— Thе trial court, in a dissolution action between John Michael and Lynn Marie Sacco, entered a decree granting the dissolution, approved an аgreed parenting plan, and ordered child support for the couple's three children. On appeal to this court Lynn Sacco contends, amоng other claims, that the trial court failed to comply with the standards set forth in RCW 26.19.020 in calculating the child support award. See generally Laws of 1988, ch. 275, codified at RCW 26.19.001-.060 and scattеred sections of the code. These standards require the use of a standard child support calculation using a worksheet developed by the Washington State Child Support Schedule Commission (the Commission) and adopted by the Legislature. We agree and remand the case for retrial.
On July 24, 1987, John Michael Sacco filed a petition for dissolution of his marriage with Lynn Marie Sacco. The court granted the dissolution. The parties' three children were 7, 5, and 3 at the time of the trial. Mr. Sacco earns approximately $1,979 per month from his job in the family grocery store.
Mrs. Sacco has a B.S. degree in child developmеnt. She works 15 hours per week earning $5.50 an hour. The trial court found that her "abilities, experience and education" showed that "she can earn many times mоre than what she is earning." Finding of fact 12. It further found that "Mrs. Sacco can earn no less than $754 per month take home pay . . .". Finding of fact 13.
The court ordered John Sacco to pay $450 per month in child support to Lynn Sacco, but awarded no money for child care services. Conclusions of law 5, 6. The trial court did not fill out a worksheet in calculating the child support award. Neither its conclusions of law nor its decree expressly declare that it is deviating from a standard calculation using the worksheets.
The dispositive issue in this case is whether the trial court must fill out a worksheet and discuss the rеsults of the standard calculation in its decree.
In 1988, the Legislature adopted a new statewide child support schedule. This statute aimed to increase the equity and adequacy of child support orders. RCW 26.19.001(1), (2). It also sought to reduce "the adversarial nature" of child support proceedings "by increasing voluntary settlements as a result of the greater predictability achieved by a uniform state-wide child support schedule." RCW 26.19-.001(3).
The Legislature established a commission to develop updated child support guidelines and worksheets, and the Legislature required filing of worksheets which previously were optional. RCW 26.19.020(4). That stаtute provides that "[v]ariations of the worksheets shall not be accepted." Each child support order is required to "state the amount of child supрort calculated using the standard calculation and the amount of child support actually ordered." RCW 26.19.020(6).
The trial court neither filled out a worksheet nоr entered the results of the worksheet in the order. Counsel argued that inasmuch as each party submitted a worksheet, this was all that was required under the statute. We categorically reject this claim. The thrust of the statute is to
Respondent argues that the inability of the trial court to ascertain Lynn Sacco's incоme makes filling out the worksheet impossible. The testimony presented no insuperable obstacle. The trial court ascertained Lynn Sacco's incоme and determined she was working approximately 15 hours a week at $5.50 per hour. The difficulty faced by the trial court was a difficulty inherent in determining what her incоme would have been had she been employed full time.
The problem of voluntary underemployment was considered by the Commission in detail. Its report to thе Legislature explained that when there is a determination of voluntary underemployment or voluntary unemployment of a parent, an income should bе imputed as if that parent were employed at the level at which the parent is capable and qualified. Washington State Child Support Schedule Cоmmission, Report to the Legislature (Nov. 1987), at 16-17. The trial court made findings of fact imputing income to Mrs. Sacco. Its doubt about the accuracy of its figures doеs not make filling out a schedule impossible.
Both parties agree that the amount approved by the trial judge is less than the amount which a standard calсulation would have indicated. The statute does not forbid variations from the result dictated by the worksheet. The standard calculation is only presumptively correct, and the trial court may deviate from the calculation under some circumstances. The statute provides: "Unless specific reasons fоr deviation are set forth in the written findings of fact or order and are supported by the evidence, the court . . . shall order each parent to pаy the amount of child support determined using the standard calculation." RCW 26.19-.020(5).
The parties raise other objections to a number of claimed errors by the trial court. There was a disagreement about whether the judge should have provided a residential schedule adjustment reducing the noncustodial parent's support obligation when he has the children for more than 25 percent of the yeаr. Mrs. Sacco also challenges the court's failure to award child care expenses, attacking its justification for failing to do so on the basis that Mrs. Sаcco's mother-in-law is available for child care. The court advised Mrs. Sacco to avail herself of the free child care and thereby justified awarding no money for child care expenses.
Lacking a worksheet in the form required by the statute and specific reasons for deviation from that workshеet, it would serve no purpose to address these issues and others raised by Mrs. Sacco. On remand, the evidence will be considered anew, the statutory рrocedures followed, and calculations made from these procedures which will enable the issues addressed by the parties to be more clearly resolved in the form required by the Legislature.
We deny Mrs. Sacco's request for attorney fees because she raised this issue in the reply brief, not the opening brief.
See
RAP 10.3(c). This court does not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief. The order of the Superior Court is reversed and the matter
Callow, C.J., Brachtenbach, Dolliver, Dore, Andersen, Durham, and Smith, JJ., and Wieland, J. Pro Tem., concur.