Wife appeals a trial court order denying her motion to modify child arid spousal support and for attorney fees. On de novo review, we affirm.
The parties were divorced in 1985, after a 17-year marriage. The original dissolution judgment provided that husband would pay child support of $500 per month per child and spousal support of $750 per month for 36 months and then $500 per month spousal support for 60 months. In 1990, wife moved to modify the judgment because of increased child care expenses. ORS 107.135(2)(a). By that time, two of the parties’ three children had moved to Bend to attend a private high school and to be involved in competitive ski racingin the hope of making the U.S. Ski Team. The older son, a community college student in Bend, aspired to attend Colorado University for school and skiing during 1990-91. On the basis of that year’s proposed budget for the older son, wife asked the court to increase his support to approximately $1,482 per month.
Wife argues that, although her proposed increase in child support for the two sons deviates from the $518 figure
The only question, then, is whether a child’s extracurricular or recreational activities can be considered “needs” that can constitute a substantial change in circumstances to justify an increase in child support. “Need” has been defined as “that amount which is required for the actual, necessary expenses of providing for the child at the standard of living which would have been enjoyed but for the dissolution.” Smith v. Smith, supra,
Because the distinction between what is an actual need and what is merely a desire is largely a subjective matter, it is difficult to formulate a rule. The determination must be made on a case-by-case basis. The trial court’s evaluation of the parties’ credibility becomes a most significant factor.
' On de novo review, we find nothing in the record to contradict the trial court’s determination that the children’s skiing expenses, under the facts of this case, were merely desires and, therefore, did not involve a substantial change in circumstances. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying an increase in child support.
Finally, the court denied wife’s motion for attorney fees, reasoning that, when there is a bona fide dispute in a domestic relations case, each party should bear its own expenses. ORS 107.135(1) provides for proceedings to vacate or modify a dissolution decree, including child and spousal support provisions. ORS 107.135(6) provides, in part:
“In a proceeding under subsection (1) of this section, the court may assess against either party a reasonable attorney fee and costs for the benefit of the other party.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Attorney fees were within the trial court’s discretion. We find no abuse of discretion.
Affirmed. Costs, not including attorney fees, to husband.
Notes
We note that it is difficult to discern from the record the precise amount of the increase in child support sought by wife.
The parties agreed that a fair allocation of child care expenses is 70% for husband and 30% for wife. The $518 figure represents husband’s share under the guidelines.
ORS 25.280 provides, in part, that
‘ ‘the amount of support determined by the formula established pursuant to ORS 25.270 to 25.285 [and] 107.105 * * * shall be presumed to be the correct amount of the obligation. This shall be a rebuttable presumption and a written finding or a specific finding on the record that the application of the formula would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular case shall be sufficient to rebut the presumption. The following criteria shall be considered in making the finding:
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“(7) The needs of the child.1
