In re Vasquez-Ramirez
In re Alvaro VASQUEZ-RAMIREZ, Alvaro Vasquez-Ramirez, Petitioner,
v.
United States District Court for the Southern District of California, Respondent,
United States of America, Real Party in Interest.
No. 04-75715.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted November 18, 2005.
Filed April 6, 2006.
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED Steven F. Hubachek, Chase Scolnick and Lori B. Schoenberg, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for the petitioner.
Michael J. Dowd, Lerach Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP, San Diego, CA, for the respondent.
Carol C. Lam, United States Attorney; Roger W. Haines, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Section, Criminal Division; and David P. Curnow, Assistant United States Attorney, San Diego, CA, for the United States, real party in interest.
Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California; Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CR-04-01037-LAB.
Before: WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., ALEX KOZINSKI and EUGENE E. SILER, JR.,* Circuit Judges.
KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge.
We consider whether a district judge may reject a guilty plea that satisfies all of the requirements of
Facts
Alvaro Vasquez-Ramirez was deported from the United States after having been convicted of an aggravated felony. He then reentered the United States in violation of
Vasquez agreed to the deal, signed a plea agreement, and was arraigned on an information charging two counts of violating
The court had reviewed the criminal history report. I have reviewed the report—excuse me—the report and recommendation. I reject the Plea Agreement in this case. And accordingly, I am going to give the defendant, Mr. Vasquez, the right to withdraw his plea. Actually, he doesn't need to, because I am not going to accept the plea. I reject it. The criminal history category in this case and the criminal history of the defendant is so high that in good conscience I would not sentence him to 30 months, and I reject the Plea Agreement. I am not going to follow that. I am not going to go along with it. I am not going to dismiss the [
Vasquez moved for reconsideration but the district judge declined. When pressed for his reasons, the judge stated that he didn't want to get "mousetrapped" into losing his discretion to impose a sentence longer than 30 months. Vasquez brings a mandamus petition seeking to compel the district judge to accept his guilty plea.2 He does not challenge the judge's rejection of the plea agreement.
Merits
1. The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of treating pleas and plea agreements distinctly, see United States v. Hyde,
The distinction between pleas and plea agreements is codified in
Thus, viewing
2. We have previously addressed the relationship between plea agreements and guilty pleas. In Ellis, we issued a writ of mandamus to a district court that had rejected a plea agreement and vacated the defendant's previously entered guilty plea. We held as follows:
If ... the court rejects a
[T]he court must do the following on the record and in open court (or, for good cause, in camera):
(A) inform the parties that the court rejects the plea agreement;
(B) advise the defendant personally that the court is not required to follow the plea agreement and give the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea; and
(C) advise the defendant personally that if the plea is not withdrawn, the court may dispose of the case less favorably toward the defendant than the plea agreement contemplated.
The only course available for the district court, upon rejecting the plea agreement, is to advise the defendant of his rights, including the right to withdraw the guilty plea.... And should the defendant decide to maintain his plea of guilty, the court "may dispose of the case less favorably toward the defendant than the plea agreement contemplated."
When his plea agreement was rejected, it became Ellis's choice whether to: (i) stand by his plea ... (ii) withdraw his plea and attempt to renegotiate a new plea agreement ... or (iii) withdraw his plea and take his chances at trial....
Ellis,
The district judge in this case tried to avoid the strictures of Ellis by refusing to accept Vasquez's guilty plea in the first place; thus, he thought, there would be nothing to vacate. But the judge's attempt to distinguish a guilty plea already accepted from one that has only been tendered must fail; as described above, the act of "accepting" a tendered guilty plea is non-discretionary once the
The Supreme Court's description of the proper sequence of events accords with our analysis: [The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure] explicitly envision a situation in which the defendant performs his side of the bargain (the guilty plea) before the Government is required to perform its side.... If the court accepts the agreement and thus the Government's promised performance, then the contemplated agreement is complete and the defendant gets the benefit of his bargain. But if the court rejects the Government's promised performance, then the agreement is terminated and the defendant has the right to back out of his promised performance (the guilty plea), just as a binding contractual duty may be extinguished by the nonoccurrence of a condition subsequent.
Hyde,
3. The district judge protests that, were he forced to accept Vasquez's guilty plea, he could impose no more than a 30-month sentence, which he finds inadequate in light of Vasquez's criminal history. He also argues that the parties will be effectuating the very plea agreement he rejected, which recommended a 30-month sentence. The dissent in Ellis shared the district judge's concerns:
The majority states that ... the judge may still "dispose of the case less favorably toward the defendant than the plea agreement contemplated" under
Ellis,
We rejected this argument in Ellis, and we reject it again here, because it misses the point. Now that the plea agreement has been rejected, Vasquez's guilty plea is a naked plea, unencumbered by waivers of his right to appeal or collaterally challenge the proceedings, and unaccompanied by a government promise to drop the section 1326 indictment. There will be no enforceable agreement to which the government can point should Vasquez decide to appeal or should he refuse to depart the country after serving his sentence, and no agreement to which Vasquez can point should the prosecutor decide to proceed on the indictment. Vasquez is pleading guilty to the section 1325 charges because he admits he committed the crime and, most likely, because he believes the government will not pursue the section 1326 charge.
Should the government indeed decide to drop the section 1326 indictment, it will be exercising classic prosecutorial discretion. It may have any number of reasons for doing so, such as wise allocation of scarce resources, none of which are the district court's business. It is true that the district judge's sentencing discretion will then be capped at the same 30-month sentence the parties recommended in their plea agreement. But that is just happenstance, a function of the parties' decision to recommend the statutory maximum sentence; it doesn't mean the judge's rejection of their plea agreement has been nullified. The district judge will still be free to sentence Vasquez to any term of imprisonment within the statutory range; he will have no less discretion than he would if the government had declined to bring the section 1326 indictment in the first place. The judge's sentencing discretion will be cabined only by the prosecutor's decision regarding which charges to pursue, and by Congress's decision to create a statutory maximum sentence for those charges. A judge has no constitutional role in either of these decisions; one is strictly executive and the other is strictly legislative.6
By refusing to accept Vasquez's guilty plea, the district judge is trying to force the government to pursue a charge it does not wish to press. As we held in Ellis, this intrudes too far into the executive function:
The district court viewed the sentence resulting from Ellis's plea bargain as not in the best interest of society, given Ellis's criminal history and the circumstances of the offense charged. This was a judgment properly within the judicial function. It is also a function protected by
Ellis,
4. Our reading of
The Supreme Court has held that:
Moreover, the rule must not be taken lightly. Presentence reports are documents which the rule does not make available to the defendant as a matter of right. There are no formal limitations on their contents, and they may rest on hearsay and contain information bearing no relation whatever to the crime with which the defendant is charged. . . . [T]here is no reason for [the judge] to see the document until the occasion to sentence arises, and under the rule he must not do so.
Gregg v. United States,
The parties in this case submitted a criminal history report to the district court in conjunction with their plea agreement, in compliance with the district judge's "standard practice."7 But this practice is permissible only if the judge adheres to
The district judge wants to have it both ways—he wants to have access to information to which he is only entitled once the defendant is guilty, and then use it retrospectively to decide whether to accept the defendant's guilty plea. This is not allowed under the Rules.
5. Finally, our reading of
Although we can find no case dealing with precisely the same issue we confront here, where a judge rejects a plea that meets the
Remedy
Having concluded that the district court erred in refusing to accept Vasquez's guilty plea, we must decide whether to issue a writ of mandamus. We consider five factors when deciding whether to issue a writ of mandamus: (1) whether the petitioner has any other means of obtaining the relief he desires; (2) whether the petitioner will suffer harm that is not remediable on appeal; (3) whether the district court was clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) whether the district court's error is oft repeated, or manifests a blatant disregard of the rules; and (5) whether the district court's order raises new and important issues. See Bauman v. United States Dist. Court,
For the reasons explained above, factors three and five are easily satisfied in this case: The district judge's decision to reject Vasquez's guilty plea is clearly erroneous and raises important issues involving prosecutorial discretion and separation of powers. Factor four is also satisfied to some degree: Although the district judge's error is not oft repeated, it is contrary to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The only two factors remaining involve whether Vasquez can obtain adequate relief by going to trial on the section 1326 charge—or pleading guilty to it—and then appealing his conviction. We have already explained why this alternative remedy is inadequate:
Substantial prejudice would result to [the defendant], the government, and the judicial system by requiring all to proceed through trial . . . before the district court's error could be remedied on direct appeal. . . . The uncorrectable prejudice arising from the district court's refusal to proceed on the [lesser] charge is evident from a consideration of the possible outcome of a trial on the [greater] charge, were we to deny mandamus relief. If the jury acquitted the defendant . . . [he] would go free because he would not, under the district court's ruling, have pleaded guilty to the [lesser] charge, and could not be tried on that charge. Had the jury, instead, returned a verdict of guilt on the [greater] charge . . . [the defendant] would have irreparably suffered the prejudice of the additional, and unnecessary, financial and emotional burden of having to stand trial.
Ellis,
Finally, Vasquez argues that the case should be reassigned to a different district judge. The district judge who denied Vasquez's guilty plea has already viewed Vasquez's criminal history report and has expressed strong views about its contents. Further, the judge has told the parties that he will not grant any motion the government may file to dismiss the section 1326 indictment, even though he would likely have no basis for denying such a motion. See
The district judge has read the presentence report and has expressed strong views on its contents. . . . [T]o preserve the appearance of justice, and consistent with the purposes of
Ellis,
* * *
A district judge retains broad discretion to sentence a defendant to any term of imprisonment within the statutory range set by Congress, for the crime the prosecutor has chosen to pursue. See United States v. Booker,
The petition for mandamus is GRANTED. Respondent shall order the case shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such motion by Rule 56."
Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint against Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, the Commonwealth of Virginia, the Fairfax Connector, Kimberly Powel and J.C. Lyle. We vacate the district court's dismissal in favor of Freedom and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.* We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART
Notes:
Notes
The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr., Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation
We have previously expressed approval of the fast-track programSee United States v. Estrada-Plata,
Vasquez also filed an interlocutory appeal seeking the same relief, which we dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
One type of agreement that the courtcan reject is a "charge bargain" like the one at issue in this case. See
The
Of course, the rejection of a plea agreement does impact the defendant's ability to change his pleaSee pp. 696-97 infra.
The Tenth Circuit has also discussed the impact of charge bargains on a trial judge's sentencing discretion, concluding as we do that district courts should be wary of interfering with prosecutorial discretion:
Though charging decisions implicate executive power, they also implicate the sentencing discretion of district courts. However, the court's sentencing discretion is implicated only as an incidental consequence of the prosecution's exercise of executive discretion. In fact, a court's sentencing discretion is implicated in this situation in precisely the same manner it is implicated by prosecutorial decisions to bring charges in the first place, where prosecutorial discretion is nearly absolute. As such, charge bargains directly and primarily implicate prosecutorial discretion whereas judicial discretion is impacted only secondarily. Thus, while district courts may reject charge bargains in the sound exercise of judicial discretion, concerns relating to the doctrine of separation of powers counsel hesitancy before second-guessing prosecutorial choices.
United States v. Robertson,
This practice gives the judge the flexibility anticipated by
The district judge argues that
In arguing that he was not required to accept Vasquez's guilty plea, the district judge points to the "well-settled proposition that a defendant has no absolute right . . . to have his guilty plea accepted."Gomez-Gomez,
Further, courts that discuss this "well-settled proposition" often cite to Santobello v. New York,
In any event, the Supreme Court in Santobello was reviewing a state court decision, see
The reason for remand is entirely procedural and is unrelated to the merits of the case