*1 No. 16. marked as state’s exhibit documents support value to of probative tial evidence offense, fingerprints, the verdict These exhibits consisted each element of a commitment copy Wofford v. and a photographs, disturbed. will not be jury 100; were Poindex State, Ind., N.E.2d of Corrections (1979) Department Whiteman, 167, Ind. 374 N.E.2d State, (1978) certified Sam properly ter v. all review, does not have Indiana Reform- Court at the 509. On this Director of Records evidence ade find circumstantial atory. hypoth reasonable every
quate to overcome since our error here We find no that an inference only esis of innocence but (Burns 1973), statute, 34-1-17-7 Ind.Code § therefrom which reasonably be drawn public copies for admission provides finding jury. Hall supports the as true and they are attested records when 530; Parks v. State, Ind., 405 N.E.2d (1980) the records under keeper complete by 286; State, Ind., Jones v. (1979) 389 N.E.2d State, Eldridge v. seal of his office. 640, 1349. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 377 N.E.2d 134, (1977) 266 Ind. 361 N.E.2d Since case, shows In this the evidence the docu certification of proper there was a per was the authorized that Etta Cox they case we find that ments in the instant night of building school on the son suf and there was properly were admitted breaking and glass crime. heard She support the verdict evidence ficient Riley arrived at the security. called Officer count II. and saw some few minutes later building a reasons, there foregoing For all of the light jacket wearing cap a dark judgment and the was no trial court error starting to crawl out of a window. be affirmed. court should of the trial building back into the person ducked affirmed. Judgment other officers that a Riley Officer advised the south side of person had been seen on DeBRULER, GIVAN, J., PREN- C. ap building. Briner then Officer PIVARNIK, JJ., concur. TICE and walking on a sidewalk prehended defendant building. Defend on the west side cap light dark and a wearing
ant was side, a to be on the west
jacket. In order out have had to come
person would either or would have had to climb building building the south side
the fence on Riley. There was in full view of Officer Eugene MARRIAGE OF In re the attempt there had been an evidence that McDONALD, wiiford clerk’s office open a desk drawer in the pry Appellant-Petitioner, evi building. This was sufficient verdict of bur jury’s dence to glary. McDonald, Margaret Helen convic- argues that his
Defendant further Appellee-Respondent. II, the habitual offender tion on count 3-580A125. No. count, evi- by sufficient supported was not Indiana, Appeals state’s exhibits Court dence in that one of the Third District. errone- conviction was relating prior to a hearing During admitted. ously Jan. II, Anthony Larocca the state called count 12,1981. March Rehearing Denied that he was testified as a witness. Larocca Re- Indiana employed by a counselor and was not the custodian
formatory testify, permitted
records. Larocca was objection, regarding
over defendant’s *2 Brunner, C. Ham- Jr. and John J.
Thomas Hamilton, Parker, South ilton, Brunner & Bend, appellant-petitioner. for Kuehl, Bend, argues IC 31-1-11.5-11.1 He that he has appel- James R. South of the liabilities been saddled with most lee-respondent. Mrs. McDonald received STATON, greater equity than the of the mari- Judge. equity whole; therefore, as a he tal taken This civil the dissolution action concerns its court has abused discre- reasons that the *3 Eugene Wilford Mc- marriage of of the marital estate with by enlarging tion the Helen McDonald. A Margaret Donald and in the did not have a assets which marriage decree of dissolution of was en- at the time of division. We present interest provided tered which distribution of disagree. liabilities of parties, the assets and the cus- child, and of their minor tody and disposition marriage The of the payment attorney the fees. the property is within sound discretion (1980), the trial court. Irwin Irwin Ind. v. appeal, Eugene On Dr. McDonald raises App., just 406 A and reasona N.E.2d 317. following the three issues for our considera- ble does property require division of the tion: the court to the property equally divide 1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion parties. between the Id. in its division of the marital property? objects physical refers to Property providing 2. Did the trial court err in a houses, cars, It also such as and furniture. contingent property interest in to one encompasses complex group jural the party leaving party while to the other physical of the relations between the owner ever, when, the in- discretion if such Nelson object and all other individuals. v. might terest be liquidated? 584, (1961), Ind.App. 178 LaTourrette 3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion court divides the N.E.2d 67. When the trial sup- in child its award of estate, must of the marital it also property port? up relationships. may sepa divide these It part We affirm in and reverse and re- relationship object of the rate the debt mand part. relationship object. from the of the equity words, give party In other the court can I. giving the debt of the property the object. party physical other the Property Division of Dr. McDonald the trial court the trial court’s divi contends We will reverse just dispo- upon showing failed to and property only make a reasonable sion of the required by sition of as of the trial court’s discretion. property the marital an abuse whether owned marriage, acquired by shall divide the her own final their manner, kind, either to over to one installments, ble the court shall consider the conditions as the court dividing [31-1-11.5-3(a)] factors: “(a) “In ordering relevant separation joint or determining In an action by setting right either pay efforts, the sale of the same under such [1] proceeds part as such after the by may of this of the division of the property what is the same or sum, either in a pursuant be of such sale. parties, either spouses marriage statute states: just either in just spouse prior chapter, of the spouse and reasonable to section and or prescribe and parts and reasona- and acquired by proper, the following requiring in his or prior parties, thereof court or in 3(A) or desirability as having or the property parties erty rights riage sipation tribution of a spouse acquired by acquisition “(3) “(1) “(2) or right The The The extent to which the The contribution of custody as related to a at the time the through is to become final as related to the their earnings of the conduct economic to dwell therein for such parties.” each may spouse awarding determination property; inheritance or property, any spouse prior deem as effective, including circumstances of final children; earning homemaker; just disposition of the each parties during including division family property was spouse gift; ability residence the mar- the con- periods or dis- the Wife (1977), Ind.App., 360 v. Geberin Geberin an abuse of dis- 41. To constitute
N.E.2d
paying
to her
dwelling subject
Finally
cretion,
must show that
Dr. McDonald
mortgage
was one which
trial court’s decision
Furniture,
furnishings,
appli-
Household
effect of the
logic
sup-
“clearly against
ances,
fixtures,
equipment,
court, or
for debt
responsible
circumstances before
plies
facts and
—husband
reasonable,
actual deduc-
items
these
probable,
Marshall
subject
to be drawn therefrom.”
tions
Mark V Automobile
Lincoln
807,
it
Ind.
311 N.E.2d
(1974),
Reeves
the indebtedness
paying
her
pendant
Diamond-set
necklace
evidence; we
reweigh the
We will not
Husband
that evidence and
will consider
Automobile
Datsun
inferences
drawn
therefrom
reasonable
*4
Equipment
and
Furniture
Office
appellee,
to the
which is most
favorable
Receivable
Office Accounts
Jackman
McDonald.
Margaret Helen
Value
Life Insurance Cash
27, 294 N.E.2d
Ind.App.
(1973),
Jackman
might sup-
though
Even
the evidence
620.
pay
was ordered
Dr. McDonald
the one
different
from
account,
conclusion
port a
loan,3
furniture
commercial
court, we cannot substi-
the trial
Roebuck,
reached
Union4
the I.U. Credit
and
Sears
that of the trial
judgment
liability.5
tute our
the 1978 tax
and
Geberin, supra.
court.
court
trial
say the
We can not
court considered
The
marital
its discretion.
The trial court divided the
abused
31-1-11.5-11.6
in IC
forth
following manner:
the factors set
in the
erty
decree,
the wife believed
court noted that
The trial
trial court set
2.In
its dissolution
$118,-
parties
stipulated
assets of the
amounted
with
the
622.00,
forth the marital
$81,107.05, leaving a net of
unstipulated
liabilities
values as follows:
$37,514.95
and that the husband believed
Stipulated
$
$91,570.00, liabilities to
amounted to
assets
Lifeinsurance cash value.
350.00
$9,398.00.
$82,172.00, leaving
The trial
a net of
$60,900
Family dwelling-rangeof
true net value
stated in its decree that the
65,000.00
to .
estimates
marital assets lies between the
2,500.00
Home furniture .
depending upon
treatment
3,358.00
Husband’s office furniture .
family dwelling
and the value
taxes
10,750.00
1979Mark V automobile .
V on sale.
Mark
2,487.50
1976 model Datsun automobile
open
his
loan was used
pendant
bulk of this
Wife’s
diamond-set
$2,400
downpay-
1,900.00
range
practice.
used for the
$900
was
to.
$5,000 was used for the
V.
ment on the Mark
downpayment
Unstipulated
$
the house.
on
Husband’s
accounts receiv-
personal ex-
18,000.00
used for
separation
This loan had been
able at
.
.
penses
10,434.00
and taxes.
of which .
had been collected at the date of
liability
of his moon-
the result
tax
5. This
trial and of which an addition-
supported
gambling
lighting,
habit
1,500.00
his
which
al .
couple
trips the
had taken.
is estimated to be collectible
Husband’s balance in office ac-
1971, 31-1-11.5-11
in 1C
The factors listed
4,500.00
separation
count at
.
(1979 Supp.) are as follows:
parties’
follows:
liabilities were as
The
spouse
“(1)
each
The contribution of
8,090.36
National Bank on Mark V
American
including
property,
acquisition
the con-
mortgage
American National Bank
homemaker;
spouse as
of a
tribution
48,720.00
dwelling
.
property was
to which the
The extent
American
Bank commercial
National
spouse prior
mar-
acquired
each
15,079.00
loan.
gift;
through
riage
inheritance or
2,200.00
Ries Furniture Co.
circumstances
The economic
5,700.00
Revenue
Internal
Sears,
Service.
time the
at
Company .
780.00
Roebuck and
University
Indiana
Union .. .
900.00
Credit
pay
tempo-
Dr. McDonald
a week
pay
$500
ordered to
the debt
Mrs. McDonald was
maintenance
for his
except
rary
received
on the items she
court,
The trial
in its
daughter
Mc
and wife.7
furniture. Dr.
debt on the household
after its decree dis-
Order of Distribution
the debt on
pay
Donald was ordered to
McDonalds, or-
marriage of the
$5,300
solving the
approximately
“his” assets and
arrearage
his
pay
dered Dr. McDonald to
debt on assets he did
receive.
order. He now ar-
temporary support
party proper
either
court did not award to
its
trial court abused
discre-
gues
present
did not have
ty
they
which
temporary sup-
tion because its award
The court
interest at the time of division.
in law or fact.
is without foundation
port
in excess of the
did not award
n
disagree.
We
marital estate.
The determination
II.
is committed to
maintenance
support and
of the trial court. On
the sound discretion
Lien on Residence
the evidence most
we will consider
appeal,
the family
The trial court ordered that
and will
decision
favorable to the court’s
to Mrs. Mc-
dwelling should be transferred
clearly
where the decision
reverse
sale,
$5,500
pay
its
she must
Upon
Donald.
facts and
effect of the
against
logic
McDonald,
lien on the
to Dr.
which sum is a
Marshall,
court.
circumstances before the
argues that
family dwelling. Dr. McDonald
supra.
provide
court to
improper
it was
of the trial
*5
property
him
in the
contingent
this
interest
support
designed
provide
Child
leaving
to Mrs. McDonald’s discretion
living he would
for a minor the standard of
when,
ever,
might
liqui-
if
be
such interest
marriage not been
enjoyed
have
had the
dated. He cites the recent case of Hender-
(1977), Ind.
dissolved. Wendorf v. Wendorf
(1980), Ind.App., 401
son v. Henderson
must con
The court
App.,
was not an abuse INSURANCE INDIANA Defendant-Appellant, enough are standing by themselves opinion regarding to form an child would have living standard of MUTUAL INSURANCE FEDERATED in the marriage had the not been enjoyed CO., Plaintiff-Appellee. being dissolved. process No. 1-480A101. and re- and reverse part We affirm in Indiana, in part. mand Appeals Court First District. HOFFMAN, J.,P. concurs. Jan. 19,1981. Denied Feb. Rehearing J.,
GARRARD, opinion. with concurs GARRARD, concurring. Judge, arrived at agree
I with the conclusions of his
Judge parts opin- I and II Staton However, division of concerning
ion. out in pointed I think it should be order Judge Montgomery’s
connection with (a) the hus- there was evidence that $15,000 of his earn- dissipated
band some activ- gambling
ings during
ities; (b) board physician he was pulmo- in internal medicine and
certified of his There was evidence
nary medicine. his wife as a
earning as such and of ability consider- I believe these factors add
nurse. *6 award since perspective
able to the court’s provides for consideration
IC 31-1-11.5-11 and reasonable effecting
of both in assets.
disposition of marital III, agree I
Concerning part cannot interlocutory support propriety appeal. now The order
order is available pursuant when entered appealable
was Procedure, Appellate Rule
Indiana Rules of and,
4(B)(1). appeal perfected No such course, expired with order That entry judgment. of final remaining at deficiency
court ordered the not, my does paid
the date of dissolution
view, appeala- foregone revive the issues origi- concerning propriety
bility
nal award. result reached.
I therefore concur