Ex parte M.P. (In re: W.C.M. v. M.P.)
SC-2025-0690
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
July 10, 2026
McCOOL, Justice.
SPECIAL TERM, 2026; Baldwin Juvenile Court: JU-19-510.02; Court of Civil Appeals: CL-2023-0615
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
WRIT QUASHED.
Stewart, C.J., and Shaw and Sellers, JJ., concur.
Parker, J., concurs specially, with opinion.
Mendheim, J., concurs in the result.
Wise and Cook, JJ., dissent.
Bryan, J., dissents, with opinion.
I agree with the decision to quash the writ, which is consistent with my vote to deny the certiorari petition when it first came before us.
In this case, M.P., the mother of E.H.P., seeks to terminate the parental rights of W.C.M., E.H.P.‘s father. M.P.‘s primary basis for seeking our discretionary review was her assertion that the decision below “conflict[s]” with binding precedent. See
Given the extremely fact-intensive nature of these arguments, they do not, in my view, identify a true “conflict” warranting review by this
This standard for granting certiorari review may seem like a high one. And it admittedly leaves open the possibility that errors will sometimes go uncorrected by this Court. But it is the standard embodied in our rules. It is also the standard that will most effectively respect the proper institutional roles of our Court and of the intermediate appellate courts.
I respectfully dissent from the Court‘s decision to quash the writ of certiorari we issued in this case. We issued the writ to determine whether the Court of Civil Appeals’ decision, W.C.M. v. M.P., [CL-2023-0615, May 23, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2025)(opinion on remand from the Alabama Supreme Court)(“W.C.M. II“), is in conflict with prior decisions of that court holding that an appellate court may not reweigh the evidence presented to a juvenile court and prior decisions concerning “abandonment” in the context of terminating parental rights, as defined by
Regarding whether the Court of Civil Appeals has impermissibly reweighed the evidence presented, I agree with Judge Fridy‘s dissenting opinions that the Baldwin Juvenile Court (“the juvenile court“) could have reasonably concluded that clear and convincing evidence was presented to support terminating the parental rights of W.C.M. (“the father“). See W.C.M. II, ____ So. 3d at ____ (Fridy, J., dissenting); and W.C.M. v. M.P., [Ms. CL-2023-0615, July 19, 2024] ____ So. 3d ____, ____ (Ala. Civ. App. 2024)(Fridy, J., dissenting)(“W.C.M. I“), rev‘d, Ex parte M.P., [Ms. SC-2024-0684, Mar. 7, 2025] ____ So. 3d ____ (Ala. 2025).
Analysis
In a footnote, the Court of Civil Appeals noted that the father‘s paternity of E.H.P. (“the child“) was adjudicated in 2017. W.C.M. II, ____ So. 3d at ____ n.1. See Keener v. State, 347 So. 2d 398, 401 (Ala. 1977)(“A verdict that the defendant is the father of the child subjects the defendant to all of the obligations for the care, maintenance and education of the child as are imposed upon fathers of legitimate children.“)1.
In analyzing the father‘s failure to support the child after adjudication of his paternity, the Court of Civil Appeals first stated:
“Insofar as [M.P., the mother,] contended that the father‘s failure to pay child support or a portion of the child‘s expenses could support the conclusion that the father had abandoned the child or otherwise support the judgment terminating the father‘s parental rights, we again note that the father‘s child-support obligation had not yet been established.”
W.C.M. II, ____ So. 3d at ____.
The court then quoted its 2024 decision in M.W. v. Marshall County Department of Human Resources, 399 So. 3d 287, 292 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024), for the following proposition: ” ‘Without an order of child support, the juvenile court could not determine that the mother had “failed” to perform her duties to provide financial support and to meet the material needs of the children within the meaning of abandonment set forth in
In support of its conclusion, M.W. cited a decision from only four years earlier, B.L. v. Elmore County Department of Human Resources, 324 So. 3d 829, 837 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020), and included a parenthetical stating that B.L. had “explain[ed] that[,] in [the] absence of [an] order requiring [a] parent to pay child support in compliance with
Thus, the pertinent holding that the Court of Civil Appeals has derived from B.L. is clear: Unless a court has ordered a parent to pay child support pursuant to
To begin, it does not appear that B.L. actually articulated the holding that the Court of Civil Appeals has begun attributing to it in the past few years. Although B.L. noted that the father at issue in that case had not failed to comply with an order requiring him to pay child support, it also reasoned that “[t]he evidence [wa]s not clear that the father ... was
In other words, B.L. did not even facially suggest that the absence of court-ordered child support had, as a matter of law, constrained a juvenile court from determining that a parent had failed to support the child within the meaning of “abandonment,” as set forth in
”[a] voluntary and intentional relinquishment of the custody of a child by a parent, or a withholding from the child, without good cause or excuse, by the parent, of his or her presence, care, love, protection, maintenance, or the opportunity for the display of filial affection, or the failure to claim the rights of a parent, or failure to perform the duties of a parent.”
(Emphasis added.)
“A rebuttable presumption that the parents are unable or unwilling to act as parents exists in any case where the parents have abandoned a child and this abandonment continues for a period of four months next preceding the filing of the petition. Nothing in this subsection is intended to prevent the filing of a petition in an abandonment case prior to the end of the four-month period.”
As a separate factor for determining whether parental rights should be terminated,
Thus, the statutory scheme pertaining to dependency and termination-of-parental rights proceedings clearly embraces the concept
“Alabama is a common-law state .... The common law is the base upon which all of the laws of this State have been constructed, and when our courts are called upon to construe a statute, -- when they are called upon to ascertain and declare the legal effect and meaning of a legislative enactment, -- they must read the statute in the light of the common law.”
Weaver v. Hollis, 247 Ala. 57, 60, 22 So. 2d 525, 528 (1945).
Proceedings to formally terminate parental rights have statutory origins. See M.L. v. Jefferson Cnty. Dep‘t of Hum. Res., 362 So. 3d 1242, 1248 (Ala. Civ. App. 2022)(“Termination-of-parental-rights proceedings are purely statutory in nature.“). However, as demonstrated above, the parental duty of support for minor children and the consequences of parental abandonment have common-law roots.2
To put yet a finer point on it, I see no reason to interpret the word “maintenance,” as used in
Moreover, other prior decisions of that court and of this Court further undermine the Court of Civil Appeals’ novel view of the pertinent statutory landscape. The language of
In a 1987 decision involving a father who was seeking to avoid his obligation to support his child through a termination of his parental rights, this Court discussed the statutory concept of “abandonment,” as set forth in the 1984 Child Protection Act. Ex parte Brooks, 513 So. 2d 614,
In relevant part, the Court explained: “The Child Protection Act of 1984 ... was not intended as a means for allowing a parent to abandon his child and thereby to avoid his obligation to support the child .... The courts of this State will not be used in the furtherance of such a purpose.” Id. at 617. In other words, the Court‘s analysis inherently acknowledged a father‘s preexisting, i.e., common-law, obligation of support for his minor child and concluded that the relatively new statutory scheme dealing with abandonment should not be interpreted as having relieved the father of that common-law duty. See Weaver, 247 Ala. at 60, 22 So. 2d at 528 (” ‘The presumption is that the legislature does not intend to make any alteration in the law beyond what it explicitly declares, either in express terms or by unmistakable implication, and that it does not intend to overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart from a general system of law without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness.’ Duncan v. Rudulph, 245 Ala. 175, 16 So. 2d 313, 314 [(1944)].“).
“A basic principle of Alabama law is that a parent has a duty to support a minor child. ‘Parental support is a fundamental right of all minor children.’ State ex rel. Shellhouse v. Bentley, 666 So. 2d 517, 518 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995)(quoting Ex parte University of South Alabama, 541 So. 2d 535, 537 (Ala. 1989)). See also Anderson v. Loper, 689 So. 2d 118 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996). In March 1994, §§ 30-3-1104
through 30-3-115, Ala. Code 1975, became effective. Those Code sections create a cause of action, maintainable by the custodial parent or guardian or the State, for retroactive child support against a nonsupporting parent. In enacting these sections, the Alabama legislature determined that, even in the absence of a court order requiring the noncustodial parent to pay support, a custodial parent or guardian can recover support for periods when the noncustodial parent made no contribution for the support of the child. ...
....
”Given this state‘s policy and law requiring a parent to support a minor child, we hold that a trial court may, in its discretion, award child support retroactive to the filing of the complaint for divorce where the trial court has failed to enter a pendente lite child support order for the period in which the parent had a duty to support the child but failed to provide that support. ...
“We emphasize that this holding is not meant to eliminate the use of pendente lite orders for temporary child support during the pendency of divorce proceedings. Parents have a duty to support their minor children; the trial courts should rule on a request for temporary child support as expeditiously as possible.”5
(Emphasis added.)
In Judge Fridy‘s dissent in W.C.M. I, he noted the following regarding the circumstances of this case:
“Based on the evidence, the juvenile court could have been clearly convinced that the father initiated his withdrawal from the child‘s life. The father‘s reliance on wanting ‘his day in court’ in the custody action to obtain visitation with the child or to be required to pay support for the child does not negate his voluntary disappearance from the child‘s life for more than a year, during which time he failed even to check on her safety when a hurricane struck Baldwin County, where the child lived. A pending custody case does not replace the father‘s intentional decision to refuse to maintain a relationship with a young child. To a child, a pending custody action cannot make up for missed visits, ignored holidays and birthdays, and an absence of the father from her life for at least a year.”
W.C.M. I, ____ So. 3d at ____ (Fridy, J., dissenting).
As demonstrated above, the father‘s duty toward his child did not depend upon the existence of a court order requiring him to fulfill the natural obligations of a parent. In my opinion, the father‘s failure to recognize this natural duty demonstrates his total disregard for what it
As this Court has previously observed,
” ’ [w]e should not equate the filing of “court papers” and the taking of legal positions with the establishment of human relationships. ... While those papers sit in a folder in a courthouse, children grow. They are read to and tucked in at night. They are nursed to health. They are taught. They are nurtured. They are loved. And they love back. And bonds are formed -- but not with a biological father who has allowed himself to remain absent from the child‘s life. See generally R.K. v. R.J., 843 So. 2d 774 [(Ala. Civ. App. 2002)]; Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 [(1982)].”
” K.W.J. [v. J.W.B.], 933 So. 2d [1075, 1081 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005)] (Murdock, J., dissenting) ....”
Ex parte J.W.B., 933 So. 2d 1081, 1092 (Ala. 2005).
Conclusion
A parent‘s natural obligation to support his or her minor child is inherent and preexists any Alabama statute. Moreover, Alabama‘s statutory scheme as a whole recognizes this natural duty and provides for its enforcement when necessary -- and even retroactively. As a component of this statutory regime, judicial proceedings may be brought
I see nothing in the statutes governing such proceedings that limits the term “maintenance,” as included in the definition of “abandonment” set forth in
Accordingly, I disagree with the Court of Civil Appeals’ misguided conclusion that, ” ’ [w]ithout an order of child support, [a] juvenile court [cannot] determine that [a parent] ha[s] “failed” to perform her duties to provide financial support and to meet the material needs of the children within the meaning of abandonment set forth in
Notes
“[W]e now state a new standard regarding the period that a court may consider in determining whether a putative father has voluntarily forfeited his presumptive right to a child born out wedlock. The relevant period begins when ‘a putative father knows, or should know, of his paternity of a child born out of wedlock.’ B.F. [v. C.D., [Ms. CL-2025-0032, Aug. 22, 2025]] ____ So. 3d [____,] ____ [(Ala. Civ. App. 2025)](Moore, P.J., concurring specially).”
Id. at 905 n.2 (emphasis added).“[i]n enacting [Ala. Code 1975, former] § 26-18-7(c) [the predecessor statute to
§ 12-15-319(d) ], the Alabama Legislature has modified the common law by declaring that abandonment creates only a rebuttable presumption that theparent is unable or unwilling to act as a parent. However, when the parent fails to rebut that presumption, grounds for termination are established and the juvenile court may terminate parental rights. Therefore, just as under the common law, unrebutted evidence of abandonment acts as a forfeiture of parental rights.”
Indeed, a short survey of prior decisions before that time demonstrates that the Court of Civil Appeals has historically analyzed the question of financial abandonment under
“There is hereby created a civil action to establish an order of retroactive support which may be brought against a non-supporting parent who has a duty to support as the legal parent of a child or children but has failed to provide support. The action may be brought by the parent or guardian with physical or legal custody who is providing the actual care and support for the child or may be brought by the Department of Human Resources pursuant to the provisions of [Ala. Code 197, §] 38-10-1 et seq. An action under this section can be brought only if support has not previously been ordered pursuant to a divorce or other action in this or any other jurisdiction.”