In re the MARRIAGE OF JEFFREY J. SMITH, Petitioner and Respondent, and KATHLEEN FOLEY SMITH, Respondent and Appellant.
No. 88-59.
Supreme Court of Montana
Submitted on Briefs June 2, 1988. Decided July 14, 1988.
757 P.2d 784
Thomas W. Trigg, Missoula, for petitioner and respondent.
MR. JUSTICE HUNT delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This appeal arises from a judgment of the District Court, Fourth Judicial District, County of Missoula, awarding joint custody of the two children with primary residential custody to the father. Mother appeals. We affirm. The issue on appeal is whether the District Court abused its discretion in awarding resident custody to the father by:
- Improperly making extensive findings of fact not based on substantial, credible evidence.
- Improperly weighing the evidence and testimony.
- Failing to make any findings regarding the best interests of the daughter of the parties.
- Awarding joint custody, but giving superior custody rights to the father‘s girlfriend over the children‘s natural mother.
The marriage of the appellant (mother) and respondent (father) was dissolved by order dated October 7, 1987, which was amended November 5, 1987. There were two children born of the marriage, Nate, age 9 and Julie, age 5. The parties have resolved the property issues to their satisfaction and primarily differ on the issue of custody of Nate and Julie.
Father is currently employed as a staff writer at a large hospital. He resides in Missoula with a companion.
Mother is a full-time student at the University of Montana. She is not currently employed. Throughout the marriage she contributed financially to the family income through her pottery craft.
An informal custody arrangement required that each parent get physical custody of the children every other week with some reasonable visitation by the other parent during the week. Mother has often taken care of the children during father‘s week while he was at work.
The order of the District Court awarded joint custody of both children with father serving as primary residential parent. Mother was granted custody of the children two to three weekends per month, Thanksgiving, Easter and part of Christmas vacations, and summers. Each parent is allowed liberal visitation when custody resides with the other parent. From this order the mother appeals.
Mother attacks several of the District Court‘s 89 findings of fact.
To begin, this Court has recognized that even verbatim adoption of a party‘s proposed findings of fact is not grounds for reversal if they are supported by substantial credible evidence. In re Marriage of Sessions (Mont. 1988), [231 Mont. 437,] 753 P.2d 1306, 1307, 45 St.Rep. 744, 746; In re Marriage of Watson (Mont. 1987), [227 Mont. 383,] 739 P.2d 951, 954, 44 St.Rep. 1167, 1170. Our task, then, is to examine the record to see if it contains evidence that supports the findings. There are 26 contested findings but we need not address each one individually. We will, however, take this opportunity to address a few of the contested findings.
“13. Nate and Julie have a close bond. Given the hostility between Father and Mother, these two children need all of the stability and familiarity they can receive. It would not be in their best interest to split the children between the parents, (i.e. Nate with Father and Julie with Mother) because of the danger of the children identifying with the parent with whom they live at the expense of alienation from the other parent. The bond between the children, as they live in the separate homes of their Father and Mother, will remain of great value in the coming years.”
There was no error with regard to this issue.
“19. Mother should be allowed liberal visitation when the children are in Father‘s custody. Father shall make an active effort to allow the children to visit their Mother, if she is available, rather than place the children in day care or [with] other non-family members.” (Emphasis added.)
After filing of the judgment, the District Court in court minutes dated January 7, 1988 ruled that the phrase “non-family members” does not include the father‘s companion. We do not see how this provision hinges mother‘s visitation rights upon the companion‘s availability. It plainly states that if mother is available she must be allowed liberal visitation. The last clause explains that this is in preference to sending the children to day care or to friends. It does not limit the right of the mother to visit with her children. There is no mention of the companion‘s availability with regard to visitation
Affirmed.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TURNAGE and MR. JUSTICES HARRISON, WEBER and McDONOUGH concur.
