents and purposes, direct claimants under the TDP are those individuals that directly suffered injuries from exposure to Grace Asbestos. Indirect claims against Grace are those claims that are derivative of Grace’s liability, such as common-law indemnity and contribution claims, brought by co-defendants of Grace in the tort system. BNSF is an indirect claimant of Grace because it seeks indemnification and contribution from Grace for personal injury lawsuits it previously defended or will defend related to the Grace Asbestos that it transported by railroad from the Libby mine site.
Grace’s PI Trust has established procedures to handle the payment of both direct and indirect claims. The matrix put forth by the TDP authorizes all direct claimants within Class 6 to receive Scheduled Values (or, if they meet the necessary prerequisites, Maximum Values) that purport to reflect the estimated value of their claims outside of bankruptcy. An indirect claimant’s payment under the TDP depends on the claimant’s relationship with a direct claimant. An indirect claimant must first prove that it paid all, or a significant portion, of a liability that Grace owed to a direct claimant. The indirect claimant can then pursue an indemnity and/or contribution claim against the trust. At this point, the indirect claimant assumes the same position as a direct claimant and is entitled to recover from the trust the same amount that a direct claimant could have recovered had it brought a direct claim against the trust itself.
As previously mentioned, the Joint Plan takes into account that several direct claimants may have been exposed to more than just one type of asbestos or may be unable to adequately trace their exposure to one specific type. In such instances, the Joint Plan reduces the amount of recovery such claimants can obtain from Grace because they can potentially recover from multiple asbestos manufacturers. Similarly, the Joint Plan also accounts for claimants that may be able to prove that they were predominantly exposed to Grace Asbestos. In this scenario, the individual would be entitled to receive “Extraordinary Claims Value” treatment, meaning that his actual award could be up to eight times its Scheduled Value. However, if an Extraordinary Claims Value claimant can additionally obtain recovery from a non-debtor, then the overall award is reduced to the Scheduled Value amount (or, in qualifying circumstances, the Maximum Value) on the premise that claimants should not be able to recover “more than once” for their injuries. The amount of indemnification and contribution that the non-debtor could receive from Debtor Grace in such instances, however, would be limited to the amount the direct claimant could have received directly from Grace.
At the outset, the Court notes BNSF appears to be solely challenging the Joint Plan on the grounds of disparate treatment based on its alleged common law indemnity and contribution rights.
BNSF cited no law in support of [a common law right to contribution], and did not mention it in its post-trial brief, or its pretrial statement. Furthermore, BNSF did not argue or address the issue of a common law right to contribution at the confirmation hearing ... At [a] hearing on March 2, 2011, BNSF referred to a “common law indemnity claim.” This was the first mention by BNSF of a common law indemnity claim and to the extent BNSF meant “indemnity” in this statement as opposed to “contribution,” its motion for reconsideration is denied as it never raised the issue before. To the extent BNSF meant to refer to a common law contribution claim, it has not pursued this.
In re W.R. Grace & Co., Bankr.No. 01-1139,
As set forth above, in bankruptcy, equality of treatment among creditors in a Chapter 11 reorganization plan has two aspects: (1) all members of the class must receive equal value for their claims; and (2) each member of the class must pay the same consideration for distributions under the plan. Quigley,
Nevertheless, BNSF contends that equal value is not being accorded to its claims because most Class 6 claimants will receive the full non-bankruptcy value of their claims under the TDP, while BNSF is precluded from receiving the full value of its claims because the Joint Plan does not include the Extraordinary Claims Value when assigning a value to BNSF’s claims.
Finally, BNSF also claims that it is not receiving equal value for its claims under the Joint Plan because it might, at some uncertain point in the future, suffer a judgment or enter into a settlement with a direct claimant by which it would be required to pay a direct claimant more than
In addition to ensuring that all class members receive equal value for their claims, “each member of the class must pay the same consideration for its distribution [under the plan].” Id.; see also In re AOV Indus. Inc.,
This argument does not make legal sense, however, because for an action to proceed against BNSF, BNSF would have to bear at least some independent liability.
Finally, the Court points out that if it were to award BNSF the Extraordinary aims Value treatment for its common law indemnity and contribution claims, then it would actually be awarding BNSF preferential treatment to all other creditors within Class 6. As the Plan stands, all claimants are subject to the same process for distribution determination purposes. If BNSF were allowed to obtain Extraordinary Claims Value treatment, however, this would actually allow it to recover more from the trust than a direct claimant could since the direct claimant would remain subject to the Scheduled Value safety valve against double recovery. Section 5.6 of the TDP specifically seeks to avoid such unfairness, providing that: “In no event shall any Indirect Claimant have any rights against the PI Trust superior to the rights of the related Direct Claimant ... [including] timing, amount or manner of payment. In addition, no Indirect PI Trust Claim may be liquidated and paid in an amount that exceeds what the Indirect Claimant has actually paid to the related Direct Claimant.” (Asbestos PI Trust Distribution Procedures (“TDP”) § 5.6, Ex. 4, JA 000306.) Permitting BNSF to obtain the Extraordinary Claims Value would therefore not only directly contravene the Plan’s requirements, but would also award favorable treatment to BNSF, which is expressly forbidden by the Code.
Based on the above reasons, the Court affirms the Bankruptcy Court’s finding
b. Administrative Costs
Under the current structure of the Joint Plan, an indirect claimant asserting a claim against the trust must prove that it has paid in full Grace’s liability and obligation to a direct claimant for which the trust would otherwise have had to provide payment. Additionally, the indirect claimant must obtain the direct claimant’s agreement to forever and fully release Grace from related liability. If an indirect claimant cannot meet these requirements, Section 5.6 of the TDP provides that the indirect claimant may:
request that the PI Trust review the Indirect PI Trust Claim individually to determine whether the Indirect Claimant can establish under applicable state law that the Indirect Claimant has paid all or a portion of a liability or obligation that the PI Trust had to the Direct Claimant ... If the Indirect Claimant can show that it has paid ... [the] liability or obligation, the PI Trust shall reimburse the Indirect Claimant the amount of the liability or obligation so paid.
(TDP § 5.6, Ex. 4, JA 000306.) BNSF asserts that in the event that it may not be able to satisfy these requirements and must instead pursue Individualized Review, it will unfairly face increased administrative costs that would not be imposed on other indirect claimants, thereby violating § 1123(a)(4).
BNSF has not, however, demonstrated how it would be burdened by more administrative costs than any other indirect claimant within Class 6. Rather, it is apparent that all indirect claimants within Class 6 would be required to prove the validity of their claim subject to the, requirements of Section 5.6, and, if unable to meet these requirements, would be able to pursue their claim under Individualized Review.
Moreover, the Court notes that there is nothing discriminatory or unfair about requiring a claimant against the trust to
The Court declines to deem the Joint Plan unfairly discriminatory based on the mere possibility of increased administrative costs. Administrative costs are a hurdle faced by corporations, law firms, and courts across the nation on a daily basis, and the Court has not been provided with any information that BNSF would be unable to handle this administrative inconvenience. As such, BNSF’s challenge to the Joint Plan on these grounds is denied.
3. Montana and the Crown’s Discrimination Claims
Montana and the Crown allege, inter alia, that the Joint Plan discriminates against them on account of: (1) the legal theory upon which their liability in this lawsuit is based; (2) the timing associated with the receipt of their payments from the trust; and (3) an apparent lack of equality of payment among creditors. Each argument is considered separately below.
a. Failure to Warn Liability
In order to have an indirect claim paid by the trust, the indirect claimant must first prove that it paid in full a liability or obligation to an individual or entity to whom Grace otherwise would have been liable.
As noted by the Third Circuit, Appellants’ potential liability here is based on a legal duty independent from Grace’s liability. See W.R. Grace & Co.,
Moreover, the record is devoid of any evidence indicating disparate treatment. Neither Appellant has convincingly shown how it would be disparately impacted by the Joint Plan’s requirements for indirect claimants. Rather, it is evident that the same procedures are applied to and the same things are required of all indirect claimants within Class 6. The Court finds that both Montana and the Crown are required to give up equal degrees of consideration in order to benefit from the TDP and will be receiving equal value for their claims under the Plan. The TDP, therefore, does not impermissibly discriminate against either Montana or the Crown in violation of § 1123(a)(4).
Finally, if Appellants were to prevail on this request, the entire central purpose of § 524(g) would be destroyed. As detailed at length above, § 524(g) “helps achieve the purpose of Chapter 11 by facilitating the reorganization and rehabilitation of the debtor as an economically viable entity.” In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc.,
b. The Effect of Timing on Treatment of Creditor Claims
Montana and the Crown further allege that the Joint Plan discriminates against them on the basis of the timing of the payment of claims under the TDP. Under the terms of the Joint Plan, all finalized claims
Once again, however, Appellants fail to show how this process would treat them differently than the other creditors within Class 6. Instead, it is evident that all claimants in Class 6 — both direct and indirect — will be subjected to this same “first-in, first-out” process. The TDP also provides various protective mechanisms, such as the Payment Percentage requirement, that ensure that all Class 6 claims receive similar treatment, regardless of where they fall in the payment queue.
Having found that treatment of Montana and the Crown under the Joint Plan does not run afoul of § 1123(a)(4), the Court likewise declines to adopt Appellants’ sug-
c. Equality of Payment and Treatment of Claims in Different Classes Under the Joint Plan
Finally, the Crown alleges that it is a victim of disparate treatment because, under the Joint Plan, American and Canadian ZAI property damage claims will not be treated equally since American claimants allegedly will receive greater payment for their claims. For present purposes, it is important to remember that property damage claims are afforded a different classification under the Joint Plan than the personal injury claims related to exposure to Grace Asbestos in Class 6. American Property Damage (“PD”) ZAI claims are categorized in Class 7B, and Canadian ZAI PD claims are classified in Class 8.
The bankruptcy court in In re Dow Corning,
The holding of Dow Corning is directly applicable here. American ZAI PD claims are categorized in a completely different class than Canadian ZAI PD claims. As such, equal treatment of these claims is not required.
4. AMH’s Discrimination Claims
AMH claims that the Joint Plan does not treat it equally compared to other creditors in Class 7A. Under the Plan’s terms, all creditors must resolve their claims against the PD Trust in federal bankruptcy court. By filing a proof of claim against the PD Trust, creditors agree to submit to the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over their claims. AMH claims it is treated inequitably under the Plan because it is the only claimant in Class 7A that has been denied the right to pursue its claims in .the forum of its choice — South Carolina state court.
As previously mentioned, in order to satisfy the equality of treatment require
The second prong of the equal treatment test requires equal consideration. AMH essentially argues that the Joint Plan requires it to give up more than any other claimant in order to participate in the TDP because it is the only claimant that has been denied a choice of forum to litigate its claims. This assertion, however, is incorrect. Rather, all Class 7A claimants that opt into the Plan and file Proofs of Claims against the trust are required to subject themselves to the Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction. No creditors’ claims in this class will be handled in any other forum, and AMH has presented no evidence that treatment of its claims would be any different. In fact, requiring all creditors to submit to federal bankruptcy jurisdiction is advantageous under these circumstances. In a case of this scale and complexity, it is helpful to have the same rules, procedures, and binding caselaw applied to all claims.
Moreover, even if AMH were somehow disadvantaged by the bankruptcy court forum, its argument would still fail because it does not consider the second clause of § 1123(a)(4)' — 'that disparate treatment cannot occur when a claimant agrees to the less favorable treatment. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) (“[A] plan shall ... provide the same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class, unless the holder of a particular claim or interest agrees to a less favorable treatment of such particular claim or interest[J”). Here, AMH agreed to the federal bankruptcy court forum when it initially filed three Proofs of Claims against the PD Trust and chose to extensively litigate its class action claims before the Bankruptcy Court. This procedure in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases is entirely legally permissible. See Langen-
Finally, the Court also finds that § 524(g) is satisfied under these circumstances because the trust utilizes mechanisms that will value and pay present and future claims in substantially the same manner. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V). As previously mentioned, all claims that have not already been settled will be subject to the requirements put forth in the 2009 CMO, which apply to both present and future property damage claims. As such, all property damage claims in Class 7A will be treated in substantially the same manner.
Thus, for all the aforementioned reasons, and after careful consideration of the Plan as an integrated whole, the Court finds no disparate treatment in regards to the claims of the Libby Claimants, BNSF, Montana, the Crown, or AMH.
G. The Best Interest of the Creditors Test
In an effort to protect creditor interests in bankruptcy proceedings, Congress created a provision in the Bankruptcy Code that is commonly referred to as the “best interest of the creditors test.” 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(i-ii). Under the test, every creditor to a Chapter 11 reorganization plan must receive at least the liquidation value of its claim under the plan as it would in a Chapter 7 proceeding against the debtor in order for the court to find the plan is in the creditors’ best interest.
The Libby Claimants allege that the Bankruptcy Court erred in finding that the Joint Plan satisfied the test by: (1) failing to make a specific finding regarding the recovery amount the Libby Claimants would receive in a hypothetical Chapter 7 proceeding; (2) disregarding the evidence of the Libby Claimants’ expected settlements and jury verdicts; and (3) failing to consider the Libby Claimants’ right to recover from Grace’s insurance policies in a hypothetical Chapter 7 case. The Court considers each argument individually below.
1. The Level of Specificity Required
The Libby Claimants allege that the Joint Plan fails to meet the best interests of the creditors test because the Bankruptcy Court did not identify the specific amount of their expected recovery under Chapter 7. Specifically, they claim that the Bankruptcy Court erred when it did not identify an exact percentage dividend that general unsecured creditors would receive in Chapter 7 liquidation.
Under the best interest of the creditors test, the plan proponent bears the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that its plan is within the creditors’ best interests. In re Briscoe Enters., Ltd. II,
2. The Consideration of Evidence Concerning Tort System Values
The Libby Claimants allege that the Joint Plan also fails the best interest of the creditors test because they stand to recover more through jury trials and settlements in the tort system in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation than under the Chapter 11 reorganization plan. They argue that the Bankruptcy Court should
First, the Libby Claimants’ claims are untimely. “Where a party had ample opportunity to produce evidence at trial, and failed to do so, a court should not permit that party to relitigate the case by presenting evidence previously ignored by the party.” Matter of Nelson Co.,
Moreover, even if this argument were timely, remand is still unwarranted because the Libby Claimants fail to take into account the practical implications of what Chapter 7 liquidation would entail in this case. As the Bankruptcy Court properly noted, valuation of Grace creditors’ claims under Chapter 7 is highly speculative due to the uncertainty associated with future claims related to latent pleural disease. These future claims are not and cannot yet be known. The Joint Plan accounts for this uncertainty in its proposed structure, and guarantees all claimants — both current and future — some degree of recovery. In contrast, a liquidation under Chapter 7 has no such reassurance in place. Rather, creditors’ claims in a Chapter 7 proceeding would be put into a pool that would not distribute payments until all claims in the class were liquidated and all the assets were reduced to cash value. See In re Kiwi Int’l Air Lines, Inc.,
Finally, the Libby Claimants contend that the best interest of the creditors test was violated because they stand to recover more through either settlements with a Chapter 7 trustee or jury verdicts against Grace outside the context of the asbestos trust. In making this argument, the Libby Claimants relied on previous pre-bankruptcy settlement amounts between Grace and Libby residents as a benchmark for their present estimated recovery in a jury trial or settlement. Their argument, however, suffers from a fundamental flaw — it compares settlement amounts obtained by non-creditors in the tort system years prior to Grace’s bankruptcy petition to the claims of current creditors after Grace filed for bankruptcy. As its name implies, the best interests of the creditors test only applies to creditors. Thus, the Libby Claimants’ reliance on pre-bankruptcy settlements with non-creditors is inapposite. Additionally, the Libby Claimants cannot prove that they would even be able to obtain settlements or jury verdicts equal in amount to those made pre-bankruptcy. These prior settlements and verdicts were rendered at a time when Grace was still a highly solvent and profitable company. Grace’s present circumstances are obviously quite different. There is currently only a finite pool of funds available to pay all claims, and this pool would rapidly deplete if individual claimants each obtained a verdict or settlement in differing amounts. Unless fortunate enough to be among those claimants able to obtain a settlement or verdict early in the process, certain Libby Claimants may not even recover at all. Thus, the Libby Claimants’ argument is without merit.
For the above reasons, the Court declines to remand to the Bankruptcy Court for the purpose of obtaining a hearing on this issue.
3. Recovery From Grace’s Insurers in a Hypothetical Chapter 7 Case
The Libby Claimants next contend that the Bankruptcy Court erred in failing to consider their alleged rights to recover compensation under Grace’s insurance policies in a hypothetical Chapter 7 case. They allege that while they would be enjoined from' pursuing insurance proceeds under Chapter 11, they could proceed directly against Grace’s insurers under Chapter 7. Thus, they claim they would receive more recovery through Chapter 7 liquidation proceedings than under the Joint Plan, and that therefore Grace’s proposed reorganization plan is not within the creditors’ best interest. For the following reasons, the Court respectfully disagrees with the Libby Claimants’ position.
The Libby Claimants spend the remainder of their argument attempting to show that they stand to recover more under Chapter 7 liquidation than under the Joint Plan. To properly address these assertions, a brief digression is needed to provide some background on the operation of Chapter 7 liquidation cases versus Chapter 11 reorganization plans in the context of the best interests of the creditors test. As already stated, the best interest of the creditors test requires a comparison of a creditor’s Chapter 11 recovery amount to its hypothetical recovery under Chapter 7. Chapter 7 of the Code addresses the liquidation process of an insolvent debtor, in which the property of the bankruptcy estate is reduced to cash value in an attempt to satisfy the debtor’s
Injunctive relief under Chapter 7 would operate slightly differently in the instant case. After the filing of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, an automatic stay against litigation would be put in place pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
The Libby Claimants allege that they would be able to circumvent the injunction in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation because “[i]t is routine for claimants to obtain relief from the automatic stay to pursue the debtor’s insurance coverage.” (Libby Br. 36.)
In fact, it appears to be settled law that, in appropriate circumstances, § 362(a) gives courts the power to enjoin parties from proceeding against non-debtors. See Piccinin,
Finally, even if the Libby Claimants could somehow circumvent the § 362 injunction under Chapter 7, their argument still fails because they have not successfully shown the Court that the amount they would recover under Chapter 7 would indeed be higher than that under Chapter 11. Under the best interests of the creditors test, courts should only consider “the dividend the creditor would receive from the [Cjhapter 7 trustee — and only that amount — for comparison with the dividend available under the [Chapter 11] plan.” In re Dow Corning, Corp.,
For all the above reasons, the Court declines to find that the best interest of the creditors has been violated under the present circumstances. The Chapter 11 Joint Plan would clearly provide the Libby Claimants with the same, and likely even greater, amount of recovery than would be available in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation of Grace. Moreover, the certainty and guaranty of at least some amount of recovery under the Joint Plan is of tremendous value, both monetarily and procedurally, to the Libby Claimants. Therefore, the Libby Claimants’ objections are overruled and the findings of the Bankruptcy Court on this point are affirmed.
H. Impairment of Claims in Chapter 11 Reorganization Plans
The Bankruptcy Code requires a reorganization plan to specify which classes of claims and interests are “impaired” and “unimpaired.” See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(2-3); In re Aleris Int’l, Inc., Bankr.No. 09-10478,
Each creditor has a set of legal, equitable, and contractual rights that may or may not be altered by bankruptcy. If the debtor’s Chapter 11 reorganization plan does not leave the creditor’s rights entirely “unaltered,” the creditor’s claim will be labeled as impaired under § 1124(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. If the creditor’s claim is impaired, the Code provides the creditor with a vote that, depending on the value of the creditor’s claim, may be sufficient to defeat confirmation of the bankruptcy plan.
Id. The court recognized that the Bankruptcy Code creates a presumption of im
In the instant case, both the Bank Lenders and AMH allege that their claims are impaired by the terms of the Joint Plan. The Court considers each Appellant’s claims separately below.
1. The Bank Lenders’ Claims
The Bank Lenders hold unsecured claims against Grace. As described in detail above, under the Joint Plan, the Bank Lenders will receive 100% payment of their $500 million principal, as well as payment of post-petition interest set at a 6.09% rate that converted into a floating Prime Rate in 2006. The Bank Lenders’ post-petition interest rate under the Joint Plan is greater than the federal judgment rate and the non-default rate set under their Credit Agreements with Grace, but less than the set default rate.
a. Entitlement to the Post-Petition Default Interest Rate
Before the Court can properly determine whether or not the Bank Lenders are impaired by the Joint Plan, it must initially determine whether they are entitled to the post-petition default interest rate under the Credit Agreements in the first place.
The first alleged event of default which the Court considers is the filing of Grace’s own bankruptcy petition. Section 10 of the parties’ Credit Agreements contains a provision providing that in the event that Grace should file for bankruptcy, this action would constitute an event of default under the contract. This provision constitutes what is known as an “ipso facto” clause. Ipso facto clauses are contractual provisions which expressly state that upon a borrower’s filing of a bankruptcy petition, the creditor may accelerate the payment of the entire unpaid balance due under the terms of the contract. I.T.T. Small Bus. Fin. Corp. v. Frederique,
The general prohibition against ipso facto clauses has its roots in two specific sections of the Bankruptcy Code:
The Court next considers the Bank Lenders’ assertion that Grace’s alleged failure to comply with certain reporting requirements under the Credit Agreements constituted an event of default. Specifically, the Bank Lenders allege that Grace failed to furnish each bank with certificates and other financial information as required by Section 8.2(a)-(e) of the Agreements, did not promptly give notice to appropriate parties as required by Section 8.7, and did not remedy these breaches within thirty days as required under the contract. Section 10 the Credit Agreements defines the events that would give rise to a default. Nowhere in this Section is there any mention of a requirement to furnish the aforementioned information to the banks or else risk defaulting under the contract. Section 10 is also devoid of any cross-reference to Sections 8.2 and 8.7, nor is there any mention of a thirty-day time window to remedy a breach. While Sections 8.2 and 8.7 may refer to such reporting requirements, they cannot be considered events of default unless they are explicitly mentioned in Section 10. In fact, the Credit Agreements themselves require this interpretation, as an “event of default” is specifically defined under the Agreements as “any of the events specified in Section 10.” {See 1999 Credit Agreement, Section 1 Definitions, at D.I. 19322.) The failure to adhere to these reporting requirements therefore does not constitute a grounds for default under the Credit Agreements.
The Court now turns to the question as to whether or not Grace’s failure to pay the post-petition interest and its failure to repay the principal when the loans
The record indicates that prior to its bankruptcy petition, Grace was current with its payment obligations to the Bank Lenders.
Nonetheless, the Bank Lenders assert that Supreme Court precedent mandates that a debtor’s “happenstance of bankruptcy” should not impair a creditor’s state law rights. Butner v. United States,
Under § 362(a) of the Code, a party filing for bankruptcy is automatically granted temporary relief from the assertion of any legal actions against it. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3); see also In re Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Corp.,
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debt- or a breathing spell from his creditors .... [It] also provides creditor protection. Without it, certain creditors would be able to pursue their own remedies against the debtor’s property. Those who acted first would obtain payment of the claims in preference to and to the detriment of other creditors.
See H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5963 at 6297. The statements in the statute’s legislative history amplify the underlying public policy in federal bankruptcy law that a debtor’s bankruptcy estate should be maximized for the benefit of both the debtor and all of its creditors. This policy is particularly important in reorganization cases, where the automatic stay is utilized to maintain the status quo and avoid piecemeal liquidation while the debtor formulates a reorganization plan. See NextWave,
A second federal interest at play here is the Bankruptcy Code’s central objective of facilitating a debtor’s reorganization. The whole point of filing a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition is to loosen the financial noose that has been placed around the debtor’s neck so that it can reassess its available assets and liabilities and proceed forward as a viable entity able to properly satisfy all of its creditors and outstanding obligations. Section 1123(a)(5)(G) of the Code facilitates this central objective of reorganization, providing that a debtor’s reorganization plan shall “provide adequate means for the plan’s implementation, such as ... curing or waiving any default.” 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(G). Although not explicitly defined, curing a default has been interpreted to mean the reversal of an event triggering the alleged default so as to return to pre-default conditions during the reorganization period. See NextWave,
Based on all the above, the Court finds that the Bank Lenders are not entitled to the default post-petition interest rate because: (1) no event of default giving way to the default rate has actually lawfully occurred here,
b. Section 1124(1) and Alleged Impairment Under the Joint Plan
Under § 1124(1), the presumption of creditor impairment is only overcome if the debtor’s reorganization plan does not adversely alter any of the creditor’s legal, equitable, or contractual rights. See 11 U.S.C. § 1124(1); PPI Enters.,
Additionally, the Third Circuit in PPI Enterprises specifically provided that once a debtor files its bankruptcy petition, a creditor is only entitled to its rights under the Bankruptcy Code. PPI Enters.,
c. Solvency and Impairment
A significant point of contention between the parties is Grace’s solvency. The Bank Lenders contend that Grace is presumed to be solvent because equity will retain an interest under the Joint Plan since Grace’s shareholders will still receive their shareholder interests. On this point, the Bankruptcy Court found that a presumption of post-petition default interest is payable to the Bank Lenders only if solvency has been established. See In re W.R. Grace & Co., Bankr.No. 01-1139,
First, the Court will briefly comment on the issue of solvency. The Bankruptcy Court ultimately found that a determination of Grace’s solvency could not be made as a matter of fact,
Second, the Bankruptcy Court did not run afoul of PPI Enterprises. It is true that in that case the Third Circuit found that “to be unimpaired, the claim must receive postpetition interest.” PPI Enters.,
Moreover, the Bank Lenders claim that PPI Enterprises applies equally in solvent and insolvent debtor cases. But PPI Enterprises said nothing about insolvent debtors. Rather, the Third Circuit favorably cited to a footnote in a bankruptcy court decision which stated that “a solvent debtor must ... pay post-petition and pre-confirmation interest on a claim to have a
Even if the Court were to assume that Grace was solvent,
For all the above reasons, the Court therefore overrules the Bank Lenders’ ob
2. AMH’s Claims
a. Entitlement to Post-Petition Interest
Under Grace’s Joint Plan, claims in Class 7 either fall into the traditional property damage category in Class 7A, or the American ZAI property damage category in Class 7B. Claims in Class 7A are further delineated as “resolved” claims or “unresolved” claims. Resolved claims are those that have already been settled through a settlement agreement reached by the parties or an appropriate court order, while unresolved claims are those that still remain in dispute. Both types of claims are subject to slightly different distribution procedures for payment,
AMH contends that this categorization of its claims is incorrect. Rather, AMH believes that its claims in Class 7A should be categorized as impaired because Class 7A claimants are not entitled to recover interest on their claims, thereby affecting their legal rights. In order to be impaired by the Joint Plan on these grounds, AMH would first need to show that it was entitled to the interest in some way. The general rule in bankruptcy is that “unsecured creditors are not entitled to recover post-petition interest.” In re Wash. Mut., Inc.,
In the instant case, however, the issue of solvency was never determined, despite the Bankruptcy Court’s willingness to do so. See In re W.R. Grace & Co.,
b. The Effect of Impairment on Voting Rights
The distinction between impaired and unimpaired claims is important because only impaired classes have a right to vote to accept or reject a reorganization plan. See Polytherm,
Moreover, § 524(g) has additional requirements in place for voting procedures under Chapter 11 reorganization plans related to debtor asbestos liability. Specifically, in order to accept the debtor’s reorganization plan, the statute requires that all classes that are affected by the trust’s distribution procedures must vote to accept the plan by a majority of at least 75%. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2)(B) (ii) (IV) (bb).
AMH alleges that its placement in an unimpaired class negatively impacts its voting rights. This contention, however, is without merit. Sections 6.1 and 6.3 of the Joint Plan provide that all impaired classes are entitled to vote on acceptance or rejection of the Plan, while all unimpaired classes are conclusively presumed to have voted to accept the Plan. The Plan recognizes, however, that Class 7 is actually one class split into two subclasses, with Class 7A categorized as an unimpaired class and Class 7B categorized as an impaired class. Section 524(g) would be violated if the two subclasses were treated differently for voting purposes. Cognizant of this fact, the Plan Proponents crafted the Joint Plan so that the votes of all claimants in Class 7 would be solicited and tabulated as one, single class. Therefore, even though Class 7A is categorized as an impaired class, the terms of the Joint Plan provide that it is still entitled to vote on the Plan’s acceptance or rejection. Having already determined above that AMH’s claims are properly categorized in Class 7A, AMH would thus still be allowed to vote. As such, its voting rights have not been negatively impacted.
I. The Libby Claimants’ Right to Trial by Jury Claims
The Libby Claimants assert that the Bankruptcy Court erred in confirming the Joint Plan because its present structure deprives them of their constitutional and statutory rights to a jury trial. As described above, the Joint Plan provides two forms of claims processing: Expedited Review and Individual Review. If a claimant is dissatisfied -with the outcome of these two procedures, he can seek further review through mediation and nonbinding arbitration. If the claimant is still dissatisfied after exhausting these options, he can then elect to have his claims liquidated in the tort system by jury trial. However, if a claimant elects to proceed to jury trial, his potential recovery under the Joint Plan is limited to the lesser of the amount of the jury verdict or the Maximum Value established by the TDP. The Libby Claimants allege that this “lesser-of’ limitation on their recovery places an undue burden on the exercise of a constitutional right, as well as violating their statutory rights under 28 U.S.C. § 1411. The Court considers each argument separately below.
1. Rights Under the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in suits at common law.
The Libby Claimants do not object to the Joint Plan because its structure and procedure for the liquidation of personal injury claims does not allow them to pursue their constitutional right to a jury trial. In fact, they acknowledge that they ultimately can obtain a jury verdict if they are dissatisfied with their categorizations or amounts awarded under Expedited Review, Individual Review, arbitration, and mediation. The Libby Claimants instead argue that the “cap” imposed by the asbestos trust — the lesser of the jury verdict or the Maximum Value established by the TDP — serves as a constructive limitation upon their constitutional right to a jury trial because a jury might not be the ultimate determinant of their award amount. The Libby Claimants do not cite to any legal authority to support this argument.
In the instant case, when Congress enacted § 524(g), it made a policy decision to allow debtor corporations in asbestos-related bankruptcy proceedings to reorganize their corporate structure to be able to satisfy their current and future asbestos liabilities. See In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc.,
Vested with this legislative authority, the legal representatives in the Grace litigation established the current structure of the Joint Plan, which allows for the determination of claimant compensation by a jury. By the same token, however, the legal representatives also established the challenged de facto cap on an individual's compensation. They made this well-reasoned decision, no doubt, to ensure that there would be enough money available for all present and future claimants’ recovery — a decision directly in accordance with the legislative goals of § 524(g). Thus, the current structure of the Joint Plan would not require a “reexamination” of a jury’s verdict in contravention of the Seventh Amendment. Rather, it merely involves implementation of a legislative policy. It
Furthermore, the Libby Claimants are not required to participate in the asbestos trust pursuant to the Joint Plan. The benefit of the Joint Plan is that participants avoid unpredictable piecemeal litigation, thereby ensuring the availability of more funds for claimant compensation. In return for receiving the benefit of ensured compensation, plan participants are restricted to the structure of the TDP. The election to participate in the Joint Plan’s settlement options is, however, entirely voluntary. Claimants are not restricted from instead opting to bring an individualized lawsuit against the PI Trust. Although the lawsuit would be stayed for a period of time due to the TDP, this temporary delay would not result in a Seventh Amendment violation since the case would still ultimately be tried before a jury. Thus, there is nothing preventing the Libby Claimants from exercising their Seventh Amendment rights through an independent jury trial in the tort system. The Libby Claimants may not, however, reap the benefits of both the Joint Plan’s settlement options and an independent jury trial — either they must wait to pursue an independent jury trial with the mere possibility of obtaining a larger jury verdict and the potential of an award less than the trust’s Maximum Value, or they may elect to participate in the Joint Plan’s settlement options and their benefit of ensured, but limited, compensation. Either way the Appellants’ ability to pursue a jury verdict eliminates any Seventh Amendment concerns.
Finally, the Libby Claimants’ argument runs contra to § 524(g)’s explicit requirement to treat all “present claims and future demands that involve similar claims in substantially the same manner.” 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V). One of Congress’ primary intentions in creating § 524(g) was to ensure uniform treatment of all claimants. If the Libby Claimants were not subject to the de facto cap on jury verdicts and judgments under the TDP, they would actually receive preferential treatment under the Plan in comparison to other similarly situated claimants within Class 6. Moreover, § 524(g) was also designed to ensure that present claimants do not exhaust all of the debtor’s assets before future claimants have even manifested injuries. H.R.Rep. No. 103-835, at 41 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3349-50; 140 Cong. Rec. S4523 (Apr. 20, 1994) (statements of Senator Brown and Graham); see also In re Grossman’s, Inc.,
For all the above reasons, the Court finds that the Joint Plan does not violate the Libby Claimants’ constitutional right to a trial by jury.
In conjunction with their constitutional claim, the Libby Claimants also assert that they have a statutory right to a jury trial pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1411(a). Section § 1411(a) states that causes of action arising under “[T]itle 11 do not affect any right to trial by jury that an individual has under applicable non-bankruptcy law with regard to a personal injury or wrongful death tort claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 1411(a). As described in detail below, the Court finds that the Libby Claimants’ statutory right to a jury trial has not been violated.
The Libby Claimants have a choice available to them when deciding what course of action to follow regarding their recovery, and neither option infringes upon their statutory rights to pursue a jury verdict. Under the first choice, the Libby Claimants may elect to participate in the Joint Plan’s settlement options, and will thereby accept a set award established by the structure of the plan under Expedited Review, Individual Review, arbitration, or mediation. Although § 1411(a) provides that Title 11 actions should not affect the right to a jury trial in personal injury or wrongful death cases, this does not of course mean that such cases must be tried before a jury. See In re Dow Corning Corp.,
Finally, the Court provides some clarity on an issue raised by both parties — the apparent conflict between § 524(g) and § 1411(a). When briefing the Court on this issue, Grace argued that when two statutes such as § 524(g) and § 1411(a) conflict with one another, the statute that is later in time and more specific should control, which in the instant case is § 524(g). On the other hand, the Libby Claimants argued that § 1411(a) should control because it expressly provides for jury trial rights, whereas § 524(g) is silent on this point. At first glance, these two statutory provisions are seemingly in conflict. However, closer scrutiny reveals that the two provisions can be aligned with one another and, if possible, should be read in harmony. See Morton v. Mancari,
Section 1411(a) has been interpreted to be a statute that is “strictly procedural in nature” and that “come[s] into play only when a right to trial is established.” Dow Corning,
Based upon this Court’s conclusions that the Libby Claimants’ have not been deprived of either the constitutional or statutory rights to a jury trial, the Bankruptcy Court’s holding on this point is affirmed.
J. The Fair and Equitable Test and The Absolute Priority Rule
Section 1129(a) of the Bankruptcy Code lists sixteen conditions that must be satisfied prior to a reorganization plan’s confirmation under Chapter 11.
Section 1129(b) sets forth the fair and equitable test, which requires that a reorganization plan be fair and equitable to each non-accepting class of impaired claims or interests under the plan. Section 1129(b) provides, in relevant part, that:
[I]f all of the applicable requirements of subsection (a) of this section other than paragraph (8) are met with respect to a plan, the court, on request of the proponent of the plan, shall confirm the plannotwithstanding the requirements of such paragraph if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1). Subsection (b)(2) of the statute goes on to set forth the nonexclusive requirements for meeting the fair and equitable test. One of these requirements is that the reorganization does not violate the absolute priority rule. The absolute priority rule is “a judicial invention that predated the Bankruptcy Code. It arose from the concern that because a debtor proposed its own reorganization plan, the plan could be ‘too good a deal’ for that debtor’s owners.” In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc.,
Several Appellants — specifically Montana, the Crown, BNSF, AMH,
It is a well-known legal rule in Chapter 11 reorganization litigation that “[u]nder § 1129(b), a finding that a plan is ‘fair and equitable’ is required only in the context of a cramdown[.]” In re Dow Corning Corp.,
Given that § 1129(b) does not apply to this case, the absolute priority rule likewise does not come into play here. The requirements of the absolute priority rule are subsumed within the rest of the cramdown requirements set forth in § 1129(b). See Armstrong,
Therefore, the Court finds that neither the fair and equitable test nor the absolute priority rule are violated under these circumstances. Accordingly, Appellants’ objections on these points are overruled.
On June 5, 2010, Garlock filed its own petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Having filed for bankruptcy, Garlock left the realm of tort litigation and entered the enclosed sphere of bankruptcy, where it will benefit from an automatic stay against litigation pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 until it has successfully reorganized. Given its current Chapter 11 status, the Bankruptcy Court found that Garlock lacked standing to object to Grace’s Joint Plan. Most recently, Garlock filed its own proposed reorganization plan on November 28, 2011. (See Debtor’s Joint Plan of Reorganization, Bankr. No. 10-31607 (Bankr.W.D.N.C.), Doc. No. 1664 (“Garlock Plan”).) Despite the Bankruptcy Court’s finding, Garlock maintains that it satisfies the requirements for standing in the instant litigation, and thus asserts that it is entitled to substantively challenge Grace’s Joint Plan.
1. Garlock’s Standing
Standing is a “threshold question in every federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain suit.” Warth v. Seldin,
The Third Circuit recently clarified the scope of bankruptcy standing in GIT, providing that a party challenging a reorganization plan in bankruptcy court must meet both the constitutional requirements for standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, as well as the statutory standing requirements put forth by the Bankruptcy Code in 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b). Id. at 210. In so holding, the Third Circuit found that “Article III standing and standing under
In order to have constitutional standing under Article III of the Constitution, a party must first satisfy three requirements. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167,
Similarly, § 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code governs the parties’ standing to litigate their claims in the bankruptcy context, and provides that “[a] party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors’ committee, an equity security holders’ committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee, may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this chapter.” 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b). In GIT, the Third Circuit adopted the Seventh Circuit’s definition of a “party in interest” to mean “anyone who has a legally protected interest that could be affected by a bankruptcy proceeding.” GIT,
a. Injury in Fact
In regards to the first element of standing, Garloek alleges that, as a former, current, and potentially future co-defendant with Grace, it has suffered an injury in fact because its alleged rights to contribution
In order to ascertain whether Garlock did or will at some point suffer an injury, it is necessary to consider the longstanding litigation history of these two parties. Both Garlock and Grace previously manufactured products that contained traces of asbestos, and were frequently named as co-defendants in personal injury lawsuits when the harmful effects of asbestos were discovered. Unable to satisfy its massive liabilities, Grace filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2001, thereby benefitting from the protective shield of the § 362 automatic stay and § 524(g) injunction. Garlock faced a similar fate, and filed its own bankruptcy petition nine years later in 2010. Thus, in order to ascertain at which points, if any, Garlock suffered an injury at the hands of Grace, it is helpful to divide the parties’ litigation history into three relevant time periods: (1) prior to 2001 when both parties were solvent entities and were litigating their asbestos liabilities in the tort system; (2) the period between 2001 and 2010, after Grace filed for bankruptcy but before Garlock filed its own petition; and (3) the present post-2010 period when both parties are in bankruptcy.
Prior to 2001, Grace and Garlock were co-defendants in the tort system for nearly two decades. If Garlock wanted to seek contribution and/or set-off from Grace at this point in time, it was free to do so and could presumably recover from Grace, given that the hurdle of bankruptcy was not yet present. Garlock, however, has introduced no evidence that it ever actually impled Grace or sought contribution and/or set-off from it during these two decades. Moreover, Garlock has offered no evidence indicating an amount, if any, still owed to it by Grace for judgments it suffered during this time period.
On April 2, 2001, Grace filed its bankruptcy petition. It was at this point that the rules of the game changed significantly. Armed with the protections afforded by §§ 362 and 524(g), Grace was immunized from having further legal actions asserted against it, and all future asbestos claims were set to be channeled to a trust rather than asserted against Grace itself. If Garlock suffered a judgment during this time for which Grace was also partly responsible, then Garlock could file a proof of claim against the Debtors and such a claim would be handled as an “Indirect PI Trust Claim” in accordance with the terms of Grace’s Joint Plan and TDP. As noted by the Bankruptcy Court, however, Garlock has not filed any proofs of claims here. See In re W.R. Grace & Co.,
Unlike Grace’s Joint Plan, Garlock’s reorganization plan handles future and current claims differently. Future claims— defined as those “for which an alleged asbestos-related injury allegedly becomes manifest or is diagnosed on or after the date the Confirmation Order is entered by the Court”- — are channeled to a post-confirmation trust by means of a § 524(g) injunction. (Garlock Glossary of Terms (“Glossary”) ¶ 68.) Once channeled to the trust, Garlock’s plan provides that these future claims will be assumed, liquidated, and paid in accordance with the claims resolution procedures outlined in Garlock’s plan. (Garlock Plan §§ 2.1, 2.2.5.) Current claims, on the other hand, are to be paid by Garlock itself upon reorganization, and the channeling injunction does not apply to such claims. (Id. §§ 2.1, 2.2.4.) There are three types of current claims under Garlock’s plan: (1) claims asserted against Garlock prior to the filing of its bankruptcy petition, (2) claims that arose between the 2010 petition and the present, and (3) unknown claims that will presumably arise before Garlock’s plan is confirmed. (Glossary ¶ 41; Doc. 168, Garlock Mot. for Recons. 4.)
The crux of Garlock’s argument rests on the methods of recovery available to asbestos claimants under Garlock’s plan. Similar to Grace’s Joint Plan, Garlock claimants may choose to accept a pre-de-termined settlement offer amount from Garlock. (Garlock Plan §§ 2.1, 2.3.1.) Claimants may also, however, elect to pursue a second “Litigation Option,” under which they can sue Garlock
[193] This feared threat of potential litigation in the tort system, however, remains entirely speculative at this point in time because Garlock’s plan has merely been proposed, not confirmed. It is well-established that the terms of a Chapter 11 plan do not become binding until the plan in question is confirmed. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a); In re Northwestern Corp.,
Moreover, it is highly likely that Garlock’s reorganization plan will need to undergo several revisions and versions — as did the plans proposed by Grace and other high-profile Chapter 11 asbestos defendants — before it is ultimately confirmed. The record, in fact, reflects this point. At a January 26, 2012 hearing before the court presiding over Garlock’s bankruptcy in the Western District of North Carolina, the Bankruptcy Judge explicitly stated that:
My feeling when I saw the plan, which has been reenforced since reading the committee’s papers, is that it was not something that could be confirmed and that, in fact, it looked to me like a sham.... I am not prepared to approve a disclosure statement for a plan that I don’t think has the slimmest chance of being confirmed, but I think I ought to give you a chance to convince me that I am wrong about that, which you haven’t had yet[.]
(Bankr. No. 10-31607, 01/26/12 Hr’g Tr. at 10-11.) These comments highlight the fact that Garlock’s plan remains at a highly preliminary stage, and therefore any litigation threat that Garlock faces under its terms is entirely speculative at this point in time. The law is clear, however, that in order to satisfy the requirements of standing, a party must show that it has “sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of the challenged [] conduct[.]” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
Garlock’s admission of an unlikelihood of injury is further evident from the language found in its Disclosure Statement. According to this document, “the vast majority of all pending claims against [Garlock] ... are stale and dormant.” (Disclosure Statement for Debtors’ Joint Plan of Reorganization (“Disclosure Statement”) § 2.4.3.) The Disclosure Statement further provides that, of the alleged 100,000 claims asserted against Garlock prior to its petition, approximately 85% were filed more than four years ago and over 35% were filed more than ten years ago, and that these claims “have not been pursued because the claimants no longer intend to assert a claim ... or lack evidence necessary to do so.” (Id.) Moreover, approxi
Furthermore, in its briefing submitted to this Court, Garlock admitted that its second and third categories of current claims — those that arose since the filing of its petition and those that may arise before confirmation — remain largely “unknown.” (See Garlock Mot. for Recons. (“Recons. Mot.”) 4.) Garlock has not offered a single piece of evidence explaining where such judgments were or are likely to be entered, exactly how many judgments were entered to date, the amount of any such judgments, and, most importantly for purposes of this litigation, whether Grace also bore some degree of responsibility for any such claims. Thus, Garlock’s testimony before the Bankruptcy Court presiding over its case, the language in its Disclosure Statement, and its own briefing before this Court further support the finding that any injury it may face is entirely conjectural.
Based on the above reasoning, the Court concludes that Garlock has not articulated how it has suffered any injury here, let alone one that is “real and immediate” and not merely “conjectural or hypothetical” at this point in time. Lyons,
The second and third elements of constitutional standing provide that the party’s injury must be fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct, and that a favorable decision from the court could likely alleviate the injury. See PA Prison Soc’y v. Cortes,
Here, even if Garlock could prove that it suffered or will suffer an injury, it has nonetheless failed to introduce evidence indicating Grace’s partial responsibility for them. As discussed above, Garlock has introduced no evidence indicating that it ever impleaded, sought contribution and/or setoff, or filed a proof of claim against the Debtors. The record does indicate, however, that Garlock has successfully asserted proofs of claims and received substantial contribution payments from other similar asbestos personal injury trusts, including the Armstrong World Industries Asbestos PI Trust, the United States Gypsum Asbestos PI Trust, two Owens Corning Fiberglass/Fibreboard trusts, and the Babcock and Wilcox Company Trust. (See Payments to Garlock on Indirect Claims as of July 31, 2009 (“Trust Payment Chart”), Garlock Ex. 73, JA 017469.) If, in fact, it holds claims against Grace based on contribution and set-off, Garlock has offered no reason why it still has not filed a proof of claim that could serve as evidence of any liability that Grace may owe it.
Finally, given that Garlock has failed to establish a likelihood of injury here that is attributable to Grace, it follows that a federal court ruling will not remedy allegedly aggrieved Garlock. As such, Garlock also cannot establish the third element of constitutional standing. Therefore, based on the above reasoning and evidence of record, the Court finds that Garlock lacks standing under Article III of the Constitution.
c. Statutory Standing
As mentioned above, § 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code grants persons that are “parties in interest” to the litigation the authority to substantively challenge a bankruptcy reorganization plan. Section 1109(b) provides a list of parties in interest, including: “the debtor, the trustee, a creditors’ committee, an equity security holders’ committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b). Garlock does not fit within any of these categories. Notably, Garlock is not considered a creditor here because it has not yet filed a proof of claim against the PI Trust.
Garlock likewise does not satisfy the Third Circuit’s recent definition of a “party in interest” in GIT because, as discussed in detail above, Garlock has not identified “some legally protected interest that either
2. Garlock’s Arguments On the Merits
Notwithstanding Garlock’s lack of standing in the instant litigation, the Court will nonetheless address the merits of its objections because both parties specifically request that the Court “go further ... with more detailed rulings on Garlock’s arguments on the merits [because] [s]uch rulings would put to rest, both here and in the Third Circuit, any contention by Gar-lock ... that its substantive arguments on the merits were overlooked.” (Plan Proponents’ Sur-reply Re: Mot. for Recons. (“Grace Sur-reply”) 1-2; Garlock Reply 9.) Given that both Grace and Garlock have fully briefed and orally argued these points, the Court will acquiesce to this request, and assume for the purposes of the Memorandum Opinion only that Gar-lock has standing to raise these objections.
The central point of Garlock’s argument on the merits is that Grace’s Joint Plan, as applied to it, is unfair and inequitable. More specifically, Garlock argues that the Joint Plan shifts Grace’s asbestos personal injury liability to its co-defendants, including Garlock.
a. “Fair and Equitable” Under the Bankruptcy Code
In crafting its first argument, Garlock contends that the term “fair and equitable” has the same meaning under § 524(g) as it does under § 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. Garlock thus asserts that § 524(g) incorporates the absolute priority rule defined in § 1129(b), and that the rule is violated under the present circumstances because shareholders retain equity under the Joint Plan. An analysis of both statutory provisions and relevant caselaw, however, indicates otherwise.
Section 1129(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code codifies the absolute priority rule, and provides that: “the court ... shall confirm the plan ... if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan.” 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (emphasis added). By its terms, this statutory provision governs how a reorganization plan prioritizes classes of claimants when comparing their
Section 524(g), on the other hand, mandates that a channeling injunction in a reorganization plan be “fair and equitable with respect to [] persons that might subsequently assert [] demands, in light of the benefits provided, or to be provided, to such trust on behalf of such debtor or debtors or such third party.” 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). In this context, the Code requires a reorganization plan to be “fair and equitable” to those persons that may assert demands against the PI Trust in the future — not with respect to impaired and dissenting classes of creditors as required by § 1129(b).
A plain reading of the statutory text therefore indicates that both statutory provisions have distinct purposes and applications under the Bankruptcy Code. Contrary to Garlock’s assertion that “fair and equitable” is a legal term of art that has the same meaning under both provisions, the Supreme Court has previously found that “[a] given term in the same statute may take on distinct characters ... calling for different ways of implementation.” Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp.,
In the present context, the “fair and equitable” requirement of § 1129(b)— and therefore the absolute priority rule — is inapplicable because all impaired classes here have voted to accept the Plan. Assuming arguendo that Garlock could satisfy the elements of standing, any hypothetical future demands that it may assert would be categorized as “Indirect PI Trust Claims” in Class 6, which as a class voted 99.51% in number and 99.39% in dollar amount in favor of the Joint Plan. Given that Garlock’s class voted largely in favor of — not against — acceptance of the Joint Plan, the “fair and equitable” requirement of § 1129(b) and absolute priority rule do not apply here.
However, the “fair and equitable” requirement of § 524(g) does apply here, as Grace is a debtor seeking bankruptcy relief through the utilization of an asbestos channeling injunction and corresponding trust under the statute. Applied here, § 524(g) requires the channeling injunction in the Joint Plan to be fair and equitable to all holders of future demands “in light of’ the benefits Grace and the Asbestos Protected Parties provided to the PI Trust. Courts within the Third Circuit have interpreted the term “fair and equitable” in this context to be “closely tied to the value being contributed to the plan.” In re Congoleum Corp.,
b. The Effect of the Joint Plan and TDP on Garlock’s Alleged Pre-Petition Rights to Contribution and Set-off
Garlock also asserts that its alleged rights to contribution and set-off from Grace are negatively impacted by the TDP. Specifically, Garlock asserts its “rights and remedies” against the PI Trust are “far inferior” to those it may hold against Grace outside the context of bankruptcy, and that the Plan Proponents “must prove that the replacement rights and remedies ... are the full equivalent of the rights such demand holders possess against Grace.” (Garlock Main Br. 31.)
The Court first considers Gar-lock’s alleged contribution claims. As noted by the Bankruptcy Court, both here and in the Pittsburgh Coming bankruptcy proceedings, the purpose of contribution is contingent on a finding of joint liability, and the right to recover on a contribution claim must await payment of the joint tortfeasor’s liability by the entity asserting contribution. In re W.R. Grace & Co.,
The Court next considers whether Garlock’s alleged rights to set-off are negatively impacted by the Joint Plan and TDP. Garlock alleges that the Joint Plan thwarts its ability to obtain set-off from Grace because the TDP provides personal injury claimants with “unusual procedural rights.” (Garlock Main Br. 35.) In particular, Garlock objects to §§ 6.3 and 5.7 of the TDP. Section 6.3 provides that claimants can request deferment of the processing of their claims for up to three years without affecting their status for statute of limitations purposes, and also permits claimants to withdraw their claims at any time without prejudicing their ability to subsequently file a future claim. (See TDP § 6.3, JA 000324.) Section 5.7(b)(3) states that a claimant’s failure to identify Grace products as the basis of their asbestos claim does not automatically preclude recovery from the PI Trust, so long as the claimant satisfies other necessary criteria.
Notably, Garlock provides no citation to any case law or Code provision to support its claims based on §§ 6.3 and 5.7, but rather bases its entire argument on another litigation in which it was involved in Maryland state court, Puller v. ACandS, Inc. (Balt. City Cir. Ct. No. 24-X-02-000023); appeal denied by Crane v. Puller,
A closer scrutiny of Puller, however, shows that it actually does not support Garlock’s objection. According to documents in the Joint Appendix before the Court in the instant litigation, the plaintiff in Puller actually recovered from the NGC Trust before recovering any payment from Garlock.
Garlock also takes issue with other TDP provisions related to the confidentiality of certain information. On these grounds, Garlock once again objects to § 5.7(b)(3), which states that “[ejvidence submitted to establish proof of Grace Exposure is for the sole benefit of the PI Trust, not third parties or defendants in the tort system.” (TDP § 5.7(b)(3), JA 000313.) Garlock likewise objects to § 6.5 of the TDP, which provides that:
All submissions to the PI Trust by a holder of a PI Trust Claim or a proof of claim form an d materials related thereto shall be treated as made in the course of settlement discussions between the holder and the PI Trust, and intended by the parties to be confidential and to be protected by all applicable state and federal privileges, including but not limited to those directly applicable to settlement discussions.
(TDP § 6.5, JA 0003325.) According to the terms of § 6.5, Grace will keep claimant information confidential, unless the claimant permits it to disclose the information “to another trust established for the benefit of asbestos personal injury claimants pursuant to section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code ... or in response to a
The record is devoid of any evidence that the PI Trust was designed to operate as a “secret claims processing facility.” To the contrary, the evidence of record demonstrates that the confidentiality provisions were based on the same rationales and policies used in standard tort system litigation that favor confidentiality in settlement negotiations and discussions. In particular, federal courts have recognized “a strong public interest in preserving the confidentiality of settlement or arbitration proceedings,” because this “eneourag[es] settlement out of court as a more efficient solution [in] heavily litigated area[s] of law” and especially complex lawsuits, such as the one at hand. Arkema Inc. v. Asarco, Inc., No. Civ.A.05-5087,
Garlock also alleges that the confidentiality provisions of the TDP alter rights that it held prior to Grace’s bankruptcy filing because it is now prevented from obtaining certain claimant information. In response to this argument, Grace asserts that Garlock may still obtain claimant information under § 6.5 of the TDP,
c. Appointment of an Independent Representative for Garlock’s Alleged Future Demands
Finally, the Court considers Garlock’s argument that the Joint Plan cannot be confirmed and the channeling injunction cannot be entered because the Bankruptcy Court did not appoint an independent representative for co-defendant demand holders. In essence, Garlock avers that a single representative cannot adequately represent the interests of personal injury claimants and eodefendants simultaneously because their interests are “profoundly adverse” to one another with respect to the TDP. Garlock’s argument is premised on the notion that its demands are fundamentally different from any future demands that may subsequently be brought by personal injury claimants. Moreover, in a separate but related argument, Garlock also claims that the Asbestos Creditors Committee (“ACC”), the entity largely responsible for the drafting of the TDP, used its drafting powers to “rigg[] the TDP” in a way that benefits personal injury claimants at the expense of co-defendants such as Garlock. (Gar-lock Main Br. 33.)
The Court begins with Garlock’s allegation that the appointment of the PI FCR in this case as a representative of all future claimants violates the statutory requirements of § 524(g).
Aside from its argument premised on § 524(g), Garlock further contends that the present structure of the TDP and failure to appoint an independent representative for its demands violates prior precedent. Garlock relies on the Second Circuit’s decision in Findley v. Blinken (In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.),
Findley dealt with a class action grouping under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
In the instant matter, we are at the confirmation stage. At best, Garlock is an entity that may pay a future demand holder and thereby acquire an indirect claim. In that regard, its interests are no different from any other Indirect Claimant’s interests. Its rights rise no higher than, are dependent on, and will be treated the same as, that of the future demand holder whose claim against the [ ] Trust Garlock pays. The [ ] Plan and TDP provide for the reimbursement of Indirect Claims to the same extent as the Direct Claims to which the Indirect Claimants are subrogated by virtue of the payment they make to the Direct Claimants.... To give Garlock more ... would be unfair and inequitable to the Direct Claimants.
Pittsburgh Corning,
As to Garlock’s related argument that the TDP is fundamentally flawed because it was partially drafted by the allegedly self-interested ACC, the Court notes that Garlock fails to point to any evidence in the record that would support such a finding.
Thus, having now submitted over 100 pages of briefing and exhibits, as well as being twice given the opportunity to orally argue its position to the Court, Garlock can no longer complain that it has repeatedly unfairly denied an opportunity to have its claims heard and considered. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that Garlock fails to satisfy the elements of constitutional and bankruptcy standing. In any event, even if Garlock were to have standing to substantively challenge the Joint Plan and TDP, its claims would nonetheless fail on the merits for the reasons detailed above. Garlock’s objections to the Joint Plan are therefore overruled.
L. The Anti-Assignment Provisions in Insurance Policies
At differing points in time prior to Grace’s bankruptcy petition, insurance companies AXA Belgium, GEICO, and Republic
All three insurers objected to the assignment at the Confirmation Hearing. The Bankruptcy Court nonetheless authorized the assignment in its Confirmation Order confirming the Joint Plan. The Bankruptcy Court’s decision to do so was rooted in the language of § 1123 of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that:
Notwithstanding any otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law, a plan shall ... provide adequate means for the plan’s implementation, such as ... transfer of all or any part of the property of the estate to one or more entities, whether organized before or after the confirmation of such plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(B). In support of its holding, the Bankruptcy Court relied on the Third Circuit’s decision in In re Combustion Engineering, Inc.,
The Third Circuit addressed this issue in its prior precedential holdings in Combustion Engineering, Inc.,
Most recently, the Third Circuit directly addressed this issue in a case precisely analogous to the one at hand, In re Federal-Mogul, Inc.,
The holdings of Combustion Engineering and Federal-Mogul are directly applicable to the instant litigation. Akin to the debtors in those two cases, Grace has also filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy as a result of its overwhelming asbestos liabilities, and its reorganization plan includes an Asbestos PI Trust, to which it purports to assign
M. Residual Bank Lender Issues
The Bank Lenders raise various additional objections to confirmation of the Joint Plan. Most especially, they attempt to invoke two provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, §§ 1129(a)(7) and 1129(b), as support for their claim for the post-petition interest set at the default rate under the parties’ Credit Agreements. The Court already addressed both these statutory sections elsewhere in this Memorandum in regard to other Appellants’ objections. As previously noted, § 1129(a)(7) governs the best interests of the creditors test, while § 1129(b) encompasses the fair and equitable test and the absolute priority rule. The Court need not dwell on either objection, however, since the Third Circuit has made clear that both statutory sections only require payment of post-petition interest to unsecured creditors when the debtor in question is both impaired and solvent. In re PPI Enters. (U.S.), Inc.,
1. The Best Interests of the Creditors Test and Legal Rate of Interest Objections
As previously discussed, the best interests of the creditors test requires that every creditor in a Chapter 11 reorganization plan receive at least the liquidation value under Chapter 11 as it would in a Chapter 7 liquidation. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(i—ii); see also In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc.,
The Bankruptcy Court here favored this approach as well. The Bank Lenders now contend that this was erroneous and that the state law approach should apply, which they claim would entitle them to the default interest rate under the Credit Agreements. This objection is overruled.
In any event, it does not matter which of the three approaches would properly apply here because none of the three
2. The Absolute Priority Rule Objections
As stated above in reference to other Appellants’ objections, the absolute priority rule requires a Chapter 11 reorganization plan to be fair and equitable with respect to an impaired, dissenting class of unsecured claims if (1) it pays the class’s claims in full, or if (2) it does not allow holders of any junior claims or interests to receive or retain any property under the plan “on account of’ such claims or interests. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i-ii); Bank of Am. v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship,
The Bank Lenders contend that the absolute priority rule is violated under the present circumstances because Grace’s shareholders will retain value under the Joint Plan. The Court finds no such violation for several reasons. First, the rule only applies to unsecured creditors that are impaired by the terms of the plan, and the Court already determined that the Bank Lenders are not impaired. Second, the Bank Lenders will be paid the full amount of their allowed claims. Allowed claims do not include claims for unma-tured, post-petition interest. As such, the Bank Lenders’ allowed claims only consist of the principal and interest that was due as of the Petition Date. The Joint Plan will
3. The Fair and Equitable Test and the Authority of the Committee to Bind the Bank Lenders
Section 1129(b) provides that a reorganization plan cannot be confirmed unless it does not “discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable” with respect to impaired classes of creditors that have rejected the plan. 11 U.S.C. 1129(b)(1). “[T]he decision for or against confirmation is placed squarely within the discretion of the judges and encompasses all their intrinsic perceptions of fairness and equity.” In re Horwitz,
The Bank Lenders contend that, regardless of whether they are impaired or not, the equities of this case lead to the conclusion that the Joint Plan is not fair and equitable to them. Upon a consideration of the equities of this particular case, the Court still finds that the rate of interest that the Bank Lenders will receive under the Joint Plan is fair and equitable. The Bank Lenders have not established Grace’s solvency, nor have they shown the Court why they are entitled to anything higher than the federal judgment rate of interest. Moreover, Grace claims that it repeatedly relied on the interest rate agreed upon in the Term Sheet when it adjusted its internal books and records, filed disclosures with the SEC, submitted monthly operating reports to the Bankruptcy Court, and as a baseline when it entered into settlements with other parties. The Bank Lenders did not make their demand for the higher interest rate known until after the Term Sheet was signed by all parties and finalized. Therefore, the Court finds that the fair and equitable test has been satisfied based on the facts and circumstances of this case. The Bank Lenders will receive the rate of
The Bank Lenders also assert that the fair and equitable test is violated because they are not bound by the terms of the 2005 and 2006 Letter Agreements. Specifically, they claim that these Agreements were entered into by the Committee, not the Bank Lenders, and that they therefore should not be bound by contracts to which they were not parties. The Bankruptcy Court rejected this argument, finding that Mr. Maher was authorized to act on behalf of and bind all general unsecured creditors in his capacity as Committee Chairperson and Administrative Agent for the Bank Lenders. See W.R. Grace & Co., Bankr.No. 01-1139,
4. Dissolution of the Unsecured Creditors Committee
Section 11.8 of the Joint Plan provides that the Committee may continue to exist and have the authority to participate in any appeals of an order confirming the Joint Plan that was in progress prior
The Court disagrees. At this point, all other general secured creditors are satisfied with their distribution from the Joint Plan and the Bank Lenders remain the only creditors in Class 9 that continue to pursue objections on appeal. The Committee astutely points out that in Kensing-ton, the Third Circuit stated that “it is established that a Creditor’s Committee owes a fiduciary duty to the unsecured creditors as a whole, not to the individual members” of the class. Kensington,
While the Court credits the laudable work that the Committee has performed on behalf of all general unsecured creditors to date, it agrees with the Bankruptcy Court that there is no statutory basis for its continued existence after the Joint Plan becomes effective. The Committee’s ob
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Settlement Agreement reached between Grace and the CNA Companies, as well as the Joint Plan, are affirmed. Having made this determination, the findings of the Bankruptcy Court and its judgment are also hereby affirmed, and the Joint Plan is confirmed in its entirety.
An appropriate Order follows.
MEMORANDUM
Currently pending before the Court is the Emergency Motion of Appellant Gar-lock Sealing Technologies, LLC’s (“Gar-lock”) to Stay this Court’s Amended Memorandum Opinion and Order Pending Appeal to the Court of Appeals. For the following reasons, the Motion is denied.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The lengthy factual background of this case is one familiar to all relevant parties and the Court. On January 30, 2012, this Court entered its Memorandum Opinion and Order confirming Debtor W.R. Grace & Co.’s Joint Plan of Reorganization in its entirety. Subsequently, Garlock filed what appeared to be a reconsideration motion, entitled a Motion for Reargument, Rehearing, and/or to Alter or Amend the Judgment. (See Docket No. 168.) The Court granted Garlock’s reconsideration request, and gave it the opportunity to once again appear before and have its objections heard by the Court at oral argument on May 8, 2012. On June 11, 2012, this Court filed an Amended Memorandum Opinion and Order, once again confirming the Joint Plan. In this Amended Opinion, the Court dedicated approximately thirty pages to Garlock’s objections. Despite finding that Garlock lacked standing to object to the Joint Plan, the Court nonetheless discussed Garlock’s arguments on the merits in extensive detail, concluding that its substantive objections were unfounded. On June 25, 2012, Garlock filed the present Emergency Motion, requesting the Court to stay its Amended Memorandum Opinion and Order from going effective pending Garlock’s appeal to the Third Circuit.
II. DISCUSSION
A motion for a stay of a Court’s decision is an “extraordinary remedy.” See United States v. Cianfrani,
(1) [Wlhether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) whether a stay is in the public interest.
Hilton v. Braunskill,
In regard to the first factor, Gar-lock must show that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its appeal. As the basis of its argument under this first factor, Garlock once again rehashes the allegations it previously argued at length before the issuance of both the initial Memorandum Opinion on January 30, 2012, and the most recent Amended Memorandum Opinion on June 11, 2012. In fact, the text of Gariock’s Emergency Motion is essentially a mirror image of its prior briefing submitted to the Court. As previously noted, despite once again concluding that Garlock lacked standing to object to the Joint Plan in its Amended Opinion, the Court nonetheless discussed Gariock’s substantive arguments in extensive detail and found them to be without merit. Having now been given the benefit of two oral arguments before this Court and the opportunity to submit over 100 pages of briefing, any finding other than that Gariock’s arguments have been awarded ample consideration by this Court is incomprehensible. As such, the Court declines to once again discuss in extensive detail here its reasoning for why Garlock is unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claims. To view its full consideration of these issues, Appellant is instructed to consult the Court’s 228-page Opinion, available at In re W.R. Grace & Co.,
The second factor requires Garlock to establish that it will be irreparably harmed absent entry of a stay. “To establish irreparable harm, plaintiffs must demonstrate an injury that is neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent.” Tucker Anthony Realty Corp. v. Schlesinger,
The third factor requires Garlock to present satisfactory evidence that imposition of the stay will not substantially injure other parties in the litigation. Grace initially filed for bankruptcy in 2001. Its various creditors, including significantly ill victims of pleural disease and their families, have been awaiting payment for their claims since at least that time. If the stay were issued, these creditors would once again be thwarted along their path to recovery from Grace. There comes a time when finality of litigation is needed. Having already been pending for eleven years, the time for finality has arrived in this case. Allowing otherwise would have detrimental effects for both Grace and its thousands of creditors, who at this point are more than entitled to take steps forward towards emergence from bankruptcy and obtaining payment of their long-awaited claims. As such, the Court finds that entry of a stay would harm the other parties — notably, the Debtor and its other creditors — involved in this litigation.
The fourth and final factor that the Court must consider is whether a stay is in the public interest. In the bankruptcy context, there is a general public policy weighing in favor of affording finality to bankruptcy judgments. In fact, it has been recognized that: “Public policy weighs in favor of facilitating quick and successful reorganizations of financially troubled companies. This policy is furthered by the policy favoring finality of bankruptcy judgments. When investors and other third parties can rely on a confirmed plan of reorganization and other bankruptcy judgments, they have the footing and confidence they need to pursue investments and business arrangements with the reorganized debtor, all of which foster the debtor’s successful reorganization.” In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc.,
Where, as here, investors and other third parties consummate a massive reorganization in reliance on an unstayed confirmation order that, explicitly and as a condition of feasibility, denied the claim for which appellate review is sought, the allowance of such appellate review would likely undermine public confidence in the finality of bankruptcy confirmation orders and make successful completion of large reorganization like this more difficult.
Id. at 191 (citing Cont’l Airlines,
Finally, the Court pauses to comment on Garlock’s failure to even acknowledge that a party seeking a stay under such circumstances may be required to post a supersedeas bond
III. CONCLUSION
Garlock’s failure to produce sufficient evidence on all four factors, coupled with its lack of acknowledgment of the potential for entry of a supersedeas bond in a case of this magnitude, counsels against a finding that a stay of the Court’s Amended Memorandum Opinion and Order is necessary under these circumstances. As such, Garlock’s Emergency Motion is denied.
An appropriate Order follows.
Notes
. Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
. Appellee Grace consists of sixty-two separate corporate entities. For clarity and ease of reference, the debtors are collectively referred to hereinafter as "Grace.”
. (See Bankr. No. 01-1139, Doc. No. 21747, 05/19/09, Memorandum Opinion and Order Sustaining Debtors’ Objection to Unsecured Claims insofar as Claims Include Postpetition Interest at the Contract Default Rate.)
. (See Bankr. No. 01-1139, Doc. No. 26106, 01/22/11, Order Pursuant to Section 105, 363, 1107, and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules 2002, 6004, 9014, and 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure Approving the Settlement Agreement Between W.R. Grace & Co. and the CNA Companies.)
. (See Bankr. No. 01-1139, Doc. No. 26154, 26155, 01/31/11, Memorandum Opinion Regarding Objections to Confirmation of First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization and Recommended Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.)
. The CNA Companies consist of several insurance companies joined together over the course of this litigation as a result of mergers and successions, including: Continental Casualty Company, Continental Insurance Company, Pacific Insurance Company, Boston Old Colony Insurance Company, Harbor Insur-anee Company, Buffalo Insurance Company, Buffalo Reinsurance Company, and London Guarantee & Accident Company of New York. For clarity and ease of reference, these insurance entities are collectively referred to hereinafter as the "CNA Companies.’'
. Pleural disease encompasses many different medical conditions caused by an inflammation of the tissue surrounding the lungs and lining the chest cavity.
. Specifically, several major corporations (many of which were Grace competitors) filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy due to their own asbestos liability, which increased focus on Grace as a defendant. This time period is summarized below, as originally seen in In re Asbestos Litigation, No. 0001,
Bankruptcy _Company_Petition Date
Babcock & Wilcox_February 2000
Pittsburgh Corning_April 2000_
Owens Corning_October 2000_
Armstrong World December 2000 Industries_
G-I Holdings_January 2001_
W.R. Grace_April 2001_
U.S. Gypsum_June 2001_
United States Mineral July 2001 Products
. When Grace filed its bankruptcy petition in 2001, it was granted an automatic stay against all ongoing and future legal proceedings. This injunctive relief, available under § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, is awarded to all Chapter 11 petitioners. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (stating that the filing of a bankruptcy petition results in the automatic stay of all "judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor[.]"). Grace’s bankruptcy petition is more fully discussed, infra.
. The Bankruptcy Court reasoned that if the state court did not find that Montana breached its duty, then indemnification and/or contribution would not be permissible. It went on to note that even if a breach of duty were found, Montana would still have to bring entirely separate proceedings to receive any indemnification or contribution from Grace. See id.
. Specifically, Grace entered into the following settlements: (1) California State University and University of California for $1.4 million; (2) Pacific Freeholds Ltd., Inc. for $9,043,375; (3) various hospitals and healthcare facilities for $576,250; (4) several private commercial building owners in the United States for $16 million; and (5) building owners in Canada for $2.5 million.
. All sixteen of CNA's excess policies to Grace attach at or above $75 million in excess of primary coverage, and a majority of these sixteen policies attach at or above $150 million in excess of the primary coverage.
. Also engaged in the negotiations were the Asbestos Personal Injury Committee and the Asbestos Personal Injury Future Claims Representative ("PI FCR”).
. GEICO and Republic have consolidated their arguments together for presentation to this Court. Given the parties' decision to jointly present their arguments, the Court will address their claims together below.
. High level excess general liability insurance is a specific type of insurance coverage that provides additional coverage beyond that of the underlying insurance policy. This type of insurance coverage has commonly been referred to as an "umbrella policy." For example, if an insured is sued for $1 million and its primary insurance policy only covers $500,000 of the claim, the excess policy would cover the remaining $500,000 of the claim. See generally Michael Knoerzer, Introduction to Excess Insurance and Reinsurance, 652 PLI/LIT 115, 119 (Apr. 2001).
. Grace entered into the first Credit Agreement on May 14, 1998, under which it borrowed $250 million. On May 5, 1999, Grace also borrowed $250 million under the second Credit Agreement.
. LIBOR is a commonly-used acronym in financial affairs that stands for "London Interbank Offered Rate.” The LIBOR is the average interest rate that leading banks in London charge when lending to other banks. The LIBOR serves as a benchmark for financial institutions worldwide, which adjust their own interest rates based upon the LIBOR figure. For more information on this subject, see generally Ernest T. Patrikis, Federal Reserve Capital Adequacy Guidelines as Applied to SWAPS, 689 PLI/CORP 627, 694-98 (May 1990).
. In its most simple interpretation, members of the "impaired” classes under the Joint Plan are those persons and entities that will not necessarily have their claims paid in full according to the Plan’s terms. Conversely, members of the "unimpaired” classes are those persons and entities whose claims are definitively set to be paid in full under the Joint Plan. Delineation as an impaired or unimpaired class also affects creditor voting rights. This subject is discussed extensively, infra.
. Unimpaired classes under the Joint Plan include: Class 1 (Priority Claims), Class 2 (Secured Claims), Class 3 (Employee Benefit
. Class 9, an unimpaired class comprised of all holders of non-asbestos-related general unsecured claims, voted 92.54% in favor of the Joint Plan. However, the Bank Lenders, a small subset of Class 9, are not in favor of the Joint Plan. Their arguments are considered further, infra.
. Impaired classes under the Joint Plan include: Class 6 (Asbestos Personal Injury Claims), Class 7B (American ZAI Property Damage Claims), Class 8 (Canadian ZAI Claims), and Class 10 (Equity Interests in the Parent). All impaired classes voted overwhelmingly in favor of the Joint Plan. The only opponents of the Joint Plan in Class 6 are the Libby Claimants. Their argument is further discussed, infra.
. The parties assert different amounts as to the pre-petition interest that is owed. Grace claims that it owed approximately $2.5 million in accrued pre-petition interest at this time. (Grace Br. at 5.) The Bank Lenders, on the other hand, contend that approximately $3.1 million in accrued pre-petition was still outstanding at this point in time. (Bank Lender Br. at 9.) The Court need not determine which monetary figure is correct, however, because it is undisputed that Grace was current with its interest payments as of the Petition Date and that there thus was no pre-petition default. Only post-petition interest is relevant to the instant litigation.
.In addition to not paying the principal and accrued interest, the Bank Lenders also claim that Grace failed to furnish certificates and other information and notices, as required by the Credit Agreements. As a result, the Bank Lenders contend that these failures to adhere to the terms of the Credit Agreements constituted an "event of default,” entitling them to accelerate the entire outstanding amount of loans and notes due to the time period immediately following Grace’s bankruptcy petition. Grace does not dispute that it did not furnish the certificates and other information and notices, but contends that noncompliance with these terms does not constitute an event of default.
. The federal judgment rate is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1961, which provides in relevant part that:
(a) Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court_Such interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the calendar week preceding the date of the judgment. The Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall distribute notice of that rate and any changes in it to all Federal judges.
28 U.S.C. § 1961. The rate of interest used in calculating the amount of post-judgment interest is the weekly average 1-year constant maturity (nominal) Treasury yield. This rate is published every Monday by the Federal Reserve System. See http://www.uscourts.gov/ FormsAndFees/Fees/PostJudgementlnterest Rates.aspx. In a bankruptcy case, the applicable rate is the federal judgment rate reflected on the day that the debtor filed its bankruptcy petition. See In re Wash. Mut., Inc.,
. The involved constituencies were the Official Committee of Asbestos Personal Injury ("PI”) Claimants appointed by the U.S. Trustee, the Asbestos PI Future Claimants’ Representative appointed to protect interests of future personal injury claimants, and the Of
. District courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals of "final judgments, orders, and decrees” of the bankruptcy courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a); see also Fed. R. Bankr.P. 8001(a). A bankruptcy court's approval of a settlement agreement is considered a final order. See In re Nutraquest, Inc.,
. The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a) and 1334(b), and this Court has appellate jurisdiction over the Bankruptcy Court decision under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) and 1334(b).
. The Bankruptcy Court approved the Settlement Agreement on January 22, 2011. Nine days later on January 31, 2011, the Bankruptcy Court issued a Confirmation Order confirming the Joint Plan. Approval of a settlement agreement and confirmation of a reorganization plan are two entirely distinct matters, governed by different provisions of law and sections of the Bankruptcy Code.
Nonetheless, in filing their present objections, the Libby Claimants and BNSF conflate these distinct matters and argue, inter alia, that the Settlement Agreement cannot be approved because the Bankruptcy Court erred, for various reasons, in enjoining asbestos-related claims against CNA pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 524(g). The Libby Claimants' and BNSF’s objections to entry of the injunction are related to confirmation of the Joint Plan and are irrelevant to the present discussion regarding the Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Agreement does not alter the scope or clarity of the injunction in the Joint Plan, but rather merely provides that upon approval of the Settlement, CNA will be designated as a "Settled Asbestos Insurance Company” entitled to § 524(g) injunctive relief under the terms of the Joint Plan. Thus, to the extent that the Appellants make arguments based upon entry, extension, or clarity of the channeling injunction, those arguments are properly considered separately, infra, in this Court’s analysis of confirmation of the Joint Plan.
. The relevant insurance policies covered by the Agreement include all known and unknown, full or portions of, policies issued to Grace prior to June 30, 1985 by which CNA provided insurance coverage for asbestos-related claims.
.The benefit of being designated as a Settled Asbestos Insurance Company is that, under Grace’s Joint Plan, the channeling injunction issued pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) will extend to enjoin any asbestos-related personal injury claims brought against CNA, up to a limit of $1 million in litigation costs. If for some reason such claims are not enjoined under the terms of the Joint Plan, or have not already been addressed by the Settlement Agreement, then the PI Trust will indemnify CNA for any judgments rendered against it or any settlements it entered into with a third party, up to a maximum of $13 million.
The Settlement Agreement, however, only calls for CNA to be designated as such a party under the Joint Plan. The corresponding channeling injunction was not issued as part of the Bankruptcy Court's approval of the Settlement Agreement, but rather as part of the Bankruptcy Court's subsequent confirmation of the Joint Plan. Any challenges related to the substance of this designation or extension of injunctive relief to CNA, therefore, are relevant to the terms and conditions of the Joint Plan and are properly categorized as objections to the Confirmation Order, not the Settlement Agreement Approval Order. These objections are addressed by the Court in its discussion related to the confirmation of the Plan, infra.
. Rule 9019 states in full that: "On motion by the trustee and after notice and a hearing, the court may approve a compromise or settlement. Notice shall be given to creditors, the United States trustee, the debtor, and indenture trustees as provided in Rule 2002 and to any other entity as the court may direct.” Fed. R. Bankr.P. 9019(a).
. The question of whether the Bankruptcy Court applied the proper legal test is a conclusion of law, and is therefore reviewed de
. These contracts and leases are more fully discussed, infra, in the Court’s analysis regarding confirmation of the Joint Plan.
. BNSF further asserts that, as an “additional insured” under the Grace-CNA insurance policies, Montana law dictates that Grace owes it a duty to defend it under a liability policy — a duty that is broader and independent from a duty to indemnify, and that cannot be waived by any entity other than BNSF. CNA argues that New York state law would apply on this point. Given the Court’s finding that BNSF’s is not an "additional insured” under the Grace-CNA policies, however, this argument is moot and the Court need not engage in a lengthy choice-of-law analysis to determine BNSF's alleged contractual rights under either state’s law.
. Although relevant to confirmation of substantive provisions of the Joint Plan, the Court notes that the Plan Proponents and Bankruptcy Court specifically modified the Joint Plan to ensure that the channeling injunction would not impact BNSF's rights to pursue claims against its own insurance coverage. Section 8.2.2 of the Joint Plan provides that:
[T]he Asbestos PI Channeling Injunction ... shall not enjoin:
(e) BNSF from asserting any claim ... for insurance coverage as an insured or an additional insured under an insurance policy (or part of a policy) that is not identified as being the subject of any Asbestos Insurance Settlement Agreement in Exhibit 5[.]
Joint Plan § 8.2.2. This Section of the Joint Plan specifically precludes BNSF from asserting claims under any of the insurance policies listed in Exhibit 5. This list includes the Grace-CNA insurance policies. Thus, consideration of this provision in the Joint Plan further implies that Grace had no intention of including BNSF as an additional insured under its policies with CNA.
. The Bankruptcy Court’s Approval Order explicitly states:
For the avoidance of doubt, the insurance policies identified in Exhibits A, B, and C to BNSF’s Objections to Approval of the Settlement Agreement ... are not Subject Policies for purposes of the Settlement Agreement. All parties reserve their rights regarding such policies, including with respect to the existence and terms of such policies.
(Bankr. No. 01-1139, Doc. No. 26106, 01/22/11, Order Pursuant to Sections 105, 363, 1107, and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules 2002, 6004, 9014, and 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure Approving the Settlement Agreement Between W.R. Grace & Co. and the CNA Companies ("Approval Order”), at 8-9, ¶ 5.)
. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit stated that the debtor must first establish a "legally cognizable claim” to the insurance proceeds in order for them to be included in the bankruptcy estate. Id. at 56. Given that the debt- or in Edgeworth was not named as an intended beneficiary under the policy, the court found that the insurance policy proceeds were not part of the debtor’s estate. Id.
. The Libby Claimants base their argument on Montana state law. In a footnote, the Plan Proponents make clear that they do not concede that Montana law applies, but rather claim that a choice-of-law analysis makes no difference to the outcome of the present dispute. Given that both parties fully briefed their arguments premised upon Montana state law, the Court will likewise apply that state’s law to any choice-of-law inquiry in regards to the present matter.
. The Libby Claimants attempt to refute this principle of law by asserting that "direct actions [against an insurer] and vesting of an injured party’s rights have nothing to do with each other." (Libby Br. at 11.) The two legal principles are actually very much interrelated. Insurance companies do not merely dole out free proceeds to any party that files an insurance claim. Rather, to avoid fraud, conserve resources, and streamline policies, the claiming party must show that it has a right to the insurance proceeds because the insured is in some way liable to the claimant. This liability can be established in many ways: in accordance with proceeds owed to a party specifically identified as an intended beneficiary in an insurance contract, by provisions in a settlement, or, most relevant to the instant case, by obtaining a judgment against the tortfeasor. Absent liability, the claimant has no right to collect the proceeds. And since the claimant has no rights in the first place, there would be no rights that could vest. As such, the Libby Claimants' attempt to distinguish direct actions against an insurer from vesting principles is without merit. See Dow Corning,
. The statute states, in relevant part, that:
(5)(a) The liability of the insurance carrier with respect to the insurance required by this part becomes absolute whenever injury or damage covered by the motor vehicle liability policy occurs. The policy may not be canceled or annulled as to the liability by any agreement between the insurance carrier and the insured after the occurrence of the injury or damage.
(6) A motor vehicle policy is not subject to cancellation, termination, nonrenewal, or premium increase due to injury or damage incurred by the insured or operator unless the insured or operator is found to have violated a traffic law or ordinance of the state or a city, is found negligent or contrib-utorily negligent in a court of law or by [ ] arbitration proceedings!.]
Mont Code Ann. § 61 — 6—103(5)(a); (6).
. If the good faith of a debtor’s proposed Chapter 11 plan is contested, then the debtor bears the burden of proof on the issue, and the standard of proof is the preponderance of the evidence standard. In re Barnes,
. The Court notes that Mount Carbon Metro. dealt with the confirmation of a Chapter 9 bankruptcy plan, which addresses a municipality's debt structure under the Bankruptcy Code. However, because Chapter ll’s plan requirements have been expressly incorporated into Chapter 9 by 11 U.S.C. § 901(a), a court may only confirm a Chapter 9 plan if all provisions of § 1129(a) have been met. Thus, a Chapter 9 plan will only be confirmed if the court finds that the plan was proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law. Mount Carbon Metro.,
. As noted above, Mount Carbon Metro, involved the confirmation of a Chapter 9 plan proposed by a municipality. Id. at 25-26. Under that plan’s proposed structure, a particular creditor received favorable treatment. The court noted that while favorable treatment alone did not automatically constitute bad faith, in this particular case it had the greater effect of effectively stripping the municipality of its public function duties because it transferred almost all of its taxing and revenue-raising powers to a single creditor. Id. at 42. As such, the court found that the plan "ignor[ed] the District’s current and future obligations as a governmental entity and in doing so both unfairly favor[ed] a single landowner [ ] and [fell] outside the policy and purposes of Chapter 9.” Id. at 41 (emphasis added).
. Montana also asserts the Joint Plan was not proposed in good faith because it disregarded the absolute priority rule, failed to comply with the Bankruptcy Code, and was unfairly discriminatory and infeasible. Essentially, Montana argues that because the Joint Plan may fail for these reasons, it should automatically fail on good faith grounds as well. These arguments, however, have no bearing on whether or not the Plan was proposed in good faith. Instead, "[t]he only test of 'good faith’ is whether the reorganization plan can succeed,” Sound Radio,
. Section 524(g) states, in relevant part:
(1)(A) After notice and hearing, a court that enters an order confirming a plan of reorganization under chapter 11 may issue, in connection with such order, an injunction in accordance with this subsection to supplement the injunctive effect of a discharge under this section.
(B) An injunction may be issued ... to enjoin entities from taking legal action for the purpose of directly or indirectly collecting, recovering, or receiving payment or recovery with respect to any claim or demand that, under a plan of reorganization, is to be paid in whole or in part by a trust ... except such legal actions as are expressly allowed by the injunction, the confirmation order, or the plan of reorganization.
(2)(B)(i) [T]he injunction is to be implemented in connection with a trust that, pursuant to the plan of reorganization ... (I) is to assume the liabilities of a debtor which at the time of entry of the order for relief has been named as a defendant in personal injury, wrongful death, or property-damage actions seeking recovery for damages allegedly caused by ... asbestos or asbestos-containing products[.]
11 U.S.C.§ 524(g)(1-2)(I).
. Section 524(g) lists these requirements, including that: (1) the debtor likely faces substantial future demands for payment of asbestos-related actions; (2) the amount, number, and timing of those demands are indeterminate; (3) the pursuit of demands outside of the plan would likely threaten its purpose of dealing equitably with all claims and future demands; (4) the terms of the injunction, including any provisions barring action against third parties, are set out in the plan and any disclosure statements; (5) at least 75% of the classes of claimants whose claims are handled by the trust voted in favor of the plan; and (6) the trust includes mechanisms that provide the court with reasonable assurance that it will value and be in a financial
. Specifically, the trust is funded by Grace's contributions of: $250 million in cash (plus interest); $400 million of its insurance settlement proceeds, insurance reimbursement agreements, and its rights to pursue unsettled insurance; $1.55 billion of deferred cash payments secured by a majority of Grace’s common stock post-reorganization; and several million dollars in stock and cash to be paid by Grace’s former affiliates, Sealed Air and Fre-senius.
. On the Effective Date of the Joint Plan, Grace and its former affiliates will collectively fund the PD Trust by making certain direct payments as specified by § 7.3.2 of the Joint Plan and in the terms of the parties' respective Settlement Agreements.
. The Class 7A Deferred Payment Agreement is a payment agreement entered into between Grace and the PD Trust, on behalf of property damage claimants. The Agreement outlines the terms and conditions for payment distributions from the PD Trust. (See Deferred Payment Agreement (Class 7A PD), Ex. 27, JA 000859.)
. These contingent events are provided and described in extensive detail in Grace’s Share Issuance Agreement. (See Share Issuance Agreement, Ex. 20., JA 000626-42.)
. These independent claims of insurer wrongdoing are based on the notion that as Grace's insurers, these insurance companies owed the Libby Claimants a duty of care to warn them of the dangers associated with asbestos and the nearby mine.
. Insurance agencies CNA Companies, MCC, Arrowood, and Travelers all filed responsive appellate briefs.
. The Libby Claimants rely on the recent Supreme Court decision of Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey,
Our holding is narrow. We do not resolve whether a bankruptcy court, in 1986 ortoday, could properly enjoin claims against nondebtor insurers that are not derivative of the debtor's wrongdoing ... [I]n 1994 Congress explicitly authorized bankruptcy courts ... to enjoin actions against a non-debtor [under § 524(g) ]. On direct review today, a channeling injunction of the sort issued by the Bankruptcy Court in 1986 would have to be measured against the requirements of § 524 ... we do not address the scope of an injunction authorized by that section.
Id. at 2207. Thus, the holding of Travelers is inapplicable to the instant litigation on this point.
. In fact, the Court notes that at the Confirmation Hearing, the Bankruptcy Court clearly told the parties that: "[t]here is no way that I’m going to be granting any injunction that covers independent liability not derivative of the debtor ... to the extent the liability is determined not to be derivative it won't be channeled.” (Hearing Trans., 01/10/11, at 51, JA 055017.)
. In a separate but related argument, Grace's insurer MCC asserts that the Bankruptcy Court erred in stating that Grace and MCC agreed that the indemnity provisions of their settlement agreement would not cover MCC’s alleged independent tortious conduct. MCC claims that if it is sued for its own independent wrongdoing, then its settlement agreement with Grace should indemnify it against such claims. However, given that such independent wrongdoing claims are completely hypothetical at this point, the Court need not rule on this issue.
. The Court notes that BNSF did not attempt to clarify its request at Oral Argument before this Court on June 28, 2011, when it merely stated that: "The third issue on appeal is that BNSF should be entitled to the 524(g) injunction ... We’ll rest on our briefs on that point.” (No. Civ. A.11-199, Doc. No. 160, Tr. 6/28/11 at 53.)
. The Second Circuit recently interpreted the four instances under which third-party liability can arise under § 524(g) in In re Quigley Co., Inc.,
The Second Circuit narrowly interpreted the statutory language, finding that Pfizer’s ownership interest in its subsidiary was "legally irrelevant” to the tort claims. Id. at 62. In doing so, the court referenced the Third Circuit’s analysis in Combustion Engineering, and clearly held that "the phrase 'by reason of,’ as employed in 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii), requires that the alleged liability of a third party for the conduct of or claims against the debtor arises ... as a legal consequence of one of the four relationships between the debtor and the third party enumerated in subsections (I) through (IV).” Id. Therefore, the Second Circuit's recent strict interpretation of this statutory provision further undercuts BNSF’s assertion that the § 524(g) injunction should be extended to protect it from liability.
. The Court credits the testimony of former Judge Alexander Sanders, the legal representative for future asbestos-related property damage claimants ("PD FCR”) in this case, and expert witness Dr. Denise Martin. Judge Sanders testified to the unquestionable benefits afforded to future property damage claimants under Grace's Joint Plan in comparison to pursuing their claims outside the context of the trust. (See Trans, of Plan Confirmation Hearing, ("Sanders Testimony”), 09/17/09 at 97-100, JA 004262.) Dr. Martin testified as to the substantial likelihood that future property damage claims will be made against the trust. See In re W.R. Grace & Co.,
. To the extent that the Libby Claimants, rather than BNSF, object to confirmation of the Plan, their claims are considered and discussed more fully, infra.
. BNSF relies on the recent Third Circuit case of In re Global Ind. Technologies, Inc.,
. BNSF claims that it has standing because the channeling injunction enjoins BNSF from impleading and/or pursuing contribution claims against CNA, and will therefore inevitably increase the number of claims asserted against BNSF. BNSF cites PWS Holding Corp.,
The Court finds this language particularly instructive here. In its briefing, BNSF does not specifically identify any claims for which it presently seeks contribution or any im-pleader actions against CNA, let alone show the Court how the Joint Plan would inevitably increase the number of claims filed against BNSF should CNA receive injunctive protection. The Plan Proponents respond that BNSF has no such claims against CNA. (See Plan Proponents Br. Regarding Objection to Settlement Agreement, at 38 n. 92, "BNSF has no claims against CNA ...”). Therefore, as noted by the Third Circuit in PWS Holding, these amorphous claims are "simply too speculative to be a basis for ... standing here.” Id. at 249.
Moreover, BNSF has not explained to the Court how it would even have a contribution claim against CNA. CNA and the Plan Proponents allege that BNSF would never be able to assert such claims based on how liability is apportioned according to Montana's multiple defendant liability statute. See Mont.Code Ann. § 27-1-703. Rather than engaging in a lengthy choice-of-law analysis and interpretation of state law, the Court notes that a “terse reference in a complex ... case is insufficient” to establish BNSF's standing here. See Time Warner Entm’t Co., L.P. v. F.C.C., 56 F.3d 151, 202 (D.C.Cir.1995) (finding that a party’s reference to an argument in a footnote in its brief that was neither explained nor properly developed was insufficient grounds for standing); see also S.W. Pa. Growth Alliance v. Browner,
. Additionally, BNSF’s argument would also fail on mootness grounds. BNSF argues that because it is a co-defendant with CNA, if the channeling injunction enjoined the Libby Claimants’ future independent tort claims
.Having found that BNSF lacks standing to raise these claims, the Court declines to discuss the merits of these claims in depth. Any objections related to approval of the Settlement Agreement have been addressed at length, supra. As to any remaining objections related to issuance of the injunction in the context of confirmation of the Joint Plan, the Court notes that the Bankruptcy Court fully addressed and considered the merits of these claims in its oversight of this case. (See Bankr. No. 01-1139, Doc. No. 26106, 01/22/11, Order Pursuant to Sections 105, 363, 1107, and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules 2002, 6004, 9014, and 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure Approving the Settlement Agreement Between W.R. Grace & Co. and the CNA Companies ("Approval Order’’).) Bankruptcy courts are entitled, in their discretion, to issue injunctions to the fullest extent permitted by § 524(g). See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(1)(A-B); see also Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137,
. This section states, in relevant part, that:
(4)(B) ... [S]uch injunction shall be valid and enforceable ... if—
(ii) the court determines, before entering the order confirming such plan, that ... such injunction ... is fair and equitable with respect to the persons that might subsequently assert such demands, in light of the benefits provided, or to be provided, to such trust on behalf of such debtor or debtors or such third party.
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii).
. The Libby Claimants also assert that the fair and equitable requirement has been violated here because extending the channeling injunction to protect CNA could enjoin their potential independent insurer wrongdoing tort claims against CNA, and that the Bankruptcy Court's failure to value these independent tort claims was error. First, the channeling injunction is clear that it only enjoins third party claims that are derivative of Grace's liability, and the Libby Claimants are free to pursue their independent tort claims against CNA. This issue was discussed at length, supra, when the Court addressed the extension of the injunction to independent wrongdoing claims.
As to the Libby Claimants’ other contention, the Court finds that there is nothing unfair or
.The Libby Claimants rely on Quigley,
. Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code states that: "[t]he court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
. In making their argument, the Libby Claimants rely on In re Zenith Elecs. Corp.,
. The Crown relied on Montana’s brief in making this argument. (See Crown Br. 20 ("The Crown incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein those arguments set forth in Part I of the State of Montana’s Opening Brief on Appeal[.]").) Therefore, the Court jointly considers the claims of Montana and the Crown.
. Section 1.1(34) of the Joint Plan broadly defines an “Asbestos PI Claim’’ as:
a Claim ... or Demand against ... any of the Debtors or Asbestos Protected Parties ... whether in the nature of or sounding in tort, or under contract, warranty, guarantee, contribution, joint and several liability, subrogation, reimbursement or indemnity, or any other theory of law, equity, or admiralty ... based on, arising out of, resulting from, or attributable to, directly or indirectly:
(a) death, wrongful death, personal or bodily injury ... caused, or allegedly caused, based on, arising or allegedly arising from or attributable to, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, acts or omissions of one or more of the Debtors; [and]
(b) the presence, of or exposure at any time to [Grace] asbestos.
(Joint Plan § 1.1 (34)(i)(a — b).)
. In its review of this case, the Third Circuit noted the importance of its precedential holding, stating that: "It is only on a rare occasion that we overrule a prior precedential opinion. We assemble en banc to consider whether this is such an occasion.” In re Grossman's,
Prior to its holding in this case, Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (Matter of M. Frenville Co.),
At the time that the Joint Plan was pending before the Bankruptcy Court, Frenville was still governing law. Therefore, Montana argued both before the Bankruptcy Court and now before this Court that Montana state law should apply to its claims. (See Montana Br. 21.) On July 2, 2010, the Third Circuit issued its opinion in Grossman’s, whereby it expressly overruled the Frenville Test. Grossman's,
. Prior to 1963, Grace’s predecessors, the Zonolite Company and Universal Zonolite Insulation Company ("Zonolite”), owned and operated the Libby mine. Zonolite assigned all of its rights, title, interest, and equity to Grace upon its purchase of the mine. In re W.R. Grace & Co.,
. EBITDA is a commonly-used financial acronym that stands for “Earnings Before Inter
. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
Fed.R.Evid. 702. In conjunction with Rule 702, Rule 703 states, in relevant part:
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted.
Fed.R.Evid. 703 (emphasis added).
. AMH also claims that the Plan is not feasible because the procedures associated with the 2003 Bar Date Notice Order for PD Claims are flawed.
In 2002, Grace attempted to organize all the property damage claims brought against it, and sought a centralized way to provide notice to all potential claimants. The result was the Summary Bar Date Notice Program ("Bar Notice”), which was published in thousands of newspapers and periodicals, and was estimated to reach 83% of adults nationwide. Over the years, AMH has repeatedly challenged the sufficiency of the Bar Notice, alleging that the notice procedures used did not reach a sufficient number of potential claimants and thereby violated due process. AMH repeats that argument here. The adequacy of the Bar Notice, however, has long been settled. In 2007, the Bankruptcy Court found that it comports with due process. See In re W.R. Grace & Co.,
AMH claims that the Third Circuit’s recent decision in In re Grossman’s, Inc.,
. The Crown does not join Montana in this claim.
. Montana contends that it arrived at its current hypothetical $850 million claim amount by estimating that approximately 1,150 claimants could potentially bring suit against it, and that each claim is subject to a statutory maximum of $750,000 under Montana state law. Montana's appellate brief and the record are devoid of any explanation for its previous $750 million claim amount.
. Specifically, Montana's counsel questioned Ms. Zilly about Grace's potential ability to pay a hypothetical $750 million non-dischargea-ble post-confirmation judgment upon the Effective Date of the Plan. The relevant line of questioning was as follows:
Montana: Again, assuming a 750 million dollar non-dischargeable post-confirmation judgment, would Grace have the ability to pay that one year after the effective date?
Ms. Zilly: Well, needless to say, I have not done the analysis, but you know, it's possible they might be able to pay it based on an accrual of cash as well as additional borrowings. But, you know, again, it's totally based on two assumptions which I have not put down on a piece of paper or figured out what the ramifications of those would be.
Montana: So as you sit here today you’re unable to determine that?
Ms. Zilly: I think that’s a fair statement.
{See Conf. Hearing Trans. (“Zilly testimony”), 10/13/09, at 157-58, JA 004476).
. Specifically, it was brought to light that Appellants’ expert witness that conducted the CARD study did not randomly select his sample, but rather drew his conclusions based on a select group of asbestos patients that he himself treated in Libby. The importance of random sampling in legal research and evidence is a topic that has been widely discussed in various law review and journal articles, and the Court need not opine on this point here. See generally Richard A. Berk, An Introduction to Sample Selection Bias in Sociological Data, 48 Am. Soc. Rev. 386 (1983); Bert Black, James A. Jacobson, Edward W. Madeira, Jr., & Andrew See, New Directions in Expert Testimony: Scientific, Technical, and Other Specialized Knowledge Evidence in Federal and State Courts, SH007 A.L.I.— A.B.A. 115 (2002).
. The Joint Plan takes into account the unique situation of the Libby Claimants in this litigation due to the fact that they were exposed to asbestos through multiple avenues. The Plan accounts for this by lessening the burden of production that the Libby Claimants must establish regarding their specific pleural diseases. Specifically, the TDP permits claimants at lower Disease Levels to bring subsequent claims if their diseases should progress to a more severe diagnosis (including the possibility of qualifying for Category IV-B several disabling pleural disease). Additionally, the Libby Claimants are not required to prove "significant occupational exposure” in order to qualify for additional recovery.
The Joint Plan also accounts for the Libby Claimants' situation through the application of an "Extraordinary Claim Value” multiplier under the TDP, discussed more fully, infra. If a personal injury claimant can establish that 75% or more of his asbestos exposure was traceable to Grace Asbestos, then he is entitled to an award of up to five times the set Scheduled Value. If a claimant can establish that 95% or more of his asbestos exposure can be traced to Grace Asbestos, then he is entitled to an award of up to eight times more than the Scheduled Value. These Plan provisions were designed specifically with the Libby Claimants’ personal injury claims in mind.
. The Libby Claimants also argue that the Individual Review process is discriminatory because it impermissibly delegates the Court's authority to a non-judicial entity — the panel of trustees representing the trust. In making their argument, the Libby Claimants rely heavily on the language of In re G-I Holdings, Inc.,
. The Libby Claimants’ discrimination argument also ignores the second clause of § 1123(a)(4), which states that disparate treatment of a claim is permissible if the holder of that claim "agrees to a less favorable treatment.” 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4). The initial compensation option available to the Libby Claimants under the Joint Plan is to seek an automatic settlement payment under Expedited Review — an entirely voluntary decision. If a claimant is unhappy with his categorization or amount of compensation received under Expedited Review, he can elect to pursue Individual Review. Therefore, even if the Expedited Review process did by some chance treat the Libby Claimants less favorably (and the Court finds that it does not), it is completely within a claimant's discretion
. According to the Libby Claimants, under Montana state law, their rights to the insurance proceeds vested at the time of their injuries. In making their argument, the Libby Claimants rely on the holding of McLane v. Farmers Ins. Exch.,
As discussed in detail above, McLane dealt with an insurance policy regarding an automobile accident. The issue in that case was whether an insurance company’s actions constituted an implied waiver of its right to rescind its coverage. Id. at 99. The plaintiff’s liability was not at issue. Since McLane became law in 1967, no other case in Montana has cited it as legal authority for the position that a victim’s rights to insurance proceeds vest at the time of the accident. In fact, subsequent Montana caselaw has established that automobile accident insurance holds a unique place in the state’s legal landscape. Specifically, Montana has a "public policy” of protecting injured victims of automobile accidents by granting them payment of damages which are not in dispute without first executing a settlement agreement and final release. See Ridley v. Guar. Nat. Ins. Co.,
. BNSF also alleges that the Joint Plan improperly classifies its claims within Class 6, claiming that "[t]he common-law claims of BNSF should have been separately classified based on disparate treatment!)]” (BNSF Br. 26 (internal capitalization omitted).) In making this argument, however, BNSF makes no mention of the relevant provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a), or any supporting caselaw. The Court refuses to make BNSF’s argument for it. Therefore, based on a lack of evidence to the contrary, the Court affirms the Bankruptcy Court’s finding that BNSF's claims are properly classified in Class 6.
. A step-by-step example is particularly helpful to understand this process. Suppose a hypothetical Libby Claimant brings a claim against BNSF for personal injuries related to
• Assume that the Libby Claimant prevails in the litigation and obtains an award in the amount of $400,000 (the same amount that has been established as the approximate base line for Libby Claimants suffering from severe pleural disease that can prove that they were exposed 95% or more to Grace Asbestos).
• Assume that BNSF initially pays the Libby Claimant this amount. Due to the fact that BNSF and Grace were co-defendants in the litigation, payment of this award would extinguish any subsequent claims that the Libby Claimant could have against Grace.
• BNSF would then seek indemnity and contribution from Grace in an amount representing Grace’s share of the liability.
• Under the Plan, indirect claimants seeking indemnity and contribution step into the shoes of the former direct claimant to pursue their claims, and can recover the same amount the direct claimant could have recovered from the trust. In continuing with the aforementioned example, this means that BNSF would receive the same amount for its indirect claim as that which the Libby Claimant would have recovered directly from Grace’s trust.
• Assume that the Libby Claimant can prove that he suffers from severe pleural disease and that the Scheduled Value of his claim would be $50,000 under the TDP. Further assume that the claimant, being from Libby, could prove that he was predominantly exposed to Grace Asbestos by more than 95%. In such a situation, the Extraordinary Claim Value would have entitled this hypothetical Libby Claimant to eight times the Scheduled Value of his claim ($400,000) had he directly pursued his claim against Grace.
• However, because the claimant could obtain additional recovery from another party (BNSF), his recovery would be limited to the Scheduled Value of the claim ($50,000) to avoid allowing double recovery.
• Thus, Grace would only indemnify BNSF for $50,000 because this is the amount that the Libby Claimant could have recovered directly from the trust.
. BNSF also holds contractual indemnity rights in regards to any asbestos-related liability with Grace in Libby, Montana. Between 1938 and 1995, Grace and BNSF entered into several agreements, including various property leases, quit-claim deeds, right-of-way agreements, assignment contracts, and asset transfer agreements. Under the terms of these various agreements, Grace and BNSF agreed that Grace would fully indemnify BNSF for any and all asbestos-related claims asserted against BNSF, including defense costs. See In re W.R. Grace & Co.,
In its briefing submitted to this Court, BNSF recognizes that its objections based on contractual indemnity were resolved by the addition of Section 5.14. (See BNSF Br. 18 n.3 ("To the extent BNSF's indirect claims falls within its contractual indemnity, it will be entitled to an award equal to its actual non-bankruptcy value. BNSF asserts that most of its indirect claims constitute contractual indemnity claims.").) In that very same footnote, BNSF also asserts that ”[n]either the Debtors nor the other Plan Proponents, however, have admitted that the [contractual] indemnity agreements exist ... or are binding!.]” {Id.) Therefore, to the extent that any part of BNSF’s present argument attempts to extend to its contractual indemnity rights, the Court finds that this issue was already addressed by the Bankruptcy Court's December 2010 Plan modification.
. The final version of the Joint Plan was amended and confirmed on January 31, 2011. Therefore, any subsequent opinions and orders of the Bankruptcy Court only addressed any residual issues, but did not significantly alter the structure of the Joint Plan that is presently on appeal before this Court.
. BNSF’s argument fails to take into account that no creditors within Class 6 will likely be receiving 100% non-bankruptcy value for their claims under the TDP because the values assigned to claims under the trust only represent a rough average of the claim value outside of bankruptcy. In fact, BNSF expressly acknowledges this point in its briefing submitted to the Court:
The intent in setting the Scheduled and Maximum Values for each category was to provide claim values “roughly equivalent” to what the asbestos-related claimant would have received in the tort system ... Although some asbestos PI claimants may have received higher awards in the tort system (perhaps due to favorable juries, access to more experienced and qualified lawyers, etc.), while others may have received lower awards in the tort system (perhaps for obverse reasons), the values scheduled in the TDP represent the "rough justice" value of the claims.
(BNSF Br. 14.) Thus, the full non-bankruptcy amount of a direct claimant’s claim is not actually being paid by the TDP, but rather only a rough estimate of this amount. This point therefore further undercuts BNSF's argument.
. The Crown made the same argument regarding access to the Extraordinary Claims Value multiplier. (See Crown Br. 26-27.) The Court overrules this objection to the Joint Plan for the same reasons that it rejects BNSF’s claims above.
. In fact, both Montana and the Crown raised this same argument, alleging that the TDP "results in disparate treatment particularly to a holder of an Indirect PI Trust Claim in the event that a judgment is entered against it in an amount in excess of the maximum value." (MN Br. 42-42.) (Crown Br. 28.) Nothing in the record indicates that Montana or the Crown are being treated differently than any other indirect claimant under the Joint Plan. For the same reasons set forth above regarding BNSF, the Court finds that the TDP applies the same process to all claims in Class 6, and that therefore all indirect claimants, including Montana and the Crown, are being treated equally under the Plan.
. It appears that BNSF has confused the concepts of "liability” and "indemnity.” As explained above, BNSF would need to have at least a minimum percentage of fault in order for the lawsuit to proceed forward. It is possible, however, that BNSF could subsequently be awarded full indemnity for its indirect claim (in fact, this is what its contractual indemnity agreements with Grace were designed to do). Regardless of the phrasing of BNSF's argument, its claim is not uniquely situated from all others in Class 6, and BNSF therefore is not a victim of disparate treatment.
. In fact, federal courts have afforded the equal consideration prong a more relaxed inquiry because determining each party’s amount of consideration is an extremely amorphous process, particularly in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. See Quigley,
Requiring a bankruptcy court to inquire as to the amount of consideration involved in each claim ... especially in a mass tort situation, would be unrealistic, unworkable, and an unduly burdensome position for the bankruptcy court to be in.
Id. at 497.
.Indeed, allowing BNSF to obtain this extra level of recovery would not only violate the equal treatment requirement of § 1123(a)(4), but would also run afoul of § 524(g)’s requirement to pay present and future claims the same amount in substantially the same manner under the same criteria. See 11 U.S.C. 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V).
. In its brief submitted to the Court, BNSF sporadically mentions that it is entitled to defense costs and attorney's fees from Grace. On this point, the Court affirms the Bankruptcy Court's holding that ''[tjhere is nothing in the Bankruptcy Code, and BNSF has pointed to no case law, that indicates that a plan must pay attorneys' fees incurred in connection with the underlying tort claims or indemnity or contribution claims arising from those torts.'' In re W.R. Grace & Co., Bankr.No. 01-1139,
The Court notes, however, that BNSF's contractual indemnity agreements with Grace over the years allegedly called for Grace to fully indemnify BNSF for any asbestos-related liability, including the cost of defense and attorneys’ fees. To the extent that BNSF’s present argument is based on these contractual indemnity agreements, this would constitute a contract interpretation dispute that is beyond the confines of the present suit, and the Court need not opine on it any further here.
Moreover, BNSF also argues to this Court that BNSF’s classification under the Joint Plan violates the Absolute Priority Rule, which provides that dissenting creditors will be paid in full, and that no creditor with a claim or interest that is junior to the claims of the dissenting creditor will get or retain anything under the plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). BNSF's specific objection under the absolute priority rule is that its common law indemnity and contribution claims should have been separately classified because the Joint Plan treats them differently than the other creditors in Class 6, and that therefore, as a dissenting creditor, no creditor with a claim junior to its own should have retained anything under the Plan. However, given the Court’s finding that BNSF's claims are no different than any others in Class 6, BNSF's absolute priority rule argument unravels and lacks merit.
. Montana and the Crown also put forth similar arguments alleging that the TDP’s restrictions on holders of indirect claims result in "increased costs that would be incurred by such tortured and bureaucratic processes” and that requiring indirect claimants to obtain a release from underlying direct claimants before recovering from the trust is discriminatory. (MN Br. 42) (Crown Br. 26.) Montana and the Crown’s arguments fail for the same reason that BNSF's arguments failed. The Court reiterates its finding that there is nothing discriminatory or unfair about requiring a claimant against the trust to prove the validity of its claim, or to seek release of the debtor — the one paying the indirect claimant — from future liability. The Court extends the same reminder to Montana and the Crown that it did to BNSF, and also finds that Montana and the Crown are properly equipped to handle these administrative costs.
. For the most part, the Crown adopts the arguments of Montana (Crown Br. at 28 ("The Crown incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein those arguments set forth in Part V of the Montana Opening Brief.”).) The Crown does, however, put forth one additional argument that Montana does not make, and is considered separately in Part (c), infra.
.Section 5.6 of the TDP provides, in relevant part:
Indirect PI Trust Claims ... shall be ... paid by the PI Trust ... if the holder of such claim [ ] establishes to the satisfaction of the Trustees that the Indirect Claimant has paid in full the liability and obligation of the PI Trust to the individual claimant to whom the PI Trust would otherwise have had a liability or obligation to.... To establish a presumptively valid Indirect PI Trust Claim, the Indirect Claimant's aggregate liability for the Direct Claimant’s claim must also have been fixed, liquidated and paid fully by the Indirect Claimant^]
(TDP § 5.6, Ex. 4, JA 000305-306.) See also In re W.R. Grace & Co.,
. Claims are considered finalized if they have been paid in accordance with the terms of a settlement agreement or final court order.
. In making their argument, Appellants blend their improper classification and discriminatory treatment allegations. Essentially, Montana and the Crown assert that their claims are different from others in Class 6 because they are indemnity and/or contribution claims based on a failure to warn theory, and that, as holders of such claims, they are not treated equally with other claimants based on the timing associated with payment of indirect claims under the Plan.
In In re Congoleum Corp.,
. On this point, the Court credits the Confirmation Hearing testimony of the Asbestos PI FCR, Mr. David Austern. Mr. Austern is the legal representative that was independently appointed by the Bankruptcy Court to protect the interests of future asbestos personal injuiy claimants in this litigation. When questioned about the possibility of the PI Trust running out of funds before it could pay indirect claims for indemnity and contribution, Mr. Austern testified that he did not believe that such a scenario was likely under the current structure of the Plan. (See Bankr. No. 01-1139, Doc. No. 23532, Trans. 9/17/09, at 70-71 ("Austern Testimony”).) Thus, Montana and the Crown’s basis for its objection— that the PI Trust may run out of funds before it can satisfy its indirect claims — is without merit.
. Montana makes a similar argument, alleging that it has been unfairly discriminated against because Class 6 is impaired under the Plan, while other unsecured claims in different classes (specifically Class 5, Class 7A, and Class 9) are unimpaired (MN Br. at 35.) Given that § 1123(a)(4) only requires equality of treatment for creditors within the same class,
. AMH also mentioned two other arguments in its appellate brief to this Court. It claims that other creditors in Class 7A receive superior treatment because their claims are:
(1) already settled and awaiting payment, while AMH’s claims remain in dispute; and
(2) subject to alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures with lowered proof thresholds. (AMH Br. 46.)
As repeatedly stated throughout this Opinion, § 1123(a)(4) merely requires that all parties receive equal value for their claims and relinquish equal consideration in order to participate in the Plan, see Quigley,
AMH’s second argument is also lacking. Although AMH mentions that creditors in Class 7A are subject to different ADR procedures, this is where its argument ends. AMH has failed to present any evidence to the Court explaining these ADR methods or how they would result in different treatment of AMH’s claims. It is a well-established maxim that, on appeal, courts need not address legal issues that have not been fully developed through proper briefing. See Sw. Pa. Growth Alliance v. Browner,
. The CMO provides that all claims in Class 7A will be governed by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Rules of Evidence, applicable federal statutes, and any applicable federal local court rules.
. Chapter 7 of the Code addresses the liquidation of a bankruptcy estate. Chapter 11 addresses reorganization plans in bankruptcy proceedings.
. A class vote, however, may not waive an individual creditor’s right to this protection under the Code. See Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Assoc. v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship,
. A finding by the Bankruptcy Court that all creditors would receive no less under the Joint Plan than under Chapter 7 liquidation is a finding of fact. See PC Liquidation, 383
. At the Confirmation Hearing, Ms. Zilly estimated the value of Grace’s assets to be between $2.1 and $2.5 billion under the Joint Plan, and between $1.05 and $1.25 billion in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation. She testified that she discounted the liquidation value to account for the time pressures faced in liquidation proceedings and the probability that buyers would pay less than fair market value for Grace's assets since successor liability protection would not be available under Chapter 7, and Grace's former affiliates would therefore be unwilling to contribute funds to the trust. Ms. Zilly also testified that determining Grace’s liability in liquidation would be extremely uncertain because there are no mechanisms under Chapter 7 that achieve an orderly settlement of claims and liabilities as there are in reorganization plans under Chapter 11. The Court notes that her testimony was based upon her extensive experience with mass tort bankruptcies, and was supported by the evidence found on the record.
. Dr. Mark Peterson was the only expert witness who testified at the Confirmation Hearing as to the value of Grace’s personal injury liability in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation. He estimated Grace’s liability under the Joint Plan to be between $9.2 and $10.7 billion. He testified that without the procedural safeguards available under Chapter 11, Grace’s liabilities would quickly surpass this amount because there likely would be a substantial acceleration of claims filed in response to a Chapter 7 filing deadline. Dr. Peterson’s testimony was based on his own extensive experience, as well as his analysis of comparable situations that occurred in similar bankruptcy proceedings.
. While the Libby Claimants assert that there would be no distribution to future claimants under Chapter 7, their assertion is summarily incorrect in light of the Third Circuit's recent decision in Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s Inc.),
. At the outset, the Libby Claimants’ initial assertion that "the Bankruptcy Court erred in refusing to consider [their] insurance rights under Chapter 7” and that the bankruptcy judge "did not appear to take issue with the need to consider [their] insurance rights” is incorrect. (Libby Br. 35) (emphasis added). The record is clear that the Bankruptcy Court carefully considered the Libby Claimants' arguments. Moreover, the Bankruptcy Court’s Memorandum Opinion specifically discusses the Libby Claimants’ alleged rights to Grace’s insurance. See In re W.R. Grace & Co.,
. The Libby Claimants outline a process for pursuing Grace’s insurance policies in lieu of actually establishing Grace’s liability to them. Under their proposed procedure, they assert that each Libby Claimant would first file a Proof of Claim in a Chapter 7 case, which would have the effect of establishing Grace’s liability under 11 U.S.C. § 502(a). (Libby Br. 36.) However, this assertion is incorrect. Section 502(a) says nothing about liability, but rather merely states that "[a] claim or interest ... is deemed allowed, unless a party in interest ... objects.” 11 U.S.C. § 502(a).
The next step in the Libby Claimants' proposed procedure is that, upon an objection by the Chapter 7 trustee, the extent of their claims would need to be determined by jury trial under 28 U.S.C. § 1411(a). Once again, however, this statutory provision makes no mention of liability, but rather only provides that Chapter 11 may not affect the right to a jury trial in personal injury and wrongful death cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 1411(a).
The final step in the Libby Claimants’ proposed procedure is the assertion that the Libby Claimants could bring an independent lawsuit against Grace in a hypothetical Chapter 7 case because they would not be enjoined from doing so under the § 362 injunction. However, whether or not the Libby Claimants could actually obtain relief from the automatic stay afforded by § 362 does not establish how Grace is liable to them, but would merely allow them to proceed forward with their claim. As such, the Court rejects the Libby Claimants’ proposed liability procedure.
. Injunctive relief in Chapter 11 cases is initially available under 11 U.S.C. § 362. Section 362 applies to all cases filed under the Bankruptcy Code (except for the exceptions outlined in subsection (b) that are irrelevant here), regardless of the specific Chapter. In special circumstances under Chapter 11, supplemental injunctive relief may be available under other statutory provisions of the Code, such as the § 524(g) channeling injunction available in Chapter 11 asbestos bankruptcy cases.
. Section 362(a) states, in relevant part:
[A] petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title ... operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of—
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debt- or that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; (2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title; (3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate; (4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate; (5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; (6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; (7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor; and (8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax Court concerning a tax liability of a debtor that is a corporation for a taxable period the bankruptcy court may determine or concerning the tax liability of a debtor who is an individual for a taxable period ending before the date of the order for relief under this title.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
. The Court notes that the federal courts recognize four grounds upon which bankruptcy courts may enjoin suits against debtors and their assets and property. See Piccinin,
. The Court recognizes that Piccinin dealt with a Chapter 11 proceeding. However, as explained above, supra, § 362 applies to cases filed under both Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (stating that petitions filed under §§ 301, 302, and 303, provisions that address the commencement of bankruptcy petitions under the Code operate as an automatic stay); see also Johnston, supra, at 101-03 (“[T]he criteria for eligibility of an entity to a be a [CJhapter 11 debtor are the same as those to be a [C]hapter 7 debtor[.]”). Thus, the findings of Piccinin would be applicable in a hypothetical liquidation of Grace under Chapter 7.
. 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1) provides that: “The trustee shall collect and reduce to money the property of the estate ... and close such estate as expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of parties in interest[.]’’
. The Bank Lenders and the Unsecured Creditors Committee filed joint objections and appellate briefs. Thus, for ease of reference, the Court refers to these parties collectively hereinafter as the "Bank Lenders.” To the extent that either party asserts a separate and independent claim, the Court will clarify this in this Memorandum.
. The non-default rate under the Credit Agreements is 5.77% and the federal judgment rate at the time of the bankruptcy filing was 4.19%. Under the Term Sheet, the interest rate that would apply to the Bank Lenders’ claims is 6.09%.
.To be clear, this Section of the Court’s Memorandum addresses the appeals related to the Bankruptcy Court’s May 19, 2009 Memorandum Opinion finding that the Bank Lenders were not entitled to the post-petition default rate, In re W.R. Grace & Co., Bankr. No. 01-1139,
. Section 541(c) provides that:
(c)(1) [A]n interest of the debtor in property becomes property of the estate ... notwithstanding any provision in an agreement, transfer instrument, or applicable nonbank-ruptcy law—
(A) that restricts or conditions transfer of such interest by the debtor; or
(B) that is conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor, on the commencement of a case under this title, ...
(2) A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankrupt-cy law is enforceable in a case under this title.
11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1-2).
. An executory contract is a contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far underperformed that failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing performance of the other. Enter. Energy Corp. v. United States (In re Columbia Gas Sys., Inc.),
. Section 365(e) provides, in relevant part, that:
(e) (1) Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease, or in applicable law, an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor may not be terminated or modified, and any right or obligation under such contract or lease may not be terminated or modified, at any time after the commencement of the case solely because of a provision in such contract or lease that is conditioned on- * * *
(B) the commencement of a case under this title[.]
11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1)(B).
.In support of their argument, the Bank Lenders rely heavily on In re Anchor Resolution, Corp.,
. The Court notes that Section 10 does, however, require that the Bank Lenders give Grace notice of the acceleration of the loan in the event of a default. (See id., Section 10(B)(ii).) The record indicates that the Bank Lenders never provided Grace with any such notice. The Bank Lenders’ demand for hy-pertechnical compliance with the Credit Agreements by Grace, therefore, is somewhat weakened in light of this fact.
. In Section III of their Appellate Brief, the Bank Lenders put forth as one of the issues presented on appeal that "1. The Bankruptcy Court erred in concluding that no defaults exist under the Credit Agreements on the basis that ... (d) the Bank Lender Group agreed that Grace did not owe any pre-petition interest on the Bank Lenders’ claims under the Credit Agreements.” (Bank Lender Br. at 6.) This is, however, where consideration of this issue ended. The Bank Lenders did not pursue their objection regarding pre-petition interest any further in their brief. In fact, other sections of their brief solely reference alleged post-petition defaults. (See, e.g., Bank Lender Br. at 45, "Grace defaulted on its obligations dozens of times after it filed for bankruptcy in 2001 [.]”) As repeatedly explained above, mere mention of an issue on appeal without adequate explanation or briefing is not enough, and the Court will not make their argument for them. See Sw. Pa. Growth Alliance v. Browner,
. In support of their claim for the default rate, the Bank Lenders heavily rely on the case of In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R.,
First, as the Bankruptcy Court made clear, Chicago is a Seventh, not Third, Circuit case and is therefore not binding upon either the Bankruptcy Court or this Court. Even more so, however, Chicago is a twenty-six year-old case based on the now defunct Bankruptcy Act, not the presently governing Bankruptcy Code. See Chicago,
. The Bankruptcy Court’s reliance on this case is a source of significant dispute between the parties because it was ultimately vacated for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Vacation of a decision only affects its binding authority on subsequent courts — the internal discussion remains useful for persuasive authority purposes. See Brown v. Kelly,
. The Bank Lenders rely on Am-Haul Carting, Inc. v. Contractors Cas. & Sur. Co.,
. The Bank Lenders also make an argument for the post-petition default interest rate predicated on § 1124(2)(A), which provides that a claim can only be unimpaired if the
Moreover, the legislative history of § 1124(2) provides that: “The intervention of bankruptcy and the defaults represent a temporary crisis which the plan of reorganization is intended to clear away. The holder of a claim or interest who under the plan is restored to his original position, when others receive less or get nothing at all, is fortunate indeed and has no cause to complain.” S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 120 (1978), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5787, pp. 5906. The statements in the legislative history nicely illuminate the present situation. Under Grace's Joint Plan, the Bank Lenders will be "restored to their original position” — they will receive full payment of the principal, plus interest set at a rate higher than both the federal judgment rate and non-default rate under the Credit Agreements. The rate of interest that the Bank Lenders will receive is also higher than the rate awarded to all other unsecured creditors in Class 9 under the Plan. As such, the Bank Lenders are "fortunate indeed.” Id.
. Section 502 states, in relevant part:
(a) A claim or interest ... is deemed allowed, unless a party in interest, including a creditor of a general partner in a partnership that is a debtor in a case under chapter 7 of this title, objects.
(b) [I]f such objection to a claim is made, the court, after notice and a hearing, shall determine the amount of such claim in lawful currency of the United States as of the date of the filing of the petition, and shall allow such claim in such amount, except to the extent that—
(2) such claim is for unmatured interest.]
11 U.S.C. § 502(a), (b)(2).
. There are two exceptions to the general rule that would allow creditors to proceed against the debtor for the post-petition interest: (1) when a creditor is oversecured under § 506(b); and (2) under § 726(a)(5), when the debtor in interest has sufficient funds on hand to pay the interest after having satisfied all other allowed claims. Here, the § 506 exception does not apply because the Bank Lenders are un secured, not over secured, creditors of Grace. The § 726(a)(5) exception, on the other hand, provides that if the debtor in question is solvent, then creditors can be paid the post-petition interest "at the legal rate.” 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(5). The Bank Lenders claim that because Grace is solvent, this exception should apply and they should be entitled to the post-petition interest. Grace's solvency, however, was never determined. As such, this exception is inapplicable.
. The Bank Lenders also make the argument that, regardless of whether an event of default occurred under these circumstances, they are still entitled to a higher rate of interest because the principal loans matured during Grace’s bankruptcy. The Bank Lenders state that a different Section of the Credit Agreements — Section 5.1(c) — governs when the loans have matured and provides a different interest rate (the Alternate Base Rate plus 2%) that applies irrespective of Section 10. However, this higher interest rate is not available merely because the loans have matured. Rather, the higher interest rate is available if Grace has failed to repay the loans when they matured. As a factual and legal matter, Grace could not continue to repay the principal during the course of its bankruptcy. To now require it to pay a higher interest rate as a result of its bankruptcy petition would effectively be punishing Grace for seeking the bankruptcy relief to which it is lawfully entitled. As such, this objection is overruled.
. On June 20, 2011, Appellants filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority with the Court (See Bankr. No. 11-199, Doc. 139). In this Notice, Appellants wished to inform the Court of a recent decision in the Southern District of New York, In re General Growth Properties, Inc.,
. The Bank Lenders claim that the Bankruptcy Court erroneously adopted a presumption of insolvency by relying on Sierra Steel, Inc. v. Totten Tubes, Inc.,
. As part of what appears to be a tactical litigation strategy, the Bank Lenders withdrew from the estimation litigation. Nonetheless, the record indicates that the Bankruptcy Court repeatedly informed interested parties, including the Bank Lenders, that they would need to present evidence if they wished to pursue any claims based on Grace’s solvency. Despite repeated invitations and opportunities, the Bank Lenders never did so.
. The Bank Lenders also claim that the Bankruptcy Court improperly conflated the issues of plan feasibility and solvency. The Bankruptcy Court found that while a determination of Grace’s solvency could not yet be rendered, it nonetheless held that the Joint Plan was feasible. The Bank Lenders contend that these two conclusions are “irreconcilable.” (Bank Lender Br. at 40.)
The issues of solvency and plan feasibility are different, but nonetheless often interrelated. In order to confirm a reorganization plan, § 1129(a)(11) of the Code requires that the debtor establish that its plan "presentís] a workable scheme of organization and operation from which there may be reasonable expectation of success.” Corestates Bank, N.A. v. United Chem. Techs., Inc., 202 B.R. 33, 45 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1996). Bankruptcy courts can consider a wide array of factors in determining whether or not a plan is feasible, including whether the reorganized debtor will emerge from bankruptcy as a solvent entity. See In re Magnatrax Corp., Bankr.No. 03-11402,
. Additionally, PPI Enterprises does not support the Bank Lenders' definition of solvency in this case. The Bank Lenders define solvency as "not balance sheet solvency,” but "equity retaining value because it is only in that instance that an increase in one creditor’s distributions will not diminish other creditors’ recoveries!!]” (Bank Lender Br. 30.) PPI Enterprises, however, did not define solvency, and certainly did not hold that a debtor whose equity retains value under its reorganization plan impairs its creditors and must pay them post-petition interest. In fact, the Third Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy court’s analysis below in PPI Enterprises, which had stated that, "[i]n large Chapter 11 cases, it is possible to have numerous leases rejected, the resulting claims capped pursuant to § 502(b)(6), and value retained by interest holders. Thus, Congress clearly contemplated value being given to equity holders even where creditors' nonbankruptcy law rights are materially adversely affected by the Code." PPI Enterprises,
. Section 3.1.7(b) of the Joint Plan provides that resolved claims in Class 7A are to be paid in accordance with the appropriate settlement agreements, stipulations, or orders that have been put in place. Unresolved claims in Class 7A are to be paid pursuant to the procedures set forth in the Class 7A CMO.
. AMH also asserts that Class 7A should be categorized as an impaired class because the Joint Plan denies it the ability to pursue its claims in its preferred forum in South Carolina. The Court already discussed this matter, supra, when addressing AMH's objection to the structure of the PD Trust. Given that the Court has already found that AMH was not denied a choice of forum since it willingly submitted itself to the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction, AMH's impairment argument on these grounds is rendered moot and the Court need not opine on it any further here.
. In a separate but related argument, AMH argues Class 7A was improperly "lump[ed] together” with Class 7B for voting purposes, and that this "classification scheme” also negatively impacts its voting rights. First, the Court notes that claim classification and vote solicitation are two entirely distinct concepts under the Bankruptcy Code, and therefore the underlying premise of AMH’s claim is incorrect. Regardless, it makes no difference whether Classes 7 A and 7B were lumped together for voting purposes because Class 7A, independent of Class 7B, voted overwhelmingly in favor of the Plan. Thus, even if Class 7A would have voted separately upon acceptance or rejection of the Joint Plan, AMH's claims would still have been subsumed by a majority vote of Class 7A in favor of the Plan.
. The Libby Claimants also allege that the Joint Plan violates their constitutional rights under the Montana Constitution. Normally, federal courts may abstain in favor of state court adjudication if there is an unresolved question of state law which only the state courts could authoritatively construe, and which may avoid the unnecessary decision of a federal constitutional issue. R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co.,
. U.S. Const. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States than according to the rules of the common law.”).
. Although the facts of G-I Holdings are very similar to the instant case, the two cases differ as to what exactly a jury may consider under the respective plans. The debtor corporation in G-I Holdings proposed a scheme in which all asbestos personal injury claims would be liquidated through the application of a medical matrix. G-I Holdings,
In contrast, the Joint Plan in the instant litigation allows a jury to consider all disputes on appeal, not just certain issues. The jury can make its own findings de novo, rather than being limited to determining whether a committee acted arbitrarily or capriciously in making its decision. Most significantly, a claimant under the Joint Plan is not restricted from having a jury determine the amount of his recovery. Thus, based on these crucial differences between the two plans, the Court finds that G-I Holdings is distinguishable from the case at hand.
. The litigation related to the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund ("9/11 Fund”) is particularly analogous to the instant case. Under the 9/11 Fund, victims of the terrorist highjackings and their families could file claims for compensation without having to prove fault or show a duty on the part of any defendant. In re Sept. 11 Litigation,
The federal courts have also regularly upheld caps on jury verdict amounts directly on Seventh Amendment grounds. This is particularly evident in the capping of jury verdicts in medical malpractice actions. See Davis v. Omitowoju,
Aside from medical malpractice actions, the federal courts have also routinely recognized and upheld the constitutionality of jury verdict caps and fixed rules of compensation in a wide array of federal legislation, including, inter alia, limitations on: compensation for victims of natural disasters, wrongful death awards, personal injury awards, product liability awards, civil rights violations, and violations of international air transportation laws and regulations. See, e.g., Hemmings v. Tidyman's Inc.,
. Legislative rules enacted by Congress that establish set levels and schedules of compensation are frequently utilized in the federal judicial system. The Seventh Amendment only requires that a jury make the factual findings regarding a plaintiff's particular grievance. Pierre,
. U.S. Const. amend. VII ("... no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States!.]”) (emphasis added).
. While a damage cap might raise a constitutional red flag if its fixed sum is so low as to be arbitrary or irrational, this would implicate due process concerns rather than the Seventh Amendment. Regardless, this is not at issue in the present case. The cap imposed by Grace's trust allows the Libby Claimants to obtain up to the Maximum Value of their claim — an amount determined to be fair after years of careful consideration by medical, government, and legal experts who sought to ensure uniformity of compensation and fund availability for all claimants.
. Section 1129(a)(1) states that a court can only confirm a reorganization plan if it "complies with the applicable provisions of this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1). Montana and the Crown objected to confirmation of the Plan on the ground that it violates this statutory provision. Section 1129(a)(1), however, is an "umbrella” statutory section that ensures compliance with other more specific sections of the Code. In particular, § 1129(a)(1) is predominantly aimed at ensuring compliance with § 1122 and § 1123, discussed supra, which address classification of claims and contents of the plan. See In re TCI 2 Holdings, LLC,
. The absolute priority rule is codified in § 1129(b)(2), which states, in relevant part:
(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair and equitable with respect to a class includes the following requirements:
s * * *
(B) With respect to a class of unsecured claims:
(i) the plan provides that each holder of a claim of such class receive or retain on account of such claim property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim; or
(ii) the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or interest any property!.]
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i-ii).
. The Court recognizes that Appellant AMH has a slightly different claim than the other objecting parties because its claims fall within Class 7A, a subclass that is deemed unimpaired, but still entitled to vote under the terms of the Joint Plan due to the status of its counterpart, Class 7B, as an impaired class. Regardless, Class 7 as a whole voted in favor of the Joint Plan, and therefore the fair and equitable test also does not apply to AMH's claims.
. Montana, the Crown, and BNSF argue that their claims are distinct from other claims in Class 6, and that had they been classified as their own class under the terms of the Joint Plan, this class would have been impaired and voted against the Plan's confirmation. This argument, however, is unfounded. First, it is a classification argument governed by § 1122, and not the § 1129(b) fair and equitable requirement. Moreover, it is an entirely baseless claim since there is no separate class for these creditors' claims under the terms of the Joint Plan. The Court refuses to rule on the basis of a mere hypothetical that in no way adequately portrays the present structure of the Plan. Having already decided that Montana, the Crown, and BNSF’s claims are properly classified in Class 6, supra, the Court need not opine on this matter any further here.
. In their appellate brief, Montana and the Crown argue that the fair and equitable test has been violated because, inter alia, the Trust Advisory Committee ("TAC”) "wields considerable control and influence over the trustees and the governance of the trust” that is "fundamentally unfair and inequitable” and an "impermissible conflict of interest.” (Montana Br. at 46.) Although its objection is improper because the fair and equitable test does not apply here, the Court nevertheless pauses to comment on this particular objection.
The TAC is a committee of attorneys enlisted for the purpose of protecting the rights of present personal injury claimants. It has been a feature of Chapter 11 asbestos litigation since the Johns-Manville case. The TAC is a separate entity from the PI FCR — the individual appointed by the Bankruptcy Court for the purpose of representing the interests of future personal injury claimants. The TAC is also distinct from the U.S. Trustee(s) appointed to represent the trust. In fact, given
As the Bankruptcy Court properly found, Appellants’ objection on these grounds is entirely speculative. The record and the parties’ appellate briefs are devoid of any evidence that the TAC has or will at some point engage in any improper conduct. Moreover, the Joint Plan has specific procedures in place to protect the parties' interests and avoid conflicts of interest. For example, the TAC and PI FCR are only involved in matters related to the general administration and implementation of the trust. The Trustees, not the TAC or PI FCR, determine whether a particular claim satisfies payment criteria and how those claims should be paid. The Trustees, in turn, hold fiduciary duties to all Trust beneficiaries. Furthermore, the TAC and PI FCR have identical consent rights, and both are limited. Neither may withhold consent unreasonably, and both must explain in written detail their objections to any course of action within thirty days. If a dispute remains as to consent rights, the issue is submitted to ADR and, in special circumstances, can proceed straight to the Bankruptcy Court. Finally, all TAC decisions are subject to oversight by the court.
Based on all the above, the Court finds that not only are the procedures associated with the TAC fair and equitable, but are also devoid of a conflict of interest. There simply is no possibility for the TAC — one of many entities representing claimants’ interests here — to wield considerable control and influence over governance of the trust As such, Appellants' argument on these grounds is unfounded.
. Contribution is a legal principle determining how judgment is allocated among joint tortfeasors. The methods of allocation are governed by state law, and generally arise in joint and several liability jurisdictions. "Contribution comes into force when one joint tortfeasor has discharged a common liability or paid more than its share of such liability, in which case the joint tortfeasor is entitled to reimbursement from the other tort-feasors to the extent that its payment exceeded its own liability.” Exxonmobil Oil Corp. v. Lucchesi, No. Civ. A.03-1625,
. Set-off is also a legal principle related to apportionment of judgments among joint tort-
. On May 8, 2012, the Court once again heard Oral Argument on all issues related to Garlock’s objections to the Joint Plan. At this time, the Court specifically asked Garlock several times whether it had previously impled or sought contribution and/or set-off from Grace in the time period prior to Grace’s bankruptcy petition. (See 05/08/12, Hr’g Tr. at 5, 6, 45, 46.) Garlock, however, was elusive in its responses, and was unable to provide the Court with any citation to the record evincing concrete evidence of any impleader, contribution, or set-off actions that it previously asserted against Grace. (See id. at 5 ("The Court: You exercised it during the period before the bankruptcy was filed by Grace? Counsel: Yes, Your Honor. We did exercise that right and I'm — to understand that, it’s important to understand what that right is....”).) Nor did Garlock introduce evidence of a specific amount of money for which Grace remains liable based on prior impleader and contribution or set-off actions. Absent evidence indicating that Garlock previously exercised its presently alleged im-pleader, contribution, and set-off rights, the
. Garlock, in fact, seemed to admit as much at the May 8, 2012 Oral Argument. When asked specifically by the Court whether it had ever previously exercised its alleged contribution or set-off rights, Garlock responded that: "Garlock wasn’t having to pay Grace’s liability. The evidence is Grace and a few other defendants were paying almost all of the compensation that plaintiffs were getting. Garlock was protected because they were making the payments.” (05/08/12 Hr'g Tr. at 46.)
. The Court notes that, despite having a second bite at the apple at the May 8th Oral Argument, Garlock did not introduce any evidence or provide any citation to the record indicating that it previously filed a proof of claim or suffered a judgment upon which Grace’s liability to it could be predicated. To the contrary, Garlock’s counsel specifically stated that, "We’re not looking back at the past. We're looking at what the future does to Garlock’s rights to protect itself from having to bear Grace’s share. And that’s what matters here, and that's what gets — gives Gar-lock standing.” (05/08/12 Hr’g Tr. at 87.) This statement further bolsters the Court’s finding that Garlock did not previously suffer an injury here for which Grace was responsible.
. If the claimant holds a future claim, then his claim will proceed against the GST Asbestos Trust. If the claimant holds a current claim, his claim will proceed against Reorganized Garlock. (Garlock Plan §§ 2.1, 2.3.2.)
. The Court is aware of a 2009 Stipulation entered into between Garlock and Grace, in which it was stipulated that, upon the confirmation and consummation of Grace’s Joint Plan, the Grace PI Trust was likely to receive future demands by claimants who also asserted claims against Garlock in the tort system. The Stipulation further provides that, in such instances, Garlock would be able to assert Indirect PI Trust claims against the Grace PI Trust on account of the common claims and demands shared by both parties. (See Phase II Stipulation (“Stipulation”) ¶ 4(a-c), JA 017590.) Garlock now contends that this Stipulation serves as evidence that it will be a co-defendant with Grace in future litigation. Grace, in turn, avers that Garlock's own bankruptcy petition rendered the Stipulation obsolete. The Court is not wholly convinced by either party’s argument here. Nonetheless, the Court finds that the Stipulation does not conclusively establish that Garlock has or will at some point suffer an injury upon which standing may be premised.
The Stipulation at issue was entered into on September 9, 2009 — a time when Garlock was still subject to the tort system. The Bankruptcy Court, as the judicial entity that approved the Stipulation, no doubt remained cognizant of its effects when Garlock filed its own petition a few months later in June of 2010. Despite this change in circumstances, the Bankruptcy Court nonetheless found that Garlock lacked standing in its Memorandum Opinion approving the Joint Plan on January 31, 2011. As previously noted, the abuse of discretion standard is highly deferential to the bankruptcy court’s findings in bankruptcy appellate litigation, and the reviewing court should generally refrain from disturbing the bankruptcy court’s judgment absent a "definite and firm conviction” that it committed a clear error. In re Hudson's Coffee, No. Civ. A.06-683,
Moreover, it is well settled that stipulations - may be nullified by a court for good cause, such as a change in the parties’ conditions or unforeseen factual developments. See H.D. Warren, Annotation, Relief from stipulations,
Finally, the Court pauses to note that, in the 2009 Stipulation, the parties also stipulated to the fact that any Indirect PI Trust Claims brought against Grace's PI Trust — such as the contribution and set-off claims allegedly held by Garlock — would be subject to a Payment Percentage in the range of 25% to 35%. (See Stipulation ¶ 7, JA 017590.) Garlock now vehemently objects to being subject to this Payment Percentage range, repeatedly stating that this is unfair, inequitable, and "far inferi- or” to any remedy it may have outside the bankruptcy context. As a point of logic, Gar-lock cannot pick and choose which provisions of the Stipulation it seeks to enforce. It must either attempt to enforce or nullify the entire Stipulation. To allow otherwise would be unfair, illogical, and disorganized. Thus, Garlock's attempt to selectively enforce the Stipulation further undermines its argument.
. It is for this reason that Garlock’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in Clinton v. City of New York,
In the instant litigation, Garlock cites to Clinton for the proposition that “a claim for relief in one case (here, Garlock's objection to confirmation) is not mooted by a claim for the same or similar relief in another case (such as Garlock's bankruptcy case).” (Recons. Mot. 8.) As an initial matter, the relief that Garlock seeks in both cases is not — as it asserts — the same, but rather is very different. In Grace’s bankruptcy case, Garlock seeks relief related to potential contribution and set-off. In its own bankruptcy case, on the other hand, Gar-lock seeks bankruptcy relief and the reorganization of its entire structure under Chapter 11.
Even with this fact aside, however, Gar-lock’s reliance on Clinton is still inapposite. In Clinton, the Supreme Court held that New York had a concrete injury because ”[i]f HHS ultimately denie[d] the State's waiver requests, New York law w[ould] automatically require [Appellees] to make retroactive tax payments ... of about $4 million for each of the years at issue.” Clinton,
. It is worth mentioning that, over the years, Grace served as a co-defendant alongside numerous other corporate entities in the context of its asbestos litigation. (See 05/08/12 Hr'g Tr. at 62.) Garlock, however, remains the only such entity that continues to object to the Joint Plan.
. See Pari IV: Confirmation of the Joint Plan, Section J: The Fair and Equitable Test and The Absolute Priority Rule, supra.
. Garlock cites a House Report that accompanied the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 to support its argument that "Congress knew exactly what 'fair and equitable’ meant when it incorporated that term in section 524(g)(4)(B)(ii), and knew it incorporated the absolute priority rule.” (Garlock Main Br. 25.) Garlock specifically cites to language in the Report stating that:
The words "fair and equitable” are terms of art that have well established meaning under [ ] caselaw ... as well as under the Bankruptcy Code. Specifically, courts have held that where an estate is solvent, in order for a plan to be fair and equitable, unsecured and undersecured creditors' claims must be paid in full ... before equity holders may participate in any recovery.
H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 48 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340 at 3357. In a footnote following this language, the Report provides citations to two cases from the Supreme and Circuit courts, which Garlock contends evinces Congress's intent to apply the same meaning to "fair and equitable” under §§ 524(g) and 1129(b).
Garlock, however, takes the language of the Report out of context. The above quotation appeared in a section of the Report entitled "Impairment of Claims and Interests,” which only discussed the "fair and equitable” requirement in the context of § 1129(b)(2). Id. at 48. Despite references to numerous other statutory provisions, that section of the Report is devoid of any reference to § 524(g). As to the case law cited in the footnote, both
Garlock also fails to mention that § 524(g) is discussed a few pages later in a subsequent section of the Report, but makes no reference to § 1129(b) or the absolute priority rule, let alone make any indication that the term "fair and equitable” under § 524(g) incorporates the absolute priority rule. Id. at 95-100. If Congress had, in fact, intended for the "fair and equitable” requirement to have the same meaning under § 524(g) as it does under § 1129(b), then it would have expressly indicated as much. As such, Garlock’s reliance on this House Report to support its argument that “fair and equitable” has the same meaning under both statutory sections is inappo-site, disingenuous, and misplaced.
. Garlock relies extensively on In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc.,
Armstrong, however, is readily distinguishable from the instant case. Armstrong involved a "cram down” scenario. Armstrong,
. Garlock’s argument based on § 524(h) is likewise misplaced. Section 524(h) states that a channeling injunction must be "fair and equitable in accordance with the requirements of section 1129(b).” 11 U.S.C. § 524(h)(1)(A). Garlock alleges that § 524(h) serves as "unmistakable proof” that Congress intended to incorporate the absolute priority rule into § 524(g) because both statutory sections were enacted at the same time. (Gar-lock Main Br. 25.)
Section 524(h), however, is a grandfather clause that is only applicable to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) injunctions issued in asbestos cases prior to the congressional enactment of § 524(g). See 11 U.S.C. § 524(h)(1); In re Johns-Manville Corp.,
Moreover, the fact that both subsections (g) and (h) were enacted at the same time actually undercuts, rather than bolsters, Garlock’s argument. Congress made its intent to incorporate the absolute priority rule into subsection (h) explicitly clear when it expressly referenced § 1129(b). Subsection (g), however, is devoid of any comparable clear indication of congressional intent. If Congress had meant to likewise incorporate the mandates of § 1129(b) into subsection (g), then it would have made its intent to do so explicitly clear as it did in subsection (h). As such, the Court is not convinced that the “fair and equitable” language in subsection (h) is "unmistakable proof” that the absolute priority rule is incorporated into § 524(g).
. Specifically, the following contributions and/or payments will be made to the PI Trust: (1) $250 million in cash from Reorganized Grace on the Effective Date; (2) approximately $1.5 billion in cash payments by Reorganized Grace over a fifteen-year period; (3) the Cryovac Payment of over $512.5 million (plus interest) and 18 million shares of Sealed Air Common Stock on the Effective Date; (4) the Fresenius Payment of $115 million on the Effective Date; (5) a Warrant for the purchase of 10 million shares of common stock in Reorganized Grace; (6) the Asbestos Insurance Rights; and (7) the Asbestos PI Trust Causes of Action. (See Joint Plan §§ 1.1(47); 7.2.2.)
. Specifically, Mr. David Austern testified as follows:
Q: Does that contribution provide a benefit to the trust?
A: It provides enormous benefit to the trust. $1.1 billion is a very significant portion of what will be the trust assets.
Q: If that contribution were not available, how would that impact future claimants?
A: It would seriously jeopardize ... future claimants ... [from] receiving] the same or similar treatment as present claimants, and very candidly, I don’t think that without that we would have had an understanding with the debtors to settle this matter.
Q: What are your reasons, sir, for accepting the extension of the 524(g) injunction to Sealed Air and Fresenius as the FCR, fiduciary in this case?
A: ... [I]t is a condition precedent to receiving the $1.1 billion.
Q: And as you stated, that is a material benefit to the futures?
A: It's an enormous material benefit.
Q: Mr. Austero, is the plan before the Court fair and equitable to asbestos P.I. future claimants?
A: I believe it is.
Q: Why?
A: A number of reasons. They will be treated in the same and similar manner as present claimants. There are sufficient funds that are available to ensure that they will be paid in the same and similar manner ... as present claimants. And there are mechanisms in place within the trust distribution process to ensure that as well.
(09/17/09 Hr'g Tr„ JA 004166.)
. Section 1.1(144) of the Plan defines "Indirect PI Trust Claims” as:
any Claim ... or Demand against the Debtors ... held by any Entity ... who has been, is, or may be a defendant in an action seeking damages for ... personal injuries ... to the extent caused or allegedly caused, directly or indirectly, by exposure to asbestos or asbestos-containing products for which the Debtors have liability ... [and] on account of alleged liability of the Debtors for payment, repayment, reimbursement, indemnification, subrogation, or contribution of any portion of any damages such Entity has paid or may pay to the plaintiff in such action!.]
(Joint Plan § 1.1(144).)
. Section 5.6 of the TDP provides, in relevant part, that:
Indirect PI Trust Claims ... shall be ... paid by the PI Trust ... if the holder ofsuch claim [] establishes to the satisfaction of the Trustees that the Indirect Claimant has paid in full the liability and obligation of the PI Trust to the individual claimant to whom the PI Trust would otherwise have had a liability or obligation ... To establish a presumptively valid Indirect PI Trust Claim, the Indirect Claimant’s aggregate liability for the Direct Claimant's claim must also have been fixed, liquidated and paid fully by the Indirect Claimant^]
(TDP § 5.6, Ex. 4, JA 000305-306); see also In re W.R. Grace & Co.,
.This section states:
If the Indirect Claimant can show that it has paid all or a portion of such a liability or obligation, the PI Trust shall reimburse the Indirect Claimant the amount of the liability or obligation so paid, times the then applicable Payment Percentage. However, in no event shall such reimbursement to the Indirect Claimant be greater than the amount to which the Direct Claimant would have otherwise been entitled.
(TDP § 5.6, Ex. 4, JA 000306-307.)
. In fact, the Court notes that permitting Garlock’s claims to receive different treatment under the Joint Plan and TDP could potentially violate other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, such as the equality of treatment requirement of 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4).
. The Trust likewise provides that “claimants are not required to furnish the PI Trust with evidence of exposure to specific asbestos or asbestos-containing products other than those for which Grace has legal responsibility, except to the extent such evidence is required elsewhere in this TDP.” (TDP § 5.7(b)(3), JA 000313.)
. The jury returned a verdict against Gar-lock in the Puller case on May 5, 2004, which it subsequently appealed. See Crane v. Puller,
. Specifically, Dr. Mark Peterson, an expert witness in this case, testified that: "There are confidentiality provisions ... [because] there’s concern [ ] the information being submitted is [] sensitive personal material, including medical information. In general, the information of trusts is confidential as it is for any defendant.” (09/15/09 Hr'g Tr., Peterson Test., JA 003718.)
Likewise, Mr. Elihu Inselbuch, one of the principal drafters of the TDP in this case, testified as follows:
Q: Mr. Inselbuch, are you familiar with the adage that the public is entitled to every man’s evidence?
A: No.
Q: So, in the tort system would evidence of Grace exposure be for the sole benefit of Grace, or could other defendants use it, as well?
A: If it’s put in, in open court it would be available to everybody.
Q: But, the trust isn’t an open process, is it?
A: It’s a settlement process and whatever they submitted to Grace by way of settlement wouldn't be available to the public under any adage.
Q: So, at least as it relates to co-defendants like Garlock, as far as the trust is concerned a claim filed by a claimant is confidential?]
A: It’s confidential, except to the extent that the document provides otherwise ... [T]he trust will respond to subpoenas that are lawfully issued under the jurisdictions of the United States. So, ... if Garlock or any other co-defendant is being sued by a plaintiff and Garlock believes the plaintiff has submitted evidence to the trust, why don't they just subpoena that evidence and the proof of claim and whatever else from that claimant who’s a litigant with them in the tort system? If they’re entitled to that, under whatever adage of evidence you want to use, the Court there will give it to them.
(09/14/09 Hr’g Tr., Inselbuch Test., JA 003239-42.)
. In fact, the Court notes that Garlock can subpoena the information it seeks from not one, but two, sources — the Grace PI Trust and the claimant himself. It is the claimant, after all, who provided information to the PI Trust in the first instance. Thus, this fact further undercuts Garlock's argument here.
. Although Garlock’s argument is rooted in § 524(g), the key premise of its objection is that the interests of co-defendants such as Garlock are fundamentally different from those of direct personal injury claimants. Such an allegation hints of an improper classification claim predicated on § 1122. However, given that Garlock has not cited this statutory section as the basis of its objection and that Garlock did not raise this issue below before the Bankruptcy Court, it would be inappropriate to do so now on appeal. As such, the Court declines to consider any allegation related to a claim that Garlock’s indirect claims are impermissibly categorized alongside the direct claims of personal injury claimants, and the above discussion is only in the context of § 524(g).
. This argument appears to be one based on the notion that the Joint Plan was proposed in bad faith because the ACC somehow poisoned the provisions of the TDP. However, as noted at the beginning of this Memorandum Opinion in Part IV: Confirmation of the Joint Plan, Section A: The Good Faith Requirement, supra, there is no evidence of bad faith here.
. The Third Circuit recently noted that “[t]here is substantial similarity among the various [asbestos personal injury] trusts in structure and function. Nearly all the trusts are governed by trustees who manage financial affairs, while a committee of advocates, consisting of representatives of current and future claimants, [] approve substantial trust activities.” In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc.,
. GEICO and Republic have jointly briefed and presented their claims. Thus, the Court considers their arguments together.
. Each insurance company individually issued three high level excess general liability insurance policies to Grace.
. AXA Belgium furthers claims that its policies contained provisions that required Grace to “cooperate” with it and prohibited settlements without its consent. (AXA Belgium Br. 10.)
.Section 1 of the Transfer Agreement states, in pertinent part:
(a) [T]he Insurance Contributors hereby irrevocably transfer, convey, and grant the Asbestos PI Trust all of their Asbestos Insurance Rights, including, without limitation, any and all rights to Proceeds (the "Transfer”). The Transfer is made free and clear of all Encumbrances, liens, security interests, and claims or causes of action[.]
(See Asbestos Insurance Transfer Agreement ("Transfer Agreement”) § 1(a), Ex. 6, JA 025985.)
. Section 7.15 of the Joint Plan provides the following:
(e) Each Asbestos Insurance Entity shall be bound by any Final Order, and related Court findings and conclusions that, under the Bankruptcy Code, the transfer of Asbestos Insurance Rights under the Asbestos Insurance Transfer Agreement is valid and enforceable against each Asbestos Insurance Entity notwithstanding applicable non-bankruptcy law or any anti-assignment provision in or incorporated into any Asbestos Insurance Policy, Asbestos In-Place Insurance Coverage, Asbestos Insurance Reimbursement Agreement or Asbestos Insurance Settlement Agreement.
(Joint Plan § 7.15(e).)
. The Court notes that at the time that Appellees and the insurers filed their briefing before this Court in the instant litigation, Federal-Mogul remained pending on appeal before the Third Circuit. On May 1, 2012, the Third Circuit issued its precedential Opinion in this case.
. GEICO and Republic assert that, in the event that state law would apply to the current dispute, New York law would govern. The Court is not, however, interpreting the underlying insurance contracts here. Rather, the only issue presently before the Court is a federal question: are anti-assignment provisions in insurance contracts that prohibit the assignment of insurance rights to a trust superseded by the federal Bankruptcy Code? Even if state contract law were to be considered here, the Court nonetheless would not need to engage in a lengthy choice-of-law analysis given its present holding.
. In regards to the insurance dispute, Debt- or Grace is joined by the Official Committee of Asbestos Claimants and the Legal Representative for Future Asbestos Claimants in its response to the insurers' claims on appeal.
. In fact, the Court notes that the debtors in both Federal-Mogul and the instant litigation filed the same briefs before this Court and the Third Circuit, any semantic differences notwithstanding. (See Grace Br., Case No. 11-199, Doc. No. 84; FMC Br., Case No. 09-2230 (3d Cir.), Doc. No. 00319934031.) Moreover, GEICO and Republic liberally borrow from the insurers' briefs in Federal-Mogul. (See GEICO/Republic Br., Case No. 11-199, Doc. No. 19; Hartford Insurance Br., Case No. 09-2230 & 09-2231 (3d Cir.), Doc. No. 00319954413.)
. The Court likewise notes that every other court that has considered this and largely similar issues have also found that anti-assignment provisions in insurance policy contracts are preempted by § 1123(a)(5)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code. See In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp.,
Most notably, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently recognized the preemption of state law contractual rights in a bankruptcy setting in In re Thorpe Insulation Co., No. Civ.A. 10-56542,
Section 524(g) was specifically designed to allow companies with large asbestos-related liabilities to use Chapter 11 to transfer those liabilities, along with substantial assets, to a trust responsible for paying future asbestos claims_ Part of the '‘cornerstone” of the reorganization is contribution by the insurers to the trust.... For such reasons we hold that the anti-assignment provisions contained in the contracts between Appellants and Appellees stand as an obstacle to completion of a successful § 524(g) plan, and therefore are preempted by federal bankruptcy law.
Id. Thus, Thorpe further supports this Court’s finding that, to the extent that anti-assignment provisions in insurance policies prohibit the transfer of insurance proceeds to a § 524(g) trust, they are preempted by the Bankruptcy Code.
. The Court likewise overrules the Bank Lenders' objection that the default interest dispute was not ripe in 2009.
. The Bank Lenders spend a significant portion of their argument discussing In re Dow Corning,
Since solvent bankruptcy estates are somewhat of a rarity, it comes as no surprise that the majority of courts to consider whether to award default interest have done so in the context of an insolvent debt- or. In those cases, bankruptcy courts have concluded that default interest need not be awarded in every instance for a plan to pass muster under § 1129(b)(1). Instead, bankruptcy courts analyze whether § 1129(b) requires the payment of default interest on a case-by-case basis.
Id. at 678-79. Thus, given the unknown nature of Grace's solvency at this point in time, Dow Coming is not directly applicable, and does not serve as a roadblock to plan confirmation under the circumstances at hand.
. The Bank Lenders' reliance on In re Kensington Int’l, Ltd.,
. The Committee asserts this claim independently and separately from the Bank Lenders.
. Section 11.8 states, in relevant part:
On the Effective Date, except as set forth below, ... the Unsecured Creditors’ Committee ... shall thereupon be released and discharged of and from all further authority, duties, responsibilities, and obligations relating to or arising from or in connection with the Chapter 11 Cases, and those committees shall be deemed dissolved.... Further, after the Effective Date, the Unsecured Creditors’ Committee ... shall continue in existence and have standing and capacity to (i) object to any proposed modification of the Plan, (ii) object to or defend the Administrative Expense Claims of Professionals employed by or on behalf of the Debtors or their estates, (iii) participate in any appeals of the Confirmation Order (if applicable), (iv) prepare and prosecute applications for the payment of fees and reimbursement of expenses, and (v) continue any adversary proceeding [], claim objection, appeal, or other proceeding that was in progress prior to the Effective Date.
(Joint Plan § 11.8.)
. This "exception clause” provides that:
Nothing in ... the foregoing sentence[s] shall be deemed to confer standing and capacity on the Unsecured Creditors' Committee ... to provide services or take action in connection with an adversary proceeding, claim objection, appeal or other proceeding that was in progress prior to the Effective Date where such services are for the benefit of an individual creditor or creditors and do not serve the direct interests of the creditor or equity interest class which such Entity is appointed to represent.
(Joint Plan § 11.8.)
. In analyzing whether a party's objections are equitably moot, the Third. Circuit has put forth five factors for the court to consider: (1) whether the reorganization plan has been substantially consummated; (2) whether a stay has been obtained; (3) whether the relief requested would affect the rights of the parties not before the court; (4) whether the relief requested would affect the success of the plan; and (5) the public policy of affording finality in bankruptcy judgments. See Nordhoff Invs., Inc. v. Zenith Elec. Corp.,
. Garlock’s sole support for its irreparable injury argument is its citation to Los Angeles Dodgers,
Even with the timing of its Emergency Motion set aside, however, Garlock’s reliance on Los Angeles Dodgers is still inapposite. In that case, the court did recognize equitable mootness as a factor demonstrating that the appellant could be irreparably harmed absent entry of a stay. Id. at 36. The court, however, explicitly pointed out that "the risk of equitable mootness is not, by itself, sufficient to demonstrate irreparable harm to justify a stay pending appeal[.]” Id. (internal citations omitted). Cognizant of this point, the court likewise considered that, without a stay, the appellant would be forced to engage in negotiations with less leverage than it had contracted for and that it would lose "unique sports-related marketing or media opportunities.” Id. at 35-36. As such, the Los Angeles Dodgers Court considered equitable mootness as one among several factors indicating irreparable injury on the appellant’s part without a stay. Here, by contrast, Garlock points to equitable mootness as the sole basis of its alleged irreparable injury. Reliance on this factor alone, however, is insufficient to establish irreparable injury for purposes of a stay.
. Specifically, Garlock states that it will be irreparably injured because:
[I]f the stay is not granted, the Channeling Injunction will become effective and purport to permanently bar Garlock from exercising any of its state law rights against Grace. Grace may immediately begin consummation of the Plan, which will only pay Garlock at most 35% of its claims for contribution and set-off and will similarly underpay claimants in jurisdiction with joint and several liability for co-defendants, forcing Garlock to pay more than its share of liability.
(Garlock ER Mot. 18.) Not only is this argument solely based on Garlock’s alleged monetary damages, but is also essentially a rechar-acterization of its arguments on the merits. Given that the Court has already awarded ample consideration to Garlock’s merits arguments, it need not do so yet again here.
. A supersedeas bond is defined as: "[a] bond required of one who petitions to set aside a judgment or execution and from which the other party may be made whole if the action is unsuccessful.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 1289 (5th ed. 1979).
. The Court notes that the only times Garlock even cursorily makes note of the bond requirement is on page 5 of its brief, stating that: "Both [Rjules [8017(b) and 62(c)] allow the Court ... to issue a stay without requiring Garlock to post a bond,” and in the concluso-ry sentence of its brief, requesting that "this Court enter a stay without imposing a bond.” (Garlock ER Mot. 5, 20.) Other than these two scant references, Garlock does not further acknowledge the necessity of a superse-deas bond in this case.