In Re: TMI

1106

its zone. This result is R-R-2 consistent The House Report to the FHAA expressly with broad Congress “the remedial intent of states that prohibit “is intended to Housing] embodied in the ... imposition [Fair [the Act.” of] Havens terms or conditions Coleman, Realty ... Corp. v. which have the effect of excluding ... 1114, 1125, (1982). congregate living 102 arrangements S.Ct. 71 persons L.Ed.2d 214 — with Edmonds, handicaps.” City ——, Rep. H.R. 100th U.S. at 115 Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted at (noting 1780 the Fair 1988 Housing Act’s “ U.S.C.C.A.N. 2184. As one court has compass, ‘broad and inclusive’ and there- explained, “strict adherence to a rule which according ‘generous fore construction’ to has the effect precluding handicapped indi- complaint-filing provision”) Act’s (quoting residing viduals from in the residence [of Co., Metropolitan Ins. Trafficante Life precisely choice] type was of con- 205, 209, 212, 364, 367, 368, U.S. 93 S.Ct. duct Housing which the Fair Amendments (1972)); L.Ed.2d 415 see also Housing Fair Act sought to overcome with the enactment Act, (“The supra, scope 3604(f)(3)(B).” §of Village States v. United sweeping, the statute is only Marshall, Wisconsin, F.Supp. of (W.D.Wis.1991). affords, protections broad it but also in the allows.”). exceptions limited It is uncontroverted that the Township of IV. Brick has a substantial interest in enforcing We will reverse the 1995 order zoning that, its code and under appropriate of the district court and remand this matter circumstances, zoning local codes are entitled enjoin instructions to Township to a See, considerable amount of deference. Brick interfering with the construction e.g., Village Boraas, Belle Terre v. nursing home facility terms, under the 1, 7-8, 39 L.Ed.2d specifications conditions and agreed (1974); Butler, City Doe v. Pennsylva- Jersey.5 State of New

nia, (3d Cir.1989). We are also mindful of the fact that requiring “[i]n accommodation,

reasonable ... Congress

surely did not mandate a blanket waiver of facially zoning policies rules, neutral

regardless House, of the facts.” Inc. Oxford City Beach, Virginia Virginia, 825 F.Supp. (E.D.Va.1993). Nor did “give intend to per- handicapped TMI, In re

sons carte blanche to determine where and how regardless live zoning Philip Dorothy Aldrich; L. Alleman; Faith contrary.” ordinances to City Thornton v. ngeli; Anoka; Michael J. Ruth V. A Allegan, (W.D.Mich. F.Supp. Anoka; Balinosky; Catherine Regis J. 1993). Nonetheless, the FHAA’s promise Beasley; E. Borda; Betty Louis Marie that “reasonable provid accommodations” be Boylestein; George Boylestein; L. Shir ed to handicapped persons emp would be an Burhanan; lean Butler; Ruth E. Frank ty one if indeed Brick Township permit were Caka; J. Chynoweth; Susan H. Daniel nothing ted to do to accommodate elderly Chynoweth; M. Costello; Catherine disabled who are in need of nursing home Costello; John T. Costik; Martha A. care and desire live in one of Town Costik; Mary Richard N. Margaret Ear ship’s residential zones. hart; Ferguson; Edward Glad, Marco G. 5. Our decision interpreted invali- question. tion in Hovsons still must adhere to dating Township zoning of Brick’s scheme. capacity the size and set restrictions forth in the injunctive relief that we authorize need, limited building State-issued certificate of code strictly preventing requirements, enforcement the R- government and all other regula- zoning R-2 purported ordinance that to bar con- tions that relate to the manage- construction and nursing struction of a specific home at the loca- nursing ment of the homes Jersey. in New Grandon; Glad;

Jr.; Barbara I. Linda Hertzog; Hank; John Edward M. Helen Hindermyer; Hertzog; Dianne H. Marie Hitz; Marjorie Hitz; B. George Vance Hoch; Estate Hoch; A. Louis C.

Carol Nagy; Holmes; M. Thelma P. Robert Of Pristello; Georgeann Obercash; Barry Lynn Pristello; Pristel Jamie J.

James Snyder; South

lo; R. Patricia Kenneth Evelyn Stewart; ard; Joseph Charlotte

Stewart, Appellants.

No. 94-7598. Appeals, Court

United States Circuit.

Third 1,May 1995.

Argued July

Decided SCIRICA, McKEE and

Before: SAROKIN, Judges. Circuit COURT OF THE OPINION SCIRICA, Judge. Circuit Three Mile Island In the wake than two thou- more accident in personal brought suit for sand individuals ap- in this forty-two plaintiffs injuries. The year limita- Pennsylvania’s two peal missed Mississippi in date,' in filed suit and tions year six stat- that state’s to fall within order chal- plaintiffs now ute of limitations. These choice application of the lenge the retroactive Price-Anderson provision law 100- Pub.L. No. Act of application Retroactive 102 Stat. 1066. require provision would of the choice limi- Pennsylvania’s application of Three from the actions to all tations plaintiffs’ bar accident and Mile Island argue Mississippi. Plaintiffs in claims filed the choice of application retroactive guar- constitutional violates federal provision Alternatively they process. of due antees Pennsylvania statute even if the argue that pro- Pennsylvania law applies, limitations in to file their period which grace for a vides claims. Because rational was a choice of power, we legislative Congress’ exercise of Addi- process. due not violate hold does Pennsylvania law does tionally, we hold circum- period under the grace provide for a this case. stances of challenge sum- The same in against them rendered mary judgment court Pennsylvania state in filed actions They date. year limitation the two after have should the statute assert Be- Pennsylvania law. tolled under been material to raise a failed plaintiffs have cause judg- summary fact, Fishbein, we will affirm Levin, issue (argued), Levin Arnold Pennsylva- ment. Berman, Philadelphia, & Sedran Swartz, & Mor- Hepford,

nia, Swartz C. Lee History and R. I. Procedural Pennsylvania, William Facts Harrisburg, gan, Jackson, Appel- Wilson, Jr., Mississippi, for Island Three Mile On March lants. Harris- facility near located power into radiation Wilcox, burg, released H. (argued), Alfred K. Scott Ellen result, thousands As a atmosphere. Scheetz, Philadelphia, Pepper, Hamilton & suit filed and businesses area residents Pennsylvania, Appellees. for against operators the owners (Dauphin February 20, 1987); and the facil- In re TMI Co. Litig. II, ity, injuries.1 alleging various In Cases Consolidated each No. 426 S forty-two plaintiffs 1987). in (Dauphin involved July Co. court, appeal filed in state In Superior re affirmed. Court court, Mississippi Mississippi Cases Consolidated state feder- 383 Pa.Su injuries al court to recover for personal alleg- per. 550 A.2d 255 edly Mississip- suffered the incident. The Subsequently, Congress enacted the Price- pi actions were within that filed state’s six Anderson Amendments Act of Pub.L. year personal injury statute of limitations for 102 Stat. which created a actions. federal cause of “public liability action —the September injuries defendants moved for action” —for resulting from nuclear summary judgment incidents, 2014(hh) Pennsylva- (1988),2 § 42 U.S.C. nia state court contending actions each provided claim for over and the consoli- problems related to health diagnosed more dation of such actions federal district years than two before commenced court the district where the accident oc- curred, their suits. 2210(n)(2).3 The Court of Common Pleas of 42 U.S.C. Defendants Dauphin County, Pennsylvania entered sum- removed the Mississippi mary judgment defendants, finding plain- state cases to federal court the Middle by Pennsylvania’s tiffs’ claims barred two District Pennsylvania pursuant 42 to year In Litig. re TMI 2210(n)(2). statute of limitations. § U.S.C. At the time of removal II, Cases Consolidated No. 426 Pennsylvania cases, S of the state the time to 2014(hh); 1. Over plaintiffs' per two thousand § claims for 42 U.S.C. see Price-Anderson injuries 1988, sonal have pres consolidated in 100-408, been the Amendments Act of Pub.L. TMI, 1103, litigation. 11(b), 1066, ent See In re § 67 F.3d 1105 102 Stat. 1076. (3d Cir.1995), cert. denied sub nom. General Dodson, -, Corp. Public Util. Act, 85-256, -U.S. 116 3.The Price-Anderson Pub.L. No. 71 1034, (1996). S.Ct. 134 L.Ed.2d (1957) (codified 111 Some Stat. 576 as amended in scat- plaintiffs duplicative Pennsyl filed U.S.C.), claims in both tered sections of 42 originally did not Mississippi. vania and grant jurisdiction the federal courts over all ' arising claims out of nuclear accidents. The 1981, In non-personal defendants settled injury expanded Price-Anderson Amendments Act fed- individuals, businesses, brought by claims eral “public liability to reach all ac- non-profit organizations twenty-file within a mile by tions.” After amendment the Price Anderson facility. radius of the Three Mile Island Act, removal, jurisdiction, Amendments the 993, Corp., v. General Pub. Stibitz Util. 746 F.2d provision consolidation of the Price-Anderson (3d Cir.1984) (citing 995 n. 1 In Re Three Mile provided: (M.D.Pa. 9, Litig., Island Sept. No. 79-0432 denied, 1981)), 1214, cert. 469 105 S.Ct. respect any public With to action aris- 1187, (1985). addition, 84 L.Ed.2d 334 hum ing incident, resulting out of or a from nuclear involving allegations dreds of claims personal the United States court in district the district injury were settled in 1985. where the place nuclear incident takes ... already We have other resolved issues raised original jurisdiction shall have regard without appeal by TMI, plaintiffs. on the See In re 67 citizenship any party to the or the amount in care); TMI, (duty F.3d 1103 In re 67 F.3d controversy. Upon motion of the defendant or (3d Cir.1995) (punitive damages), cert. de Commission, Secretary, the appro- or the as Metropolitan nied sub nom. Edison v.Co. Dod priate any pending such action State son, -U.S.-, 134 L.Ed.2d (including any court such action 20, 1988) States United district court shall be removed or transferred to the United 2. “public liability The ap- definition of action" having States district court venue under this pears 2014(hh): § at 42 U.S.C. subsection ... (hh) action', ‘public liability The 2210(n)(2) (1988); term as § used 42 U.S.C. see also Price- title], [section 2210 of this means Anderson Amendments ofAct Pub.L. 100- asserting public liability. public 11(a), A § ac- 102 Stat. tion shall be deemed to be arising II, an action Litig. In In re TMI Cases Consol. title], (3d Cir.1991), [section and the sub- Gumby cert. denied sub nom. stantive rules for decision in such action shall Corp., General Pub. Utils. be derived from the (1992), law occurs, State in which 117 L.Ed.2d upheld we the nuclear incident unless such law constitutionality the of the retroactive provisions inconsistent with the provision of such sec- of this to cases from the Three tion. Mile Island accident.

lili summary grant of appeal district court’s to the summary judgment grant appeal the yet judgment. not had Supreme Court Mississippi actions expired. prior adopted the court also The district District of Middle to the transferred were Common judgment rendered the Court U.S.C. pursuant plaintiffs against Pleas 1404(a). § sought Plaintiffs Id. at 23. state cases. summary grant in the Mid- the eases reconsideration consolidation After filed arguing that under the interven- Pennsylvania, judgment, defendants District dle respect Superior judgment summary holding motion for Corp., court and federal Mississippi state in Marinari v. Asbestos Court claims grounds that Pa.Super. on the 612 A.2d actions Price-Anderson injuries” untimely under should arising from “second claims were 11(b) of Section Act of 1988. Upon Amendments dismissed.4 reconsider- been have Act, provi- choice of law ation, district court ordered 2014(hh) (1988)), (codified § 42at U.S.C. injuries” sion had “second specify which of deci- rules “the substantive provides In re Marinari rule. subject to the liability action] shall [any public op. sion slip. Consol. No. Cases in which law of State from the 1994). derived July (M.D. On Pa. June Sec- involved occurs.” incident stipulation into a parties entered Act, 20(b) the effec- of the Amendments tion the “initial did relate Marinari (codified note date tive subject of injury” claims were 2014), “the amend- provides that U.S.C. summary judgment motion for defendants’ Amend- 11” of the made Section ments injury” claims would be any “second and that to nuclear incidents Act “shall ments action. In re separate class treated on, of the the date before, or after occurring II, No. 88-1452 Litig. Consol. TMI Cases § note 42 2014 U.S.C. of this Act.” enactment 1994). (M.D.Pa. 14, July The district court added). held court The district (emphasis against summary judgment then entered 20(b), conjunction § read that injury” claims and the “initial plaintiffs on application of 11(b), compels retroactive § In re TMI as time barred. them dismissed of year statute limitations Pennsylvania’s two (M.D.Pa. II, 88-1452 Litig. Consol. No. Cases by plain- brought the causes of action the order, 1994). this 22, appeal July Plaintiffs Missis- tiffs, of mandating dismissal had the statute arguing barred. as cases time sippi state and federal injury” claims. expired on “initial II, No. 88- Litig. Consol. TMI Cases re had The district court (M.D.Pa. 16,1993). Aug. 1452, slip. op. at 2-6 42 liability actions” “public over these reading dispute this do not Plaintiffs jurisdic 2210(n)(2), and we exercise § U.S.C. appeal. Act on Amendments final orders un the district court’s tion over court the district before Plaintiffs asserted of § review 1291. Our U.S.C. der 28 of the choice application retroactive summary judgment grant of court’s district constitutional violate provision would Bathgate, 27 F.3d F.D.I.C. v. plenary. See They ar- process. of due guarantees Cir.1994). (3d 850, 860 law, incorporated as Pennsylvania gued Act, would Amendments Statutory II. Construction in which to file grace period provide language held the court The district ar- rejected both court The district claims. 20(b) “by very its unambiguous and § 15-20, now plaintiffs id. at guments, banc). (1984) (in Subsequently, Penn- granted A.2d 493 Pleas of Common When the Court 4. state. Under sylvania a “two disease" became a “one- summary judgment, was rule, claim for on a the statute limitations limita- the statute of meant state. This disease” injury" related “second separate and distinct exposure to a out claim tions begin to exposure run prior would plaintiff toxic began run when the substance toxic injury itself. manifested inju- the second until of his known "initial or should have knew 440, Pa.Super. Corp., 417 Asbestos Marinari exposure. See Cathcart ry” resulting from (1992). 123, Insulation, Pa.Super. 612 A.2d Keene Indus. clearly requires terms appli provision in provides turn that “the substan provisions § cation of all of the tive rules includ for decision” shall be derived from provision.” In re of law law. Since choice the statute of limi Consol. 88-1452, decision, tations is a Cases Men slip. substantive rule of op. Grant, ichini v. (M.D.Pa. 1993). (3d Aug. 1228 n. Although Cir.1993); § 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. challenged have not the district (1981), we believe reading court’s of the Amendments Act on applies retroactively limitations plaintiffs’ appeal, plenary we exercise review of the causes of in Mississippi.5 action filed Con district court’s construction the Act. gress exempted could have statutes of limita Credit, Inc., Moody v. Sec. Pac. Business application, tions from retroactive but did (3d 1056, 1063 Cir.1992). F.2d Accordingly, not. Mississippi 20(b) unambiguously Section calls time-barred, causes of action are unless some application for the retroactive of the choice of imposed by constraint Constitution 11(b). § prevents of law choice state law this result.6 20(b) 5. Statutes of limitations are provides treated as substan- 6. Section that "the amendments purposes tive rules of decision for of the doctrine made Section 11" "shall to nuclear Tompkins, before, on, of Erie Railroad Co. v. occurring incidents or after the date (1938). 82 L.Ed. 1188 As the dissent enactment this Act." The dissent con- out, points the intent of Erie was to ensure that apply” tends that may the words "shall be inter- litigation "the outcome of the preted in federal ways: court requiring in two same, substantially should legal be so far as filing law from the date of suits, litigation, rules determine the outcome of a as it or from 1988 forward. if tried Guaranty in a State court." interpretation The dissent asserts the former ne- York, Trust New Yorkv. fiction," Co. imposition cessitates of a “historical 89 L.Ed. 2079 merely while the latter "attaches legal new con- sequences completed events before [] enact- We the Erie believe rationale is instructive in ment [of the Act].” Dissent at 1118— interpreting Congress’ command "the sub- 19. [any public stantive rules for decision in action] be derived from shall the law of the State But we not create do a historical fiction that incident occurs." filed suit on date other than that on 2014(hh); U.S.C. see also they actually Price-Anderson simply which legal filed. We attach new Amendments § Pub.L. consequences filing to the fact that the date 11(b), Although 102 Stat. years was not within two of the Three Mile legislative history issue, sum, is silent on the we be- Island apply Pennsylva- accident. In we language lieve provision clear of this indi- nia’s statute retroactively, as the cates an intent to 20(b) (b) ensure that the language § outcome of clear § of and 11 demands. dissent, arising single action hand, from a nucle- The legal on the other attaches no substantially ar incident should be consequences same as it application to the Pennsylva- of would be if tried in the fact, state where the incident nia's statute of limitations. In the dissent goal achieving substantially occurred. of apply Pennsylvania does not statute of limita- actions, public same all, outcome in all retroactively re- only tions at prospectively but to filed, gardless of where brought necessitates treatment of suits after the enactment of the Amend- statutes of limitations as rules "substantive ments apply Act. It refuses to the statute of decision.” We do not Pennsylvania believe law retroactively, despite limitations lan- clear Congress can answer whether guage the term Pennsylvania intended apply,” law “shall and "substantive rules for decision” to though include stat- even acknowledges rulings it made utes of prior limitations. passage to the of the Amendments Act on course, Pennsylvania Of because courts do not the basis substantive longer of law which no diversity, they sit in applies will never have the occasion should be modified to conform to the apply to decide whether to governing or new law of the case. Dissent at 1119. Mississippi statute of limitations to an unambiguous action We language believe the of Mississippi. 20(b) filed in 11(b) But § § courts ap- calls for the retroactive generally "apply[] Pennsylvania's plication law, of limi- of of including all only wholly tations not causes domestic statute of It limitations. is difficult to conceive action also to but causes of action aof clearer apply” formulation than the "shall (unless, jurisdictions pursuant other Pennsyl- 20(b). fact, language Landgraf v. USI statute, borrowing Products, vania's 244, -, a court Film 511 U.S. 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1494, a directed shorter (1994), statute of limitation 128 L.Ed.2d 229 the Su- jurisdiction.)" Transmissions, another preme AAMCO virtually Court considered identical lan- Harris, F.Supp. Inc. v. 759 guage 1143-44 meaning" to have "a determinate mandat- (E.D.Pa.1991) (footnotes omitted). ing application legislation. retroactive See id.

1113 (3d Cir.1991), cert. F.2d Consol. Due Process III. Gumby Pub. v. General sub nom. denied law choice of court held The district 1262, 117 906, 112 Corp., Utils. Amend- Priee-Anderson provision process held that due L.Ed.2d 491 we Pennsylva- application requires Act ments applica only that retroactive requires “the Pennsylvania statute law, including the nia by a supported legitimate tion of a statute is fed- limitations, Mississippi state and to the by rational purpose furthered legislative argue the retroactive Plaintiffs cases. eral (quoting at Pension means.” Id. Benefit limi- Pennsylvania’s statute Co., Gray Guaranty Corp. v. & R.A. already properly filed to bar tations 81 L.Ed.2d con- action violates pending causes (1984)). show Accordingly, order to process. Well-established due stitutional application of the choice that retroactive not. that it does indicates precedent vio Amendments Act provision of the law guarantees, plaintiffs bear process due lates A. appli showing that retroactive the burden purpose and effect.” Constitu “irrational the United States cation Under was claim do. affecting pending a tort tion, Id. at 861. This cannot legislation scrutiny” due “heightened subject to is not claim pending tort a review because process B. right. See a vested constitute does adopted Amendments States, v. United Hammond efficiency in uniformity, equity, and “to effect Cir.1986) a vest (1st not have (plaintiff does aris- claims” disposition of action until there tort cause right in a ed H.R.Rep. No. accidents. final, judgement); see unreviewable Sess., 104,100th pt. Cong., 1st (6th Jenkins, F.2d

Arbour v. application of the retroactive We believe Cir.1990) (retroactivity a statute does provision of law Act’s choice Amendments af legal claim as a make unconstitutional goals. each of these furthers right re property until no enforceable fords First, application of retroactive v. Ameri judgement); final Sowell duced (11th provision Act’s Co., choice F.2d Cyanamid can all Pennsylvania law to Cir.1989) (same). uniformly applies of appeals courts Other Second, application ad- plaintiffs. retroactive recently the constitu addressed that have the same equity by applying vances legislation either tionality of retroactive eliminating similarly situated substantially affects abolishes appli- inconsistent results. While reviewed have tort cause of action requires choice of cation of the basis” stan legislation on “rational such plaintiffs’ claims of these See, At dismissal e.g., In re Consolidated U.S. dard. Mississippi’s compliance with in were filed F.2d 990- Testing Litig., 820 mospheric limitations, this result of Cir.1987) year statute (9th challenging six (plaintiff retro- time- actions were inequitable. not These showing that activity the burden bears they were Pennsylvania when in way), barred arbitrary, irrational in legislature acted distant plaintiffs resorted brought, and v. Liver nom. Konizeski denied sub cert. Pennsylvania’s stat- in order to forum avoid Labs, 485 U.S. more Hammond, Application limitations. (1988); 786 ute see L.Ed.2d 235 occurred, the accident in which the Litig. the state Cases In In at 13. re F.2d that dissent also asserts ap- at 1505. The provision S.Ct. 'shall (language as "the new such Congressional in- interpretation its accords proceedings on or commenced ply to all " that evidence it has not tent. Yet offered mandates retroac- date of enactment’ after the except limita- statutes of intended often invokes the application). The tive dissent application. legisla- from retroactive tions against retroactive presumption stated argued plaintiffs have Finally, we note that Congress has But if at 1118-19. tion. Dissent exempts 20(b) ambiguous or that § prescribed” should "expressly a statute applica- retroactive from judi- statutes resort retroactively, need to "there is no at-, Landgraf, tion. 511 U.S. cial rules.” default live, and where the jurisdiction were federal over allowing them and injured allegedly inequitable. creating is not their consolidation. But in federal jurisdiction, Congress was constrained Finally, application retroactive principle constitutional that it cannot confer promotes provision efficiency choice of law subject jurisdiction matter on federal courts by allowing the constitutional exercise of fed- underlying where there is no federal statute over, jurisdiction eral and the consolidation creating question. a federal v. Osborn of, “public these Prior to actions.” (9 States, Wheat) Bank United 22 U.S. Act, the Amendments the Price-Anderson (1824); L.Ed. Verlinden B.V. jurisdiction provided for federal over Nigeria, Central Bank 461 U.S. only arising a limited class of cases—those (1983); S.Ct. 76 L.Ed.2d 81 see also In “extraordinary an from nuclear occurrence.” re TMI Cases Consol. 940 F.2d at Co., Metropolitan Kiick v. Edison 784 F.2d (“a case cannot be said to arise under (3d Cir.1986); Stibitz Gen. Pub. federal nothing statute where there is more (3d Corp., Cir.1984), Utils. jurisdictional than a grant.”). Congress was denied, 1214, 105 cert. 84 clearly aware this constitutional con- L.Ed.2d not, Because the therefore, Nuclear straint.7 It did simply grant Regulatory designate subject jurisdiction Commission did federal courts matter arising over all the Three Mile Island cases from nuclear accident an accidents. “extraordi Instead it occurrence,” created substantive nary federal federal courts governing nuclear accidents in the choice of subject jurisdiction lacked matter to hear provision the Amendments Act jurisdictions Mile Three Island cases filed in providing “the substantive rules of decision country. across This situation resulted [any public liability action] shall be derived “duplicative determinations of similar is from the law of the State which the nucle- jurisdictions.” multiple sues S.Rep. ar incident involved occurs.” 42 U.S.C. 218, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 reprint 2014(hh). In the absence of the retroac- 1476, 1488. ed in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. tive provision choice of law Congress sought remedy pro cases, to the Three Mile Island Congress’ problems plaguing cedural the Three Mile jurisdiction creation of federal by retroactively cases providing Island for over them in the Amendments Act would be report, course, In its the Senate Committee on recognizes, Envi- The Committee Arti- and Public ronment law Works stated the choice of cle III Constitution limits type creating was essential to cases that federal courts created under jurisdiction over actions: reason, may Article hear. For this H.R. 1414 [In to] order avoid the resulting inefficiencies expressly asserting states that suit duplicative determinations of similar is- arising be shall deemed to be an action multiple jurisdictions may sues in occur in Act, thereby under the making Price-Anderson pro- the absence of consolidation ... the bill asserting public liability suits "Cases ... aris- vides federal district court in which the ... under laws of the United States” subject nuclear incident occurred with matter meaning within the of Article III. Rather than arising over claims from the nucle- designing body a new of substantive law to ar provision pro- [The incident. choice of law cases, however, govern provides such the bill [a]ny asserting public liability that] vides provision] [in the of law choice that the sub- shall deemed to be an action stantive rules decision in such shall actions Act, the Price-Anderson and the substantive be derived from the law of the state in which law decision shall be derived from the law occurs, the nuclear incident involved unless occurred, of the State in which the incident such law is inconsistent with the Price- satisfy requirement order to the Article III Anderson Act. The Committee jurisdiction believes courts have over cases aris- federal conferring jurisdiction on the Federal ing courts under the Constitution or laws of arising over claims out of all United States. nuclear incidents 218, Rep. Cong., S. No. in 100th 1st Sess. 13 manner within the constitutional au- (1987), reprinted 1476, thority in 1988 Congress U.S.C.C.A.N. Congress of and notes that added). (emphasis 1488 approach has used this in the Outer Continen- The House Committee on Interior and Insular tal Shelf Act. Lands Reporting Affairs came to the same conclusion. 104, Sess., H.R.Rep. Cong., No. 100th 1st Pt. on H.R. the House version of the Amend- (1987). at 18 Act, explained: ments

1115 require dismissal of provision does not law grant an unconstitutional nothing than more They actions. assert underlying Mississippi sub without jurisdiction of incorporates Penn- creating provision a federal of law legislation choice federal stantive II, law, including a centu- Litig. Consol. as federal sylvania Cases law In re question. 854-55; v. Common that holds O’Conner of cases ry-old at line 940 F.2d Co., 1096-1101 grace period 13 F.3d when the requires a process Edison due wealth — -, denied, 114 (7th Cir.), retroactively a statute of cert. curtails legislature (1994).8 Accord 2711, 129 838 L.Ed.2d Kay Pennsylvania Rail v. limitations. See retroactive that the (1870); little doubt ingly, Co., there is Byers v. Penn Pa. 269 road 65 provision has of the choice law application Co., of Pa. Co. Ct. R. 187 sylvania Railroad process uniform and the efficient furthered 1896); B. Philadelphia & (Allegheny Co. Three Mile arising from the ing of claims Co., Quaker City v. Flour Mills W.R. Co. allowing those claims Island accident (1925); Frantz’s A. 845 Ferki v. Pa. in federal brought and to be consolidated Co., Pa.Super. A.2d 586 Transfer (1943); court. Indus., Inc., Penn Wilson v. Central 452 A.2d 257 Pa.Super. application Because retroactive line of to follow this causes of court declined pending district provision choice law cases, vitality light uniformi- of inter Congress’ goals doubting its advances action relating efficiency disposition property vening developments in the equity ty, and accidents, it is refusing to read broad rights, claims to vested Plaintiffs have irrational. arbitrary rights into the process not due vio- application precedential retroactive a weak bas not demonstrated on such Constitution II, process. O’Con- due Litig. lates constitutional re TMI Cases Consol. is.9 In Cf. Co., at (M.D.Pa. 13 F.3d Aug. v. Edison op. ner Commonwealth at 17-19 slip. (retroactive application Amendments 1993). period doctrine grace if the Even irrational); In re TMI arbitrary and Act not Consti force retains under II, F.2d at 860-61 Consol. tution, Cases believe the we do not (same). apply it under the Supreme Court case. facts of this Pennsylvania Law Period IV. Grace pe Pennsylvania grace None of the ap argue retroactive also Plaintiffs in which a situation cases addresses riod Act’s choice plication of the Pub. Utils. prior passage. General to its Stibitz explicitly Congress stated that Corp., at 996. 746 F.2d provision of the Amendments and consolidation pending retroactively causes apply should imposition 2210(n)(2) (Amend- cases base their § 9. Most of cited 42 U.S.C. action. See process provision period due clause grace on the ment Act's consolidation removal actions, States “includ- of the United apply Amendment to all Fourteenth shall Four- construing action on cases such Constitution or Flour, See, 1988”). jurisdic- City e.g., understood that Quaker teenth Amendment. pass 587-88; Ferki, not 846-47; could tion and at consolidation 31 A.2d at 127 A. choice of law without muster Wilson, constitutional treat an at 260. These cases A.2d Congress in- Accordingly, we provision. believe right” of action as “vested tort accrued cause provision also to of law the choice Constitution, tended see Jenkins States under the United retroactively. A.2d College, Hospital 535 Pa. Med. contrary cur- and are 1104-05 Moreover, if retroactive even precedent that finds rent constitutional constitutionally provision is choice essential, before right a tort cause action vested no create a feder- Congress at least had to 420; Arbour, see, e.g., judgment, F.2d final arising out of nuclear for cases cause of action al Hammond, They conflict at 12. exercise could the district court incidents before finds no law that Fourteenth with current case 11(b) § the Amend- jurisdiction. It did this process in ration- due violation Fifth Amendment choice of section ments Act—the al, affecting vested legislation not "public defining provision is contained— See, Litig. Cases Consol. rights. e.g., 860-61; re TMI 11(b) apply retro- If does action." 805; Sowell, at In 888 F.2d 940 F.2d at jurisdiction over actively, have we do not Testing Litig., Atmospheric re Consolidated was no plaintiffs' because there claims at 820 F.2d 990-91. Price-Anderson under the cause of action 1116

Pennsylvania plaintiffs failed to sue within Discovery A. The Rule period by Pennsylvania the time allotted discovery running rule tolls the brought statute of limitations and of a plaintiff statute of limitations until “the Pennsylvania’s another state’s courts to avoid knows, (1) reasonably or should know: Pennsylvania time bar. We believe the bor- injured, he has injury been and that his statute, rowing 42 Pa. Ann. Cons.Stat. 5521 by party’s has been caused another conduct.” (1981), accurately poli- reflects current state Insulation, Cathcart v. Keene Industrial cy against shopping” by applying “forum 123, (1984) (in 493, Pa.Super. 471 A.2d claims in another state either the banc); Hayward see also v. Medical Ctr. of other state’s statute of limitations or the 320, County, 1040, Beaver 530 Pa. 608 A.2d limitations, Pennsylvania statute of (1992). whichev- Every plaintiff duty has a “Pennsylvania’s er is shorter. borrowing diligence” exercise “reasonable in ascertain unequivocally legislative statute [evinces] the injury the existence of an and its cause. prevent plaintiff Ebersole, intent who sues in 306, Pa.Super. v. Stauffer obtaining 816, 817, denied, greater rights app. A.2d 524 Pa. (1989). than those available in the state A.2d 384 where the Stone, Gwaltney cause of action arose.” v. brief, plaintiffs their assert (1989). Pa.Super. 564 A.2d plaintiffs that several filed their actions with We believe courts would not years diagnosis in two specific of a injury, favorably plaintiffs look here who missed thereby complied discovery with the Pennsylvania’s limitations, statute of al- Pennsylvania law, rule. plaintiffs Under though Pennsylvania is the state where the proving they bear the burden of filed their occurred, brought accident suit in Mis- applicable claims within the statute of limita sissippi. if Pennsylvania Supreme Even Osei-Afriyie tions. See College v. Medical require grace period Court would when the (3d Pennsylvania, Cir.) Pennsylvania legislature retroactively shor- cases), denied, (citing cert. 502 U.S. limitations, tens a we do not be- 581, 116 (1991). Where, L.Ed.2d 606 they require grace lieve period here, non-moving party bears the burden this case. trial, proof summary at judgment appro

priate if non-movants fail to showing “make a sufficient to establish the existence of an Discovery V. The Rule and Fraudulent element essential to [their] case.” Nebraska Concealment 584, 590, Wyoming, 507 U.S. 113 S.Ct. Plaintiffs in the state cases 123 L.Ed.2d 317 In re appeal the grant summary district court’s sponding to a motion summary judgment, judgment injury” on their “initial claims.10 non-moving party “go beyond must First, plaintiffs argue the statute of limita- pleadings by affidavits, her own by tions “discovery was tolled under the depositions, rule” interrogatories, answers to they until file, knew or should have known their designate and admissions on specific injuries were caused the Three Mile Is- showing genuine facts there is a issue for accident. Catrett, land Plaintiffs assert there are trial.” Corp. Celotex material issues of fact as to whether 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal knew omitted). or should have known the quotations cause of Beyond injuries. Second, plaintiffs argue assertions, mere have not directed statute of limitations was tolled because de- us to evidence the record that raises a fraudulently fendants concealed information material issue of fact as to whether about the Three Mile Island plaintiff accident. years filed suit within two of discov- ation, originally adopted The district court in its the court holding limited the state court's entirety prior judgment injury” rendered the Dau- to "initial claims. It then entered sum- phin County against mary Court of Common judgment against plaintiffs Pleas on the "initial in the injuiy” state cases. In re claims and dismissed them as time II, Litig. slip. op. Cases Consol. No. barred. In re TMI Cases Consol. (M.D.Pa. 16, 1993). Aug. (M.D.Pa. Upon 1994): July reconsider- 88-1452 accident. Moli Mile Island Accordingly, we to the Three injury.” an “initial ery of Reed, Pa. 532 A.2d appropriate. neux was summary judgment believe (“Where through conceal fraud or argue [dis- that “because also Plaintiffs ment, plaintiff to causes the the defendant of what a questions involves covery rule] right vigilance or deviate from his relax his known, a clas- have person should reasonable estopped from inquiry, the defendant invariably presented, jury question is sic limita invoking of the statute of the bar summary thereby precluding the use omitted). tions.”) (internal quotations In or Appel- Brief of the procedure.” judgment by a concealment to fraudulent der establish of Common But Court lants at 35-36. defendant, prove “an affirma plaintiff must confirms, held, that the the record Pleas concealment that independent act of tive Mile Island acci- the Three plaintiffs knew of plaintiff from divert or mislead that dent,11 have known or should and knew injury” or its cause. Bohus discovering the could cause adverse to radiation exposure (3d Cir.1991). Beloff, F.2d circumstances, the In such health affects. us to plaintiffs But have not directed running of not toll the discovery rule does sought to conceal that defendants evidence of limitations. the statute injuries. plaintiffs While cause of their summary judgment assert Plaintiffs also to defendants’ have referred statements questions re- factual improper was because employees downplaying the seriousness they used reasonable main as to whether occurred, immediately after it the accident inju- cause of their to diligence discover an issue such do create statements Pleas held: ries. The Court Common respect to fraudulent con material fact with re- interrogatories ... responses to cealment. specific injury their plaintiffs knew of veal con- response to fraudulent In they, years prior to the than time more two argument, the Court Common cealment Thus, at time complaint. that filed their pleas found: knowledge to requisite they possessed the simply prevail. cannot The contention running. Under statutory clock set Here, fact not “conceal” the defendants did Pennsylvania they were the law escaped the TMI facili- that from radiation diligence to in- duty to use reasonable all nothing did to induce ty. Defendants cause operative facts of their vestigate the fact, timely claims. not to file plaintiffs notoriety of the of action.... Given settle- action class notice investigative plethora of and the accident house- ment, to all which was disseminated plaintiffs, it is clear reports available twenty-five of the reac- miles holds within discovery” they the “means that had put persons widely publicized, tor and available them. they had a they if believed on notice II, No. Cases Consolidated In re injury, they should start personal claim for (Dauphin slip op. at 8-9 Co. 426 S type of not the This is lawsuit. own 1987). not di- February Plaintiffs have a claim of give rise to which could conduct evidence the record us to rected estoppel. Accord- conclusions. us to these leads doubt Moreover, of in- amount given the vast properly court believe the district ingly, we concerning available formation respect summary judgment granted accident, it is and extent of the the nature injury” “initial claims. any ba- rationally possible ascertain B. Concealment Fraudulent claim plaintiffs could sis which from asserting estopped are defendants argue Plaintiffs en- Defendants defense. the limitations was because defendants tolled could affirmative action relating gaged no fraudulently information concealed accident, during they were where until al- Although plaintiffs did not file suit left even acci- Some years Mile course of the accident. six the Three Island most after dent, defen- they response to the accident. geographic able to answer detail were area interrogatories to know on how came dants’ plaintiffs periods these to deviate from have caused limitations that did not on the inquiry. day right Certainly their those claims were filed. such Congress’s a result is inconsistent with intent II, In re TMI Cases Consolidated No. promote “‘equitable and uniform treat- (1985), slip op. (Dauphin at 10 426 S Co. ” ment of victims.’ TMI 940 F.2d at 861 20, 1987). February (quoting H.R.Rep. Cong., 100th 1st agree that We defendants’ statements Sess., (1987)). pt. plaintiffs could not have caused to deviate right inquiry from into the their source of agree I majority jurisdic- with the that the injuries. their reflects that The record volu- provision, provision, tional the choice-of-law minous information about the Three Mile “public liability and the definition of action” Island accident was domain.12 apply retroactively contained in section 11 Moreover, many plaintiffs other obtained suf- pending lawsuits that were when the ficient information to file within the stat- passed. Amendments Act was Because the ute of limitations. Under these circum- majority’s understanding of that retroactive stances, plaintiffs’ genuine have raised a however, application sweeps broadly, too I respect issue of material fact with to fi*audu- respectfully dissent. Summary judgment lent concealment. was It is well established that law is “[a] retro- proper. spective if ‘changes legal consequences ” completed of acts before its effective date.’ VI. Conclusion Florida, 423, 430, 107 Miller v. 482 U.S. S.Ct. The choice of law of the Price 2446, 2451, (1987)(quoting 96 L.Ed.2d 351 Act, Anderson Amendments 42 U.S.C. Graham, 24, 31, 101 Weaver v. 450 U.S. 2014(hh), applica- mandates the retroactive (1981)). 960, 965, Thus, L.Ed.2d retro Pennsylvania’s year tion of two statute of “ legislation statutes, active includes ‘all limitations to the claims filed which, though operating only pas Mississippi state and federal court. Retroac- sage, rights affect past vested transac application comports tive with constitutional ” (quoting tions.’ Society Propa Id. and, requirements process, of due in the Wheeler, gation Gospel 22 F.Cas. case, Pennsylvania circumstances of this (No. 156)(CCDNH provide grace period does not for a in which 1814))(empha-sis added). Story, In the words of Justice plaintiffs may file their claims. No issue of statute, “every away which takes or im- precluded grant material fact a summary pairs rights acquired existing vested judgment based on the statute limitations laws, or a obligation, imposes creates new in the state cases. For the duty, disability, a new or attaches new reasons, foregoing judg- we will affirm the respect to transactions or considerations ment of the district court. already past, retrospec- must be deemed ” tive .... SAROKIN, Judge, dissenting. Circuit (citation omitted). I primarily dissent I Nevertheless, because cannot con- Id. “decid Congress clude intended the operates Amend- when a ‘retroactively’ extinguish ments Act pending always simple suits or mechanical task.” timely were Products, instituted in with Landgraf accordance v. USI Film 511 U.S. then-applicable 244,-, simply statutes of limitations 114 S.Ct. 128 L.Ed.2d because would not Ultimately, have satisfied the particular whether statute of limitations of the forum in “depends which upon what underlying nuclear accident occurred. one considers to be the determinative event Nor can I conclude that retroactivity prospectivity intended is to that certain claims survive while oth- be calculated.” Kaiser Aluminum & Chemi er identical ones Corp. cease to exist as a result of Bonjorno, cal 857 n. 12. The Three brought Mile Island accident was the sub- their illnesses or suit. See ject investigation of extensive Corp., and exhaustive re- v. General Pub. Util. n. 1 ports (3d Cir.1983). long diagnosed before were interpretation that the latter I conclude L.Ed.2d 842 n. retroactivity under section 20 is the

(1990)(Scalia,J., concurring). correct foremost, one, for reasons. First and several case, stated Congress expressly applying pending Amendments Act to the apply to Act “shall Amendments the that August from 1988 forward accom- cases on, occurring before, or af- incidents goals Congress that the plishes the intended Act.” 42 of this the enactment the date of ter accomplish by added). retroactivity provision to de- agree I (emphasis § 2014 U.S.C. Island cases fining pending the Three Mile “nuclear majority that the term with the providing actions and as actions pending includes incidents” litigation removal to federal court and is unclear from their What from such incidents. apply” law. exactly the “shall under federal substantive is how the statute interpreted the context language should be where, here, Second, as the statute is am- pending actions. appropriate scope of retro- biguous as the to guidance on no itself offers The statute activity, I that the well-established believe matter, however, a theoretical point. this As statutory retroactivity presumption against in one of two retroactivity understood can be narrowly. interpreting scope that requires First, as the it can be understood ways. case, explic- In this the statute neither states a re- it: as majority apparently construes itly state in that substantive law of the the theory, sec- history. this writing of Under applies the occurred “retroac- incident past to transform into the tion 20 reaches tively” nor pending to actions offers inception, undo- lawsuits as their pending language ap- guidance to how the “shall as proceedings rewriting subsequent all ing and interpreted in the of a ply” should be context though it had exist- law as applying and new ambiguous is as to pending action. It wheth- theory en- filing. This from the date ed applies to er section 11 actions as pursuant to which fiction genders a historical whether, majority as the August public actions were plaintiffs’ suits concludes, applies to such actions as of it by governed they filed in were when explicit inception. In the absence of subject to Pennsylvania substantive law and instruction, I believe the that Congressional although jurisdiction, original federal anti-retroactivity underlying the principles until Act did not effect take Amendments interpretation the former presumption make years later. three sweeping ap- than the appropriate far more Act can be Alternatively, the Amendments by retroactivity the ma- proach to enunciated more limited sense as retroactive seen jority.1 legal consequences to it “attaches new that its enactment.” completed before events Third, interpretation eliminates this at-, at 1499. Landgraf, 511 U.S. major- fiction on which the historical strained pend- simply theory would mean that This based, necessity, by must be ity opinion, public liability were asserting ing actions analytic thereby providing a more rational into transformed effectuating Congress’s intent framework for actions, courts that the federal and equitable result. For leading to a more those ac- original acquired over practical effect of the most part, to, of, date. prior that as but tions ei- provision is the same under retroactivity case, rulings in either interpretation; retroactivity is ac- ther interpretation of Either passage of the Amend- prior to the It is our made ceptable as a theoretical matter. of substantive Act on the basis one ments correct to determine which task applies can be modified longer which no this case. the circumstances evince a cautious conserva- presumption insofar as suggest that is not This case; retroactivity approach that fundamental governs tive legislation against retroactive here, Where, legal system. there is as agreement to our contrary, with the I am in on the retroactivity, scope of question the intended majority intended the underlying principles anti- Majority Op. I believe retroactively. toAct interpret presumption urge retroactivity us underlying the anti- principles n.6. The 1112-13 relevant, however, narrowly. scope retroactivity presumption are governing requires extending Pennsylvania law of the the new law back conform to action, inception recognized time to the of action case. Causes Pennsylvania’s concludes that statute of limi- can filing but not the forum state be state evidence, applied tations was violated —at burdens of dismissed. Rules of —and However, time the suit was filed. at the time adjust- all can proof, jury instructions filed, plaintiffs’ it was lawsuit was not a law of ed to accommodate the the forum. result, public liability action. As a I conclude majority’s interpretation, Under the these governed that it was at the time it was adjustments adopting be made filed Pennsylvania, Mississippi, not law. Al- applied fiction that though the substantive law of beginning relitigating the entire and then governs plaintiffs’ August ease from accordingly. my interpretation, case Under forward, the statute of limitations was satis- adjustments simply by these can be made Mississip- fied or violated back in when applying Pennsylvania August law after time, pi applied. law At that under the renewed, motions, brought by new law, applicable I conclude that it was satis- words, parties. August the In other after fied. party a can move to dismiss a claim basis, longer any legal that no has renew a Finally, interpretation the I endorse con- summary judgment previ- motion that failed policy” forms with the “settled of federal succeed, ously might but now or seek recon- interpretation courts to “avoid an of a federal prior evidentiary rulings sideration of that do engenders statute that constitutional issues if up governing not stand under the new law. interpretation poses reasonable alternative Thus, interpretations require while the two question,” no constitutional Gomez v. United States, procedures implementation, 858, 864, different the is, parties by ultimate effect the for the most eliminating L.Ed.2d 923 part, the same in both cases. questions process the constitutional of due majority’s interpretation. raised the If context, In the statute of limitations how- applies pending the Amendments Act ac- ever, theory the difference in between the forward, August tions from then interpretations two translates into a crucial is there no issue as to whether the Act difference in outcome. The historical fiction process rights plaintiffs violates the due majority’s theory premised on which the is lawsuits, pending because the majority plaintiffs’ forces the to conclude that statute of limitations does not to de- action, although Mississippi filed within the prive plaintiffs of their cause of action. limitations, statute is now barred the result, As a I conclude that the retroactivi- ineq- statute of limitations —an ty provision of the Amendments Act does not uity I Congress’s which believe contravenes actions, history applied pending rewrite my theory intent and which avoids. Statutes operates by but changing ground rather uniquely of limitations are concerned with a midway through game, altering rules specific point in time: the date on which the legal governing status and law complaint was filed. While a defendant can actions from the time its enactment for- raise the statute of limitations as a defense at ward. lawsuit, during time the course of a question always relevant for the court is majority proffers The agrees that it whether, filed, at the time the case interpretation, was this and denies that its inter- applicable pretation statute of limitations was satisfied. engenders of section 20 rewriting majority history.2 Nevertheless, Because the reasons that section 20 conceding while (1) suit, majority's understanding plaintiffs The of the term "his- this: When filed their it was indeed, public torical fiction” liability is different from what I intend. not a that cause action— exist; (2) denying interpretation yet In that its Amend- of action did not When fiction, suit, engenders governed by Pennsylva- ments Act a historical the ma- filed their it was not law; jority (3) suit, plaintiffs’ “do[es] states that it not create a historical nia When filed their limitations; any day applicable fiction that filed suit on other satisfied the statute of 20, 1988, they actually August than that on plaintiffs' filed." This On suit was trans- action, point My simply public rebuttal wide liability governed by of mark. is formed into a action, that the definition of lations can be called to the attention of the provision, original any point the choice-of-law court at during pendency of a jurisdiction provision apply to pending cases lawsuit. majority’s Under the interpre- own August forward, majority tation of section this public case was not a plaintiffs’ concludes that was filed in filed, lawsuit action when it was and Penn- Pennsylvania’s two-year violation of sylvania result, did apply. aAs positions majority’s limitations. Both cannot be cor- treatment of the statute of limita- effect, rect. Act drew a tions cannot be reconciled with interpreta- its bright line down the middle of meaning this lawsuit on tion of the and effect of the Amend- 20, 1988, August dividing the into two ments Act. case parts. distinct Prior to majority justify seeks to illogical generic suit was gov- Mississippi result in of congressional terms It intent. erned; date, since that it has been clear, however, not at all in governs. action and tended the choice-of-law hold, I it logically think inconsistent to as the Amendments Act to encompass statutes does, majority suit was not a limitations. While it is well established filed, public liability action when it was statutes of limitations are characterized as yet required conclude that it was at the time purposes substantive law for of the doctrine satisfy it Pennsylvania was filed to the stat- of Tompkins, Erie Railroad v.Co. 304 U.S. only applies ute limitations —a statute of that (1938), 58 S.Ct. 82 L.Ed. 1188 see to this action in its incarna- Guaranty York, Trust Co. New York v. of plaintiffs’ public tion.3 Either lawsuit was a 99, 109, 326 U.S. 65 S.Ct. filed, subject action it when was to L.Ed. 2079 this does not mean that Pennsylvania’s federal stat- they are considered substantive in con other limitations, ute of or it was not. Indeed, texts. in holding that of statutes limitations are Therefore, purposes substantive for my of majority, view it is the doctrine, the Eñe I, such that federal not who seeks to treat statute of courts the sitting diversity must state differently from statutes limitations all other “sub- limitations, of Supreme the Court rules Pennsylvania stantive for decision” of confined analysis narrowly its to the context concluding Pennsylvania law. While of Erie: that operates plaintiffs’ substantive on lawsuit It is therefore immaterial whether statutes forward, majority the of limitation are characterized either as exception out carves an for ‘procedural’ the statute of ‘substantive’ or court State limitations, allowing it opinions back in reach use those terms unrelat- of crossing imaginary the specific line drawn ed to the issue us. R. Eñe time — the Amendments Act—to before operate Tompkins on the suit v. Co. was not an endeavor to day on it the was filed. This treatment of legal formulate scientific terminology. It directly the statute of limitations expressed policy clashes vitally that touches the majority’s overarching the theory proper of the ease. judicial power distribution of be- limitations, above, of Statutes as discussed tween State federal courts. In es- (or satisfied) only sence, can be violated at one the intent of that decision towas specific point day that, in time —the on which the ensure in all cases where a federal notwithstanding suit was such vio- exercising jurisdiction that cowrt is solely be- filed— subject explained infra, question substantive law and to fed- 3. As I Con- whether jurisdiction; eral In order to conclude that gress phrase the "substantive intended rules plaintiffs' suit was filed in of the Penn- violation decision” to include statutes of in the limitations limitations, sylvania majority statute of the must place. majority’s first Because think I that the first conclude that the statute of argument if fails even the Amendments en- applied plaintiffs' limitations suit at the rele- limitations, however, compasses statutes of I will time; day vant on which was filed. Be- assume now that the for statute of applies only public cause limitations is substantive law in this context. however, actions, majority’s holding in this case cannot be sustained without historical fiction that liability was a day action on the it was filed. of limitation. include statutes citizenship sion” to diversity cause Act is history litigation legislative outcome parties, indeed, nothing there is substantially point; on this silent should court considered even same, legal determine that far as rules to indicate so if it would be of limitations litigation, as of statutes of a the status outcome include them Act, in a court. much intended State less tried Moreover, a of decision. rules York, as substantive at New Guaranty Trust Co. of clear Pennsylvania case makes added). review (emphasis at 65 S.Ct. Pennsylvania “generally courts of case, conclu- majority opinion’s In this ” ‘procedural.’ limitations as treat statutes a sub- “the statute of limitations sion Harris, Transmissions, Inc. v. AAMCO decision,” Majority Opinion, rule stantive (E.D.Pa.1991)(foot 1141, 1143-44 F.Supp. entirely holding cases based at Farm Mutual Boyle v. State omitted); contrast, case, by is no feder- there In this plaintiffs’ cally conclusion that inconsistent no balance of at issue and alism concern Majority Op., at is time-barred.5 courts to be and state federal power between exempted stat (“Congress could have federal, of action is The cause maintained. applica from of limitations utes Congress only question is whether and the not.”). tion, but did rules for deci- “substantive term intended the assertion, Transmissions, majority’s Contrary it is Inc. the majority cites AAMCO 4. The substantially (E.D.Pa. “achieving same out- Harris, true that the F.Supp. 1143-44 v. actions, regardless Pennsylvania 1991), come in proposition the that for filed, treatment statutes necessitates apply Pennsylvania’s where generally statute courts ” decision.' rules for limitations as ‘substantive in other of action arose to causes that limitations finding Significantly, Majority Op., a at 1112 n.5. that of action jurisdictions as well as to causes Congress "substan- not intend the term Majority Op., that did Pennsylvania. at 1112 in arose true, to include statutes tive rules for decision” may well be it is irrelevant but n.5. This First, hand, is no stat- not mean that there Penn limitations would reasons. for two the issue at actions. ute limitations regarding the sylvania statute Rather, express an command absence bearing question before us: wheth on the has no "ordinarily Congress, do not courts from federal requires us to federal section 20—a er statute — Congress no that there be that intended retro assume Pennsylvania's limitations apply statute of rather, all; task at our limit on such actions underlying This is time actively actions. to bar the law, or other suitable to ‘borrow’ the most statute neither the purely question of federal Del- pro from some other source." Pennsylvania rule of timeliness can the statutes of courts nor Teamsters, Second, v. Costello even if vide the answer. hand, If 76 L.Ed.2d 476 the lan to the issue at were relevant history legislative in the inapposite. is no majority The there indication quoted by guage Congress intended limitations way to what statute of language in which quoted describes the action, given type courts to filed in cases which are courts treat “apply the most thumb” is to "fallback rule of but are the first instance ("arose”) closely analogous limitations place outside that took based on events at 2287 Id. 158 & n. state law.” as this one cases such —not statute of limitations 12. If the state jurisdictions & n. relevant and later filed in other which were "unsatisfactory for enforce- nothing vehicle!] Pennsylvania. is an tells us It transferred however, law,” may bor- of federal courts ment way would treat courts about the one, federal from law—"either row timeliness rules highly such as this unique unusual case periods from express limitations related provides basis for inference. no legislative year Nor is there evidence statute of limitations reaches back in history or elsewhere that intended time to Accordingly, bar suit. I retroactivity sweeping majority that the would reverse. contrary, legislative endorses. On the

history indicates that the Amendments Act resulting

was based on the of claims lessons the TMI

from accident: experience

The following with claims RANKIN; Rankin; Laura Stacy David advantages accident demonstrates the Johnson; Bonacci, ability Alice to consolidate claims after Appellants, Attorneys representing

nuclear incident. both and defendants in the TMI litigation ability testified ... DeSARNO; DeSarno; Samuel M. Alice consolidate claims federal court would County Allegheny; Penn Hills greatly process determining benefit the School District. compensation for claimants.... availability provisions for consolida- Gary Gaertner, J. Trustee. tion of claims in the event County Allegheny and Penn Hills incident ... avoid the inefficiencies District, Appellants. School resulting duplicative determinations multiple jurisdictions of similar issues RANKIN; Rankin; Stacy Laura David may occur in the absence of consolida- Johnson; Alice Bonacci tion. S.Rep. Cong., 100th 2d Sess. DeSARNO; DeSarno; M. Samuel Alice reprinted Cong. in 1988 U.S. & Admin. County Allegheny; Of Penn Hills 1476, 1488; News In re TMI Cases School District. (3d Consol n. Cir.1991)(stating Congress’ decision to Gary Gaertner, J. Trustee. enact the Amendments Act was based on the Stacy Johnson, Appellant. litigation resulting lessons of from the TMI accident). This indicates to me Con ALLEGHENY; COUNTY OF Penn Hills gress contemplated providing a mechanism District, Appellants, School consolidating for TMI cases to facilitate then- litigation. continued forward-looking This DeSARNO; approach legislative Samuel M. history evidenced Alice DeSarno. wholly congressional inconsistent with Gary Gaertner, Esquire, J. Trustee. extinguish desire to those suits on technical Nos. 95-3037 and 95-3011. grounds. Because I appli- conclude that retroactive Appeals, United States Court of cation of the choice-of-law means Third Circuit. simply ap- substantive law Argued Nov. 1995.

plies governs litigation to and the instant July 30, Decided forward, respectfully I majority’s dissent from the far-reaching and

overly interpretation broad of section 20 and Pennsylvania’s

from its conclusion that two- statutes, 20); (2) or such alternatives as laches.” Id. at fall under the rubric of section Thus, apply 103 S.Ct. at 2289. there are two courts would a uniform statute of limita- possible public liability outcomes if did not intend for tions to actions drawn from feder- event, "substantive rules of decision" to include statutes al law. In either actions expressly provide single of limitations and thus did not from a occurrence would be sub- limitations, ject statute of limitations for to the same statute of with the exception already actions: the courts would state statutes of cases when the anyway (although they passed. would not Amendments Act was notes limitations are substantive that statutes Co., 10, 456 Ins. Pa.Super. Automobile Erie. purposes for procedural than rather Area Sch. (1983); Altoona A.2d limitations of statutes The characterization 131, 618 Campbell, 152 Pa.Cmwlth. Dist. however, Erie purposes, as substantive me as a This strikes their A.2d on an assessment was not based Pennsyl in the ab- that the courts of strong indication or substantive nature procedural phrase “sub impact on the rather on their not consider but vania would stract proce- rough that Erie’s Penn rules for decision” include federalism concerns stantive intended to these distinction was limitations.4 For sylvania’s statutes dural/substantive Co., Guaranty Trust address. reasons, congressional think that I do not at 1470. respect to statutes intent with majority’s logi enough to sustain is clear

Case Details

Case Name: In Re: TMI

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Date Published: Jul 18, 1996

Citation: 89 F.3d 1106

Docket Number: 94-7598

Court Abbreviation: 3rd Cir.