In the Matter of the WELFARE OF K.A.A., Child.
No. C7-86-1109
Supreme Court of Minnesota
Aug. 21, 1987
410 N.W.2d 836
KELLEY, Justice.
In reaching our conclusion, we are mindful of the important role the first amendment protection of the press plays in guaranteeing that citizens are informed about the events in their community. As Justice Powell stated in his dissent in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 94 S.Ct. 2811, 41 L.Ed.2d 514 (1974):
No individual can obtain for himself the information needed for the intelligent discharge of his political responsibilities. For most citizens the prospect of personal familiarity with newsworthy events is hopelessly unrealistic. In seeking out the news the press therefore acts as an agent of the public at large. It is the means by which the people receive that free flow of information and ideas essential to intelligent self-government.
Id. at 863, 94 S.Ct. at 2821. (Powell, J., dissenting). A community has a legitimate interest in the outcome of a felony trial, and our decision in no way affects the right to publish truthful information contained in public court records. See Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 43 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975). We cannot, however, extend that protection to the publication of the statements in this case which are admitted to be inaccurate. See Firestone, 424 U.S. at 455, 96 S.Ct. at 965. We hold that respondent Jacobson is a private individual, not a limited purpose public figure, for purposes of this defamation action, and is not required to show actual malice to establish a prima facie case.
Our holding does not imply that a criminal defendant may never become a limited purpose public figure. Although a criminal defendant does not automatically become a public figure, see Wolston, 443 U.S. 157, 99 S.Ct. 2701, 61 L.Ed.2d 450 (1979), it is possible that such a defendant by his actions may invite comment sufficient to categorize the defendant as a public figure. See 7 e.g. Marcone v. Penthouse Int‘l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir.1985) cert. denied, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 182, 88 L.Ed.2d 151 (1985); Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108 (6th Cir.1978) cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960, 99 S.Ct. 1502, 59 L.Ed.2d 773 (1979); Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978). In such a case, the actual malice standard would apply.
The trial court correctly determined that Jacobson is a private plaintiff and on remand should apply the negligence standard for recovery. See Jadwin, 367 N.W.2d at 491.
Certified question answered in the negative.
Remanded to trial court.
Steven M. Bradt, Grand Rapids, for respondent.
Jean Gerval, Minnesota Co. Atty‘s Ass‘n, Thomas L. Johnson, Hennepin Co. Atty., Vernon E. Bergstrom, Chief, Appellate Section, Beverly J. Wolfe, Asst. Hennepin Co. Atty., Minneapolis, for amicus curiae.
KELLEY, Justice.
May a juvenile alleged by the state to be delinquent, over the State‘s objection, waive the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in favor of a criminal prosecution as an adult in district court? The court of appeals, affirming the juvenile court below, held that a juvenile may make such a waiver.1 We disagree and reverse.
On April 1, 1986, a delinquency petition filed in Itasca County Juvenile Court alleged that respondent, then 17 years old, had been driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, had been driving an unregistered and uninsured motor vehicle and had fled from a police officer. Respondent had been judged delinquent on prior occasions in juvenile court, including an adjudication in the fall of 1985. In the disposition order in the fall of 1985, the juvenile court ordered respondent be placed in the custody of the Superintendent of the Minnesota Home School at Sauk Centre, Minnesota. However, the juvenile court stayed the execution of the order conditioned upon respondent maintaining his good behavior. The court then stated specifically that “in the event there be the slightest infraction of law or breach of good conduct, the court will lift that stay and transfer the juvenile to the Superintendent of the Minnesota Home School.”
Thus, when the instant petition was filed, it was apparent that should respondent again be adjudged delinquent, he faced almost certain detention at the Minnesota
Our state constitution vests in the legislature the power to create courts other than the constitutionally mandated supreme court and district court:
The judicial power of the state is vested in a supreme court, a court of appeals, if established by the legislature, a district court and such other courts, judicial officers and commissioners with jurisdiction inferior to the district court as the legislature may establish.
The two exceptions to this legislatively created exclusive jurisdiction occurred (1) if the juvenile is referred by the juvenile court to the district court for trial as an adult (
The accusations in the April 1986 petition involve more than “minor traffic offenses.” Therefore, the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over this matter unless the reference statute (
- A petition has been filed in accordance with the provisions of
Minn. Stat. § 260.131 ; - Notice of the reference motion has been given in accordance with the provisions of
Minn.Stat. §§ 260.135 and260.141 ; - A hearing has been held in accordance with the provisions of
Minn.Stat. § 260.155 within 30 days of the filing of the motion unless good cause is shown as to why the hearing should be held within the 30-day period; - The court finds that
- there is probable cause the juvenile committed the offense alleged by the delinquency petition and
- the prosecuting authority has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the child is not suitable for treatment or that the public safety is not served under the provisions of laws relating to the juvenile courts.
(emphasis supplied). See
Respondent argues that even if the trial court was wrong, and assuming the reference statute is applicable, it does not solely limit to the prosecutor the privilege of initiating the reference motion; the juvenile, respondent claims, may similarly bring the motion. Our analysis of the statute, as well as our examination of the rules enacted to implement the statute, leads us to reject that assertion. Admittedly,
Proceedings to refer a delinquency matter pursuant to
Minn.Stat. 260.125 may be initiated only upon motion of the county attorney after a delinquency petition has been filed, pursuant to Rule 19.
The present wording of
In support of allowing respondent to waive juvenile court jurisdiction so as to stand trial as an adult, both courts below relied on In re Welfare of I.Q.S., 309 Minn. 78, 244 N.W.2d 30 (1976). Particular reliance is placed on that part of the opinion reading:
Although the entire juvenile system involves the waiver of certain constitutional rights in favor of the protection, programs and special features afforded juveniles, any child not wishing to avail himself of this treatment could certainly demand his constitutional right to be, for example, tried by a jury.
309 Minn. at 85, 244 N.W.2d at 37. That language, standing alone, and not considered in context, tends to support that reliance. However, examined in the context within which the statement appeared, it seems clear the statement is inapplicable to situations, such as presented here, where it is the juvenile seeking the reference and not the State. The case in which the cited language appeared was one of nine separate consolidated appeals from orders of various juvenile courts referring juveniles to the district court for trial under the criminal law as adults. While all nine cases had some common issues, several cases additionally involved specific issues addressed individually within the parameters of the opinion. See 309 Minn. at 89-93, 244 N.W.2d at 39-41. The quotation in the text arose in the discussion of one of those specific issues. That specific issue arose when the trial court offered the juvenile an opportunity to participate in a diversionary rehabilitation program in return for an agreement by the juvenile to waive
The dissent raises an equal protection issue neither briefed nor argued by the parties in this court, nor was it ruled on by the court of appeals. However, assuming the issue is properly before us, we conclude any claim of deprivation of equal protection of the laws must be rejected. Initially, we observe that we have already rejected such a claim when the juvenile contended our statute was constitutionally flawed when it permitted the prosecutor to initiate the reference proceeding. See I.Q.S., 309 Minn. at 84, 86, 244 N.W.2d at 36-37. Secondly, because respondent is not set apart for different treatment on the basis of race, alienage, or membership of a distinct minority he is not a member of a suspect class, nor does the processing of respondent‘s case in the juvenile system deprive him of a fundamental right. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971).9 Therefore, whether our juvenile court statute passes constitutional muster when challenged on equal protection grounds depends on the existence or lack of existence of a rational basis supporting the legislative decision to handle juveniles involved in the criminal justice system differently than adults.
The legislature itself has articulated a rational basis for treating juveniles differently than adults.10 The Juvenile Court Act implemented a system of addressing adolescent problems in a fair and just manner to promote the personal and social growth of juveniles. Nevertheless, in enacting the Juvenile Court Act, the legislature clearly indicated that it was cognizant of the fact that in both the federal and state criminal justice systems prosecutors have had broad discretion in all aspects of the charging process and the enforcement of the laws. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 1531, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985) (and cases cited therein); State v. Herme, 298 N.W.2d 454, 455 (Minn.1980). To that end, in certain limited instances and with certain procedural proscriptions, the prosecutor was given the option of initiating reference proceedings. Absent the existence of precedent conditions, the legislature mandated the charges against a juvenile should otherwise by handled in juvenile court. We find no denial of equal protection.
Finally, the court of appeals erroneously relied upon Minn.R.Juv.Ct. 15.03, the rule affirming the juvenile‘s privilege to waive constitutional rights, as support for affirming the lower court.11
Unless and until the legislature amends the reference statute, the only method by which a juvenile alleged to be delinquent may be tried on a criminal complaint as an adult in district court, is by a proceeding initiated by the State in which the court finds the State has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the juvenile is not suitable for treatment or that the public safety is not served by the juvenile court laws.
SCOTT, Justice (dissenting).
This case clearly presents an equal protection problem. A juvenile—who is not suitable for treatment within the juvenile justice system—should not be denied the right to a jury trial in the criminal system by the prosecutor‘s refusal to make a reference motion. The contrary would seem more logical and constitutional. I therefore respectfully dissent.
A novel situation arises in this case in which the juvenile is requesting to be tried as an adult and the prosecutor is resisting reference for criminal prosecution. The far more common case reverses these positions. See, e.g., In re Welfare of I.Q.S., 309 Minn. 78, 244 N.W.2d 30 (1976). Because of the novelty of this role reversal, this situation does not fit comfortably within either
As the majority notes,
The United States Supreme Court has observed that “neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.” In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1436, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 1986, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971), the Court held that due process does not require a jury trial in the juvenile court‘s adjudicative stage. Here, however, there is more involved than a request for a jury trial in juvenile court—this person is requesting a jury trial with the attendant rights guaranteed all citizens.
The most persuasive argument for the more limited constitutional protections available to a juvenile within the juvenile system is that these rights are surrendered in return for other benefits. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 21, 87 S.Ct. at 1440 (“It is claimed that juveniles obtain benefits from the special procedures applicable to them which more than offset the disadvantages of denial of the substance of normal due process.“). The most substantial of these benefits is that the child is to be treated or rehabilitated rather than punished. Cf. id. 387 U.S. at 16, 87 S.Ct. at 1437.
K.A.A., however, has been found by the trial court to be not suitable for treatment within the juvenile system. This juvenile would be denied constitutional protections without receiving the benefits of the juvenile system if the juvenile court were to retain jurisdiction. The prosecutor‘s refusal to refer for adult prosecution a juvenile who is not suitable for treatment creates two classes of juveniles. Neither class is suitable for treatment and neither receives the benefits of treatment, but one of these classes receives the full constitutional protections available to criminal defendants. Commentators have noted that under the principles stated in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966), this result may be unconstitutional as denying equal protection of the laws. See Unif.Juv.Ct. Act § 34, 9A U.L.A. 51 (1968) (renamed Model Juv.Ct. Act 1985).
I too believe that the prosecutor‘s authority to deny a juvenile full constitutional protections even when the juvenile is not suitable for treatment and is willing to waive any other benefits available in the juvenile system denies that juvenile equal protection of the laws. I, therefore, dissent.
Ronald KAUTZ, Relator, v. SETTERLIN COMPANY and CIGNA Insurance Company, Respondents.
No. C7-87-598.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Aug. 28, 1987.
Notes
Except as provided in sections 260.125 [juveniles referred to district court] and 260.193 [minor traffic matters], the juvenile court has original and exclusive jurisdiction concerning any child who is alleged to be delinquent, a juvenile traffic offender * * * and in proceedings concerning any minor alleged to have been a delinquent * * * or a juvenile traffic offender prior to having become 18 years of age. The juvenile court shall deal with such a minor as it deals with any other child who alleged to be delinquent or a juvenile traffic offender.
A “minor traffic offense” is defined as being a “violation of a state or local traffic law, ordinance or regulation, or a federal, state, or local water traffic law constituting an offense punishable only by fine of not more than $100.
The provisions of this new section [Minn.Stat. § 260.111], together with the provisions of § 260.215 are intended to overcome the state constitutional provision giving the district court “original jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases” * * * by defining violations of law by those under 18 as delinquency, unless the juvenile court refers the violation to a prosecuting authority for criminal proceedings.
The purpose of the laws relating to children alleged or adjudicated to be delinquent is to promote the public safety and reduce juvenile delinquency by maintaining the integrity of the substantive law prohibiting certain behavior and by developing individual responsibility for lawful behavior. This purpose should be pursued through means that are fair and just, that recognize the unique characteristics and needs of children, and that give children access to opportunities for personal and social growth.
Rule 15.01 Applicability