98 Wash. 295 | Wash. | 1917
This is an appeal by the administrator de bonis non of a partnership estate from a judgment allowing and approving the final and supplemental account of Clara Campbell, executrix of the estate of James McKinley Campbell,
“All of the bills and accounts receivable belonging to said estate, shall be collected by the administrator with all reasonable diligence and dispatch, and after the payment of the costs and expenses of administration therefrom, including the administrator’s fee, attorney’s fee and the inheritance tax if any, the net proceeds if any remaining, shall be divided equally between” the parties to the agreement.
Thereafter the property was divided in accordance with the terms of the written contract. On March 20, 1915, James McKinley Campbell died, and Clara Campbell was appointed executrix of his estate. On May 3, 1915, Robert, Alexander, Charles, and John B. Campbell filed a petition in the probate court asking that Alexander Campbell be appointed administrator de bonis non of the partnership estate of Campbell Brothers, and on the 14th day of May, 1915, an order was entered appointing Alexander Campbell as such administrator. On March 6, 1916, the administrator de boms non filed a petition asking for the issuance of an order and citation directed to Clara Campbell, executrix of the estate of James McKinley Campbell, deceased, and the Title Guaranty and Surety Company, as surety on the bond of James McKinley Campbell as administrator of the partnership estate of Campbell Brothers. Thereafter, on March
The record in the case is somewhat complicated, and involves a consideration of bookkeeping methods and accounts to an extent that is a little bewildering to one not especially versed in the science of accountancy. However, if we understand the matter correctly, appellants make two leading contentions, the first of which is that James McKinley Campbell had no right, as an administrator of the partnership estate of Campbell Brothers, to conduct the business of the estate. Whatever the law may be on this question it is not necessary here to determine, because the evidence shows that the appellants acquiesced in the administrator conducting the business, and they are, therefore, not in a position to complain.
There are two other contentions of the appellants which should be noticed. One is the claim that no proper vouchers were submitted with the account, and, therefore, the objections to it should be sustained. It is doubtless true that the canceled checks in evidence are not what the statute contemplates as a voucher. As already stated, James McKinley Campbell, the administrator of the partnership estate, had died prior to the filing of the account here involved. During the time that the partnership business was conducted by him, the books thereof were not kept in accordance with scientific bookkeeping methods. These books had been gone over by two expert accountants and a report prepared by each, both of which are in evidence. One report covers the time from September 10, 1912, to December 81, .1914, and the other from January 81, 1918, to March 81, 1915. The evidence shows the payments made and the purpose thereof. As was stated by the trial court:
*300 “While a check is not technically a voucher, it is evidence of payment and the statements are all here, showing the party to whom it was paid and the purpose of the payment and I think they would be deemed competent proof and a sufficient account of the receipts and disbursements.”
Apparently all the evidence available upon the condition of the accounts and purpose of the expenditures was offered and received, and, under the circumstances of the case, we think they were sufficient to support the account.
The other contention of the two last referred to is that the burden was not upon the objectors, but upon the executrix making the account. We do not understand the record to show that the judge before whom the case was tried ruled that the burden of proof was upon the objectors, but, however that may be, the evidence is all in the record and the cause is tried here de novo. Even if there were irregularity in the order of proof, that would not furnish a ground for reversal, if, upon the record as made, the conclusion upon the merits which the trial court reached was correct.
The appellants also complain that the trial judge did not permit them to go beyond the items covered in their objections and challenge the correctness of other items in the account. It is undoubtedly the duty of the trial judge, where an account of an executor or administrator is presented, to scrutinize the same and reject all items not properly therein, even though no specific objection should have been made. This case, however, came before the court upon a demurrer and motions, and, as above stated, the court sought to define the issues and thus expedite the trial. Having defined the issues, so far as it was possible, and the cause having proceeded to trial upon those issues, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to allow the appellants to litigate items not comprehended in' their obj ections. Error is assigned on the rulings of the trial court as to certain of the specific objections made to the account, but it seems unnecessary to pursue these here in detail. They have all been
- The judgment will be affirmed.
Ellis, C. J., Chadwick, Morris, and Webster, JJ., concur.