In re TRANSIENT OCCUPANCY TAX CASES.
S218400
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
December 12, 2016
Ct.App. 2/2 B243800; Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. JCCP 4472
additional amount for room rental the operator requires the OTC to charge the visitor under what have been termed “rate parity” provisions of hotel-OTC contracts but, as San Diego has effectively conceded, OTCs are not operators within the meaning of the ordinance. We shall therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
The parties have not challenged the factual findings made by the hearing officer in the administrative proceedings. Accordingly, we accept that those findings are supported by substantial evidence (Environmental Protection Information Center v. California Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection (2008) 44 Cal.4th 459, 479), while independently reviewing the legal determinations reached below (City of San Diego v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2015) 61 Cal.4th 945, 956), bearing in mind that an ambiguity in a tax statute will generally be resolved in favor of the taxpayer (Microsoft Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 750, 759; see Agnew v. State Bd. of Equalization (1999) 21 Cal.4th 310, 330).
We first describe the nature of the transactions at issue. OTCs publish on their websites comparative information about airlines, hotels, and car rental companies, and allow consumers to book reservations with these travel and hospitality providers. OTCs may do business under any of several business models; involved here is the one known as the merchant model.2 Under the
merchant model, OTCs contract with hotels to advertise and rent rooms to the general public. OTCs handle all financial transactions related to the hotel reservations and become the merchant of record as listed on the customer‘s credit card receipt, but do not themselves own, operate or manage hotels,
We turn now to the ordinance at issue in this case. First enacted in 1964, it provides that “[f]or the privilege of Occupancy in any Hotel located in [San Diego], each Transient is subject to and shall pay a tax in the amount of six percent (6%) of the Rent charged by the Operator.” (
Other provisions define the ordinance‘s key terms. “‘Occupancy’ means the use or possession, or the right to the use or possession, of any room, or portion thereof, in any Hotel . . . for dwelling, lodging, or sleeping purposes.” (
management responsibility.” (Ibid.)5 “‘Transient’ means any Person who exercises Occupancy, or is entitled to Occupancy, by reason of concession, permit, right of access, license, or other agreement for a period of less than one (1) month.” (Ibid.)
The ordinance provides that “[e]ach Operator shall collect the tax . . . to the same extent and at the same time as the Rent is collected from every Transient.” (
In December 2004, the City of Los Angeles filed a putative class action on behalf of various California cities against various OTCs, alleging each such
company was liable for transient occupancy tax as the “operator” of every hotel. In October 2007, putative class member San Diego began auditing the OTCs. Eventually it issued transient occupancy tax assessments against the OTCs, which each OTC timely appealed. A hearing officer conducted a consolidated administrative hearing to determine whether each OTC had obligations and liability under the tax. In May 2010 the officer issued a decision, finding that the OTCs owed tax on their markup in merchant model transactions. The OTCs challenged the hearing officer‘s determination by filing a petition for writ of mandate and cross-complaint seeking declaratory relief. After briefing and argument, the superior court granted the OTCs’
San Diego appealed. Noting the salient facts are undisputed and the case turns solely on the interpretation of the ordinance, the Court of Appeal affirmed. Like the superior court, it reasoned the ordinance imposed tax on “rent charged by the . . . operator” and concluded that hotels, not the OTCs, are operators within the meaning of the ordinance.
San Diego petitioned for rehearing on the basis the Court of Appeal had improperly cited and relied on two unpublished decisions arising out of the same coordinated proceedings; the Court of Appeal granted rehearing and issued a new opinion again citing the same unpublished decisions, explaining the reliance was proper because the decisions were relevant as law of the case. (See
San Diego contends the tax base for calculating the tax must be the full amount of the payment the customer is charged to obtain occupancy. In San Diego‘s view, the stated purpose of the tax—“It is the purpose and intent of the City Council that there shall be imposed a tax on Transients” (
requiring the OTC to quote and charge the customer a rate not less than what the hotel is quoting on its own website, it effectively “charges” that amount, whether or not it ultimately receives or collects any portion of the markup, and that amount is therefore subject to the tax. Because, however, the ordinance imposes on “the Operator” alone the duty to remit the tax (
San Diego contends the entire amount paid by the customer, presumably including any portion of the markup within the exclusive control of the OTC above that set by the hotel, is subject to the tax because that amount is charged “for the privilege of Occupancy” within the meaning of the ordinance, and no lesser amount will gain that privilege for the customer. (
San Diego further contends that even though the OTCs do not qualify as operators within the meaning of the ordinance, they are liable for the tax under various contractual and statutory theories. We are unpersuaded.
San Diego first asserts the OTCs are liable for assessment of room tax because they are agents of the hotels for purposes of charging and collecting the tax. It points to the hearing officer‘s finding, unchallenged in this litigation, that “[t]he OTCs serve as the hotels’ agents in assuming essentially (or absolutely) all of the marketing, reservation, room price collection, and customer service functions as to those Transients who book online through the OTCs.” San Diego also cites the Court of Appeal‘s statement that “[t]he
That the OTCs act as hotels’ agents or intermediaries for the limited purpose of charging and collecting the rent, however, does not subject the OTCs to assessment as an operator or make any undifferentiated portion of the charge representing the amount unilaterally set by the OTCs “Rent charged by the Operator.” As noted, the hotels set the parity or floor rate the OTCs must charge the visitor, but do not control or determine any additional amount the OTCs may charge for their services, a circumstance that refutes any suggestion the OTCs are the hotels’ agents for purposes of setting and collecting such discretionary additional charges.
San Diego also cites contractual provisions by which the OTCs agree to be responsible for any taxes assessed by any governmental authority on the markup, to collect and remit room tax, and to assume liability to San Diego for nonpayment
or underpayment of the tax. These provisions allocate responsibility as between the hotels and the OTCs for properly assessed room taxes but, like the other contractual terms discussed above, they do not in themselves create such liability; only the ordinance can do that. The same reasoning defeats San Diego‘s assertion it is entitled as a third party beneficiary of the hotel-OTC contracts to tax the OTCs for the entire markup: Even assuming San Diego is a third party beneficiary of the contracts, a question we need not address, the contracts cannot expand room tax liability under the ordinance.
Neither
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WERDEGAR, J.
WE CONCUR:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
CHIN, J.
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
CUÉLLAR, J.
KRUGER, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion In re Transient Occupancy Tax Cases
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 225 Cal.App.4th 56
Rehearing Granted
Opinion No. S218400
Date Filed: December 12, 2016
Court: Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Elihu Berle
Counsel:
Daniel F. Bamberg and Jon E. Taylor , Deputy City Attorneys; Kiesel Boucher Larson, William L. Larson, Thomas H. Peters, Paul R. Kiesel; Baron & Budd, Laura J. Baughman, Thomas M. Sims; McKool Smith, McKool Smith Hennigan, Steven D. Wolens, Gary Cruciani; Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Irving H. Greines, Kent L. Richland, Cynthia E. Tobisman and David E. Hackett for Plaintiff and Appellant City of San Diego.
Colantuono, Highsmith & Whatley, Michael G. Colantuono and Ryan Thomas Dunn for League of California Cities and California State Association of Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant City of San Diego.
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, Darrel J. Hieber, Stacy R. Horth-Neubert and Daniel M. Rygorsky for Defendants and Respondents Priceline.com Incorporated and Travelweb LLC.
Jones Day, Elwood Lui, Brian D. Hershman and Erica L. Reilley for Defendants and Respondents Expedia, Inc., Hotwire, Inc. Hotels.com, L.P., and Hotels.com G.P., LLC.
K&L Gates, Nathaniel S. Currall; Kelly Hart & Hallman, Brian S. Stagner and Chad Arnette for Defendants and Respondents Travelocity.com L.P., and Site59.com, LLC.
McDermott Will & Emery, Elizabeth Herrington, Jessica A. Mariani and Jeffrey A. Rossman for Defendants and Respondents Orbitz, LLC, Trip Network, Inc., doing business as Cheaptickets.com and Internetwork Publishing Corp. doing business as Lodging.com
Julian M. Baum & Associates and Julian M. Baum for Society of Travel Agents, Inc., as Amicus on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Kent L. Richland
Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland
5900 Wilshire Boulevard, 12th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90036
(310) 859-7811
Darrel J. Hieber
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
300 South Grand Avenue, 34th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90071
(213) 687-5000
