1 Mills Surr. 266 | N.Y. Sur. Ct. | 1899
This matter was left undisposed of by Surrogate Arnold, and, after being reargued, has been submitted to me for decision. The proofs which have been submitted as to the execution of the will of the decedent are sufficient to- entitle it to be admitted to probate. A question has been raised, however, as to the validity of one of the bequests contained in the will, which question I shall now proceed to consider. The testator gave his estate, both real and personal, to his executor in trust for the benefit of his wife during her life, and upon her death he directed his residuary personal estate and the proceeds of his real estate, which he ordered to' be sold, to be divided, after making certain payments thereout, into four parts, and to be distributed in the manner provided by his will. One of such parts he disposed of as follows: “ I direct my executor to pay the remaining fourth of my said residuary estate to the pastor -or rector of the Roman Catholic church situated on the corner of Pitt and Stanton streets in the city of New York, and the money so paid to him to be applied and used by him in aid of the fund of the Society of Saint Vincent de Paul, attached to the church of which he is the rector.” It is claimed on the one hand that this provision is void, in that it is an attempt to create a trust or make a gift in favor of the Society of St. Vincent de Paul attached to the church mentioned by the testator, an unincorporated body or association, or in favor of the uncertain, unascertained and indefinite beneficiaries in whose behalf it dispenses its charity, and,- in addition, that the effectuation of the provision would involve an unlawful suspension of the power of alienation. On the other hand, it is contended that the bequest was made for the benefit of the S'oeiety of St. Vincent de Paul, .•a corporation created under our laws and authorized to take by
“ Section 1. 27o gift, grant, bequest or devise to religious, educational, charitable or benevolent uses, which shall, in other respects be valid under the laws of this State, shall or be deemed*271 invalid by reason of the indefiniteness or, uncertainty of the persons designated as the beneficiaries thereunder in the instrument creating the same. If in the instrument creating such a gift, grant, bequest or devise there is a trustee named to execute the same, the legal title to the lands or property given, granted, devised or bequeathed for such purposes shall vest in such trustee. If no person be named as trustee then the title to such Jands or property shall vest in the Supreme Court.
“ § 2. The Supreme Court shall have control over gifts, grants, bequests and devises in all cases provided for by section one of this act. The Attorney-General shall represent the beneficiaries in all such cases and it shall be his duty to enforce such trusts by proper proceedings in the court.”
It is claimed that the object of this statute was at the very least to reinstate in the jurisprudence of this State the law of charitable uses as declared by the Court of Appeals in the case of Williams v. Williams, 8 N. Y. 525, and as exemplified in the particular bequest which was the occasion of such declaration. The bequest was, in substance, of a specified sum of money to certain individuals and their successors as trustees to hold as a perpetual fund and apply the income thereof for the education of poor children in the academy of the village of Huntington. The court sustained the bequest, holding that a gift for a charitable use was not vitiated by reason of the uncertainty or indefiniteness of the beneficiaries or because its effectuation would involve the creation of a perpetuity. This decision was disapproved, and the principles upon which it was founded overthrown as a result of the subsequent discussions upon the subject in the Court of Appeals, and the rule finally announced by that court that a gift for charity, unless made to an incorporated body capable of receiving it, was subject to the same limitations -and restrictions as applied to trusts generally. So stood the law before the adoption of the act of 1893, and, as before stated, the legacy in dispute, if it had been previously
Decreed accordingly.