Matter of the ESTATE of Addle THOMPSON, deceased.
Claud E. TODD, Executor of the Will of Addie Thompson, deceased, and Claud E. Todd, Beneficiary thereof, Appellee,
v.
COUNTY of BOX BUTTE et al., Appellants.
Supreme Court of Nebraska.
*248 Gantz, Hein & Moran, Alliance, L. E. Mitchell, Rushville, for appellants.
Reddish & Fiebig, H. Alan Curtiss, Alliance, for appellee.
Heard before SIMMONS, C. J., and CARTER, MESSMORE, YEAGER, CHAPPELL, WENKE, and BOSLAUGH, JJ.
SIMMONS, Chief Justice.
This appeal presents the question of whether an inheritance tax is payable under the rates provided in section 77-2004, R.R.S.1943, or in section 77-2006, R.R.S. 1943.
The facts are not in dispute. Ella Thompson was born the daughter of Addie and Eugene E. Thompson. Ella was married to Claud E. Todd in 1927. She died in 1932, being at all times from 1927 to the date of her death, the wife of Claud E. Todd. Claud E. Todd married Eldora in 1936 and they have remained husband and wife since that date.
By will dated May 31, 1957, Addie Thompson devised and bequeathed a substantial part of the residue of her estate to Claud E. Todd and Eldora Todd.
Addie Thompson died November 8, 1957.
The county court held that the inheritance tax was payable under the provisions of section 77-2006, R.R.S.1943. The district court on appeal held that the tax was payable under the provisions of section 77-2004, R.R.S.1943. The counties involved are Box Butte and Sheridan. They appeal here.
We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause with directions to hold the tax payable under the provisions of section 77-2006, R.R.S.1943, and render judgment accordingly.
Section 77-2004, R.R.S.1943, provides in part: "In the case of a father, mother, husband, wife, child, brother, sister, wife or widow of a son, husband of a daughter, child or children legally adopted as such in conformity with the laws of the state where adopted, any lineal descendant born in lawful wedlock, or any lineal descendant legally adopted as such in conformity with the laws of the state where adopted; or to any person to whom the deceased for not less than ten years prior to death stood in the acknowledged relation of a parent; * * *." (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 77-2005, R.R.S.1943, provides in part: "In the case of an uncle, aunt, niece, or nephew related to the deceased by blood or legal adoption, or other lineal descendant of the same, * * *."
Section 77-2006, R.R.S.1943, provides in part: "In all other cases * * *."
The tax is a progressive one in amount depending upon which section is applicable. It is obvious that those situations that do not fall within the provisions of sections 77-2004 or 77-2005, R.R.S.1943, fall within the provisions of section 77-2006, R.R.S.1943.
At the outset we are presented with the contention that we are bound by the construction placed upon a like statute in New York by In re Ray's Estate,
This contention proceeds on the statement contained in In re Estate of Dowell,
It appears that New York first passed an inheritance tax law in 1885. Laws of New York 1885, c. 483, p. 820. The 1887 act was an amendment of the 1885 act. Laws of New York 1887, c. 713, p. 921. The act in section 1 provided a tax on "all property" passing by will or intestacy to any persons "other than to or for the use of his or her father, mother, * * * the wife or widow of a son, or the husband of a daughter, * * *."
It is interesting to note that in its original 1885 act (Laws of New York 1885, c. 483, § 2, p. 820) in setting out procedures where there was an estate for life or years involved, the statute referred only to "widow of a son." This provision does not appear to have been retained in the 1887 act. Laws of New York 1887, c. 713, p. 921. It does appear, however, in the Illinois act (Laws of Illinois 1895, § 2, p. 302), and in our 1901 act. Laws 1901, c. 54, § 2, p. 415. Illinois adopted an inheritance tax act in 1895. Laws of Illinois 1895, p. 301. In it appears language found in the 1885 New York act and not in the 1887 New York act as above noted.
It is interesting also to note that Illinois added a provision comparable to our section 77-2005, R.R.S.1943. Laws of Illinois 1895, § 1, p. 301. As it appears in our original act, Laws 1901, c. 54, p. 414, the language of our original act of 1901 appears to be substantially a copy of the Illinois act of 1895.
In People v. Beckers,
So an accurate statement, based on this research, would appear to be that we adopted substantially the Illinois act after Illinois had adopted a modification of New York's 1885 act.
But the quest for a source of the statute need not stop there. There were nine states that adopted inheritance tax laws before the New York act. Pennsylvania in 1826 was the first to do so. Pinkerton and Millsaps, Inheritance and Estate Taxes, c. II, s. 14, p. 10.
Purdon's Digest (Brightly 9th Ed.), 1700-1861, page 148, sets out the Pennsylvania act. Repeatedly in the New York act language is used that is the same or quite comparable to the Pennsylvania act. It is apparent that whoever drafted the New York act studied the Pennsylvania act or one of comparable language. It is quite certain that before New York adopted its act the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had construed its act as set out later herein. See Commonwealth v. Powell,
The general rule to which the appellees resort is one well established in this state. It is stated in Forrester v. Kearney Nat. Bank,
In some of our decisions we use the expression "courts." We did so in In re Estate of Dowell, supra. We used "highest courts" in International Milling Co. v. North Platte Flour Mills,
"* * * when a statute has been adopted from another state, ordinarily the construction *250 given prior to its adoption by the courts of that state will be followed in the adopting state, in the absence of any indication of a contrary intention on the part of the Legislature. The rule is subject to the qualification, however, that a construction of such a statute by the state from which it was adopted is entitled to no greater consideration than previous decisions of this court, and will be rejected for reasons which would require the overruling thereof had it been first adopted in this state." Nebraska Mid-State Reclamation Dist. v. Hall County,
The above is not intended to be an all-inclusive summary of our decisions.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently stated the rule as follows: "The `general rule that adoption of the wording of a statute from another legislative jurisdiction carries with it the previous judicial interpretations of the wording * * * is a presumption of legislative intention * * * which varies in strength with the similarity of the language, the established character of the decisions in the jurisdiction from which the language was adopted and the presence or lack of other indicia of intention.'" Yates v. United States,
In Smith v. Baker,
It should be stated that reported decisions of trial and intermediate appellate courts are to be considered for whatever persuasive merit they deserve.
In re Ray's Estate, supra, was decided in July 1895. It was published in the New York Supplement Reports in 1896. Our inheritance tax law was enacted in 1901 and approved April 1, 1901. Laws 1901, c. 54, pp. 414, 422.
Judicial credulity does not require us to presume that our Legislature less than 5 years after the publication of the decision in In re Ray's Estate, supra, knew or should have known of that isolated decision of a surrogate's court in one New York county and intended to adopt the construction there placed on the act. Likewise that one isolated decision cannot be held to have established a known and definite construction of the act. Obviously it was not even a solitary construction of the highest judicial authority of New York.
We accordingly put aside In re Ray's Estate, supra, as not having any controlling presumptive weight.
We have held that the fundamental principle of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature, and to discover that intent from the language of the act itself. It is not the court's duty nor within its province to read a meaning into a statute that is not warranted by legislative language. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. City of Seward,
We have also held that: "Where words of a statute are plain, direct, and unambiguous, no interpretation is needed to ascertain their meaning, and the court cannot read a meaning into statutes that is not *251 warranted by the legislative language. Neither is it within the province of a court to read plain, direct, and unambiguous language out of a statute." Heppe v. State,
The language of our statute here involved is the meaning of the phrase "husband of a daughter." It must be contrasted with "wife or widow of a son."
It will be noted that section 77-2004, R. R.S.1943, relates to those "immediate relatives" as stated in the catch-phrase heading, those who are related by blood, or consanguinity; also those where the relationship depends upon marriage; and those legally adopted or those to whom the deceased stood in the relationship of a parent.
Section 77-2005, R.R.S.1943, provides for a more burdensome tax in the case of named remote relatives by blood or legal adoption. This section incorporates no one because of a marriage relationship. Finally section 77-2006, R.R.S.1943, applies "In all other cases * * *."
Section 77-2004 and 77-2005, R.R.S.1943, set out those certain named parties who are excluded from the heavier tax of section 77-2006, R.R.S.1943.
The rules of construction applicable here are: "* * * statutes exempting property from taxation should be strictly construed, and one contending that his property is exempt from such tax must show clearly that he is within the exceptions provided by statute. * * * The same rule should be applied to a statute exempting certain legacies from an inheritance tax. To be exempt from an inheritance tax, a legacy must come within the strict letter of the statute." In re Estate of Rudge,
"Courts should give to statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning." Foote v. County of Adams,
It follows that Mr. Todd, to escape the higher tax burden of section 77-2006, R.R. S.1943, must bring himself within the "husband of a daughter" classification. That he occupied that relationship from 1927 to 1932 is patent. That he did not occupy it after 1932 seems patent were it not for decisions upon which Mr. Todd relies. Accordingly we go to those decisions.
We take up first In re Ray's Estate, supra. The author of the opinion frankly states that he prepared the first two-thirds of the opinion before discovering that the tax exemption claimant had remarried and was living with a second wife. The first part of the opinion was written on the supposition that the testatrix and beneficiary were living together as mother and son. The opinion proceeds on the reasoning that "widower" would be a better designation of the claimant than "husband" and that "husband" or "surviving husband" means the same as widower. It is then argued that because the Legislature did not restrict the exemption to a husband whose wife was living that claimant came within the act. This reasoning assumes that the Legislature was required to exclude the claimant by specific language. On the contrary in this state he must show that he is included within the language of the exemption, for otherwise he comes within the "In all other cases" provision of section 77-2006, R.R.S. 1943.
The opinion next states that because the statute says [
After having found out that the claimant had remarried, the court arrived at the conclusion that the statute not having made remarriage a bar it did not intend to do so. Here again the court reverses the burden. Under our rules of construction the claimant must bring himself within the exemption. Our Legislature was not saying who was not exempt, but who was exempt from the higher tax burden of sections 77-2005 and 77-2006, R.R.S.1943.
We have given the Ray case far more space than its merit deserves. We have done so because of the reliance that other courts and claimant here put upon it. We hold that this court is not bound by it nor are we persuaded that it is a sound precedent.
We have heretofore traced language comparable to our statutes back to the much earlier law of Pennsylvania. We now call attention to Commonwealth v. Powell, supra, decided in 1866. There the statute provided exemptions to the "wife or widow of a son." Section 77-2004, R.R.S.1943, uses this phrase. The court with reference to the meaning of widow said: "The word is so entirely and exclusively descriptive of an unmarried condition, having once been married, that any other sense would be figurative." The court held: "To assert successfully a privilege or exemption against a general law, the party must bring him or herself clearly within the class exempted; * * *." That is our rule. The court held that a widow of a son, who remarried during the life of the testatrix (mother of son), was not entitled to the exemption. Here to sustain claimant it is necessary to first find that "husband of a daughter" includes "widower of a daughter" and that widower of a daughter includes a widower who has remarried.
The above is a decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and antedates the New York statute by 20 years and the New York decision by more than 25 years. If we are to follow the prior construction rule herein discussed, it would seem more reasonable to presume that our Legislature knew of the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania than that it knew of the then recent decision of a surrogate's court in a New York county. We do not extend the presumption to either case.
In re Rhead's Estate,
In re Atherton's Estate,
Claimant relies on Clay v. Edwards,
Claimant relies also on In re Waters' Estate,
Claimant relies also on People v. Snyder,
Appellants here rely on Canal Nat. Bank of Portland v. Bailey, supra. There the court followed a statutory rule of construction not unlike our rule as quoted from Foote v. County of Adams, supra. There the statute read "husband or widower of a daughter." The widower had remarried prior to the death of the testator. The court held that "a man ceases to be a widower when he marries again." That holding appears to be correct. The court referred to In re Ray's Estate, supra, and held that it disregarded well-established and accepted definitions. The judgment went against the claimant.
Calvert v. Fisher, Tex.Civ.App.,
In Cahn v. Calvert, Tex.,
We next refer to Tax Commission of Ohio v. Hirsch, supra [
This is the exact situation presented by our statutes. The court refused to construe the language to include widower of a daughter.
We direct attention to our decision in Zimmerer v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
"Affinity is the relationship which arises as a result of the marriage contract between one spouse and the blood relations of the other, in contradistinction from consanguinity or relationship by blood.
"Clearly, when Judge Landis married Miss Cattle, the relationship of affinity arose between him and Robert T. Cattle, her brother. It would seem that when that marriage was dissolved by the death of Mrs. Landis, the relationship of affinity with Robert T. Cattle likewise was dissolved, for the relationship by affinity rests upon a subsisting marriage, not a dissolved one. * * * The plain meaning of the word `affinity' as used here implies a relationship that begins and ends with the beginning and ending of the marriage relation. * * * To hold that Judge Landis was disqualified under the statute would be to add a disqualification that is not there. We are neither inclined nor authorized so to do."
Consistent with these decisions we hold that the relationship by affinity between Mr. Todd and Mrs. Thompson was dissolved by the death of Mrs. Thompson's daughter who was Mr. Todd's wife, and that the tax here is to be calculated on the basis of the rates provided in section 77-2006, R.R.S.1943.
Claimant is concerned that such a holding will render meaningless the terms "husband" and "wife" in section 77-2004, R. R.S.1943. He argues that where either dies there is no "wife" or "husband" to receive the benefits. We anticipate no difficulty with that contention should it be presented so as to require a determination of it.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to render a judgment affirming the judgment of the county court.
Reversed and remanded with directions.