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In Re Thomas R. Beaty and Nancy Z. Beaty, Debtors, Thomas R. Beaty v. David Selinger
306 F.3d 914
9th Cir.
2002
Check Treatment
Docket

*4 FERNANDEZ, Before WARDLAW FLETCHER, and W. Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge WILLIAM A. FLETCHER; Concurrence Judge FERNANDEZ.

OPINION FLETCHER,

WILLIAM A. Circuit Judge. presented

We are in this case awith question impression: of first does the doc- trine of apply to nondischargeability complaints brought under U.S.C. and Federal Rule of Bank- 4007(b)? ruptcy Procedure When unsche- duled David Selinger sought creditor dischargeability determination of his state court judgment against Chap- default ter 7 Beaty, debtor Thomas bankrupt- cy granted court summary judgment in Beaty’s favor based on his affirmative de- fense of appeal, laches. On the bankrupt- (“BAP”) cy appellate panel reversed on ground that laches is never available as an affirmative defense in a ac- tion. For the reasons below, discussed we disagree holding with the BAP’s that lach- However, es is never available. because Beaty establish the unable elements of a laches defense this we hold that the BAP was correct in reversing the grant summary judgment in his favor.

I

The relevant facts are not dispute. 1991, September In Thomas and Nancy in the further occurred Nothing ment.” bankruptcy peti- Chapter Beaty filed a action. state court earlier, January Nine months tion. complaint had filed Selinger David 29, 1994, later, August Sel- year One a real against court state

in a California adversary proceeding proa se inger filed Does 1- company development Beatys’ estate seeking to revoke alia, conceal- fraudulent § 727. In June alleging, inter under U.S.C. Selinger summary judg- time At the bankruptcy granted malice. court ment with not action. It later action, Beatys Beatys and the did he ment to the filed his motion for reconsidera- they Selinger’s had denied Unaware know each other. lawsuit, the bank- The district court affirmed tion. Selinger or his any connection April court’s dismissal ruptcy a credi- Selinger list Beatys did In schedules. their tor on years after just six April In over grant- court January just discharge was issued Beatys’ discharge. Beatys ed the after filed shy years five Selinger that informed Notice state-court 1992, Selinger substituted In March status, Selinger, discharged Beaty’s *5 (“Beaty”) one of the Beaty Thomas se, a second bank again acting pro filed action. in his state court Does unnamed This against Beaty. complaint ruptcy Beaty after had been June On subject present ap the the of complaint, summons, complaint and substi- the served judgment that the peal, alleged default to order, Beaty had failed and after tution nondischargeable under U.S.C. was answer, the entered state court and appear (4) (6). 523(a)(2), complaint The § and against him. The judgment a default a Selinger not listed as noted that was in Beaty’s that conduct judgment stated no Beaty’s petition, received creditor in “fraudulent, had been injuring Selinger closed, and that the case would notice malicious, willful, in disre- and conscious until after of knowledge had no the court rights. The Selinger’s of gard” could not discharge, and therefore damages specified general awarded filing proof of of claim timely have amade deter- damages would be punitive that discharge- of or for determination request 17, 1993, a date. On June mined at later us, briefing and to ability. In his to that he a court order in to state response below, that he Selinger suggested courts examina- judgment at a debtor’s appear he did complaint when filed this second tion, Injunction earlier, a “Notice of filed a month United States because Cruz, Court, he Proceedings,” to which in v. de la Supreme Cohen Against Further dis- 140 L.Ed.2d of his 118 S.Ct. copy attached a 523 U.S. (1998), damages punitive stated ef- had held that “[t]he The Notice that charge. bankruptcy. in His Discharge equiva- dischargeable of Debtor is are fect of this that a injunction against complaint sought declaration lent to an automatic nondischarge judgment debt was commencing continuing or default creditors from 523(a)(3)(B);1 a modification any judg- able under enforcement any lawsuit [or] debtor, to whom such of the creditor provides 1. Section owed, permit— in time to debt discharge ... of this under section 727 [a] specified para- such debt is of kind if discharge debtor title does not individual subsection, (6) (2), (4), of this graph or debt— timely timely filing proof of a claim and discharge- scheduled section neither listed nor under request for determination name, title, para- 521(1) ability one of such of such debt under with the if known of this discharge order to allow continued learning of the after first [Beaty] had filed bank- prosecution of the state court action for a It ruptcy.” stated: punitive damages; determination Here, Mr. Selinger’s delay is inexcusable ruling punitive future award of and was done for tactical reasons. The damages would nondischargeable. Plaintiff expressed an intent- to await a In September change the law regard with to dis- granted by Beaty court a motion to dis- chargeability punitive damages and to Selinger’s complaint miss see what would happen with this 727 ground In not relevant here. March objected action which he to Mr. Bea- 2000, the BAP reversed remanded. ty’s Prejudice discharge. to the Defen- remand, Beaty On answered the com- facts, dant is obvious upon based these (1) plaint. The answer admitted that Sel- and the Court rules that the Debtor is inger was an unscheduled creditor who date, entitled to a fresh start at this late had knowledge bankruptcy pro- no having received his discharge ceeding in timely time to file a nondis- Selinger appealed BAP, which re- chargeability complaint, and asserted in part versed and remanded in a publish- laches as an affirmative defense. Beaty opinion. Beaty, ed re B.R. In argued Selinger had formal notice of Cir,BAP2001). majority The panel no later than 1993 and June held that the bringing his doctrine of nondis- laches is never a chargeability action was valid defense in a unreasonable and prejudicial. He noted that Selinger adversary had proceeding except from dis- *6 objecting lost earlier action to the Bea- charge a debt that the debtor failed to tys’ discharge present and that schedule in time permit timely filing to 523(a)(3)(B) § only brought was af- of a nondischargeability complaint. The Selinger change ter learned óf a in the law panel majority emphasized that Federal might benefit him. 4007(b) Rule of Procedure 523(a)(3)(B) provides § that a complaint Beaty moved summary judgment for may that, filed “at time.” It wrote based on laches. Selinger moved for sum- may we agree Selinger’s “[w]hile fail- mary judgment preclusion based on issue ure to act promptly questionable, more and portions Beaty’s moved to strike we are not at liberty plain to rewrite the answer, including the portion containing language of the or the A Code Rules.... his laches defense. The bankruptcy court laches filing defense to the of a motion, granted Beaty’s Selinger’s denied § motions, is in complaint conflict with and Selinger’s dismissed com- Rule inappropri- and therefore is plaint prejudice. with The court noted majority ate.” Id. at 846. The long that “laches has reasoned recognized been as a that, because a protect means to a debtor is also allowed to party from unreason- able, an action prejudicial delay” bring to determine the dis- equita- and is “an himself, properly chargeability ble defense available when of a see Fed. R. pled.” debt 4007(a), It held that Selinger “guilty Beaty was debtors like need laches B.ankr.P. by failing actions, bring bring to a Section 523 not wait for creditors to such .nondis- chargeability complaint years for over five and are therefore preju- able to avert

graphs, timely unless filing request. such creditor had notice or such and knowledge actual of the in time for a kind particular to Beaty, potential B.R. at defense In re See delay. dicial de of law reviewed question action is a P’ship v. Turner Wyler Summit novo. in concurred member panel BAP One (9th Cir. 235 F.3d Sys., Broad. object result, separately to wrote but 2000). laches majority’s conclusion ac- apply never could view, role potential po “there is a as a In his laches is available

tion. Where actions, defense” such defense, the laches law has been less tential our case to use the instant majority’s attempt “[t]he standard appropriate than clear as to incorrectly ap- laches was in which appeal, court’s decision review of lower to banish laches as the occasion plied, A case. particular in a applies laches baby throwing out the risks acknowledged have opinions number of (Klein, J., Id. with the bath water.” re have not on the issue but confusion member would panel This concurring). Formulas, See, Inc. e.g., it. Jarrow solved is available such held that laches have Now, Inc., 829, 834 v. Nutrition matter, but would general actions as (9th (holding that “the district Bankruptcy Court found that have factors is of the laches court’s finding discretion abused its deference, be reviewed entitled to not to (1) diligent, Selinger was this ease because novo,” conflict declining but to resolve de (2) by being prejudiced was not of discretion or to whether the abuse ability to defend unfairly deprived applies); Danjaq, standard clear error 523(a)(3)(B) action, this (9th 942, 952 Sony Corp., v. LLC was the self- any arguable prejudice Cir.2001) (declining question address Beaty’s attempt to “bam- inflicted result concluding result proper standard by erroneously stating Selinger boozle” under either clear error would be the same Injunction that the the Notice of review); Apache of discretion or abuse any judgment. Id. enforcement of barred States, Coalition United Survival at 850. Cir.1997) (‘We review *7 timely judgment the of appealed for application court’s of laches district the BAP. error.”); clear Tel abuse of discretion or ink, States, 42, 24 47 n. Inc. v. F.3d United II Cir.1994) (9th (holding that review is 11 appeal We review de novo cases that, while noting of discretion and abuse Panel. Bankruptcy Appellate ed from the “clearly errone panels had used the prior (9th Scovis, 975, 980 Cir. In re 249 F.3d standard, ap of this purposes “[f]or “ ous” 2001). a good we are in as ‘Because may exist be peal, distinction bankruptcy BAP review position as the immaterial”); the two standards is tween examine rulings, independently court we (9th 884, Axton, v. 25 F.3d 888 Jackson decision, reviewing court’s Cir.1994) reviewed (noting court has “[t]his of interpretation court’s grounds summary judgment grant fac Code de novo its de novo and for abuse of of laches both Tag tual error.’ In re findings for clear declining resolve discretion” (9th 987, gart, 990 249 F.3d affirm the would “[w]e conflict because (In re (quoting v. Hatton United States standard”), (9th regardless district court Hatton), 1057, 220 F.3d 1059 Cir. 2000)). v. Fan- grounds by Fogerty other available as a rev’d on laches is Whether

921 Inc., 517, 531-32, las, 114 tasy, 510 U.S. S.Ct. 304 F.3d at 833-34. But our review of (1994). 1023, 127L.Ed.2d 455 application of the laches doctrine to the Id.; facts is for abuse of discretion. see clarify here the appropriate We Wax, Wax, Inc., also Hot Inc. v. Turtle of a standard review determination of (7th Cir.1999) (“The 191 F.3d 819 in a applies whether laches case traditional standard of review in summary standard, is abuse of discretion. This judgment cases must be considered comports which with the nature light of the notion that a district court doctrine, of the laches has been suggested enjoys considerable discretion determin- Supreme Court and is used our ing apply whether to the doctrine of laches See, e.g., sister circuits. Burnett v. New pending Therefore, to claims it.... before Co., 424, 435, York R. 380 Cent. U.S. 85 while our review of the record is de novo (1965) (“Wheth 1050, S.Ct. L.Ed.2d in determining whether there are dis- er laches an given bars case fact, puted issues of material our review of depends upon circumstances of that whether the district court properly applied a question primarily and is addressed the doctrine of (inter laches is under an abuse of to the discretion of the trial court.” (internal discretion standard.” quotations omitted)); quotations nal Brown-Mitchell omitted)); and citations Co., see also Natl City Light v. Kansas Power & (8th Cir.2001) (“The Ass’n Employees City Gov’t determi Pub. Antonio, Bd. Serv. San applies nation of whether 40 F.3d (5th Cir.1994) (“[A]s present long case was a matter within the as the district court, court applies legal sound discretion of the the correct district standard on we, accordingly, summary judgment review the district court’s and does not resolve disputed of laches for an against abuse of discre issues of material fact tion.”); nonmovant, City Wyandotte v. Consol. Rail its determination of whether Cir.2001); Corp., 262 F.3d the undisputed facts warrant an applica- Dooly County, Sanders v. tion of laches is reviewed for abuse of (11th Cir.2001); discretion.”). Holmes v. Pension Plan Corp., Bethlehem Steel (3d Cir.2000) (“As 124, 134 an equitable Ill doctrine, the to apply decision laches is left to the sound discretion of the District The question initial is whether Consequently, Court. review of appellate laches is .available affirmative de a lower court’s application of the doctrine fense at all in cases. This is limited to review for abuse of discre question of law. Section *8 (internal quotations tion.” and citations provides exception discharge for the from omitted)). of certain notably, pur debts —most for poses involving of this debts fraud on one,

In cases like this where sum part of the debtor' —when those debts mary judgment been granted has on the laches, were not listed the debtor in the sched basis of aspects “we review certain decision,” ule of the district of creditors. The Code court’s such as differently and Rules treat inappropriately “whether the district court these debts any resolved from debts of the disputed material facts in same sort have been decision,” reaching properly Specifically, its under the de novo scheduled. § traditionally governs nondischargeabili standard that sum creates a mary judgment ty defrauded, review. who were Jarrow Formu- for creditors

922 Co., 434, 455, 60 Improvement and had no 310 U.S. nor scheduled neither listed 1044, (1940)); L.Ed. see also knowledge of the case S.Ct. 84 1293 actual notice or Katchen, 327, 467 timely filing proof of a 382 U.S. 86 S.Ct. permit the time to essentially “are timely request (noting bankruptcy for a determi courts a of claim or two dischargeability. equity”). principles courts of These Section nation 523(c)(1), presumption combine to create a that the provides possible which laches, which equitable of the same doctrine of has as exception from goal prevention prejudicial of creditors who its kinds of debts in cases notice,2 subject bringing proceeding, to a in the of a is rele- timely receive did 4007(c). necessary That Rule vant and doctrine the bank- limit under Rule time context. days ruptcy that a creditor has 60 provides meeting first date set for the creditors’ any BAP held that the “at time” The nondischargeability in which to file language of Rule overcomes contrast, 4007(b), By Rule complaint. any equitable presumption removes governs timing of the com which the commencement of a limitation on § complaints mencement of holding action. That has creditors, “A reads: com unscheduled example, the support. some For Patent 523(c) may plaint other than under be consistently has and Trademark Office any filed at time.” Act, 14 Lanham held that Section of the question provides The before us is wheth which that a cancellation action 523(a)(3)(B), implemented by premised genericism, Rule on abandonment or er 4007(b), procurement may brought allows the doctrine of fraudulent time,” “at analysis begins any precludes laches as a defense. Our laches defense recognition with a of two fundamental ten to such actions. See Marshak v. Tread (3d well, 184, 2 240 n. bankruptcy ets of law. The first is 193 “long[-]reeognized” (citing holding). Congress that “a chief cases so Before principle a statute purpose imposed laws is ‘to se of limitations action, prompt bringing corpus cure a and effectual administration time for habeas it providing and settlement of the estate of all bank was understood the statute rupts “may period[.]’ within a limited Katchen that a motion vacate sentence 323, 328, 467, Landy, v. 382 U.S. 86 S.Ct. made at time” rendered the doctrine (1966) (citation omitted). inapplicable. L.Ed.2d 391 of laches See v. Unit Heflin States, 415, 420, The understanding second is the that a ed 358 U.S. 79 S.Ct. (1959) (Stewart, J., equity court is a court of and L.Ed.2d 407 concur equitable principles ring). similarly should invoke A few other cases have doctrines, refusing only interpreted language to do so where “at time” in oth See, their e.g., would be “inconsistent” er statutes. Sooner Fed. Sav. & Smoot, Myr with the In re Loan P.2d Bankruptcy Code. Ass’n (9th Cir.2000) Leslie, (Okla.1995); vang, Marriage In re (1989). (citing Realty SEC v. United States & Wash.2d 772 P.2d *9 owed, 523(c)(1) 2. Section reads: creditor to whom such debt is and hearing, and a after notice court deter- (a)(3)(B) Except provided in subsection section, excepted mines to such debt from dis- of this the debtor shall be dis- (2), (4), (6), charge paragraph charged under or specified from a debt of a kind in be, (2), (15), (a) (4), (6) paragraph may as the case of subsection or of subsection (a) section, unless, request of this on of the this section.

923 However, directly disapproving equitable the few cases reach- notion of debtor good faith. at Id. 1439 n. 4. virtually conclusion do so with no ing this why language would analysis as to such (Bankr. Lyman, In re B.R. equitable eliminate S.D.Ill.1994), the one bankruptcy opinion doctrine, simply assuming that the instead the BAP considered to have”dealt limitation in absence of a time also results squarely” with the issue of the applicability 523(a)(3)(B) actions, the absence of a laches limitation. See (cid:127)§ of laches in gave no Sooner, 1090; Leslie, why at hint as to any 894 P.2d P.2d the “at time” language in Rule Further, should eliminate the “at lan- laches any at 1017. time” in defense those actions. The district in all of these cases is contained in a guage in court that case provided only the conelu- statute, procedural rather than a rule sory statement that “a debtor who fails to a statute. implementing a jurisdictional list creditor loses the and majority heavily The BAP relied on 523(c) limit protections time of Section Judge O’Scannlain’s concurrence in In re (c) ],” Rule “[tjherefore, 4007[ debtor’s (9th Cir.1993), Beezley, 994 F.2d 1433 but argument complaint should be that concurrence did not address the ques- pursuant dismissed to laches ... is with applicability tion of the of laches to a added). out merit.” Id. at 337 (emphasis 523(a)(3)(B) Rather, § áction. it ad- (9th In In re Santiago, 175 B.R. 51-52 question dressed the of whether a debtor Cir.BAP1994), by also cited the BAP in have good should to show his faith this the court only addressed omitting a debt from a bank- statutory time limitation applicable to ruptcy schedule before the of an actions, § expressly declining recognized omitted debt could be a any to render opinion as to whether laches 523(a)(3) action. See id. at 1439^10 might impose a time limit in these cases. (O’Scannlain, J., concurring). Requiring Id. at 51 n. 4. a showing “interposes equitable such an reasons, For a number of we hold that

barrier between the debtor and his dis- laches is available as a defense in a charge Congress simply did not enact First, action. an examina “[cjourts Code,” are tion other actions that are Congress not free to condition the relief without time limitations reveals Con has made available in the Bankruptcy gress nevertheless intended laches to act Congress deliberately Code factors has as a constraint in. those For ex actions. excluded from consideration.” Id. at 1439. ample, a Chapter may debtor move to But Judge O’Scannlain’s concurrence nev- reopen his case and a lien avoidance bring er to purported speak broadly about the time, any action at and creditors are pro applicability equitable doctrines to tected a concept having Indeed, cases. he cited prejudicially face actions debtors who very specific legislative history expressly Further, bringing such actions.3 See, Chabot, liens, e.g., “leading approach In re tions to avoid but the ("Absent prejudicial delay, incorporates ... an defense akin to laches, may brought may reopen avoidance action at so that debtor bank- time."), grounds by Bankruptcy ruptcy rev'd on other time avoid lien absent creditor”); finding prejudice Reform Act of Pub. Law No. 103-394 In re Bianucci, (1994); (D.NJ.2000) Levy, (noting § 303 In re 256 B.R. (7th Cir.1993) (noting statutory that the lien avoidance the absence of a time limitation for actions, provision bringing apply- sets no time limits on debtors' mo- of avoidance but

924 laches, provide 11 even when those rules no Chapter 13 and the Chapter both the contexts, For Rule 5010 recog example, have time limitation. courts regarding reopen bankruptcy to that, give failure to a credi motions while the nized require that a motion be precludes date cases does of the bar tor notice (and Rule period claim for filed within a certain time denying the creditor’s court from date, limitation provides one-year 9024 that the it that laches to file before failing 60(b) if of the Rules of Civil a claim there of Rule Federal bar such may nonetheless unreasonable, mo- delay.4 apply Procedure does not to these prejudicial is tions). recognized But courts have examples provides these Though none of be within a reason- com the motion “must filed perfect parallel may apply ... laches [and that] of laches in these able time application plaints, Lawrence P. reopen.” ac to a motion to 3 demonstrates contexts ¶ any King, Bankmptcy 5010.02[6] “at time” Collier on may brought tions ¶ (15th ed.1994); at 350.03[6] at 5010-6 id. excluded from per are not se history referencing in- (citing legislative laches. apply). tent for laches to Second, language the “at time” Third, con laches is not doctrine not found in Code is Rather, Rather, Bankruptcy solely cerned with it is timing. it is found itself. 4007(b), adopted pursuant primarily prejudice. concerned with Rule which was nothing inherently Act. Like a Federal There is thus contradic Enabling Rules to the Procedure, saying may “a that an action that Bankruptcy tory about Rule of Civil brought “at time” is exception create an to the nonetheless Rule cannot Code,” subject it cannot to an limitation equitable and based Bankruptcy “ modify any prejudicial delay. v. Am. enlarge, or substan See Couveau ‘abridge, (9th Airlines, Jastrem, 1083 tive In re 218 Cir. right.’ 2000) (“To 28 U.S.C. establish laches a defendant (quoting 2075). 2072(b) delay by must prove §§ We should there both unreasonable itself.”); extremely plaintiff prejudice reluctant to find in Rule fore be Coalition, Apache of the doctrine of Survival 118 F.3d at the abolition (“To laches, would if otherwise establish the defense of party prejudice with the limitation must show caused allow it. Consistent Act, Enabling diligence pursu lack imposed by opposing party’s the Rules other claim.”). ing implicitly Rules have been read to allow its This fact ing “recognized undisputed limitation” of laches to date. It is that Plaintiffs did not delayed filing). However, prejudicially bar a receive of the bar date.... notice inquiry, for a does not end Court's 4. See In re The Drexel Burnham Lambert indefinitely cannot wait to file a creditor (S.D.N.Y.1993) (al Group, 157 B.R. may apply equitable claim. This Court lowing court to use doctrine of laches in a prevent filing doctrine of laches to the late noting Chapter distinction 11 case “the proof of claim Plaintiff's was unrea- if rights between a creditor’s to notice under (citations omitted)); Barsky, sonable.” In re rights bankruptcy law and debtor's to resist (C.D.Cal.1988), aff’d, 85 B.R. dilatory claims under the doctrine (9th Cir.1991) that, (holding in a F.2d 1013 Hunt, laches”); In re 146 B.R. Chapter provide failure to notice (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1992) ("[A Chapter credi 11] preclude limiting “does not a court from tor's can be barred for failure to file a claim right pursuant creditor's to file a claim prior only proof to the bar date if the of claim laches”). independent creditor received reasonable notice of the bar doctrine

925 himself, (such chargeability in doctrine that a claim in recognized some cases described) if may by be barred laches even the stat just as the one the debtor for the claim has not Further, ute of limitations would not know to do so. it is (not Jackson, expired. See 887 nearly always the case that a defendant ing of limitations bar claims “[statutes who invokes brought laches could have time; only upon passage laches bars earlier declaratory judgment prejudice because would claims otherwise against the late-litigating plaintiff, see 28 defendant”); result to the see also v.Wells § U.S.C. but common sense and a Carnegie & United States Steel Pension judicial concern for economy prevent this Fund, Inc., Cir. acting as bar to a laches defense in 1991) (noting may ripen laches within a other contexts. We see no why reason applicable period that is short of the time laches should not be in bankrupt- available limitations); Loesch, Maksym 937 cy when it is available elsewhere. (7th Cir.1991) that, (noting We note that the question applica- by because laches focuses harm caused § tion of laches to actions delay, plaintiff] “the fact that sued [a [a unusual, any would that the “at time” statutory within the period defendant] 4007(b) language of Rule play comes into laches”). does not defeat the defense of only specific case of a debtor’s fail- law, Analogizing to this rule of the fact ure to schedule a creditor. As all of the that a creditor has time remaining on his seeking bring creditors such actions (indeed, statutory clock an infinite amount have, definition, by already been disadvan- time, time”) any if the clock is set at “at taged by the debtor’s failure to schedule says nothing about whether his right them, they might argue that the bankrupt- bring might his action be limited laches. cy policy promptness is forfeited In the words of concurring member of omission, virtue of the debtor and that the BAP panel this “the authoriza- per laches se should unavailable to such filing tion Rule such an However, because, a debtor. as discussed any action ‘at time’ does ... not forbid a above, timing, laches addresses more than applying court from laches in appropriate aspect this actions does circumstances; words, in other phrase necessarily not an application render ‘at time’ does not mean ‘at time no laches with the “inconsistent” inequita- matter what and no matter how Myrvang, Code. In re 232 F.3d at 1124. (Klein, Beaty, ble.’ In re B.R. at most, At might it warrant more careful J., concurring). (rather consideration of how than wheth- Fourth, it imagine is not hard to a case ) applied. er laches is in which the absence of a laches defense is, That might a concern that the debtor injustice. would lead to It highly seems inequitably himself have is best behaved unlikely Congress intended that a addressed, by declaring not unavail- innocently debtor who neglected to sched- 523(a)(3)(B) eases, able in all but rather ule a creditor be vulnerable to an ostensi- by emphasizing nature of the ble creditor who learned of the bankruptcy doctrine in its after discharge many soon but waited years cases. is hornbook law that one seek- key bring- “[I]t for a witness to die before ing ing equity equity,” must do and that debt- his action. itWhile true, noted, majority may as the BAP ors have “unclean hands” that the who Boston, could B.R. surprise by debtor avoid such seek- invoke laches. White v. (S.D.Ind.1989). ing say declaration as to the dis- could debt’s One *12 (internal of the claim” citation prosecution failed to schedule a debtor who every that omitted)); Fin. inequitably; quotation and Reconstr. thereby behaved creditor had 204 so, rightly Crosfield, said v. Harrisons & F.2d might Corp. it if that were Cir.1953) (2d 366, that “a uniformly (noting unavail- 370 that laches should 523(a)(3)(B) ... heavy party §in actions. the set- burden rests able to debtors innocently, when the ting up omit creditors laches as a defense” But debtors also Indeed, yet expired); In good period faith. limitations has not inadvertently and Cladouhos, indications, Marriage what occurred re Hahn & 263 all is by (1994) (“When above, 315, 599, here, for, 601 recounted Thomas Mont. 868 P.2d as Doe the the time limit set Beaty still an unnamed when a claim is filed within was statute, granted. analogous was the the defendant bears Beatys’ discharge extraordinary cir- the burden to show balance, we that the On believe require appli- the cumstances exist which 523(a)(3)(B) Rule reading best laches”); Bldg. cation of & Constr. Trades available as a is that laches is N. Nev. v. State ex rel. Pub. Council of time, we read those defense. At the same Bd., 605, 633, 108 Nev. 836 P.2d 637 Works directing bankruptcy courts provisions as (1992) (“Especially strong circumstances §to especially to be solicitous a must exist ... to sustain defense of invoked, and to claimants when laches is the limitations has laches when statute of a particu an action without refuse to bar Mertz, run.”); not Williams v. 549 So.2d prejudi showing of demonstrable larized (Ala.1989) (when 87, period limitations 88 strong pre there is a delay. cial Just as expired, “[sjpecial ap- has not facts must that a is reasonable for sumption (in- delay culpable”) which make the pear a specified of laches when statu purposes omitted). quotation ternal citation and yet tory period lapsed, limitations has presumption there should be a similar IV A party asserting cases. can question The next is whether complaint a to a filed laches as defense show laches on the facts this case. See height a under must make Co., 810, Brown v. 765 F.2d Cont’l Can 814 extraordinary circum showing ened (9th Cir.1985) (“Laches an equitable is doc- compelling forth a reason stances and set depends upon trine. the Its why action should be barred. See the case.”). facts of the The bank- (“If Formulas, at the 835 Jarrow ruptcy court held that the elements of analogous lim plaintiff filed suit within laches were met. hold that it erred as We strong presumption is period, itations matter a of law. v. inapplicable.”); laches is Shouse (9th County, 559 F.2d 1147 The affirmative defense of Pierce “ Cir.1977) (“It (1) extremely ‘requires proof is rare for laches lack of dili laches effectively whom de plaintiff gence party against to be invoked when (2) asserted, in an prejudice has fled his action before limitations fense is run.”); v. analogous party asserting law has see the defense.’ Kansas Bearden, Colorado, 673, 687, 115 S.Ct. also Patton U.S. (6th (1995) (noting “strong pre (quoting 131 L.Ed.2d 759 Cos States, 265, 282, apply will not when tello v. sumption that laches United U.S. analogous citing of limitations has not 5 L.Ed.2d 551 statute S.Ct. 1990) reason,” run, Dictionary compelling and re Black’s Law ed. absent (“ upon maxim quiring showing “gross laches ‘Doctrine of laches’ based (7th Cir.1991) (no and not vigilant aids those equity where rights. plaintiffs delayed challenging on their It is defined who slumber which, apportionment of two right voting or claim districts until neglect to assert statutory, amendment made it easier to together lapse taken with of time and oth dilution). impermissible show vote causing prejudice to the er circumstances party, operates adverse bar court of *13 We are also unconvinced that a lack of equity.”)). also United States v. Ma See diligence on Sehnger’s part is demonstrat- (9th Cir.1999). 1213, rolf, 173 F.3d ed the fact that Selinger before became diligence prejudice Neither lack of nor is § potential aware of his cause the here. shown on record of action pursued separate, he unsuccessful litigation § under 727. argu- There is no Diligence/Unreasonable Delay 1. of Lack judgment § ment that the in the 727 action The first element of laches re preclusive under the doctrines of either an examination both of of quires length (claim judicata preclusion) res or collateral (issue delay Selinger’s becoming between estoppel preclusion). Nor is there aware and his bankruptcy discharge any argument of Beaty unfairly that was sur- action, filing nondischargeability of the prised present action surrounding Indeed, of the circumstances that de as a result of the 727 action. if unfairness, lay, including Sehnger’s during there is it is the behavior result of what concurring member of the BAP period. bankruptcy the interim The called panel “bamboozl[ing]” Seling- finding diligence court’s of a lack of and an by Beaty er in that-action. delay largely unreasonable rested on the Selinger fact that knew five years for Supreme “The Court has re 523(a)(3)(B) action, potential § he had a ‘(t)hat peatedly emphasized arbitrary no or affirmatively opted and that he to file been, period be, fixed of time has or will until the law on dischargeabili rule, established as an inflexible but that ty changed assuming his favor. Even the delay which will defeat such a suit Seling this was motivation behind every must in depend peculiar on the delay, er’s conclu court’s circumstances of case.’ legally Delay was erroneous. for the sion Douglas, v. McDonnell Goodman 606 F.2d purpose awaiting change previously (8th 805-06 (quoting The delay unfavorable law is for reasonable (14 Wall.) 653, 660, Key City, 81 U.S. .laches, purposes of and does not constitute (1871)). Beaty provided L.Ed. 896 has no See, diligence. e.g., Wauchope lack of v. particularized support evidence to his as State, Dep’t United F.2d States lag sertion that the time between knowl (9th Cir.1993) (laches 1407, 1411 not a bar edge potential filing action and the plaintiff for who did not seek United length. of the action was unreasonable citizenship changed States until law in her laches, delay Mere alone will not' establish favor); Cuomo, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Group, see Am. Int’l Inc. v. Int'l Am. (2d Cir.1993), Bank, reversed on Cir.1991), grounds, other 514 U.S. 115 S.Ct. the record does not demonstrate a lack of (no 131 L.Ed.2d 695 diligence delay Seling or unreasonable on prior part. because unfavorable court decisions er’s a legitimate 'delaying constitute reason for Prejudice

until recent Supreme-Court United States success); improved prospects particu- cases for failed to make a has also Bd., showing prejudice arising Dickinson v. Ind. State Election 933 larized ” and changed dramatically’ factors ‘have bringing his Selinger’s little mean- shed[ ] The “a review of the record action. solely precise on the nature of these prejudice ingful light based assumed court element, Selinger’s changes”). alleged the first the fact that in nature. As discussed tactical delay, was awaiting while favor-

above, delays on the Facts of This tactical 3. No Laches Case in the law are excused changes able of laches “Because laches, thus the court’s purposes of all the depends on close evaluation of also fails. analysis prejudice it facts is seldom by summary judgment.” susceptible of resolution to makes a hand Beaty’s brief us veau, at 1083. How Cou additional, conclusory, but claims ful of *14 ever, party argu where a has based his that he was “de He contends prejudice. entirely on a prejudice ment of almost finality discharge,” of his that prived legal support, that without contention is attorney’s fees that he otherwise he faces not, despite ample opportunity, and has faced, might and that there might not have due any specific adduced evidence of harm witnesses (unspecified) be some and/or like, unavailability or the to of evidence unavail evidence that will be documentary development further factual remand for At passage of time. able because of would be futile. We affirm the therefore Beaty pro was unable to argument, oral Selinger’s decision of the BAP that con any specific support vide more for his be allowed to should delay prejudicial. was tention with the proceed. disagree While we of prejudice claims do not generic Such affirm its conclusion reasoning, BAP’s we case, in any a laches defense suffice for action. Selinger’s that laches does not bar in a particularly and are insufficient heightened showing in which a of extraor Conclusion and demonstrable

dinary circumstances See, prejudice required. e.g., United We hold that laches is available as a Inc., Enter., States v. Admin. defense to action filed under U.S.C. (finding prejudi no 523(a)(3)(B). In order to establish a alleged cial where harm was “entire defense, successful laches a defendant ly Meyers Corp., v. Asics hypothetical”); extraordinary must show circumstances (Fed.Cir.1992) (“De compelling why and set forth a reason they fendants also suffered evi- argue action should be barred. Because the ele- key of dentiary prejudice witnesses —loss ments of the defense are not satisfied in documentary and loss of evidence. How case, correctly this BAP re- ever, exactly none the defendants state of grant versed the court’s particular prejudice what it suffered from summary judgment Beaty’s favor. the absence of these witnesses or evidence. AFFIRMED. Conclusory statements there are witnesses, that witnesses’ memo missing FERNANDEZ, Judge, Circuit lessened, and that ries have there is miss concurring: evidence, ing documentary are not suffi McLean, cient.”); agree ex rel. Casale v. I concur in the result because I State (1991) Selinger’s 569 N.E.2d laches does not bar com- Ohio St.3d (refusing litigant plaint dischargeability find laches where of to determine the fraudulent, only judgment against Beaty fered “a bare assertion that certain his willful, which in- ... may and malicious conduct leased move the court which vacate, jured Selinger. imposed the sentence to set aside or correct the sentence.” The defense, If an available it is laches were statute further provides: “A motion for here, in part not shown as is demonstrated may such relief be made at time.” majority Where I differ opinion. IV of the that, provision This latter simply means think majority is that I do not corpus, as in habeas there is no statute in an action that laches is ever available limitations, judicata, no res and that reasons, my I will type. this adumbrate the doctrine of is inapplicable. succinctly. which can be stated rather States, Selinger 415, 420, In this failed to list v. United 358 U.S. Heflin schedules, (1959) 451, 454, as a creditor his 79 S.Ct. 3 L.Ed.2d 407 (Stewart, J., have Selinger knowledge did not concurring1) (emphasis omit ted). enough timely proof to file a case soon plain enough. That seems Of (which request course, of claim and a for a determination like habeas-corpus statute Moreover, dischargeability. Selinger’s is) § 2255 can be unique, considered within allegedly exceptions debt falls that is underscored the absence of the set forth in 11 U.S.C. possibility judicata of res effect. But that (6). 523(a)(2), Therefore, or under 11 only place is not the where “at time” *15 discharge of Bea- U.S.C. given has been a rather restrictive inter ty under U.S.C. did not pretation. In the Lanham Act area it is debt, and Selinger’s under the any also been declared thaf’at time” ex Selinger’s could “be filed complaint rules cludes use of the defense of laches. 4007(b). Bankr.P. In any time.” Fed. R. Treadwell, 184, See Marshak v. view, my any just “at time” means that. (3d Cir.2001). 193 n. 4 get And to closer hand, to the heart of the case at the views course, I recognize, of federal have, bankruptcy judges by large, and prefer courts do to leave themselves flexi- been the same. bility, they are loath to hold that They not at all. apply imag-

laches does Lyman, In In re 166 B.R. envision, ine, nay possibili- a whole host of (Bankr.S.D.Ill.1994), example, for the court protected ties wherein someone should be rejected argument the debtor’s that a dis- against dilatory prejudicial filings. In chargeability complaint “should be dis general, unexceptional, is and when pursuant missed doctrines nothing way, stands in its it is estoppel plaintiffs of laches or since did not even But probably something laudable. complaint year file their until one after way does stand here. receiving notice of debtor’s something phrase That is the of art “at case.” The court did so because Rule time,” any and that all the differ- makes 4007(b) expressly complaint states that the ence ih the world. Here is what the Su- can be filed at time. Id. That tois preme say had to Court about statute where a not listed a say, debtor has credi “ containing phrase: tor, ‘jurisdictional he and time loses The Congress protections’ words which has used are limit that he would otherwise (In ambiguous. provides have. v. Section Glosser Parrish Real Estate (Bankr. Grant), “A prisoner custody

that: under sen- re 160 B.R. S.D.Cal.1993) (citation omitted). ... claiming right tence to be re- Other joined by justices. 1. Justice Stewart was four other effect. are to same

bankruptcy cases AZER; (In Doctor’s Medical Morcos S. Moberly), re Moberly v. Johnston See Laboratory, Inc., (Bankr.N.D.Cal.2001) Plaintiffs- 187, 190 266 B.R. Appellants, (Rule 4007(b) can be filed at complaint “Equita- laches. not barred time v. rulings are not basis principles ble CONNELL; Chen; Kathleen Ste John Bankruptcy or the contrary to the Code Munso; Fujimori; Joseph Al ven P. Procedure.”); Bankruptcy Rules of Federal Schaden, Defendants-Appellees. (In Santiago re Santia- see also Irons No. 01-55359. Cir.1994). (B.A.P. 9th B.R. go), 175 Appeals, United States Court of approach in this is un- good The sense Ninth Circuit. in Beezley v. derscored the discussion (In Beezley), re Land Title Co. California Argued and March 2002. Submitted curiam). (per 994 F.2d 1433 Sept. Filed There, very on a after a brief meditation area of the law and on closely related following ap-

congressional purpose, proper deemed a pears:”What Congress. equities as between debt- balancing of the respect to unlisted or and creditor -with 523(a)(3) in section debts it has enacted is not Code. It for the according to restrike that balance courts to (O’Scann- at 1440 lights.” their own Id. *16 (cid:127) lain, J., concurring). That is true here Congress desired to have the also. Had §by balance and Rule struck affected our notions of equity manifested the doctrine of laches, language it could have insisted on

less immune to those notions than “at time.” many

As defender discovered to keep strongest fortress can dismay, his by those who tunnel under it. I weakened Beaty’s participate invitation to decline 4007(b)’sdonjon. weakening Rule Thus, respectfully I concur the result n only.

Case Details

Case Name: In Re Thomas R. Beaty and Nancy Z. Beaty, Debtors, Thomas R. Beaty v. David Selinger
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Sep 26, 2002
Citation: 306 F.3d 914
Docket Number: 01-56576
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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