Neville Ross Neal appeals from a dissolution of marriage decree. He contends that the trial court lаcked jurisdiction to enter the decree because a prior dissolution decree had become finаl.
On January 18, 1983 respondent Margaret Ann Neal filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. On June 8, 1983 the parties signed a рroperty settlement agreement. It purported to settle the property rights of the parties. After a hearing the trial court entered a decree on July 20, 1983, dissolving the marriage. * That decree incorporated the tеrms of the settlement agreement.
Respondent filed a motion for new trial on August 2, 1983, and an amended motion for new triаl on August 11, 1983. On September 9, 1983 the trial court sustained the “Amended Motion for New Trial” and vacated the previous decrеe. No appeal was taken from this order.
After an evidentiary hearing before a different trial judge, a decree of dissolution was entered on February 13, 1985 awarding more assets to respondent than did the initial decree. Aрpellant contends that the court had no jurisdiction to enter the second decree because the original decree had become final. He asserts that the trial court’s order granting the new trial was void because it was granted on the amended motion for new trial, which motion was a nullity because it was untimely filed. As far as the record before us reveals this contention was not presented to the trial court.
As appellant states, a motion for new trial must be filed within fifteen days after entry of the judgment, Rule 73.-01(a)(3), and a motion for new trial filed after that time is a nullity.
Lloyd v. Garren,
Numerous cases state that when thirty days have passed following the entry of a judgment, the trial court’s “jurisdiction” to grant a new trial is limited to one of the grounds in a timely motion for new trial. Some of the recent cases so indicating include
Munn v. Garrett,
In those cаses, and in others we have examined making similar statements, the issue was whether the order granting a new trial was erronеous, not if the order was void. The cases were direct appeals from the order granting a new trial. Although some of the language used in those opinions may be inconsistent with the holding here, the results of those cases are not inconsistent with the result reached in this case.
Jurisdiction has many meanings depending upon the context used. As often usеd, lack of “jurisdiction” does not make an order void, but rather voidable. “Jurisdiction” is a loosely employed term but generally it includes three kinds of authority, over the subject matter, over the person, and to render the order given.
Farrar v. Moore,
“Jurisdiction” is often used ambiguously; in its stricter sense, it means judicial authority over the subject matter and parties; in its broader sense, it includes the power to grant specific relief in cases within such authority.
Lake Wauwanoka, Inc. v. Spain,
For an order to be collaterally attacked for lack of jurisdiction, the absence of jurisdiction claimed must be of a type that causes the ordеr to be void and not of the type which could have been raised by timely objection but otherwise is waived.
Jennings v. State,
supra,
Lack of subject matter jurisdiction or lack of personal jurisdiction is a defect which the law seeks to prevent the defendant from conceding or waiving, and collateral attacks and multiple appeals are sometimes allowed where such a defect occurs.
State ex rel. Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Moss,
When a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and pеrson it is difficult to distinguish acts in excess of jurisdiction from mere error or abuse of discretion.
Moss,
supra,
Where the subject matter of the litigation is within the general jurisdiction of the trial court, the claim of want of jurisdiction by reason of the existence of exceptional or special circumstances can be waived if not timely raised.
People ex rel. Person v. Miller,
The trial court’s reason for granting the new trial does not affect the authority it had to enter the order. The order was granted within the ninety day period following the filing of the timely motion for new trial. During that period the trial court could have properly granted a new trial on any meritorious ground preserved in the timely motion for new trial. That the trial court may have granted the new *95 trial for a reason not stated in the timely motion for new trial does not mean that the trial court’s order was subject to сollateral attack. If appellant wished to complain of that order a timely appeal should have been entered.
A party may appeal “from any order granting a new trial”. § 512.020, RSMo 1978;
Jones v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co.,
The judgment is affirmed.
Notes
The trial judge who entered that decree was not the trial judge who entered the decree appealed from.