In re Thompson

128 F. 575 | 2d Cir. | 1904

COXE, Circuit Judge.

It is manifest that the court had jurisdiction to compel the assignee under the void state assignment to render an account. Bryan v. Bernheimer, 181 U. S. 188, 21 Sup. Ct. 557, 45 L. Ed. 814. This proposition is not disputed. The petitioner, Murray, recognizing the authority of the court, appeared voluntarily before the referee, presented his account and gave testimony regarding it. Having once acquired jurisdiction of the proceeding the court did not lose it because the investigation took a wider range than the assignee expected or intended. His present contention, carried to its logical conclusion, is that the court acquired jurisdiction of those items which he chose to admit, but not of those which he chose to dispute, and that this jurisdiction was lost the moment he *577asserted a claim of title in his individual capacity. If this contention were sustained an assignee for the benefit of creditors could, by the mere assertion of a colorable claim, paralyze the arm of the court of bankruptcy and defeat the intent and purpose of the law. It is asserted by the counsel for the trustee that since the amendments of igot the District Court has jurisdiction of any action or proceeding which the trustee may hereafter institute if the petitioner’s present contention be upheld, and that a reversal of the order, while subjecting the parties to the expense and delay of retaking the testimony, will be absolutely inconsequential for- the reason that the same result must inevitably be reached in the new proceeding. Whether this contention be well founded or not we do not decide, but the possibility that it may be furnishes an additional reason wdiy a decision reached after such careful consideration should not be overthrown. The petitioner was accorded the fullest opportunity to establish his defense, every fact bearing upon the controversy is now before the court and even though the question were involved in greater doubt than it is it would seem to be the duty of the court to resolve it in favor of jurisdiction.

Upon the merits we are of the opinion that the conclusions of the referee, adopted and affirmed by the district judge, are correct. The assignment under the state law was itself an act of bankruptcy and was void. Murray got no title superior to- the title of the trustee by virtue of such assignment. His right to hold the fund in controversy is founded solely upon an alleged gift, or transfer to him by the firm of Hincks & Johnson as mortgagees. Murray was a member of this firm, but the firm saw fit, acting through its senior partner,, who had authority to bind the copartnership, to accept part of the mortgaged property in full satisfaction of the debt. After the assignment Hincks & Johnson took, under their mortgage, between 50 and 60 carriages and they were sent by the assignee to the factory of the firm at Bridgeport, Conn. The firm waived all claim to the other property, horses, harness, etc., covered by the mortgage. Of this, there can be no doubt. Mr. Hincks testified:

“I do not know what became of the property other than the carriages. We had nothing to do with it at all. I told Mr. Murray that I didn’t care to bother with horses or property of that kind, and the assignee took it. The firm of Hincks & Johnson made no claim to 119 horses that were covered by this chattel mortgage. We had nothing to do with the horses or other property, except the carriages. I don’t know what became of those horses. I suppose they were sold by the assignee. We waive all claim to all of that property. We never claimed to take that property, we never had any property except the carriages at any time. With reference to the horses and all the other property that appears in the mortgage we waive all claim, they haven’t come into our possession at all, and we don’t assert any claim and we never shall. Don’t understand me as waiving any rights of Mr. Murray. I am speaking now for myself and Mr. Johnson. I don’t know that I ought to speak for Mr. Murray; but as an entity the firm of Hincks & Johnson, those don’t enter into his assets at all. They are waived by that firm.”

Subsequently Mr. Hincks was recalled and attempted to explain this positive testimony of an unqualified release, reiterated again and again, by the assertion that he meant to testify that he told Murray “that if he would turn over the carriages to us without expense that *578he was welcome to whatever rights we had in the miscellaneous property, horses, carriages, etc. That he might apply that property towards satisfying any deficiency on his mortgage.” The District Court was at liberty to reject this explanation as an afterthought and as incompatible with the previous testimony of the witness, but assuming it to be true it does not justify the course of the petitioner in.applying the property in payment of his individual mortgage. Hincks & Johnson, the mortgagees, made no claim to-the mortgaged property other than the carriages. These they accepted in full satisfaction of their claim. In legal contemplation it was as if they had received a sum of money in full payment of the mortgage. When their mortgage was satisfied the property covered by it ceased to be theirs or under their control. It did not pass to other mortgagees, whose mortgages did not include it, but to the assignee to be divided among the creditors and, in case of bankruptcy, t'o the trustee. Hincks & Johnson might have had the property sold and the proceeds applied, on their debt; they might even have transferred it to Murray, as a member of the firm, to dispose of for their benefit, but this they did not do. After the.firm debt was extinguished they attempted to exercise dominion and control over the property and transfer it to one of the bankrupt’s creditors to the exclusion of all the rest. Hincks & Johnson unquestionably had the right to make their debt good out of the mortgage property, but when this had been done the firm’s interest ceased and the property under the provisions of the bankruptcy act, passed to the trustee for the benefit of all the creditors.

The order is affirmed with costs.

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