In re T.W.
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Jim Rice, James C. Nelson, Leaphart
¶1 T.W. appeals from the order entered by the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, denying her motion for injunctive and declaratory relief. We affirm.
¶2 The following issues are dispositive on appeal:
¶3 Did the District Court err in concluding that
¶4 Did the District Court err in concluding that T.W. was not entitled to immediate placement in community-based services after her involuntary commitment expired?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶5 Involuntary commitment of a seriously developmentally disabled person is governed by
(a) has a developmental disability;
(b) is impaired in cognitive functioning; and
(c) has behaviors that post an imminent risk of serious harm to self or others . . . who, because of those behaviors or deficits, cannot be safely and effectively habilitated in community-based services.
If the RFST reports that the individual is seriously developmentally disabled, then the court may consider commitment to a residential facility.
¶6 T.W., a female in her mid-twenties, was admitted to the Montana Developmental Center (MDC) facility on an emergency commitment in November 1999. On November 29, 1999, the RFST reported that T.W. was mildly mentally retarded, exhibited behaviors that presented “a risk of serious harm to herself and others“—including self-mutilation and assaultive tendencies—had cognitive delays and poor memory, and was seriously developmentally disabled. On December 22, 1999, the District Court ordered that T.W. be involuntarily committed to MDC for one year to receive an extended course of treatment and habilitation. Thereafter, T.W. was recommitted to MDC pursuant to the statutory process for additional one-year commitments on January 5, 2001, and May 21, 2002. This latter one-year commitment was scheduled to expire on May 21, 2003. In November 2002, T.W.‘s treatment team at MDC referred her for community placement, recommending that T.W. be
¶7 On June 3, 2003, pursuant to the statutory referral procedure, the RFST completed its evaluation and issued a report which concluded that T.W. had made substantial improvement at MDC and was no longer seriously developmentally disabled:
The [RFST] is in consensus that [T.W.] is no longer seriously developmentally disabled. She has benefited greatly from the structure, supervision and counseling she has received at the Montana Developmental Center and is no longer exhibiting the behaviors that put her and others at risk.
. . . .
From December 1, 2001 until September 30, 2002, she had 6 incidents of physical aggression, compared to 34 the previous year. She had 21 incidents of verbal aggression compared to 87 the previous year, and she had 4 incidents of self-injurious behavior compared to 16 the previous year. She was seen in psychiatric clinic 9 times in the past year. By taking part in the one-to-one counseling and group sessions she has addressed some very difficult issues and has gained insight into her own problems as well as the problems her peers encounter. . . . She handles her anger more effectively than she used to.
In consideration of T.W.‘s significant progress, the RFST did not recommend recommitment to MDC, and, despite some difficulties which T.W. continued to experience, assessed T.W.‘s qualifications for placement as follows:
REFERRAL STATUS: She is referred for community-based services. Her team noted that she has made an effort to work through her issues and has made significant progress in the last year. She is noted as still needing 24-hour awake staff because of suicide threats and actions, runaways, self-injurious and violent behavior.
¶9 On August 8, 2003, T.W. filed a motion requesting declaratory and injunctive relief with the District Court. T.W. sought injunctive relief to compel the State to immediately place her in a community-based service, arguing that the State‘s failure to do so “left her with no option but to remain in institutional confinement—in a de facto involuntary commitment.” T.W.‘s motion also sought a declaratory judgment that
¶10 On October 17, 2003, the District Court issued an order which found that T.W. was no longer seriously developmentally disabled, adopted the recommendations of the RFST and dismissed the recommitment petition. The court also found that T.W. was not being held involuntarily and denied T.W.‘s motion for injunctive and declaratory relief. On December 15, 2003, T.W. filed a notice of appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶11 Our review of the constitutional issue of due process, a matter of law, is plenary. Forsythe v. Leydon, 2004 MT 327, ¶ 5, 324 Mont. 121, ¶ 5, 102 P.3d 25, ¶ 5. “A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must prove the statute unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.” Ravalli County v. Erickson, 2004 MT 35, ¶ 17, 320 Mont. 31, ¶ 17, 85 P.3d 772, ¶ 17. “The constitutionality of an enacted legislative statute is prima facie presumed.” Ravalli County, ¶ 17.
DISCUSSION
¶12 Did the District Court err in concluding that
¶13 As an initial matter, we note that, in April 2004, T.W. was accepted for placement by a community-based developmental disabilities service provider and, at the time this matter was argued, was residing in a group home. Consequently, she had resided at the MDC for approximately eleven months following the expiration of her commitment prior to being placed with a community-based service provider. T.W.‘s demand for injunctive relief providing immediate placement in community-based services was mooted when she was placed during the course of her appeal. However, we deem the claim she advanced as one “capable of repetition . . . which could evade review,” an exception to the mootness doctrine. Cape v. Crossroads Corr. Ctr., 2004 MT 265, ¶ 25, 323 Mont. 140, ¶ 25, 99 P.3d 171, ¶ 25. Therefore, we undertake consideration of T.W.‘s arguments.
¶14 T.W. asserts that
Nothing in this part may be construed as authorizing the placement of and delivery of services to persons with developmental disabilities in community-based services by court order. Placement of persons in community-based services is governed by
53-20-209 .
¶16 The State responds that
¶17 With sincere regard to the concerns T.W. has expressed about discrimination against or ill treatment of the disabled, we nonetheless must reject the constitutional challenge to
¶18 In 1986, this Court struck down a statute which limited general assistance payments as violative of
(3) The legislature may provide such economic assistance and social and rehabilitative services for those who, by reason of age, infirmities, or misfortune are determined by the legislature to be in need.
(4) The legislature may set eligibility criteria for programs and services, as well as for the duration and level of benefits and services.
¶19 Pursuant thereto, the Legislature has enacted the current statutory scheme, set forth in Title 53, which designates the forms of public assistance to be made available and which governs the provision thereof. In that regard, still in furtherance of its express constitutional authority, the Legislature determined that community-based services to persons with disabilities would be provided by way of an administrative process, as opposed to a direct judicial order.
¶20 T.W.‘s arguments barely acknowledge the administrative process created by the Legislature, offering only that the process is “an administrative one in which judicial intervention is viewed with disdain.” This statement is made without evidentiary support, perhaps because there was little or no factfinding herein due to the procedural path this case has taken, including the failure of T.W. to seek relief through the administrative process, discussed further below. In any event,
¶21 Thus, T.W.‘s challenge to
¶22 In light of the specific directives of
¶23 Did the District Court err in concluding that T.W. was not entitled to immediate placement in community-based services after her involuntary commitment expired?
¶24 It is not disputed by either party that T.W. was accorded due process when she was originally committed to MDC pursuant to the commitment statutes. However, T.W. contends that her constitutional rights were violated when she was not immediately placed within community-based services following the expiration of her commitment, asserting that her stay at MDC was a “de facto commitment.” T.W. cites to Clark v. Cohen (E.D. Pa. 1985), 613 F.Supp. 684, and Thomas S. by Brooks v. Morrow (W.D.N.C. 1984), 601 F.Supp. 1055, to establish that individuals remaining in an institution beyond the time needed for the appropriate care are suffering from unnecessary confinement. T.W. therefore contends that because the State did not provide for her immediate placement, her institutionalized care was, by definition, unnecessary and a violation of her rights to due process, dignity, privacy and equal protection, and that the District Court erred in denying her request for placement.4
¶27 As we have noted, there was little or no “factfinding” completed in this matter. The evidence surrounding this case is minimal, a problem created by T.W.‘s failure to participate in the administrative process. A person who is denied placement services is entitled to a fair hearing following the adverse decision.
¶28 Addressing the factual dispute regarding the voluntariness of T.W.‘s post-commitment stay at MDC, the District Court held:
[T.W.]‘s own affidavit fails to specifically allege that she is being held against her will; rather, [T.W.] alleges that she knows she is no longer committed but that she “cannot leave,” because has no where else to go. [T.W.]‘s affidavit does not clearly reveal that she cannot leave because she is being held against her will, as counsel alleges in the brief in support of declaratory ruling.
. . . .
The State has submitted the affidavit of Leigh Ann Leary, a Qualified Mental Retardation Professional at MDC who testified that [T.W.] is currently residing at MDC on a voluntary basis while awaiting community-based services . . . .
. . . .
[T.W.] has not provided any meaningful dispute to the allegations contained in Ms. Leary‘s affidavit.
¶29 Based on the minimal record, the District Court‘s “finding” that T.W. was not involuntarily held at MDC cannot be said to be clearly erroneous as unsupported by substantial evidence. Upon the expiration of T.W.‘s commitment, the State had no legal hold on her, and she was free to leave the institution. Although T.W. asserts that she was not content at MDC and wanted to leave, it was clear that her continued stay resulted from, not a legal restraint, but a practical one: she lacked personal or family resources or other assistance to provide a place to reside outside MDC. She therefore elected to wait at MDC until a community-based placement could be provided by the State.
¶30 Upon such a factual premise, we cannot conclude that T.W.‘s substantive due process rights were violated. As the State notes, this Court held in In re W.M. that a developmentally disabled person did not have a constitutional right to receive treatment in a community-based setting. In re W.M., 252 Mont. at 229, 828 P.2d at 381. There is a
¶31 Additional factual development may affect the analysis, and further, T.W. offers other constitutional arguments. However, a fundamental problem arises from T.W.‘s failure to exhaust her administrative remedies—that is, our inability to determine whether a statute or its corresponding administrative regulations violates her constitutional rights in application. Although claiming a violation of rights, T.W. did not avail herself of the very system which could have prevented or remedied those violations. “[B]efore a party can seek declaratory relief in district court, it must exhaust its administrative remedies.” Mt. Water Co. v. Dept. Pub. Serv. Regulation, 2005 MT 84, ¶ 14, 326 Mont. 416, ¶ 14, 110 P.3d 20, ¶ 14.
¶32 A review of the administrative process created by the Legislature reveals that it was designed to address the specific complaints T.W. now raises. For example,
¶33 As a consequence, we cannot undertake and determine whether T.W.‘s individual constitutional rights, such as privacy, were violated as a result of the delay in her placement in community-based services. Her failure to seek relief provided by the system prevents us from determining whether, as applied to her, that system violated her rights. It is possible that future cases may present an opportunity to assess whether an individual‘s rights were violated following exhaustion of available administrative remedies. However, in this case, T.W. failed to do so.
¶34 Affirmed.
/S/ JIM RICE
We concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ JOHN WARNER
/S/ PATRICIA O. COTTER
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
Honorable Ingrid Gustafson, District Judge, sitting in place of former Justice Jim Regnier
¶35 I join the Court‘s Opinion today with reluctance. But for the language of
¶36 The Dissent would conclude that
¶37 This Court and the district courts are circumscribed by the present provisions of
/S/ PATRICIA O. COTTER
District Court Judge Ingrid Gustafson joins in the concurrence of Justice Patricia O. Cotter.
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
Honorable Ingrid Gustafson, District Judge, sitting in place of retired Justice Jim Regnier
Justice W. William Leaphart, dissenting.
¶38 I dissent.
¶39 The Court‘s conclusion that the State‘s treatment of T.W. does not violate due process ignores the State‘s duty to rectify a wrong that it has created. The State placed T.W., against her will, in MDC. In doing so, it restricted her right to physical liberty, a right fundamental under the Montana Constitution. See Matter of C.H. (1984), 210 Mont. 184, 201, 683 P.2d 931, 940. Having done this, the State cannot simply continue to house T.W. as though she remains a committed patient. It is true that when the State determined that T.W. was no longer “seriously developmentally disabled” she was free to leave
¶40 T.W. continued to live at MDC because she quite literally had nowhere else to go. The State initially confined her knowing that she required round-the-clock care, and knowing that at the end of her time at MDC she, in all likelihood, would still require round-the-clock care. In fact, even before the State first committed T.W., she was living in a community-based group home. Although the record illustrates that her stay at MDC may have improved her lot in life (as she apparently was no longer “seriously developmentally disabled“), it unsurprisingly did not improve it to the point where she could saunter forth and make her way in society. In involuntarily committing T.W. to MDC, the State created a dependency. As a result of this dependency, T.W., although legally at liberty to leave the institution, had no realistic choice but to continue her residence there.
¶41 Having created this dependence on institutional living, the State has a duty to wean T.W. from that state of complete reliance. This duty arises out of our State‘s Due Process Clause, a provision of our Constitution that the Court today ignores.
¶42 The federal courts have recognized that although the Due Process Clause of the
¶43 While we have recognized that there is no right to community-based services, per se, under the Montana Constitution, before today we have not ruled on whether the State denies due process to a person in T.W.‘s post-commitment situation if it refuses to extend those services to her. See Matter of W.M. (1992), 252 Mont. 225, 229, 828 P.2d 378, 381
¶45 Our sister court in New Jersey has addressed this subject in depth. When faced with a similar situation—previously involuntarily committed individuals who are free to go but do not have the means or capacity to do so—it reasoned that the State must continue to provide for them and give them community placement. We quote from its opinion at length:
Although legally entitled to leave the mental hospital, [the patients] are incapable of competently exercising that right due, in part, to the effects that prolonged confinement has had on their own personal capacity to survive in the outside world and on their relationships with friends and family who might provide support and assistance. The State cannot simply pull the rug from under these people when they physically deteriorate to a point where they are no longer dangerous. Although the State does not have the authority to continue the legal commitment of the appellants, it is not required to cast them adrift into the community when the individuals are incapable of survival on their own. In a proper exercise of its parens patriae authority, it may therefore of necessity continue the confinement of such persons on a provisional or conditional basis to protect their essential well-being, pending efforts to foster the placement of these individuals in proper supportive settings outside the institution.
¶46 It is agreed that, “T.W. was dangerous when she entered MDC and her condition substantially improved while she was in the State‘s care.” It would be a mistake, however, to equate “T.W.‘s improvement” with being independent. The institutional environment can facilitate improvement and, at the same time, create reliance or dependency. Although T.W. had improved, she was far from independent when she was referred for placement. It was noted that T.W., upon release, was “still needing 24-hour awake staff because of suicide threats and actions, runaways, self-injurious and violent
¶47 In relying on the permissive language of
¶49 Again, due process requires that the State provide an individual in T.W.‘s situation (a previously involuntarily committed individual who is free to leave the institution but does not have the means or capacity to do so) with community-based services in a timely manner. However, if the State fails to provide such services,
¶50 “Montanans’ fundamental rights to a jury trial, to due process and to equal protection, among others, are rendered meaningless absent the courts being able to enforce these rights.” Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 2002 MT 129, ¶ 58, 310 Mont. 123, ¶ 58, 54 P.3d 1, ¶ 58 (Nelson, J., joined by Trieweiler, J., Leaphart, J., and Cotter, J., specially concurring).
¶51 I would reverse the judgment of the District Court.
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
Justice James C. Nelson, dissenting.
¶52 I join Justice Leaphart‘s well-reasoned dissent. I offer one further observation. The Court seems to take great comfort in holding that the rights of persons like T.W. will be protected by the Department‘s administrative scheme. Putting the burden of exhausting that scheme on developmentally disabled people might, in theory, be acceptable if each was appointed an experienced and knowledgeable attorney to shepherd him or her through the system as soon as he or she entered it. To expect developmentally disabled persons to navigate that water alone, however, is the worst sort of pie-in-the-sky. It will inevitably lead to the sort of institutional abuse demonstrated in the case at bar.
¶53 I, too, dissent.
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON