The prosecutor of this writ of habeas corpus was convicted, sentenced and imprisoned at Rahway for manslaughter committed June 30th, 1927, and took an appeal. He was entitled to be enlarged on bail pending the appeal as the statutes stood at the time the crime was committed. Four days thereafter an act went into effect that enlargement should be only upon a certificate of reasonable doubt granted by the trial court. The trial court refused the certificate and the prosecutor sued out this writ, claiming that as he was of right entitled to bail when the offense was committed, this right was not taken from him constitutionally by the later law. The right to bail after conviction is a statutory privilege that relates not to the crime nor judgment but only to the procedure on review, and the added condition to the exercise of the privilege by an act passed after the commission of the crime does not offend the constitutional inhibition against ex post facto laws. Procedural privileges are always under legislative control. Cooley Const. Lim. 272;Moore v. State,
Counsel have recently with considerable frequency applied to this court to discharge on bail persons convicted of crime. Attention is called to Mr. Justice Kalisch's observation of the impropriety of this course in In re Baronne,
