In re: VICTOR MONDELLI, Debtor VICTOR MONDELLI, ANNA MONDELLI and KENNETH ROSELLINI, ESQ., Appellants
No. 11-3029
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
December 26, 2012
NOT PRECEDENTIAL. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil No. 2-10-cv-03393). District Judge: Honorable William J. Martini. Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) November 13, 2012. Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Appellant/Debtor Victor Mondelli and Appellant Anna Mondelli, a purported intervenor, appeal the District Court‘s dismissal of their appeals of eleven bankruptcy orders and the District Court‘s denial of their motion for reconsideration. In addition, Kenneth Rosellini, the Mondellis’ lawyer, appeals the District Court‘s imposition of Rule
I.
Mondelli filed for relief under
In orders dated April 6, 2005 and April 20, 2005, the Bankruptcy Court granted compensation to the Chapter 7 Trustee. The Mondellis now appeal these orders for the first time.
On May 15, 2007, the Bankruptcy Court entered a consent order, agreed to by Mondelli, authorizing Mondelli to obtain a loan from Jack Silverman Realty & Mortgage Co. (“JSRM“). On May 16, 2007, the Bankruptcy Court entered a related consent order, agreed to by Mondelli, which authorized Mondelli to lease property to Berkeley Realty Partners 224, LLC (“Berkeley“). On June 27, 2007, the Bankruptcy Court entered
On October 17, 2007 and May 7, 2008, the Bankruptcy Court entered orders granting attorneys fees to the Chapter 7 Trustee. On January 7, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order approving the “third and final application” for fees. On January 20, 2009, Mondelli filed a notice of appeal to the District Court of the October 17, 2007, May 7, 2008, and January 7, 2009 Orders. He thereafter failed to prosecute these appeals. The Mondellis now appeal these orders to this Court. On October 21, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order granting the Trustee fees and expenses. The Mondellis now appeal this order for the first time.
On March 15, 2010, the Bankruptcy Court entered its Final Decree. On March 29, 2010, the Mondellis filed a notice of appeal to the District Court, indicating their intent to
- February 7, 2005 Order Converting Case to Chapter 13;
- February 15, 2005 Amendment to Order Converting Case to Chapter 13;
- April 6, 2005 Order Granting Compensation to Trustee;
- April 20, 2005 Order Granting Compensation to Trustee;
- May 15, 2007 Consent Order Authorizing Ground Lease;
- May 16, 2007 Consent Order Authorizing Debtor to Enter into a Ground Lease;1
- October 17, 2007 Order Granting Attorneys Fees for Trustee;
- May 7, 2008 Order Granting Attorneys Fees for Trustee;
- January 7, 2009 Order Granting Attorneys Fees for Trustee;
- October 21, 2009 Order Granting Trustee Fees and Expenses; and
- March 15, 2010 Final Decree.
In connection with the appeal of the May 15, 2007 and May 16, 2007 consent orders, JSRM and Berkeley (the “Rule 11 Movants“) moved for
The District Court dismissed all of the appeals, reasoning that the Mondellis did not have standing to appeal the Final Decree, and that their appeals of the other ten other orders was untimely.2 In addition, the District Court concluded that the letter JSRM and
The Mondellis filed a motion for reconsideration, and in response, the Rule 11 Movants moved for additional
The Mondellis now appeal the dismissal of all of their appeals to this Court. In addition, Rosellini appeals the imposition of sanctions.
II.
a. The Bankruptcy Orders
On appeals from the District Court‘s review of bankruptcy matters, we review findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard and exercise plenary review over questions of law. In re Dykes, 10 F.3d 184, 185-86 (3d Cir. 1993).
The Mondellis raise two arguments as to why this Court should reverse the District Court‘s dismissal of their appeals of eleven bankruptcy orders. First, the Mondellis argue that the Bankruptcy Court erred in converting Mondelli‘s case to Chapter 7 instead of dismissing it as he requested in 2004.3 The Mondellis, who do not
i. The Orders
A party has fourteen days from the date of the entry of the judgment to file a notice of appeal.
The Mondellis’ appeal of the May 15, 2007, May 16, 2007, and June 27, 2007 consent orders is also untimely. Moreover, the Mondellis are precluded from even appealing these orders, as they are consent judgments, see Verzilli v. Flexon, Inc., 295 F.3d 421, 424 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining circumstances when a party can appeal a consent judgment), and this Court had already considered the merits of these orders in In re Mondelli, 349 Fed. App‘x. 731 (3d Cir. 2009). Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court‘s dismissal of the Mondellis’ appeals of the Orders.
ii. The Final Decree
Moreover, we agree with the well-reasoned analysis of the District Court that the Mondellis did not have standing to appeal the Final Decree. “[O]nly those whose rights or interests are directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by an order of the bankruptcy court may bring an appeal.” In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 249 (3d Cir. 2000)
b. Rule 11 Sanctions
The parties dispute whether the Rule 11 Movants’ letter to the Rule 11 Defendants was procedurally defective.5 We agree with the District Court that the letter substantially complied with the safe-harbor provision in
We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions on the Rule 11 Defendants for appealing two (or three) consent orders. See Waltz v. Cnty. of Lycoming, 974 F.2d 387, 388 (3d Cir. 1992) (explaining that this Court reviews a district court‘s imposition of Rule 11 sanctions for abuse of discretion). A party cannot appeal a consent judgment unless at least one of three exceptions applies: (1) a party did not actually consent; (2) the court approving the consent order lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to enter the judgment; and (3) the consent judgment explicitly reserves the right to appeal. Verzilli, 295 F.3d at 424; In re Sharon Steel Corp., 918 F.2d 434, 437 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990).
III.
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the District Court‘s ruling.
