We granted further review of a court of appeals decision modifying the property division in a decree dissolving the marriage of Robert W. and Roberta J. Johnson. The trial court considered an oral agreement of the parties, but the court of appeals refused to do so on the ground the agreement was not written. We vacate the court of appeals decision because wе believe the property division ordered by the trial court was equitable. In addition, we modify the trial court decree to divide the personalty in the parties’ lake cabin.
The parties were married in 1954 and the decree was entered in 1983. At the time of trial, Robert was 52 and Rоberta was 49. They had two adult children. Robert was employed as a zoning official for Linn County with an annual salary of $29,172. Roberta worked for аn accounting firm for an annual salary of $21,710. All of their assets were acquired during the marriage.
One of the points of contention that led to the dissolution concerned construction and remodeling projects undertaken by Robert in the parties’ residence and lake сabin. In 1979 he started a project to remodel the residence and add an addition to it. He estimated the value of the home as $35,000 аt the beginning of the project and as $32,000 at the time of trial, with the work approximately 75 percent complete. Construction and repair of the cabin was a long-term ongoing project, and considerable finishing work remained to be done on it. The trial court found the cabin had a value of $22,500.
When the parties agreed to separate in September 1981 they reached an agreement to dividе their property which the trial court discussed as follows:
The parties separated in September of 1981 when [Roberta] moved to an apartment. At about that time they agreed that the home, cabin and personalty [were] worth approximately $60,000. Additionally, [Robertа] had some savings. [Robert] sought to continue with the remodeling [of] the home; however, the parties’ financial position did not permit this to bе accomplished as well as payment of some $15,000 to $20,000 to [Roberta] as an agreed upon partial property settlemеnt of the parties.... A home improvement loan in the amount of $35,000 was obtained, and the homestead mortgaged. [Roberta] was to ultimatеly receive $15,000 to $20,000 from these proceeds; however, she has received only $1,200.
Giving weight to the trial court’s findings, we make the same findings in our dе novo review of the record.
The parties had placed the net proceeds of the post-separation mortgagе in a bank savings account requiring both signatures *201 for withdrawal of funds. Accordingly both parties signed for the withdrawal of $1,200 by Roberta for her purchasе of furniture. Without Roberta’s knowledge or consent, however, Robert effected a telephonic transfer of the account bаlance to a checking account controlled by him, and he spent the funds. Although he testified that the funds were used in the residential remodeling project, the remodeling did not enhance the market value of the home and he estimated that another $12,000 would be required to сomplete the project. He thus spent $20,000 of the money that was to go to Roberta on the home, and the home was worth less than when he started. Furthermore he was not in a position to pay Roberta an additional $10,000 he had promised her.
Under this record the trial cоurt deemed it equitable to make the following property division:
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The court of appeals changed the property division to give Robert the cabin and responsibility for the debts associated with it. Robert thus would receive net assets of $28,503.72, and Roberta would receive net assets of $28,486.00.
In defending the court of appeals decision Robert relies in part on Iowa Code section 598.21(l)(k) (1983), which includes among factors that must be considered in making an equitable, property division “[a]ny written agreement made by the parties concerning property distribution.” He argues that this provision precludes consideration of the alleged agreement in this case because it was not written.
We believe Robert has taken an unwarranted and narrow view of the criteria listed in section 598.21(1). The statute makes it mandatory to сonsider all of the enumerated factors, including any written agreement, but the list does not purport to be exclusive. In addition to the factors that are specifically identified, the court is re *202 quired in section 598.21(l)(m) to consider “[o]ther factors the court may determine to be relevant in an individual case.” Thus the court is to consider in an individual case such additional factors as the court in its discretion deems rеlevant. It is mandatory for the court to consider the listed factors and discretionary for it to consider others.
In this case the trial court determined that the oral agreement was relevant to an equitable property division, and we cannot say the court’s discretion was abused. The evidence showed more than an oral agreement. It showed that the steps taken by the parties to implement thе agreement permitted Robert to obtain control and dispose of marital assets that should have been preserved for equitаble division.
Robert’s former view of what was equitable was relevant.
See In re Marriage of McFarland,
In the circumstances of this case, we believe the trial court’s property division was equitable. We therefоre vacate the court of appeals decision and affirm the property division in the decree.
We must also clarify the dеcree, however, to allocate the parties’ personal property in the cabin. We modify the decree to awаrd Robert all of his personal effects in the cabin, all personalty in the cabin purchased by him subsequent to September 1, 1981, all items which were gifts to him, all fishing, skiing, boating and recreational equipment at the cabin, his beer dispenser and related equipment, and his tools. All other personal property in the cabin, including the remainder of the appliances and furniture, is awarded to Roberta. As modified, the decree is affirmed.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DECREE OF DISTRICT COURT MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.