Appellant, Frank Lange, appeals from summary judgment in Olmsted County District Court, precluding him from contesting the validity of a reassessment for a water line. We affirm.
Appellant owns an 80-acre tract of farm land, the northern edge of which lies within the corporate limits of respondent, the city of Byron. In 1973, the city extended a water line across the northern end of appellant’s land and assessed his property $9,263. Appellant appealed to the district court and the assessment was set aside on the ground that it did not bear a reasonable relationship to the benefit conferred on the assessed property by the water line. The court found as part of its findings of fact:
“ * * * The 4.6 acres in question was increased in value by virtue of the water main between $1000.00 an acre (appellant’s expert) and $1,800.00 an acre (respondent’s expert) with $1,400.00 being the average benefit per acre of the new water main. Thus a benefit of $6,440.00 was realized to the property which it was assessed $9,263.00.”
Pursuant to Minn.St. 429.071, subd. 2, 1 the city reassessed the property for $6,500. Ap *228 pellant again appealed to the district court, arguing that the land subject to the reassessment contained 2.13 acres, not 4.6 acres, and that it was insufficiently described in the notice of reassessment. The district court granted summary judgment for respondent, ruling that the earlier judgment, through application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, precluded appellant from relitigating these issues.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes parties to an action from reliti-gating in subsequent actions issues that were determined in the prior action.
Shimp v. Sederstrom,
Although some confusion exists concerning the evidence introduced at the first appeal with respect to the acreage of appellant’s land within the city,
2
it is clear that the issue was litigated. Appellant concedes as much in his brief. Moreover, the issue seems necessarily to have been determined by the findings of fact in the first appeal. Both appellant’s and respondent’s experts, in evaluating the market value of the Lange property before and after the improvement to measure the benefit conferred,
In re Appeals by Am. Oil Co. v. City of St. Cloud,
Appellant asserts, however, (1) that it was doubtful he could have appealed since he was the prevailing party and (2) that it was possible the error could have been remedied by the city council during reassessment, and therefore he had no incentive to seek relief. The latter assertion seems untenable. It was reasonable to expect that the city council would reassess appellant’s property consistently with the district court’s findings — which in fact it did. Thus appellant had little reason to think the alleged error would have been corrected during reassessment.
Appellant’s first contention has greater merit. Generally a prevailing party who is thereby precluded from appealing, (see,
Twin Cities Metro. Pub. Transit Area v. Holter,
Minn.,
Appellant further contends that the reassessment should be set aside because the notice of reassessment, given pursuant to Minn.St. 429.071, subd. 2 (quoted in footnote 1, supra), did not properly apprise him of the land subject to the reassessment. The reassessment notice was in relevant part identical to the notice given by the city for the original assessment. In apparent reliance on this fact, the district court held that collateral estoppel also barred appellant from contesting the sufficiency of the contents of the reassessment notice. We agree that this issue, which was necessarily determined in the first appeal to the district court, cannot be relitigated.
Affirmed.
Notes
. Minn.St. 429.071, subd. 2, provides: “When an assessment is, for any reason whatever, set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction as to any parcel or parcels of land, or in event the council finds that the assessment or any part thereof is excessive or determines on advice of the municipal attorney that the assessment or proposed assessment or any part thereof is or *228 may be invalid for any reason, the council may, upon notice and hearing as provided for the original assessment, make a reassessment or a new assessment as to such parcel or parcels.”
. Contrary to the statement in the trial judge’s memorandum accompanying his order for summary judgment that both experts testified on the assumption that 4.6 acres were involved, respondent’s memorandum in the first appeal suggests that appellant’s expert erroneously based his valuation on 4.6 acres, while respondent’s expert used approximately 3 acres. Moreover, appellant’s expert testified that appellant told him 2.6 acres lay within the city and that the tax statement listed 4.6 acres. Appellant’s expert himself testified that 4.1 acres “[mjore or less” were within the city limits.
. Rule 52.02, Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: “Upon motion of a party made not later than the time allowed for a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59.03, the court may amend its findings or make additional findings, and may amend the judgment accordingly if judgment has been entered. The motion may be made with a motion for a new trial and may be made on the files, exhibits, and minutes of the court. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to such findings or has made a motion to amend them or a motion for judgment.”