602 P.2d 1123 | Or. Ct. App. | 1979
Husband appeals from an order modifying the orig-ial dissolution decree herein by renewing spousal ipport, the original provisions for which had expired ’ior to the filing of the motion to modify, and by tcreasing child support. He also contends the trial >urt erred in awarding wife attorney fees in connec-on with the modification proceedings. We affirm ithout discussion the modification of the decree with ¡spect to child support, and the trial court’s award of tomey fees; we modify the order insofar as it pro-des for spousal support.
The dissolution decree was entered November 12, >76, and required husband to pay wife by way of ousal support the sum of $500 per month for a period 24 months commencing December 1,1976. The last Lyment under that provision of the decree was due id paid November 1, 1978. On December 6, 1978, fe filed a motion for modification of the decree questing that the original decree be modified by quiring husband to pay wife spousal support in the m of $500 per month for an additional 24 months. In i order modifying the decree, the trial court ordered sband to pay wife $500 per month for a period of 12 rnths, commencing April 1, 1979. The question pre-ated is whether the trial court had authority to new spousal support payments pursuant to a motion lich was not filed until after the expiration of the lited period of time during which spousal support is required to be paid under the original decree.
No Oregon appellate court has addressed this ques-n. It is well settled, however, that if the original ;ree provides for no spousal support, no such support i be added to the decree at a later time, the leading >e being McFarlane v. McFarlane, 43 Or 477, 73 P 203, 75 P 139 (1903), followed by Saurman v. Saurman, 131 Or 117, 282 P 111 (1929); Peake v. Peake, 242 Or 386, 408 P2d 206 (1966); and Johnson v. Johnson, 245 Or 10, 419 P2d 28 (1966). Whatever the implica
None of those authorities disposes of the question before us, nor does the applicable statute, ORS 107.135(1)(a).
Following that rationale, it is clear in this case that the husband’s duty to support the wife had expired prior to the time she filed a motion to modify that
We see no meaningful distinction between a case here the duty to support terminated because it was ot provided for in the original decree, and a case there it terminated by the express terms of the decree, i either case, there will be situations where, because ' changed circumstances subsequent to the termina-on of the duty, a reasonable argument may be made íat support ought to be awarded. Yet none may be warded by "amendment” because there would exist o duty to support at that time.
The order of the trial court modifying the dissolu-lon decree is modified by deleting therefrom para-Hraph 2, which requires husband to pay spousal sup-iprt to wife. Except as so modified, the order is af-Irmed.
Affirmed as modified.
ORS 107.135(1)(a) provides:
"(1) The court has the power at any time after a decree of annulment or dissolution of marriage or of separation is granted, upon the motion of either party and after service of notice on the other party in the manner provided by law for service of a summons, to:
"(a) Set aside, alter or modify so much of the decree as may provide for the appointment and duties of trustees, for the custody, support and welfare of the minor children, or for the support of a party * *