130 N.Y.S. 682 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1911
Hugh F. Trainor heretofore commenced a proceeding to compel Burton W. Gibson, an attorney, to account for and pay over to him the sum of $25,000 which he alleged said attorney obtained from him , through fraud and misrepresentation, and has misapplied. This money the petitioner says' was .procured through the use of his signature to papers which he, being illiterate, signed upon the representations of said attorney (then acting for him) that they were papers’ required to be signed by him for. the defense of an .action brought by one Finis R. Montgomery against him to recover' certain savings bank deposits claimed by another person of the same name as Trainor, and in conjunction with which he turned over to Gibson his bank books and drafts thereon on which the latter col- ■ lected $25,000. It now appears that among the papers he signed was a confession of judgment in the Montgomery action whereby he consented to the entry of judgment therein in favor of the plaintiff and against himself in the sum of $20,017.35 in settlement of four promissory notes for $6,000 éach, made by Trainor in favor of one Rose Guerra in settlement of a larger claim held by her against him. ■ Trainor denies that he ever executed any such notes or that he ever knew any such person. Upon his petition to compel Gibson to account for the $25,000 the latter admitted that he had received that sum, but claimed that he had applied $20,0.00' thereof to the settlement of said judgment and the balance ($5,000) he retained as his fee. A reference having been ordered, Gibson testified thereon to the alleged facts regarding his transactions with the attorney of record for Montgomery, who was the assignee of the Rose Guerra notes, and which attorney represented the real party in interest, Rose Guerra.
Gibson claims that he settled the Montgomery judgment by . delivering a check' for $18,000 to Rose Guerra, and one for $2,000 to her attorney Joseph- L. Young, the attorney of
In the present proceeding'the relation of attorney and client between Rose Querrá and her attorney, Young, has ceased; the judgment obtained on her behalf has been paid and satisfied;no proceedings are pending between' her or her assignee and Trainor; the information is sought in litigation to which she is not a party. Regrettable as it may be that the result of a reversal of the order in question i‘s to prevent the disclosure of the address of a person whose testimony, if procurable, might cast much light upon the honesty and good faith’of the transaction now under investigation, it is more important that the integrity of the privilege existing between attorney and client be preserved.
The order appealed from • must, therefore, be reversed and-the application- to compel the witness Young be- denied, without costs.
Ingraham, P. J., McLaughlin, Clarke and Scott, JJ., - concurred.
Order reversed and motion denied, without costs.