234 F. 198 | W.D.N.Y. | 1916
On the night of November 2, 1913, in St. Mary’s river, while the steamer Oceánica, with tow, was bound from Duluth to North Tonawanda, the claimant, John Moran, a deckhand, stood by the tow chock in the stem of the vessel preparatory to handling the tow line for tying the steamer up to the dock for the night. When the steamer was checked down the barge came ahead on the tow line, causing it to slack and slide to the right of the tow chock. The tow line running from the barge through the tow chock was fastened to timber heads on the steamer after passing over a sliding block positioned in the tow chock, which was about 7 feet wide and 18 inches high. Moran testified that he was ordered to take in the slack of the line and trice it along the rail; that while complying with such order he looked down on the deck to avoid stepping on ropes thrown there, when a sudden pull on the tow line caused it to come against one of the uprights of the chock, catching and crushing his hand, making necessary the amputation of three fingers.
In this proceeding for limitation of liability it is claimed that the steamer Oceánica should be held responsible for the accident, on the ground that as the place where the accident occurred, and where it was necessary for claimant to stand, was insufficiently lighted and littered with ropes, there was a complete failure on the part of the vessel to furnish a reasonably safe place in which to work.
3. So, also, as to littering the deck with rope. The owners of the vessel having furnished the rope necessary for purposes of navigation, • it was, of course, the duty of the officers to keep it in a proper place, and not to allow it to litter the deck and render it unsafe for work, to the injury of seamen there employed; but their failure to perform their duty in this respect does not constitute negligence which is attributable to the ship or her owner.
“That in any suit to recover damages for any injury sustained on board vessel or in its service seamen having command shall not be held to be fellow servants with those under their authority.”
Was such act retroactive? By section 18 it is provided that the act shall take effect as to all vessels of the United States eight months after its passage; i. e., on November 4, 1915. The injuries in question were sustained November 2, 1913, and this proceeding was begun in January, 1915. .Proctor for claimant urges that the language of section 20, referring to “any suit” and “any injury sustained,” is broad enough to include the claim for injuries under discussion. But with this 1 do not agree. Had it been the intention of Congress that section 20 should be effective prior to other provisions of the act, or that it should apply to actions pending or to causes of action already in existence, explicit words would have no doubt been used to express such intention. Upon reading sections 18 and 20 together, it seems to me that they are clearly of a prospective character. The ordinary presumption is that legislation provides for the future and that there is no retrospective intention, and both federal and state courts are slow to incorporate words into1 a statute which will permit such an interpretation. White v. U. S., 191 U. S. 545, 24 Sup. Ct. 171, 48 L. Ed. 295.
In Winfree v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 227 U. S. 296, 33 Sup. Ct. 273, 57, L. Ed. 518, the Supreme Court had before it the Employers’ Liability Act of 1908 (Act April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65 [Comp. St. 1913, §§ 8657-8665]), which it was argued was retroactive. That act substantially declared that in all actions subsequently brought against any common carrier contributory negligence should not be a bar, etc. While the reference to future actions was perhaps somewhat more definite than in section 20 of the Seamen’s Act, standing alone, I nevertheless think the principle enunciated in that case is applicable to the present situation. It was there contended, as-it is here, that the statute was merely remedial, and should be construed to apply to all suits, whether already begun or not; hut the Supreme Court said:
“While there are exceptions, especially in the case of remedial statutes, the general rule is that statutes are addressed to the future and not to the past; and, in the absence “of explicit words to that effect statutes are not retroactive in their application. The Employers’ Liability Act of 1008 introduced a new policy, and radically changed existing law, and will not be construed as a remedial statute having retrospective effect.”
So, also, in the case at bar the Seamen’s Act made a substantive change in the maritime law of the land creating a new liability — not
“It, however, takes away material defenses, defenses which did something more than resist the remedy; they disproved the right of action.”
For the foregoing reasons I am constrained to hold that Congress did not declare in the Seamen’s Act an intention that the act should operate retrospectively, that the claimant is without right of action against the steamer Oceánica, and, further, that his claim not being for maintenance or cure must be disallowed.