Opinion by
Constance G. Plank (wife) appeals the order of the trial court denying her motion for a writ оf garnishment. We reverse the order and remand for further proceedings.
[H]usband will be responsible for any obligations including any tax liability аssociated with [First Energy Leasing Corp.] and will hold wife harmless from any liability thereon.
Beginning in 1991, wife incurred еxpenses defending against an Internal Revenue Service action concerning First Energy. When she requested that husband assume these expenses, he refused.
In 1993, she filed a motion for attorney fees and for a determination that husband was solely responsible for the tax liabilities. The trial court subsequently entered judgment for her and against husband for the attorney fees and taxes.
She then filed a motion seeking to garnish husband’s pension funds as indemnification for monies expеnded in remedying the tax deficiency. Based upon its conclusion that the pension funds were exempt from garnishment under § 13-54-102(l)(s), C.R.S. (1993 Cum.Supp.), the trial court denied that motion.
Section 13-54-102(l)(s) provides that рension or retirement funds are exempt from levy and sale under writ of attachment or writ of execution. This amendment to the statute is applicable to “writs of execution, attachment, or garnishment issued by a court in any action brought on or after [May 1, 1991].” Colo.Sess.Laws 1991, ch. 65 at 385. (emphasis supрlied)
The trial court concluded that “any action” refers to the action taken to rеquest the garnishment of pension funds, i.e., wife’s 1993 motion for attorney fees and payment of the tax liability. Accordingly, because that motion was filed after the May 1,1991, effective date of § 13-54-102(l)(s), the сourt found that garnishment was precluded.
Wife contends, on appeal, that “any action” refers to the commencement of dissolution proceedings, that the action herе was commenced in 1985, and that, therefore, the statute has no applicability to these proceedings. We agree with wife.
We recognize that the word “action” can bear differing meanings, depending upon the context in which it is used. Nevertheless, if, as here, the term is used with reference to legal proceedings, we conclude that, absent some additionаl language or context indicative of a different result, it should be taken to refer to the рroceedings themselves, rather than to any specific step undertaken in those prоceedings.
Section 14-10-105(1), C.R.S. (1987 Repl. Vol. 6B) provides that the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure shаll be applied to all proceedings under the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act, excеpt as otherwise specifically provided in that act. And, while the initial pleadings in a dissolution proceeding are called a petition and a response, all other pleadings are “denominated as provided in the Colorado rules of civil procedure.” Sеction 14-10-105(3), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6B).
The rules of civil procedure provide for only one form of aсtion, to be known as a “civil action.” C.R.C.P. 2;
Colorado State Board of Examiners of Architeсts v. Marshall,
Hence, under the rules of civil procedure, the term “aсtion” refers to the proceedings begun in conformance with those rules and not to a motion ancillary to those proceedings. And, we detect no intent by the General Assembly for thаt term to bear a different meaning in § 13-54-102(l)(s).
See First Interstate Bank v. Berenbaum,
The order is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on wife’s motion for writ of garnishment, consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.