Thе trial court below granted the respondent-mother’s request to modify the custodial award of the parties’ divorce decree. We disagree with the trial court that the mother has sustained her burden of proof and reverse.
This unpleasant fact situation demonstrates that the children of the divorced parties pay the price when the tug-of-war over custody becomes fierce. The parties, Randy and Eunice Gonzales, have two sons; David, born June 1975; and Keven, born July 18, 1978. In December 1980 Eunice left the family home in Oelwein for California. The facts cоncerning the circumstances surrounding her departure are in dispute. Randy says she left with both children while the couple were having marital difficulties and he was recovering from health problems. Eunice claims she and the boys were thrown out by Randy because he had a seizure after getting out of the hospital and “didn’t want the kids to see him like that.” Randy denies this. Randy filed for dissolution of marriage on March 27, 1981. Notice was attempted as required by Iowa Code § 598A.5(3) (1985). Randy says he talked with Eunice on the phone several times regarding the marriage dissolution, and saw her oncе in California where they again discussed the proceedings. Eunice did not appear and claims she never received the notice. The court awarded custody of both childrеn to Randy. Randy traveled to California where he picked up David at the school he was attending. He also tried to take Keven, but was unsuccessful. The record is clear that since this time Eunice has prevented Randy from knowing his whereabouts and has prevented Keven from seeing his father. Randy and Keven have not seen each other since May 1981.
In October 1983 Eunicе filed a petition to modify the decree and the proceedings were transferred to Iowa. The court granted modification and awarded custody of Keven to Eunice. Randy hаs appealed.
The scope of our review is de novo. Iowa R.App.P. 4.
Eunice claims she did not receive notice of the dissolution of marriage but we agree with the trial court’s fact finding that her testimony on this point is not credible. The court apparently found credible the testimony of Randy’s mother, who was present when Randy talked with Eunice on the phone regarding the conversations. We also agree with the trial court that Eunice was not kicked out of the house, but left for California on her own. Although Eun *154 ice claims she had no money, she purchased a car when she arrived in California. The recоrd is clear that Eunice purposefully concealed Keven’s location from Randy, although he had legal custody, saying she was afraid after he took David he would also take Keven. She never revealed her address or phone, made phone calls to her other son at holidays and birthdays by placing collect calls, and sent packages from Oregon. Her justification is that, “I have kind of made my little world around my son Keven because he is about all I got.” Respondent again repeats in her brief that with the divorce she was “bilked” out of еverything and, “Actually all that was left for Appellee was Keven, this was all she was able to salvage out of this marriage and Appellant was about to attempt to take him.”
Randy maintained the same address he had since the dissolution and the same phone number. The only evidence that the father has prevented David from seeing his mother is an exchange between the two when Randy told Eunice he would let her see David if he could see Keven.
While Keven has been gone, Randy has made numerous attempts to find the child. He joined a national missing children’s organization, sent reward posters with pictures to various places in Oregon and California, sent letters to county clerks in Oregon and California to attempt to find Eunice’s name since she had remarried, sent letters to various schools in both states, obtained counsel in both states, and traced packages sent to him.
The record shows that David has thrived while in Randy’s сare. His high test scores were submitted to the court, and it was also shown David is involved in a program for gifted children. He has received awards in several school subjects. Randy is the president of the school’s parent-teacher organization. Randy’s mother also indicated Randy cleans, cooks, and otherwise cares for David. There was little evidence of Keven’s experiences with Eunice other than he eats well.
In determining whether custody should be modified, the parent insisting upon the modification must show that the circumstances of the partiеs have substantially changed and that the circumstances of the change were not within the contemplation of the court at the time the original decree was entered.
In re Marriage of Morton,
The substantial change in circumstances which has occurred here is Keven’s four-year absence from his father. We are not convinced such an absence was not within the contemplation of the court when the dеcree was entered. The court was informed that Eunice was in California with both boys and certainly would have recognized it might be a difficult process to return them to Iowa.
In addition, we are not convinced Eunice has sustained her burden to show she has superior parenting abilities.
We have frequently stated that custody is not an award or punishment to the parents.
Spotts v. Spotts,
We have considerable information regarding David’s good progress while in Randy’s сare. We know little of Keven’s activities while in California. This does not carry the burden of respondent.
The court, instead, appeared to base its decision solely on the faсt that Keven had not seen his father in three years at the time of the modification request. What the court seems to imply is that it would be
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difficult for the boy to make the transition to the home оf his father and brother after the long absence. While considering the best interests of the child, however, we are also to consider not just the short-range interests of the boy, but his long-range intеrests as well.
In re Marriage of Winter,
We recognize precedent is of little value in such cases, but find instructive the principles set out at
Maikos v. Maikos,
Pеrhaps the most perplexing problem before us in this troublesome case is the period of time these children have now been physically absent from appellant’s home. Ovеr two years have passed since they were wrongfully taken from his home and have been physically present in appellee’s home. It is unfortunate that they must be moved again. Howеver, it is our feeling that these periods of delay are not to be charged to appellant who resides in Connecticut. He promptly made a good faith, although fruitless, effort to recover possession of the children, but the court rejected his plea at that time. Under these conditions the lapse of time should not operate to deprive him of the custodial right and privilege given him by the original trial court. While the paramount question is not the rights of either parent, and frequent shifting of the children from one home to another is abhored, whеn we taken into consideration what is right and just under the revealed circumstances leading up to the appellee’s physical possession of them, we conclude the children’s best interest will be served by rejecting any change in their legal custody at this time.
Id.
at 393-93,
We find that respondent has not carried her burden to show the circumstances which have changed were not within the contemplation of the court and that her parenting skills arе superior. The circumstances show the best interests of the child will be served by denying the request tó modify custody.
Respondent has also requested attorneys fees in district court and on appeal. We consider the factors regarding an award of attorneys fees in district court set out at
Locke v. Locke,
REVERSED.