*1
In the REQUEST MEDIA OF TAX REFUND INC., ONE, No. 51-0180701-ST. License 19401, 19411.
Nos. Supreme Court of South Dakota. 4, 1996. on Briefs Dec. Considered 19, 1997. Decided Feb. Rehearing March Denied *2 Department
[¶ 3]
reversed the ALJ’s
opinion
findings
and substituted its own
fact and
Department
conclusions of law. The
exempt
concluded that the
tax
advertis-
ing
performed
prepar-
services are those
ing
placing
advertisements in the adver-
media,
tising
advertising agency
and that an
required
pay
sales tax on those transac-
prepares
tions where it
an advertisement but
place
does not
it in
media.
appealed
[¶ 4] Media One
to the circuit
court,
Department.
which reversed the
Cir-
Judge
cuit Court
Kean held
an advertis-
ing agency “places” an
advertisement
media,
exemption pur-
for tax
poses, no matter what medium the advertise-
ment is
in or on. The court listed
examples of
media that
en-
Magee, Special
Attorney
Jack C.
Assistant
General, Pierre,
compassed
billboards, containers,
appellant
signs,
for
as
South Dakota
Department of Revenue.
papers,
imposed
and television. The court
constructive trust for the return to Media
Christopherson,
A.
James
Hertz of
Baffin
One’s customers of the sales tax. The court
Anderson,
Falls,
appellee
&
Sioux
Media
granted attorney
One,
fees to Media
but
One, Inc.
trust,
against
ordered them taxed
rather
SABERS, Justice.
directly against
Department.
than
This
appeal followed.
appeals
[¶ 1] The
of Revenue
a circuit court decision which reversed an
[¶ 5]
WHETHER DEPARTMENT
taxpay-
administrative determination that the
TIMELY FILED ITS APPEAL
er was not entitled to a sales tax refund. We
agree
with the
that the
tax
[¶ 6] Media One claims that the De
does
partment’s appeal
untimely.
SDCL 15-
include the
sale
certain
provides,
26A-6
in relevant
property by
advertising agency. By
no-
appeal
judgment
An
must be
review, taxpayer challenges
tice of
the timeli-
sixty days
taken within
judgment
after the
Department’s
ness of
appeal
appro-
and the
attested,
signed,
filed and written
shall be
priate standard of review.
entry
notice of
thereof shall have been
given
party.
to the adverse
FACTS
argues
Media One
One,
2] November
Media
Inc.
sixty day
period
time
commenced on
(Media One),
advertising agency
in Sioux
September
1995, upon
filing
Judge
Falls, sought a refund of
charged
sales tax it
stating
reversal,
Kean’s letter
his reasons for
its clients and remitted to
Department.
accompanied by
judgment
findings
his
hearing,
After a
judge
administrative law
fact and conclusions of law.
It asserts that
(ALJ) found in Media One’s favor that the
these documents constituted “written
notice
ultimately
it
delivers to its client is
entry”
exempt
purposes
“advertising
SDCL 15-26A-6.
services” even
According
argument,
when Media
place
sixty days
One does not
it in
media.
elapsed
1995,1
on November
and there-
him,
three-day
1. This includes a
paper upon
allowance for mail-
notice or other
or whenever
15-6-6(e):
ing. See SDCL
required
pre-
such service is
to be made a
event,
party
right
period
specified
required
Whenever a
has the
scribed
before a
or is
and the
mail,
proceedings
paper
to do some act
days
or take some
with-
notice or
is served
three
prescribed period
in a
prescribed period.
after the service of a
shall be added to the
ap-
2. STANDARD OF REVIEW
fore,
filing
[¶ 8]
of its notice of
Department’s
too late.
1995 was
peal on November
reviewing
Our role
adminis
[¶ 9]
appeals is
trative
well-settled:
argument
One’s
is with
agency’s findings
We will overrule an
merit;
did not con
Judge Kean’s letter
out
*3
clearly
fact
when
erroneous.
entry”
signed,
notice of
stitute “written
question
The
is not whether there is sub-
attested,
judgment.
Initially, we
filed
contrary
agency
stantial evidence
letter,
judgment, and the
note that
finding, but
there is substantial
whether
of law
findings of fact and conclusions
were
agency finding. In
support
evidence to
15,1995. Although
September
until
not filed
words,
other
if
is evidence in
even
there
Department of
notice to the
it constituted
to contradict the
the record which tends
disposition of the
“notwithstand
court’s
determination,
Department’s
factual
so
party
by mail to the
ing actual notice
adverse
long as there is some “substantial evi-
judgment,
final
‘without a
of the trial court’s
supports
dence” in the record which
entry,
sixty days do not
written notice of
determination,
Department’s
this court will
”
Porter,
Porter v.
1996
commence to run.’
weight
given
affirm. Great
to the find-
¶6, 22,
448,
(quoting
542 N.W.2d
SD
ings made and inferences drawn
Inc.,
Beverages,
Kallstrom v. Marshall
agency
questions
on
of fact. Conclusions
(S.D.1986)).
In Kallstrom we
N.W.2d 647
given
fully
of law are
no deference and are
stated:
reviewable.
Co.,
Tire
Hendrix
Graham
N.W.2d
entry
judgment gives
of
to a
A notice of
(S.D.1994) (citations
876,
and internal
878-79
power
running
the time
;party the
set
omitted).
quotations
We review the adminis-
adversary may
appeal
which his
after
any pre-
agency’s
trative
decision without
statutory
party that the
and assures each
sumption that the circuit court’s decision was
may appeal
period
within which he
of time
County,
Clay
534 N.W.2d
correct. Nilson
to run until his adver-
does not commence
(S.D.1995).
598, 600
sary
given
notice.
has
such
question
imposes
The
of whether
statute
added) (citation
(emphasis
judgment.
Judge Kean’s
did not
exempting property
taxing body. Statutes
entry
judgment,
of
strictly
contain a written notice of
taxation
be
construed
should
party
taxing power.
and he was not a
to this case.2
The words in
favor of the
reasonable,
29,
given a
days
September
such statutes should be
sixty
commenced on
natural,
practical meaning to effectu-
1995,
day
after3 Media One served
purpose
exemption.
of the
ate the
entry
by mail
of
written notice
attested,
signed,
judgment.
and filed
of the
Cty.
Corp. v. Aurora
Bd.
National Food
of
Therefore,
timely
(S.D.1995)
Department could
Comm’rs,
564,
have
30, 1995.
Plastics,
appeal
Depart-
filed an
as late as November
(citing Thermoset
136,
appeal
of
on November
138-39
It filed its notice
473 N.W.2d
of
(S.D.1991));
He Crow v.
statutory
see also Estate
timeframe.
within the
thoughts
objections,
on what
assuming
correspondence
he can focus his
2. Even
entry
judg-
original).
actually adopted.
court could constitute notice
ment, Judge
open
possibility
Kean’s letter left
n
judgment was not final:
that his
15-6-6(a),
provides,
in relevant
3. See
findings and
Media One’s most recent set of
and,
signed by
were
the Court
conclusions
along
prescribed
computing any period
time
proposed judgment
signed,
court,
chapter, by order of
allowed
September
filed with the Clerk on
statute,
act,
day
by any applicable
many
have been so
different sets
Because there
event,
designated
from which the
or default
around, I am with Mr. Ma-
of documents sent
gee’s
period
begins
be in-
time
to run shall not
photocopy
sending
I
letters
him a
of what
so,
any
actually signed
cluded.
if he had
additional
Jensen,
(S.D.1992)
secretary
promulgate
revenue
(“[W]e construe administrative rules accord-
pursuant
chapter
rules
concerning:
1-26
ing to their intent as determined from the
relating
rule as a whole and other rules
(3) Determining
application
of the tax
subject.”).
the same
exemptions^]
[¶ 10] The
claims that
agency
“Rule” is defined as “each
statement
interpretation
court should defer to its
general applicability
implements,
in-
statutes, relying upon
In re
Tax
Sales
law,
terprets,
prescribes
policy,
procedure,
Cheese,
Queen
Valley
Liab.
practice
requirements
any agency.”
(S.D.1986),
where we stated: “[T]he
1-26-1(8).
Depart-
This means the
interpretation given
construction and
a stat
*4
ment is authorized to
applica-
“determine the
by
body charged
ute
an administrative
rules,
tion” of the
statute in its
great
administration is entitled to
which it has done. The
courts
this state
(Citation omitted).
weight.”
By notice of
agency
enforce
properly
rules once
review, Media One contends
Depart
the
adopted by
Legislature.
the
SDCL 1-26-6.8.
statutory
ment’s
construction is entitled to
Department
The current
of Revenue rules
expressly
by
deference
when
authorized
adopted
were
in 1987. SDCL 1-26A-1.10.
support
position,
statute.
of its
“Administrative rules have
points
the force of law
Merchandising
to Modern
v. De
partment
presumed
Dorhout,
and are
valid.” State
N.W.2d
(S.D.1986),
(S.D.1994) (citations
where we stated:
513 N.W.2d
omitted);
Mortenson,
Duffy
gives
This court
no
accord
deference to a
lower
(S.D.1993).
legal
court’s
conclusion.
It
Although
is true some
we
“great weight”
cases
agency’s
accord
to an
give great weight
Department’s rules,
to the
statutory interpretation. However,
give
we
no deference to its conclusions of law
applies only
agency
rule
when the
is ex-
in
Depart-
contested cases. Whether
the
pressly
authorized
statute to make such
correctly applied
presents
its rules
interpretation.
Secretary
of Reve-
law;
question of
when resolution
dispute
given
nue has been
power
no such
under
presents
question
of law we accord no
applicable
the
in
statutes
this case. Com- deference to the
conclusions reached
the
pare
re Tax
[In
Liab. Webber Furni-
Department or the circuit court. Sioux
ture,
(S.D.1980) (involv-
brief SD FELTROP, Appellant, Beverly OF DAKOTA DEPARTMENT SOUTH SERVICES, Appellee. SOCIAL
No. 19669. Dakota. Supreme of South Court Briefs 1997. on Jan. Considered Feb. Decided Schweiger, City, for Rapid appel-
Todd A. lant. Barnett, General, Attorney
Mark Joan W. General, Pierre, Baker, Attorney P. Assistant appellee. SABERS, Justice. Recipient 1] Aid to Families with (AFDC)
Dependent and Medicaid Children ineligible ruled for one month benefits was household’s resources exceeded because her Departs maximum limit. resource ment of Services and the circuit court Social savings granddaughter’s that a account held injury a a re- settlement was pur- household for source available eligibility. poses of AFDC and Medicaid We affirm.
FACTS (Feltrop) Beverly Feltrop received
[If two AFDC Medicaid benefits over eligibili- For years dispute arose. before this her, determination, ty her household includes Feltrop is grandson, granddaughter. *9 guardian granddaughter her admin- $1,354.47 per- from a savings ister a account injury suit. sonal court-approved [¶ 3] The settlement May began to receive Feltrop of 1992. January AFDC Medicaid benefits always reported the Although Feltrop documents, it was AFDC account on relevant was conducted supervisory not until a review
