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In Re the Termination of the Franchise Agreement Between Groseth International, Inc.
442 N.W.2d 229
S.D.
1989
Check Treatment

*1 229 Termination of the Matter of the In the Agreement Between GRO

Franchise INTERNATIONAL, INC., In SETH Johnson, Brady, Miner of Reade & Celia Harvester. ternational Intern., Yankton, appellant, 15944, 15962.

Nos. Inc. Adam, May, B. Anderson of Robert Dakota. Supreme Court of South Pierre, appellee, Thompson, & Gerdes on Briefs March Considered Intern. Harvester. Decided June WUEST, Chief Justice. International, (Groseth), Inc. corporation, appeals Dakota a circuit

South granting petition court order of Inter- (IH) sought the national Harvester agreement termination of a franchise be- cir- tween it and Groseth. We affirm the cuit court’s decision. a franchised

Until Groseth was equipment dealer of IH farm located Yankton, In South Dakota. addition handling equipment, line of farm seth was also a franchised dealer of separate agreement. This trucks under a Agreement” “Dealer was en- Sales/Service parties tered October 1984, Tenneco, (Tenneco) Inc. and its (Case), subsidiary, Company nego J.I. Case purchase equipment of IH’s farm tiated division. IH became Navistar Internation and mar al and continued to manufacture heavy-duty ket medium- and trucks. Be was located in a “conflict and IH dealer area” which both Case existed, ships equipment its farm brought was terminated. Groseth then Case, against claiming suit Tenneco and losing damages associated with the fran Intern., chise. Tenne See Groseth Inc. v. co, Inc., N.W.2d Gro Inc., Intern., Tenneco, seth v. Inc. (S.D.1987). legal N.W.2d 159 issues previous related raised action are not to this from IH’s

This stems agreement its truck franchise terminate sought with Groseth. termination of agreement because Groseth with IH’s refused computerized for a communication referred to as the “Dealer Communication *2 Regulation, Divi- ment and (DCN). designed, was of Commerce The DCN Network” Patrol, Dealer processing Highway of Office of manual sion of part, to eliminate 23, January more provide (Department) and economi- Licensing to information Department, of communication application cal and efficient methods the 1986. In its to IH and its dealers between hearing between to determine requested IH a Implementation of dealers themselves. the ter- could be whether Groseth’s franchise request the partially at the DCN arose provisions of SDCL ch. under the minated DCN, As a the IH franchisees.' hearing on March a was held 32-6A.1 Such com- required was to obtain a each dealer 11, held on hearing A was second terminal, the display screen and puter a recording appa- 8, 1986, July because the computer hard- necessary The software. the at the first ratus used to make record through compa- purchased could be ware Representing hearing failed. Groseth designated by through any other ny IH or Gro- hearing Clifford and Carol this were offering equipment private vendor They appeared the assist- seth. without compatible the DCN. was with legal counsel. ance of 1983, 19, IH to its September sent On hearing, 727 of At of the second the time dealers, including Groseth, a memorandum complied IH’s had with the 734 dealers requirements the described the for requirements. DCN Of the seven dealers expected sign a All to DCN. dealers were complied, new deal- who three were had ready agreement partic- DCN taking meeting steps ers were toward who system in the six months of a ipate within requirements the and three were dealers representative of meeting.” “roll out A bankruptcy proceed- who were involved meeting attended Groseth such Sioux course, dealer, ings. seventh was The Falls, South Dakota on October record shows Groseth. The further that Although initially signed agree- an Groseth function of which the DCN was part of the it ment to become a capable hearing time of was result, subsequently failed to do so. As a parts ordering. This also could have task 17, 1985, May its IH notified Groseth on accomplished by telephonic or written been to terminate Groseth’s franchise. orders. The other services for as its IH cited reason designed, ordering, DCN such as truck was inability franchise Groseth’s to communi- submissions, com- warranty customer electronically IH due to cate with Groseth’s plaints general communication between failing procure necessary computer among IH the dealers as well as IH contended hardware software. themselves, in the devel- dealers were still so that Groseth’s failure to do breached opmental stages. developmental pro- This provisions agree- certain expected cess an additional was take comply ment. Groseth had refused to fifteen months. ex- because pense of the its because of Department determined that Groseth litigation pending Tenneco and Case had not breached Dealer Sales/Service regarding equipment the farm franchise. Agreement. Depart- Consequently, petition seeking ment IH’s dismissed initially IH notified that it would franchise, concluding terminate Groseth’s termination of the truck franchise if seek that IH failed to show ter- did not re- DCN appealed mination. quirements 1985. This dead- October Thereafter, decision later to March court. line was extended ap- a motion application proceed with ter- Groseth filed to dismiss Written peal, claiming mination of Groseth’s truck franchise was circuit court lacked by IH to Depart- jurisdiction made the South Dakota in the matter. Groseth con- regulat- Legislature statutory provisions 1. We note that the South Dakota ch. § 63. shortly repealed ing ch. 32-6A after dealers are vehicle now contained Department, plied to the termination of ch. 32-6B. truck franchise. See 1986 S.D.Laws acquired Although certified mail. tended that the circuit court never istered or received within jurisdiction actually statutorily pre- to hear IH’s because period appeal upon appeal, of the notice of scribed time IH’s notice of it *3 argues The circuit court de- nonetheless seth was defective. that notice was served improperly motion to It also because ordinary, nied Groseth’s dismiss. it arrived via decision, hold- first mail.2 reversed the class Groseth, ing by refusing a that to become upon princi- The statute which Groseth substantially failed to relies, 1-26-31, pally SDCL reads as fol- comply requirements imposed by lows: court agreement. The circuit appeal by serving An shall be taken a requirements further held that appeal of upon party notice adverse the It were con- both essential reasonable. upon agency the which rendered the cluded that failure to decision, same, by filing the or a requirements with an in- these constituted copy, proof certified of such service dependent upon good basis which cause in office of the the clerk of courts of the termination had been shown. in county which the of appeal venue the appeals Groseth now the circuit court’s set, thirty within days agency is after decision to It this court. contends that or, notice of served the final decision if a refusing circuit court erred in dismiss to rehearing is authorized law and is appeal jurisdiction. lack of requested, thirty days within after notice seth also claims that the circuit court erred served has been of the decision thereon. in holding that IH had shown required by may Service this section be IH, terminate Groseth’s truck franchise. performed by registered or certified mail having complied with the notice review of complete and is when the material to be requirements contained in 15-26A- SDCL deposited is served United of portion asks this court review that postal States service. the circuit court’s decision that which held only that We note the last sentence of this anticipatory waived the issue of breach pertains serving statute a notice of agreement. of the franchise peal. operative in said verb sentence disagree “may performed.” Ordinarily, We with Groseth’s conten is refusing “may” tion that court in given permis- erred in word a statute is discretionary meaning. to dismiss IH’s asserts sive or It is not appeal that notice in obligatory mandatory of this matter was or is the as word improperly Peterson, It served. claims that the re “shall.”3 See Person v. 296 quirements regard Linn, of 1-26-31 N.W.2d 537 Tubbs v. 75 serving appeal (1955); of a notice of are 70 N.W.2d 2A satisfied S.D. Suther- personal by reg- (4th service or Const. 643-44 service land Stat. 57.03 at ed. § by legal represented statutory meaning language, 2. Because Groseth was not of we look to the hearing, context, words, matter, counsel at the appeal IH sent subject the notice effects and con appearing person to the on Groseth’s sequences spirit purpose as well as the behalf, namely, Clifford Groseth. Tubbs, See at the statute. 75 S.D. 70 N.W. legislative 2d We believe at 375. that the instances, 3. We note certain word that in nearly present in case is as clear as "may” has the of "must.” ex rel. effect See State 1-26-31, language legisla of SDCL itself. O’Neill, South Dakota Game & Fish Comm’n v. of the word “shall” in the statute’s first ture’s use (1934). Although 62 S.D. 254 N.W. 265 regard appeal filing sentence notice of statute, i.e., form says done, in a it of verb used whether "may” use of the word in the last and the sen "may,” something "shall” or "must” be regard said tence in to service of notice of single important is the most con textual change appeal indicate us that the verbs determining sideration mandatory whether a statute is Furthermore, purpose directory, was intentional. or it is not the deter sole 1-26-31, considerations, i.e., jurisdiction legisla conferring minant. Other such as over intent, meaning by serving tive parties, accomplished can overcome can be ordinarily such verbs connote. 2A Sutherland appeal in a differs from notice of manner which 1984). (4th § Stat. Const. 57.03 our search to 643-44 ed. specified in the that statute. legislature's ascertain intended circumstances, Statutes, existing consideration Sutton, Use “Shall” 1984); (1938), reprint- limited to: L.Q. including, but not 4 MARSHALL J. (4th Const. 691 1A Stat ed in Sutherland (1) franchisee sub- Failure 1985). language of SDCL The clear require- ed. stantially comply with those ser- proper that indicates 1-26-31 therefore upon him the fran- imposed ments appeal from an adminis- of a notice vice chise, both es- are limited to proceeding trative sential reasonable. mail. We believe certified by registered or (2) by the franchisee of bad faith Use also such notices service of the fran- carrying out the terms of *4 same manner in the may accomplished chise. complaint, as well and by which summons IH, notifying in letter Groseth its served, i.e., person- pleadings, are other as termination of Groseth’s to seek by ordinary, class first or al service franchise, breaching accused Groseth of 15-6-5(b). Accordingly, mail. See “9, 16(a)(l)(iv), 16(b)(4), 16(b)(5), paragraphs not lack circuit court did hold that the we 18, 16(c)(9), 16(c)(2), 16(c)(5), 16(c)(7), and and that said jurisdiction in this matter The agreement. De- 25” of the franchise refusing in to dismiss did err court not no of the fran- partment found that breach agreement had occurred. We note chise appeal, Gro- In issue its second capabilities related to that the DCN which sup not the record does seth claims that 9, 16(a)(l)(iv), in provisions paragraphs port court’s determination 16(c)(9), 16(b)(4), 16(c)(2), 16(c)(5), 16(c)(7), agreement was breached developmental in the 25 were still ter good cause to or that had stages hearing. time There- We, like Gro- franchise. minate Groseth’s fore, as determination question of seth, as a mixed this issue view was not erroneous. these sections arose Because this matter law and facts. decision, apply We, however, agency we the stan do not reach same an from clearly regard 16(b)(5) out paragraph which was set in dard of review conclusion Labor, Dept. v. this court in Permann agreement. This section of the franchise D., (S.D. Unemp. Ins. N.W.2d cooperate required Groseth “[t]o Permann, mixed 1987). In held that a we goods Company by placing orders for in the question of and facts treated law pro ordering accordance with advance question of Such manner as law. same grams Company.” Al announced may questions type of the which we are though specifically the DCN was not men Id. freely 119. review. agreement,, we tioned in the be refusing utilize lieve that Groseth’s fran- to terminate a A franchisor the one function of it was for provisions of ch. chise under the ordering, capable, namely, parts con then good cause show that it has 32-6A must only a of the franchise stituted not breach SDCL 32-6A-5. termination.4 good for termi agreement but also cause guidance as to what consti- only statutory nating franchise. The record shows good is found SDCL 32-6A- its tutes cause hearing, provides: that at the time of the required computer possess did not still determining good cause has In whether hardware and software would enable not or been established parts franchise, department it to order via DCN. Futher- continuing a more, steps meeting regulation shall into it had taken no toward take commerce 32-6A-5, community could also mined that the Yankton Under SDCL the franchisor ..., "upon another support show that termination if must a new IH truck franchise Groseth’s same become in the line-make will franchise effective did not franchise was terminated. Groseth community, dimi- the same without finding peal court. this to the circuit Conse- formerly of the motor vehicle service nution only remaining quently, before issue this community provided, sonably expected be rea- or that cannot court is whether IH had termi- dealership.” support such a nate Groseth’s franchise. fact, Department, findings in its deter- requirements. Our review of the indicates that even record In the Matter of the DEPENDENCY AND capabilities its limited at the time of the A.L., M.L., M.L., NEGLECT OF hearing, was an essential and reasonable Concerning V.L., G.L. and Parents. upon requirement impose Groseth and No. 16444. Implementation the other dealers. necessary step was viewed as a DCN Supreme Court South Dakota. reorganize compete effort to IH it could so marketplace in the remain a viable Argued April business. The use of the DCN IH deal- Decided June payroll allowed IH its ers to trim of em- who ployees previously had been needed to

manually process orders conduct busi- addition,

ness dealers. who

was dealer refused to

participate in the DCN. Unrefuted testi-

mony hearing indicated that its re-

fusing presented hardship to do so to IH. light foregoing, we hold that IH

established cause for truck franchise and affirm the

decision of the circuit court. We deem the which IH

issue raises notice of review to

be moot need not address it.

MORGAN, HENDERSON, and,

MILLER, JJ., concur.

SABERS, J., concurs in specially part.

concurs

SABERS, (concurring Justice in part and

concurring specially part). concur specially

I on the notice issue timely

because Groseth received notice of prejudiced was not harmed or

any manner the fact that it arrived

“ordinary, first class mail.” Matter of

A.L., 442 N.W.2d 233 Matter

of B.J.E., (S.D.1988). 422 N.W.2d 597 It is proper statutory matter interpreta legislative

tion construction of intent in See writing 1-26-31. in Jensen my

Ranch, Marsden, Inc. v. 440 N.W.2d (S.D.1989). However, dicta

majority opinion implies that a sum complaint properly

mons is served

“ordinary, first class mail” under SDCL

15-6-5(b) Jensen clearly incorrect.

Ranch, supra.

Case Details

Case Name: In Re the Termination of the Franchise Agreement Between Groseth International, Inc.
Court Name: South Dakota Supreme Court
Date Published: Jun 14, 1989
Citation: 442 N.W.2d 229
Docket Number: 15944, 15962
Court Abbreviation: S.D.
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