OPINION
Appellant-father T.F.H. challenges the termination of his parental rights, making various arguments regarding the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-63 (2000), procedural matters, evi-dentiary rulings, and appointment of counsel. Because the district court did not misapply the law, make findings unsup
FACTS
J.B. (mother) is the mother of the three children who were the subject of this proceeding in district court. She is an Indian parent within the meaning of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). At the start of the proceeding, mother had custody of the three children. The youngest child (L.B.), who is the subject of this appeal, was born in February 1998. At some point during the proceedings, L.B. was formally enrolled as a member of the mother’s tribe.
L.B.’s father (father) is also an Indian parent within the meaning of the ICWA, but belongs to a different tribe than mother. Father was adjudicated to be L.B.’s father in May 2000 and is the appellant in this proceeding. He has extensive histories in both the child-protection and criminal systems. The father of the two older children (G.A.C.) is not a party to this appeal.
In March 2001, the Hennepin County Department of Children and Family Services (the county) removed the children from mother’s home because of her chemical-dependency and mental-health problems. The county also filed a petition alleging that all three children were children in need of protection or services (CHIPS). Mother admitted that the children were CHIPS in July 2001.
In October 2001, the county petitioned to terminate mother’s parental rights due to her failure to substantially comply with her case plan. Notices were sent by registered mail to father, his tribe, and mother’s tribe. Mother’s tribe intervened, but the notice to father was returned “unclaimed,” and, despite proof of service in the file, no response was received from father’s tribe. Because mother had some success with her case plan, her termination trial was continued, but in July 2002 she relapsed. Mother’s continued termination trial was then set for March 24, 2003.
On March 21, 2003, the county petitioned to terminate the parental rights of both fathers. Notices were again sent to father, his tribe, and mother’s tribe. Both fathers first appeared in court on March 24, 2003, the first day of mother’s termination trial. Mother then moved to continue her trial based on the fact that the fathers had appeared, but the district court denied the motion and instead separated the proceedings so each of the three parents was to have a separate trial. Because mother admitted the allegations in the petition seeking to terminate her parental rights, the bulk of her trial addressed a petition that she had filed to have custody transferred to a member of her extended family, rather than whether to actually terminate her parental rights.
After mother’s trial but before the district court ruled, the district court held an admit/deny hearing in father’s proceeding, at which father stated he would move to reopen mother’s proceeding and to recon-solidate his proceeding with mother’s proceeding. The district court then stayed mother’s proceeding pending father’s motion. Father later made the motion, and, in August, the district court denied the motion and ordered termination of mother’s parental rights, but stayed the termination, pending resolution of the proceedings involving the two fathers.
In September, father moved for reunification with the child and for a continuance of his termination trial. The district court denied these motions as untimely. Also in September, the county sought to file an amended termination petition regarding father, citing a 1997 termination of father’s parental rights to another child, of which
Father sought a new trial. In doing so, he submitted documents from his tribe stating (a) the tribe did not receive notice of the proceedings; (b) under the practices of father’s tribe, the child was automatically considered a member of that tribe; and (c) father’s tribe thought the child should be returned to father. The district court denied father’s posttrial motion stating, among other things, that father’s submission of the documents from his tribe was untimely and hence that they did not entitle father to relief. Father appeals.
ISSUES
1. Did the district court err by treating the child as a member of mother’s tribe?
2. Did the district court err in ruling that Andrea Keezer was a qualified expert witness for purposes of ICWA?
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion by ruling that Keezer’s testimony had adequate foundation?
4. Does the record support the district court’s determination that the county made the active efforts to avoid the breakup of the Indian family required by 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2000)?
5. Did the district court deprive father of his rights to participate in mother’s termination trial?
6. Was father’s tribe given adequate notice of the termination proceedings?
7. Did the district court abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings?
8. Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying father’s motions for a continuance?
ANALYSIS
In Minnesota courts, proceedings to terminate parental rights to an Indian child must comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). MinmStat. § 260C.001, subd. 3 (2004).
I
In a proceeding to terminate parental rights to an Indian child, ICWA requires that the petitioning party show beyond a reasonable doubt that “active efforts” were made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that those efforts were unsuccessful. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2000) (requiring active efforts);
In re Welfare of M.S.S.,
The district court treated mother’s tribe as the child’s tribe, despite the fact that at the beginning of these proceedings, the child was eligible to be a member of both father’s tribe and mother’s tribe. On appeal, father argues that identifying the child’s tribe could have a significant impact in determining whether the “active efforts” to reunify the family were made and that the district court should have identified the child’s tribe by determining with which tribe the child had more significant contacts.
See
25 U.S.C. § 1903(5)(b) (2000) (stating, if Indian child is “a member of or eligible for membership in more than one tribe,” “Indian child’s tribe” is tribe with which child “has the more significant contacts”); Guidelines for State Courts — Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584; 67,586 (Nov. 26, 1979) [here
Father argues that the district court should have allowed him to inquire into his ability to un-enroll the child from mother’s tribe and enroll the child in his tribe. Because he cites no authority allowing or addressing un-enrollment, the argument is not properly before us.
See State, Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc.,
II
Parental rights to an Indian child cannot be terminated absent testimony by a qualified expert that “continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.” 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (2000). Mother’s tribe called Andrea Keezer, a member of mother’s tribe, to testify as an expert, and the district court allowed her to testify as an expert. Father asserts that the court erred in admitting Keezer’s testimony. His first argument in this respect is that the court admitted her testimony without assessing her qualifications as an expert witness.
Generally, whether a witness qualifies as an expert is an issue within the discretion of the district court.
Gross v. Victoria Station Farms, Inc.,
Here, the district court noted that mother’s tribe designated Keezer as an expert, and stated that under the Agreement, the court lacked the ability to second-guess that designation. Father argues that DHS’s inability to challenge the designation of the witness as an expert does not preclude the court from ruling that Keezer is not a qualified expert. But Keezer testified that she is an enrolled member of the tribe, is recognized by the tribe as being knowledgeable about the tribe’s child-rearing practices, is authorized to testify on behalf of the tribe in cases involving out-of-home placement of enrolled children generally, has done so on “numerous occasions,” and is specifically authorized by the tribe to speak on its behalf regarding this child in this proceeding. Thus, regardless of whether or not the Agreement allows entities other than DHS to challenge a tribe’s designation of a person as an expert, Keezer’s testimony is overwhelmingly clear that, she qualifies as an expert witness under the Agreement, and the court was therefore correct in qualifying her as an expert to testify in this proceeding.
Because the district court correctly ruled that Keezer qualified as an expert witness, Keezer could give opinion evidence as contemplated by Minn. R. Evid. 702. Qualifying a witness as an expert, however, does not require the court to admit any and all testimony from that witness, nor does it require the court to find such testimony persuasive. The weight to be given any testimony, including expert testimony, is ultimately the province of the fact-finder.
In re Objection to Real Prop. Taxes,
In addition to his argument that the district court erred in qualifying Keezer as an expert, father makes a number of other claims that the court erred in admitting her testimony. He argues that Keezer’s testimony both about her expertise and on the merits should not have been accepted because the testimony was “con-clusory.” But father does not allege that any of Keezer’s testimony was false or incorrect. And because the substance of Keezer’s testimony was within the area of her expertise, father was not prejudiced by the county’s method of showing that expertise. In any event, if father felt that Keezer’s testimony was too conclusory, he was given the opportunity to probe behind those conclusions in cross-examination. Thus, even if there were an error in accepting Keezer’s testimony, the error is not reversible.
See Uselman v. Uselman,
Father further argues that the substance of Keezer’s opinion testimony addressing the merits of the case was not admissible because (1) it lacked foundation and (2) was based on hearsay. As to foundation, father does not allege that any of the sources of information Keezer used to form her opinions are atypical bases for those opinions, and reports from social workers and psychologists, like those used here, have been admitted as business records in juvenile-protection cases.
See In re Welfare of Brown,
Father also argues that “[ejxpert testimony must also be based upon actual perception, the witness’s firsthand knowledge.” He cites Minn. R. Evid. 602 and argues that an “opinion is inadmissible [if] it is not based upon first-hand knowledge.” But father fails to note the last sentence of rule 602, which reads: “This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 703, relating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses.” Rule 703 states that if facts underlying an expert’s opinion are “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject,” those facts “need not be admissible in evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 703(a). Father cites
Ray v. Miller Meester Advertising, Inc.,
As we have noted, Section 1912(f) of the ICWA mandates that before a court can terminate the rights of an Indian parent, the decision to terminate must be “supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent ... is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.” Keezer was examined by all parties, including father. She testified that she had discussed this case with the Indian Child Welfare Office of thé mother’s tribe. Keezer reviewed aspects of father’s relationship with the child and reported that mother’s tribe did not consider father’s parenting to be acceptable to the tribe. She reported the tribe’s conclusion that “serious emotional or physical damage would result — damage to the child would result from being placed with [father]” and that the tribe further concluded that “it [was] in the best interests of [the child] that [father’s] parental rights be terminated.” On cross-examination by father, Keezer testified, “it’s in the best interests of [the child] to not be in [father’s] care.” We conclude that based on the expert testimony of Keezer and entire record, including the father’s lengthy criminal history, his problems with alcohol, his demonstrated lack of ability to parent his children, and his spotty relationship with the child, the district court was correct in concluding that there is evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) it is in the best interests of the child that father’s parental rights be terminated and (2) custody of the child by father is likely to result in serious physical or emotional damage to the child, within the meaning of section 1912(f) of the ICWA.
IV
Father argues that the district court erred when it ruled that 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) did not require the county to
Father further argues that the issue is controlled by this court’s decision in
In re Welfare of M.S.S.,
Father also argues that he was not given enough time to work on his case plan and that aspects of his case plan were inadequate. He admits, however, “some of the delay surely was [his] fault because of his desire to remain [with his tribe in South Dakota].” Also, the district court found that father (a) avoided participation in the proceedings; (b) “imposed the unreasonable requirement” that other services offered to him “needed to be done only on Fridays”; (c) refused transportation assistance when his car broke down; (d) testified that he did not need parenting assistance to parent the child; and (e) “rejected” the “services available to [father] in his area ... for various reasons.” Father does not challenge these findings. Thus, we affirm the ruling that the “active efforts” were provided to father, but that those efforts were unsuccessful.
V
Father challenges what he alleges was the district court’s refusal to treat him as a party to the proceeding to terminate mother’s parental rights and its “failure” to immediately appoint counsel for him in that proceeding. He argues that, as the child’s parent, he had “rights” to participate in the proceeding to terminate mother’s parental rights by testifying, offering evidence, examining witnesses, and insisting that members of his family be considered as placement alternatives. Although it is clear that father is correct to the extent he asserts that he was a party to mother’s termination proceeding, Minn. R. Juv. Protect. P. 21.01, subd. 3(a), the district court’s findings in its posttrial order show that the factual assumptions on which father bases the rest of his arguments are incorrect. The district court did appoint counsel for father, and the
Alleging that the motion to bifurcate mother’s proceeding from father’s proceeding was made without notice to father and before father had counsel, father argues that the bifurcation improperly precluded him from active participation in mother’s trial. This argument assumes that father’s nonparticipation was for reasons other than his own refusal to participate in the proceeding. Because father initially chose to avoid participating in the proceedings, the district court did not abuse its discretion by bifurcating mother’s proceeding from father’s proceeding and allowing mother’s proceeding to proceed in a timely fashion.
See Steinbrecher v. McLeod Coop. Power Ass’n,
VI
Under ICWA, notice of termination proceedings must be by registered mail or another method listed in the statute. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (2000). Here, the district court found that father’s tribe received “appropriate notices of these proceedings.” Father assumes that this finding is based on exhibits 54 and 55, and argues that the district court should not have admitted these exhibits. But regardless of whether those exhibits should have been admitted, the district court file contains an October 10, 2001 “ICWA NOTICE FOR TRANSFER OF LEGAL CUSTODY/TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTSU” and an April 21, 2003 “ICWA NOTICE FOR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTSU” Attached to each notice is an affidavit showing service of the notice by registered mail on father’s tribe. Thus, at the time of trial, the record showed that father’s tribe had been served.
Father argues that the April 2003 notice is defective because it was untimely for the hearing mentioned in that notice and because the hearing did not actually occur on the date listed in the notice. But because these questions are raised for the first time on appeal and father does not allege any prejudice as a result of the purportedly defective notice, we do not address these questions.
See Thiele v. Stick,
VII
Father challenges several additional evidentiary rulings. Evidentiary rulings are discretionary with the district court and require reversal only if the objecting party shows both that the ruling was an abuse of discretion and that it prejudiced the objecting party.
Uselman,
Father argues that exhibit 24, a 2001 document regarding his repayment of expenses associated with the child placement, should not have been admitted because it was not relevant to a termination of parental rights, was stale, and lacked foundation. But exhibit 24 was admitted to show the county’s efforts to notify father of the child’s out-of-home placement. Therefore, it was relevant to the notice issue.
Father also argues that exhibit 41, a 2003 recommendation that he receive alcohol treatment, should not have been admitted because it was incomplete and lacked foundation. Any error in admitting exhibit 41 is harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence supporting the district court’s findings, generally, and the evidence supporting the district court’s treatment of father’s alcohol-related problems, specifically.
Father argues that exhibit 42, a report by the child’s therapist that was not entirely favorable to father, should not have been admitted because it was cumulative, lacked adequate foundation, and was inconsistent with testimony from one of father’s witnesses. But erroneous admission of evidence that is cumulative of other admissible evidence is “harmless and will not warrant a new trial.”
W.G.O. ex rel. Guardian of A.W.O. v. Crandall,
Father challenges the admission of evidence of his extensive criminal history, arguing that it is more prejudicial than
VIII
Father argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motions for a continuance because he was allowed only a short period of time to complete his case plan.
See In re Welfare of J.A.S.,
DECISION
Because the child was enrolled in mother’s tribe during these proceedings, the district court correctly treated the child as a member of mother’s tribe. The district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling Andrea Keezer to be an expert witness for ICWA purposes, or in accepting her testimony. Father’s failure to timely participate in the proceedings and the unreasonable restrictions he put on his receipt of proffered services render defective his argument that the county failed to make the active efforts to avoid the breakup of the Indian family required by 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2000). For similar reasons, the district court did not deprive father of his right to participate in the trial regarding the termination of mother’s parental rights. Also, any errors in the district court’s evidentiary rulings are, on this record, harmless. And the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying father’s motions for continuances.
Affirmed.
Notes
Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const, art. VI, § 10.
. The Agreement is based on the United States Department of the Interior, BIA Guidelines, supra.
. Father notes that he was not privy to the deliberations of mother’s tribe designating Keezer as an expert and asserts that he was "surely entitled to inquire into her expertise.” As noted, above, however, Keezer's testimony qualifies her as an expert for purposes of this case. Moreover, we decline, at this time, to adopt an argument that assumes that a district court is better able than the tribe to identify who 'is an expert on tribal practices.
See Minnesota
v.
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians,
. A similar analysis applies to, and disposes of, father's argument that the district court should not have admitted the testimony of the child’s therapist because it was based on doc
. In his brief, Father argues that the district court erred when it "permitted Ms. Keezer to offer an expert opinion which met the adjudicatory requirements of § 1912(f) of the ICWA but without meeting the admissibility requirements of expert testimony under Minnesota law.” (Emphasis added.) The guardian ad litem, quoting father’s brief, argues, "Indeed [the father’s] brief concedes that Ms. Keezer’s expert opinion 'met the adjudicatory requirements of § 1912(f) of ICWA,’ " which appears to be a fair reading of father's position. In an apparent attempt to correct any misreading of his position, father states in his reply brief, "[Father] never conceded that witness Keezer qualified as an 'Indian expert witness.' In the cited passage of his brief, [father] described only the purpose for which Ms. Keezer’s testimony was offered.” (Italics in original.) Father's response challenges Keezer's ability to testify as an expert, which is consistent with his challenge to the admissibility of her testimony. It says nothing about the sufficiency of her testimony, once the court admitted it.
. While father's brief argued that the October 2001 notice regarding transfer of custody was