72 N.Y. 527 | NY | 1878
This is a proceeding to condemn land by the bridge company, to be used as a public street, in lieu of Frankfort street, which had, to a certain extent, been
The width between Pearl and Cliff street determines the extent of the second or triangular piece, as the southerly line of the former is to be continued in a straight line, until it intersects Frankfort street. It seems that Frankfort street was only thirty-five feet wide, and the defendant claims that the new street can be no wider, and that the words “ of the same width as Frankfort street ” are controlling; while the petitioners insist that the words “ and not less than fifty-two feet and six inches in width ” are controlling, and that the new street must be of that width, although Frankfort street had less width. The rules for the construction of statutes are substantially the same as for the construction of contracts and other written instruments. The intention is to be deduced from a view of the whole statute, and that intention when ascertained will always prevail over the literal sense of the terms. (1 Kent Com., 462.) Statutes should be read according to the natural and most obvious import of the language, without resorting to artificial or forced constructions,
I am unable to concur with the learned judge who delivered the opinion of the court below, in the construction of this statute, that the words “of the same width as Frankfort street ” are controlling, and that the act confers no authority to take land beyond that width. The most, certain, and if not the only certain, description in the act is the requirement that the street Shall not be less than fifty-two feet and six inches wide, and yet the construction claimed would reject these words and expunge them from the statute. The measurement was fixed by the Legislature with mathematical precision, to the fraction of a? foot, in unambiguous language, as to which there is no room for construction. I am not aware of any principle which will justify a court in rejecting such a material portion of a statute, and thus thwarting the plain and manifest intent of the Legislature. If either description must be rejected, that which is uncertain must yield to that which is certain.
The actual width of Franklin street may have been involved in doubt for many reasons. The act assumes that it is uncertain or unknown to the Legislature. The new street must be fifty-two feet and six inches wide, and wider, if Frankfort street is wider. From this it is plainly inferable that the Legislature was ignorant of the precise width of that street, and that they fixed the minimum width of the new street for that reason; and yet it is proposed to strike out what is unmistakably expressed and perfectly certain, for that which, from its nature, is uncertain, and which the Legislature treated as uncertain and unknown.
The witness called to prove the width of Frankfort street speaks of it as “about thirty-five feet.” Besides the clause requiring the new street to be fifty-two and a half feet is in the nature of a proviso, which always prevails over
It is urged that thirty-five feet was sufficient for the new street, and that it must be presumed that the Legislature intended to provide for a street of the same width only of the old street. We are not justified in speculating about the necessity of a street wider than thirty-five feet, but we know that that width makes a very narrow street, and one scarcely sufficient for public use, and it may well be that the Legislature in making a new street deemed it proper to require one more commodious and more in conformity with those of modem structure, and we cannot say that a street somewhat wider than the old one was not absolutely needed in the uexv location under the massive walls of the approaches to the bridge, and at all events vague and doubtful presumptions must yield to positive expressions. It is claimed that other portions of the description support the construction contended for by the defendant. The act calls for land in a
Stress is laid upon the title of the act, which describes the change of site of Frankfort street to be between Pearl and Jacob streets. The line described in the act crosses Jacob street, and cuts off a small corner of the next block, probably (judging from the map), about three feet at the base, and running out to Frankfort street at about fourteen feet. There is nothing in the act itself limiting the change to Jacob street, and the title is no part of the act, and has no controlling effect upon its provisions. It may, in some doubtful cases, be referred to as a circumstance in determining the intention of the Legislature, but never can be to change or impair the provisions of an act. (1 Kent’s Com., 460-461.) But the title, if given full effect, does not aid the defendant’s construction. That provides for a change of site between Pearl and Jacob streets; while the line claimed by him would not produce that result by nearly half a block. Another description is, that -the continued line must intersect Frankfort street “near” Jacob street. This would be true, if the petitioner’s construction is adopted; it would be about fourteen feet from Jacob street, but not true upon the other construction, as it would be, as before stated, nearly half a block from Jacob street. These circumstances' are not decisive either way, but they tend to con
A further point was suggested that as the title of the act described the change of site of Frankfort street, as stopping at Jacob street, the provisions of the act extending the line a few feet west of Jacob street constituted another subject not embraced in the title, and rendered the act unconstitutional. This point is not tenable. It is sufficient if the title expresses substantially the subject. It is not necessary that the most perfect expression should be adopted. The object of the requirement of the Constitution is that legislators and the public may be informed by the title of the general nature of provisions proposed to be enacted, and to prevent deception. The purpose of this act is fairly expressed in the title, which was to authorize the bridge company to take land for changing the site of Frankfort street between the specified streets, and the circumstance that the line adopted extends a few feet beyond one of the streets docs not make a new subject within the most technical view which has ever been taken of this somewhat ambiguous clause of the Constitution. The learned counsel for the defendant intimated on the argument that there were private interests to be subserved by the provisions of this act. We can only say in answer to this suggestion that we have no means of determining1 whether this is so or not, and if we had, we have no power of relieving against it. We must take the statute as we find it, and construe it according to established-rules. It was also urged that the construction indicated by the foregoing views would give the bridge company authority to take an unlimited quantity of land, and that they might.make the street one hundred or more fcct wide. The answer to this in the first place is, that the . question is not before us of the power of the company to take beyond fifty-two and a half feet; but if it was the views before expressed, as to the construction of the act, would prevent an appropriation beyond that limit unless Frankfort street was wider.
All concur for reversal except Folgeb, J., dissenting.
Order of General Term reversed, and that of Special Term affirmed.