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In Re the Marriage of Runberg
159 S.W.3d 194
Tex. App.
2005
Check Treatment

*1 the Matter of MARRIAGE OF Ann Tim Lisa RUNBERG

Runberg S.F.R., and in the Interest M.D.R., J.L.R., Z.G.R., J.G.R. Chil

dren.

No. 07-03-0382-CV. Texas, Appeals

Amarillo. 12, 2005. Jan.

OPINION JOHNSON,

PHIL Chief Justice. Runberg challenges Tim Doak of divorce. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion motion for new trial because overruling his given appeared he had but was setting hearing. for final no notice of the and remand. We reverse

BACKGROUND 20, 2003, Runberg March Lisa Ann On filed suit the 47th District Court of County Randall for divorce from 22nd, Tim Runberg. Doak On March Doak citation and with a was served with temporary restraining order which had granted by visiting judge. been order, matters, restraining among other appear Judge commanded Doak to before 26th, James W. Anderson on March why temporary show cause relief should granted. Judge not be Anderson was sit- regular judge 47th ting for the of the District Court. acting pro

Lisa, Doak, attorney, her and se, Judge court before Anderson temporary on March 26th. The orders signed by Judge following the Anderson (1) appeared recited that Doak (2) person ready, and announced “[t]he parties agreed have to the terms of this (3) order,” and the Court examined the record, agreement parties of the and thirty-page heard evidence. The written (1) rights order delineated and duties of chil- Lisa and Doak as conservators Lubbock, Moody, David E. Appel- for (2) marriage; provisions of the for dren lant. (3) children; with their Doak’s visitation $2,500 obligations pay support child Woodburn, Woodburn, Douglas R. Wat- month, per provide insurance and health Jackson, L.L.P., Amarillo, Ap- kins & for children, support pay spousal care for the pellee. month, prepare file income per and $500 JOHNSON, C.J., returns, debts; timely pay specified Before and REAVIS tax (4) CAMPBELL, which Doak had to JJ. the date parties. judge support move out of asked to set the home child $2,500 month, per orders which was the same pages contained three one-half injunctive support paid tempo- amount set to provisions of detailed directed rary support “... and a child after a statement that Lisa and Doak *3 Runberg appeared.” which Mr. did Lisa waived issuance and service of the not file to response pleading. Doak’s injunction by stipulation. 26, By 2003, regu- dated June the order 22, 2008, May As of the clerk’s record judge lar of the 47th District denied Court no proceedings reflected further Doak’s motion for new trial without a hear- Doak’s appearance day passed suit. had ing. A hearing on Doak’s Motion to Va- and he had not filed answer. See Judgments cate the and Orders Court’s Tex.R. Civ. P. 237.1 Without notice to 2003, 22, May July after was 16th. held Doak, hearing petition a final on Lisa’s for denied, That was but Doak makes motion May divorce was 22nd held on de- no will complaint ruling, about and we signed fault decree of divorce was that ruling.2 not address that day. See TRCP 239. issue,

Doak filed a By written answer on June 6th. one Doak asserts that the 20th, pleading failing On June filed a its he entitled court abused discretion Respondent’s grant Motion for New Trial and to motion for a trial.3 Cit new Judgments Motion to All ing Vacate v. International Power Oil Co. Servs., 22, Inc., (Tex.1989), May Orders From and After 777 S.W.2d 390 that, “ap Several documents were to the Doak he had attached maintains because pleading, peared” an affidavit including his due he any prior which denied notice of the under the Fourteenth Amendment to the (1) hearing. final The affidavit did not United were violated States Constitution judgment hearing offer a reason Doak’s failure an when for to file the default judg- answer to the to him and he was suit before without notice (2) granted, any set urge ment was manner of entitled to have the default decree (3) Gamblin, suit, Bryant any defense to the offer method aside. He references 1991, if a preventing (Tex.App.-Eastland harm to Lisa new trial 228 denied) authority position to be Also granted. attached to as for that, circumstances, copy Doak’s his motion pleading were a letter under the May 13, comply for new need attorney dated 2003 from Doak’s trial did not with attorney indicating to Lisa’s Doak had the mandates of Craddock v. Sunshine Lines, Inc., counsel, retained and a statement facts Bus 134 Tex. 133 S.W.2d (1939). alternative, he asserts hearing. from the final The statement of applies, final that if May facts from the 22nd Craddock he was testimony by only appear contained Lisa which she show that his failure to proce- jurisdiction did He cites 1. Further reference to a rule of civil not have over him. statement, will dure reference to "TRCP—.” authority no for the makes no ex- planation authority, and the failure to cite for Platt, Platt v. 2. See 483-84 analysis provide does not substantive (Tex.App.-Tyler pet.), for no discussion jurisdiction argument. We in his statement procedural of a similar situation. de- that a of notice deem assertion lack jurisdiction as waived. nied 3. Doak's issue a statement contains (Tex. Davis, 79 See Moser effect because he did not receive notice of App.-Amarillo pet.). judgment hearing, no the default the trial court conclusively factual presented final not intentional or the establishes granting of a new mandating of conscious indifference. He cites bases result (Tex.1988) Inc. v. Lopez, Eagle Archery, trial. Golden Lopez Parker, Jackson, Marriage In re (Tex.App.-Texarkana pet.) no support position. for his alternative ANALYSIS presenting argu- disagrees,

Lisa three In LBL First, ments. she references Brown v. defendant filed a written motion dismiss Brown, (Tex.App.-Houston personal jurisdiction. for lack of The mo- 1975, writ), support for [14th Dist.] A tion to dismiss was denied. written *4 granting judgment the trial court’s judgment answer not filed and default Next, that argues denial of new trial. she was taken without notice the defendant. “appeared” Doak had not in the suit and by error. appealed The defendant writ of process rights his due under the Four- reversing judgment, In the default the teenth Amendment Fi- were not violated. Supreme simply Texas Court said nally, she maintains that the trial court did appearance once a defendant has made an denying not err in a new trial because cause, in a the defendant is entitled to support Doak failed to his motion for new setting notice of a trial as a matter of due fulfilling requirements trial with evidence Amend- under the Fourteenth by out set Craddock. Supreme ment. Id. 390-91. The not the did consider defendant’s written

STANDARD OF REVIEW challenge jurisdiction to the trial court’s The trial court’s denial of a mo contempla- abe written answer within the tion for new is reviewed for abuse of procedure, tion of the rules of civil see Prewitt, discretion. Strackbein v. (every petition TRCP 46 and answer shall A S.W.2d in writing) be contained one instrument of if abuses its discretion its decision is arbi (original may and TRCP 85 answer consist unreasonable, trary, and without reference jurisdiction pleas or other dilato- to guiding principles. rules and See Goode ry pleas), specifically because the Court Shoukfeh, appeal involving post- referred to the as “a 1997). Likewise, a trial court its abuses case,” appearance op default discretion if it power declines to exercise a posed post-answer to a by of discretion in it vested law when the Co., LBL case. See Oil require power circumstances not follow Lisa contends that we should exercised; ifor it arrives at its choice in rather, Brown, but, follow rule, an applicable legal princi violation of Brown, respon- In 730. Koch, ple, or criterion. See Koch v. with citation and dent husband was served (Tex.App.-San Antonio counsel at a show-cause appeared with pet.); Budinger, no Landon v. Jean-Paul file hearing, although he did not writ- Inc., (Tex.App. 939-40 which could be considered as ten document writ). -Austin no pleading. Judgment of divorce was sub- A sequently trial court does not abuse its entered without notice husband, denying appealed. discretion a motion for new and husband granting though trial when the of a new trial is court of held that even appeals suit, dependent questions appeared of fact to be husband absent decid court, by pleading, ed the trial unless the evidence written the case was uncontested ties, prop- with including ability his to deal hearing the final and advance notice of by procedure money, of civil financial matters and credit erty, not the rules cards, local trial court rules. Id. at 732. entry or the until of the final decree of Brown, however, did not appellant of the court. divorce or further orders process rights contend that his due indicated that The docket sheet notation violated, Doak contends in the matter temporary orders were announced agreed inapposite. us. Brown is before parties and were acknowledged temporary or- adopted by the Court as Next, we consider whether Doak ders.4 suit “appearance” made an the divorce before when he attended attendance at during Doak’s actions 26, 2003. Judge Anderson on March 26th were of different the March so, we note that no written answer doing actions quality than those nature lawsuit, whether a has been filed appear- comprise we held which did na “appeared” depends has on the party ance Smith. party’s activities quality ture and Smith, Smith, Bradford, the case. See Bradford with the live appellant had not been served (Tex.App.-Dallas being trial was pleading on which the *5 quality of activities pet.). The nature and “ready.” announce appellant nor did the encompass filing the of to be considered Further, not in Smith did appellant the Co., documents, LBL written see Oil agreement con- enter into an extensive activity. See personal at and suit, the cerning subject matter of the 598; Bradford, 971 S.W.2d at Smith incorporated agreement was then which Dist., 615, 617 Hosp. Amarillo into a court order. writ). 1984,no (Tex.App.-Amarillo more of the was participation Doak’s affidavit, was attached to Doak’s which by the quality participation and nature trial, did not address his motion for new 595. In Bradford, appellant degree the of his appearance his at two appeared Bradford, hearing in the March 26th participation “ready,” and testified hearings, announced However, tempo- temporary orders. hearings. appellant’s at one of the testimony at rary and Lisa’s orders determined actions in Bradford the tri- hearing, which were before such appearance have been an uncontested al court at the time Doak’s aside the default failure to set trial court’s denied, showed motion for new was an notice taken without court, attended announced that Doak at 598. Id. abuse discretion. hearing, 26th and “ready” at the March Doak’s court denied At the time the trial agreement as to entered into an extensive trial, before the evidence motion for new conservator- governing orders temporary not simply Doak did the court showed that marriage, property ship of children Anderson, he Judge court before attend spousal support and marriage, of the child or- show-cause by to do was directed responsibil- and allocation of pay, he would der, proceedings. merely then observe waived, by stipulation, ity for debts. He Smith, The evi- in- See agreed-upon temporary service of the announced that Doak dence reflected certain of his activi- junction which limited when the court otherwise before reporter’s March was not copy record of the 4. A of the hearing by Judge was not trial was denied. Anderson for new 26th Doak’s motion Doak’s motion for new trial attached to ... equity. by principles controlled ready partici he was for the have some measure proceeding cooperating in the trial courts pated While truth, matter, as, an to the court submitting agreement in the discretion obligations governed which governed equi- they have all cases their children and their parties, of the it is not an unbridled principles, table subject to further orders of the property, they might to decide cases discretion subject to a agreed court. He himself any without reference proper, deem injunction— court order —the detailed judges principle. Trial guiding rule or personal freedom and which restricted princi- to have a desire and are entitled and fi ability property to deal with his we, them, and there- guide or rule to ple hand, the other there was no nances. On fore, reannounce, changed in slightly the trial court at the time evidence before by the established language the rule the motion for new trial was denied which authorities, A default as follows: above supported finding would have that Doak and a new judgment should be set aside passive pro only observer case which trial ordered March ceedings. Doak’s actions at the of the defendant to answer before failure qual were of such nature and intentional, or the re- judgment was an ity comprise appearance as to his part, of conscious indifference on sult law, Eagle suit as a matter of see Golden accident; to a mistake or an but was due Inc., Archery, 24 S.W.3d at and his for a new trial sets provided the motion right of the final due to notice defense and is filed at up a meritorious hearing attached. See granting thereof will oc- time when the S.W.2d at 390-91. delay or otherwise work casion *6 Finally, just address whether Doak a injury plaintiff. we to the This is fulfill of to the mandates prevents injustice rule. It an in order default Craddock to have the working injustice an without defendant judgment set aside. Craddock sets out the a rule has the plaintiff. on the Such applicable rule to motions for new trial equity. sanction of seeking judgments to set aside en default Craddock, (emphasis at 126 133 S.W.2d for to an tered failure file answer well added). post-answer Ivy as for defaults. See Supreme has main- The Texas Court Cairell, (Tex.1966); 407 S.W.2d granting in to regard tained that the law Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at 126. Craddock judgment is set out new trials after default guiding principle revised the rule or for Strackbein, 671 in See exercising equita trial to in Craddock. courts follow But, Supreme has also grant deny ble discretion to or new trials at 39.5 Court entry are following judgments: prongs of default that all three of Craddock always applicable. Lopez, Su- uniformity of Some lack [in did preme held that a defendant Court denying or rulings granting trials] new due, or constructive notice of not receive actual probably part still exists. This is trial, of least, prevented application question process at to the fact that the is due judgment. See McKanna Supreme did not tack on the default 5. In LBL Oil 1965). Edgar, 388 S.W.2d whether the met the Crad- address However, question appeal was whether requirements. in such LBL Oil Co. dock vitiate the trial court's trial. It error which would did not involve a motion for new apparent of the by Ap judgment was face appeal writ of error. involved direct peal by a direct at record. Id. writ of error constituted injury delay to Lisa prong of the test. avoidance of second Craddock granting of a new trial. (citing Peral Lopez, See at 723 Ctr., Inc., Heights Med. 485 U.S. ta us, the record before we Given (1988)). 108 S.Ct. 99 L.Ed.2d 75 Ap Lopez not decide whether also ex need courts have dealt with pellate Craddock’s If prong tends to the first of Craddock. ways in different when notice applicability to the first Lopez apply Peralta and vitiate Marriage Par was at issue. See In re of record, this then prong under Craddock ker, 817; Bryant, 20 S.W.3d at 829 S.W.2d in fail the trial court abused its discretion 228. trial the final ing grant a new because of Doak’s decree was entered violation above, all three ele- As noted Craddock Goode, rights. See due equity. purpose ments are based Koch, 446; at 95. If S.W.2d at third element of Craddock is to apply do not to vitiate Lopez Peralta injustice by party prevent protecting trial prong, then the the first Craddock from undue who takes failing its discretion court abused detriment, delay as a or other such loss Doak’s failure to grant a new because evidence, or other valuable witnesses hearing could not have attend the final judgment-holder disadvantage would result of conscious been intentional or the the merits of the case at presenting when, according to his uncon indifference Director, Employees new trial. See State affidavit, did not have notice. tested he Evans, Div. v. 889 S.W.2d Comp. Workers’ Parker, Marriage re 266, 270 the result is the same Accordingly, equi- prong If the first prong regardless the second Craddock’s of whether pro- due Peralta and Lo yields abrogated table rule to Constitutional Craddock is its discretion pez: of the who suffered a no- the trial court abused party cess does, aside failing set the default judgment, Lopez, notice which it see Peralta, 485 grant a new trial. See why at fail to see we 86-7, 108 U.S. S.Ct. prong third should not also Craddock’s should, yield. conclude that it We is sustained. Doak’s issue judgment- equitable protection *7 reversed and judgment of divorce is subject of holding party, which is the trial. for a new the cause is remanded prong, third does not override Craddock’s right of a defendant process the due REAVIS, J., dissenting. final di- proper dispositive notice of the Justice, REAVIS, dissenting. H. DON Peralta, at See 485 U.S. hearing.

vorce majority from the respectfully I dissent 86-7, 896; Lopez, 757 108 S.Ct. is that a reversal of the Parker, 723; 20 Marriage In re of v. Company in LBL by the decision Oil It follows that insofar as Doak at 817-18. Services, 777 S.W.2d International Power concerned, holding Lopez applies of is (Tex.1989). 390 prongs and third of to both the second is, of Doak’s disassoci- That the violation in LBL cannot be Craddock. The decision of its or constructive out of context process right to actual from or taken due ated Dodgen, 158 final means that Haden Co. notice of the facts. See W.D. (1958). 838, In 74, 840 trial and attached Doak’s motion for new Tex. Bank, American a v. First up need not have either set Lester affidavits 1993, 361, writ (Tex.App.-Waco or addressed the S.W.2d meritorious defense unincorporat- denied), sole owner of noting prior that the decision in a he was the it prior Company, if only applies the facts of business case ed ” substantially ‘dba,’ juris- the same as those case are and there was no “Oklahoma review, that the the court concluded under there had been him because diction over binding prior effect of a decision cannot be the trial court over- no service. Id. After impor him, determined without reference to its upon notice to Lindley’s ruled motion applies tant facts. Stare decisis when plaintiffs of any amendment without substantially the prior facts of a case are notice, or further pleadings as the case under consideration. See same Upon judgment.1 Id. rendered a default Kaye, 9 Edwards v. error, of Lindley’s consideration de App.-Houston pet. [14th Dist.] the record held that because the Court nied). Lindley had no actual or con- established hearing, he structive notice of the default

Moreover, process “due of law” is not of law. Id. at process had been denied due concept technical a fixed content having time, place, unrelated to and circum stances; rather, implies the term funda resident, Doak, Lindley, a Texas Unlike par mental fairness the context of the expressly served which personally ticular case. See Southwest Indem. Prof. if not file a gave him notice that he did Ins., Dept. Texas the clerk on the Mon- written answer with denied). Fur (Tex.App.-Austin day following expiration twenty next ther, process guarantee due does not citation, a days after service of “default form particular procedure of state judgment may against be taken [him].” is satisfied he had notice of the suit and Rule requirements addition to the opportunity reasonable to be heard. Do the citation further notified Doak: hany Rogers, U.S. S.Ct. authority has in this suit to The Court (1930). question L.Ed. 904 Because the any judgment dissolving or decree enter intensive, is fact due we need for the divi- marriage providing compare the facts in LBL with the facts binding on property sion of which will be presented here to also determine whether you. given Doak was not opportu reasonable authority in this has suit nity to be heard on the merits of his case. any judgment enter or decree Bank, Cunningham v. Parkdale will interest which child/children’s binding upon you, including the termi- Our review of the facts is limited to such parent-child relationship, nation of the

history opinion as is reflected and the paternity, determination of LBL, Supreme Texas Court. a Texas au- *8 appointment of a conservator with plaintiff corporation allegedly a sued Texas thority to consent to the child/children’s doing Systems as LBL Gas on a business adoption. on the sworn account and obtained service attorney Neither Doak nor his retained Al- registered agent. 770 citation, plead- or other filed written answer though he was never served with Oklahoma, constituted ing, and such failure answer Lindley, R.H. a citizen of filed allegations in Lisa’s alleging suit an admission of pro se motion dismiss the against corporation, both. judgment was or 1. We are unable to determine if against Lindley, individually, or rendered 202 reasonably proba- calculated to cause and Thompson, v. 578 S.W.2d

petition. Stoner 679, (Tex.1979); Harmon v. an bly improper 682 see also did cause the rendition of Harmon, 213, (Tex.App. 217 prevented pre- 879 S.W.2d Doak from denied).2 1994, Houston [14th Dist.] senting appeal. Tex.R.App. the case on P. answer, attorney Doak or his filed an Had Further, only 44.1. the error affects 245, per given have been Rule he would not all of the part, but setting, the trial not “reasonable notice” of part may only be reversed as to the affect- days.3 45 less than P. Tex.R.App. the error. ed applica- that 44.1(b); Tex.R.App. Doak does not contend P. 61. see also ble Texas Rules of Civil Procedure are error doctrine is well es- harmless that his unconstitutional or deficient or v. Texas tablished Texas. Walker result failure to file an answer was not the Association, 155 Insurance Employers’ diligence part. of an absence of on his (1956), 617, 298, 291 301 Tex. Lindley, who was never notified of Unlike presumed prej- that the rule of Court held filing a written consequences longer applies udice no Texas. After answer, Doak’s lack of notice of the default Hulse, decision, in v. 362 that Dennis product of his or his coun- was the (Tex.1962), 308, 309 the Court held answer, timely file an sel’s failure to an must also show the error timely failure to file an an- his counsel’s an cause the rendition of probably did imputed is to Doak. See Dow Chemi- swer Later, in v. improper judgment. Lorusso Benton, 477, cal v. 163 Tex. 357 S.W.2d Co. 818, 603 Members Mut. Ins. 565, (Tex.1962); In- Employers 567 Texas (Tex.1980), the Court held Wermske, 540, 162 Tex. surance Ass’n v. to all errors “applies harmless error rule (1961). 90, I Accordingly, 349 S.W.2d as to the in that it draws no distinction controlling LBL not would hold that is requirement of errors involved its type given opportu- that Doak was a reasonable Also, recently held that for reversal.” we nity to heard on the merits of his case. demonstrating import harm is “of since the No Reversible Error lay to establish on burden on [appellant] purported error caused appeal that Moreover, may reverse a before we improper judgment.” re rendition of judgment and order a new trial we must 580, Scott, 117 Marriage of of amount- complained find that the error 2003, pet.).4 (Tex.App.-Amarillo no of Doak’s as was ed to such a denial 689, (Tex.Civ.App.- apply pro par dolph, 467 S.W.2d procedure 2. The rules of se dismissed); attorneys. State Ins. Co. ties well Amarillo 1971 Mansfield Gulf Cohn, 181, Ball, 605, (Tex.Civ.App.- Bank v. 573 S.W.2d v. 324 S.W.2d 1978). n.r.e.); ref'd 1959 writ Amarillo Ratliff (Tex.Civ.App.- Clift, 312 S.W.2d Rolon, generally Rolon v. 907 S.W.2d 3. See n.r.e.); see also In re 1958 writ ref’d Amarillo 1995, writ) (Tex.App.-Beaumont no B.S.W., (Tex.App.-Texar allowing (holding the trial court erred denied); Sanford, Hooper pet. kana proceed had not been trial to when counsel (Tex.App.-Tyler 968 S.W.2d 245). given required by notice as Rule Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Ma pet.); lone, (Tex.App.-Houston Hicks, Knight 4. See also *9 1996), aff'd, 972 S.W.2d 35 Dist.] [1st (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo writ ref'd Brewer, 1998); Shames, v. Bickel & Sullivan n.r.e.); Whitfield (Tex.App.-Dallas ref'd (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo Cain, denied); n.r.e.); Cain v. Co. v. Ran- Traders & General Ins. that because he made Doak contends he was entitled

appearance the trial setting of the trial notice rules of comply with the court failed Although he had the burden notice.5 probably alleged error demonstrate improper judg- of an caused the rendition presenting him from prevented ment or here, Doak not address Rule his case does contention, argument, 44.1 present nor error analysis demonstrating Considering that Doak’s was reversible. his to file an constituted failure answer allegations peti- admission of the in Lisa’s carry tion and because Doak did not alleged burden to demonstrate improper in an probably error resulted judgment, may judg- we not reverse the

ment because the error is not reversible Rule 44.

per herein, I For the reasons stated would trial court. affirm the In re STATE of Texas.

No. 03-04-00684-CV. Texas, Appeals

Austin. Feb. appeal was directed (Tex.App.-Houston writ de 5. Doak's notice [1st Dist.] 22, 2003, May not the taken nied). for new trial. denial of his motion

Case Details

Case Name: In Re the Marriage of Runberg
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Jan 12, 2005
Citation: 159 S.W.3d 194
Docket Number: 07-03-0382-CV
Court Abbreviation: Tex. App.
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