delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Rоbin Rene Whiting (Rene) appeals from a default decree of marital dissolution entered on August 21, 1992, by the Twentieth Judicial District Court, Lake County, the Honorable C. B. McNeil presiding. The decree divided the marital estate and awarded the parties joint custody with equal physical custody of their minor child. We reverse and remand.
Rene and David Whiting were married on April 18, 1988, in Coeur d’Alene, Idaho. David petitioned for legal separation in August 1989, and for marital dissolution in January 1990. Rene moved to dismiss for failure to state a сlaim in February 1990; this motion was denied for lack of a supporting brief. No further proceedings took place until David filed an amended petition for marital dissolution on July 23,1992.
In the meantime the parties reconciled temporarily and had a daughter, Kalani, bom September 10,1991. At the time he filed his amended petition, David was working as a roofer and Rene was working as a janitor. The couple lived in Pablo, Montana. They had acquired three lots in different subdivisions and owned several vehicles.
In his amended рetition for dissolution David requested sole custody of the child, with Rene to visit on alternate weekends and on Wednesday evenings. He requested all of the real property, in ex *182 change for payment to Rene of half the net equity, or $16,630, in installments over a five-year period. He also asked for a hearing to show cause, having filed an affidavit stating that Rene had physical custody and that he had been informed that she intended to take the child out of the state. A hearing was set for August 5, 1992, but was later vacated at the request of David’s lawyer.
Copies of the amended petition and the order to show cause were served on Rene by a Lake County deputy sheriff on July 25, 1992. A copy of the petition was mailed to Rene’s attorney of record, Greg Ingraham, who had prepared her motion to dismiss in response to David’s original petition.
David and Rene then attempted to negotiate the terms of the dissolution directly. They agreed on a distribution of assets and debts but not on custody, visitation and child support. On August 11,1992, David advised his lawyer that a negotiated settlement was not possible and asked him to proceed with the dissolution. On the following day his lawyer filed a “N otice of Intention to Proceed,” which stated that David intended to proceed with the dissolution of his marriage and that Rene:
must comply with the terms of the Summons heretofore served on her on July 25, 1992 or Judgment will be taken against her in accordance with the prayer of the Amended Petition for Dissolution of Marriage served on her on July 25, 1992.
Copies of this noticе were mailed to Rene and to Greg Ingraham on August 11, 1992.
Upon receiving the Notice of Intention to Proceed on August 12, 1992, Ingraham wrote to David’s lawyer, Keith McCurdy, saying that he was no longer representing Rene. McCurdy’s office received the letter on August 17, 1992.
Renе received the notice on Monday, August 17, 1992. She telephoned McCurdy on Tuesday, August 18, to find out what it meant. What McCurdy said is in dispute. Rene later stated that he told her she had “until Wednesday” (i.e., August 19) to respond to the amended petition. McCurdy said during oral argument that he had told Rene the matter was “going to court at ten o’clock in the morning and that if she wanted to contest it, she had to get an appearance filed by herself or by her attorney prior to that time.” No notice of the hearing that took place on August 19, 1992, appears in the record.
David and Rene met by appointment on Tuesday, August 18,1992, to discuss the dissolution. They failed to resolve their differences, and Rene told David that she intended to contact her lawyer. David did *183 not tell Rene that he was schеduled to appear in court on the following morning, Wednesday, August 19. Believing that she had until 5:00 p.m. on Wednesday to file an answer to the amended petition, Rene consulted Ingraham that morning. He prepared the answer she filed late on Wednesday afternoon. By then, the court had issued a minute order, stating that Rene was “noticed” about the hearing but was not present and ordering default entered. The court found that the marriage was irretrievably broken and approved the child custody, child support, and property division as prayed for.
A decree of dissolution, prepared by McCurdy, was filed two days later, on August 21, 1992. It divided the parties’ real and personal property, giving Rene a choice of their three parcels of real estate and providing for cash payments to equalize their shares of the net equity. The decree awarded the parties joint custody of their child, with each party to have physical custody one week at a time, for alternating weeks. Finding that David’s income was $14,000 annually and that Rene’s income was $12,000 annually, the court awarded Rene child support in the amount of $100 per month and assigned each party equal responsibility for the child’s uncovered medical expenses.
Substitution of counsel for Rene wаs filed on August 24, 1992. On August 26, 1992, her new lawyer, Shawn Rosscup, filed a motion to set aside the default decree of dissolution. The motion was based primarily on David’s failure to provide notice of application for default judgment as required by Rule 55(b)(2), M.R.Civ.P. It also alleged misсonduct by David, because he negotiated with Rene on August 18 without telling her that he intended to appear in court the following day, and because he testified during that appearance that the parties were in agreement concerning property division, custody, and child support, when in fact they had agreed only on a division of property, one that differed from the distribution ordered in the decree.
David’s response to this motion asserted that he was not obligated by Rule 55(b)(2), M.R.Civ.R, to provide notiсe of his intention to apply for a default judgment, because Rene had not “appeared” by responding to the amended petition for dissolution. After hearing oral argument, without testimony, on September 17, 1992, the District Court denied Rene’s motion to set aside the decree.
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the default decree of dissolution. As we reverse on that issue alone, we need not address the child support and custody issues raised by Rene.
*184 Rene argues that the District Court should not have entered a default decree of dissolution, or judgment, against her because she received no notice of the August 19, 1992 hearing. She concedes that notice of entry of default was not required, but argues that Rule 55(b)(2), M.R.Civ.R, requires three days notice before the default is made a judgment. The relevant portion of Rule 55(b)(2), M.R.Civ.R, follows:
If the party against whom judgment by default is sought has appeared in the action, the party ... shall be served with written notice of the application for judgment at least 3 days prior to the hearing on such application.
At the hearing on Rene’s motion to set aside the decree, the District Court ruled that Rene was not entitled to notice because she had not filed an аnswer to David’s amended petition. David adopts this proposition in his brief, arguing also that his Notice of Intention to Proceed was served on Rene by mail on August 11,1992, eight days prior to entry of default, and that she therefore had ample time to answer his amеnded petition.
We hold that the District Court erred in ruling that Rene had not appeared in the action. Rene appeared when her then counsel, Greg Ingraham, filed a motion to dismiss David’s original petition for marital dissolution, on February 14, 1990. See
In re Marriage of Neneman
(1985),
Here, David’s “Notice of Intention to Proceed” does not constitute the notice required by Rule 55(b)(2), M.R.Civ.R While it warned Rene that judgment would be taken against her, it said nothing about any proceedings in court and did not indicate the date, time аnd place of such proceedings. Nor does it fulfill the notice requirement of § 37-61-405, MCA, which provides in pertinent part that:
When an attorney ... ceases to act as such, a party to an action for whom he was acting as attorney must, before аny further proceedings are had against him, be required by the adverse party, by written notice, to appoint another attorney or appear in person.
We have interpreted this statute to mean that unless the prescribed notice has bеen given, no proceedings may be had against an unrepresented party, and no judgment may be taken.
Montana Bank of Roundup v. Benson
(1986),
Here, the record shows that David’s lаwyer knew or should have known by August 17,1992, that Rene was not represented by counsel. As we hold that the “Notice of Intent to Proceed” that McCurdy mailed to Rene on August 11 did not constitute notice that David would apply for default judgment on August 19,1992, we conclude that the dеfault judgment entered against Rene was premature and voidable. See
Neneman,
Entry of default, as opposed to a default judgment, may be set aside for good cause shown. Rule 55(c), M.R.Civ.P.;
Cribb v. Matlock Communications, Inc.
(1989),
We conclude that Rene would have met the “good cause” standard for setting aside entry of default if she had been properly notified and given an opportunity to move to set aside the default. Her default was not willful, because she had tried to resolve dissolution issues with David for weeks preceding the default, and because she tried to meet what she understood to be the deadline for answering the amended petition. Moreover, her objections to equal physical custody constitute a meritorious defеnse. Finally, David has not shown that he would have been prejudiced by setting aside the default. See
Hoyt v. Eklund
(1991),
As Renе had no opportunity to resist the entry of default, however, she must meet the more exacting Rule 60(b) standard imposed by Rule 55(c), M.R.Civ.P., for setting aside a default judgment.
Cribb,
*186
We agree that Rene’s failure to respond to the petition was due to excusable neglect, especially in view of her lack of representation. See
Little Horn State Bank v. Real Bird
(1979),
In reviewing a default judgment, we are guided by the principle that every litigated case should be decided on its merits; judgments by default are not favored.
Lords v. Newman
(1984),
Moreover, we have consistently held that any doubt as to the late filing of an answer should be resolved by trial on the merits.
Cure v. Southwick
(1960),
In keeping with these precedents, we conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in denying Rene’s motion to set aside the default decree of dissolution. We vacate the default decree and remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings in accord with this opinion.