Opinion by
In this dissolution of marriage action, Kathleen A. Miller (wife) appeals from the permanent orders for property division. The sоle issue is whether certain stock options and a restricted stock grant received by Bradley W. Miller (husband) during the marriage cоnstitute marital property in whole or in part. We conclude that the trial court correctly determined that those assets were only partially marital property and, thus, we affirm.
The parties were married on June 10, 1983. In 1988, 1990, and 1991, the husband received stock options from his employer. These options were given in return for service and as an incentive for continued emplоyment with the company. The options could be exercised as to one-quarter of the option shares after the first аnniversary date; as to one-half the shares after the second anniversary date; as to three-quarters of the shares after the third anniversary; and the options could be exei’cised as to all shares after the fourth anniversary date. The oрtions could be exercised in full upon the husband’s death or upon regular or disability retirement, but the options would terminate upоn termination of the husband’s employment for any other reason.
The husband also received a restricted stock grant in 1991, in return for his service on a two-year project and also as an incentive to remain with the company. That stock was held in escrow by the company, and the husband had no right to transfer or assign the stock, although he could vote it and receive dividends. His ownership of the stock would be “vested” or unrestricted after five years, on July 17, 1996, were he to remain a full-time employee of the company until then. If he were to die before that date, his estate would receive a pro rata number of shares proportional to the number of years elapsed in the five-year period. If his employment were to terminate for any other reason before the “vesting” date, the stock would be “forfeited” and “ownership transferred back to the company.”
A personnel manager from the husband’s company characterized the stock options and the restricted stоck grant as “golden handcuffs.”
The trial court examined the text of each individual incentive stock option and restricted stock agreement. It then ruled that a fraction of the options and restricted stock grant was marital property, that fraсtion representing the “ratio of the period that the parties were married during these respective options and grаnt in proportion to the entire length of the options or grant.” Thus, that portion of the benefits which was earned during the marriage was determined by the trial court to be marital property.
While permanent orders were entered in May 1993, a decreе of dissolution had been entered in 1992. The date of the decree governed distribution of marital property. Based on that dаte, the wife was awarded as her separate property: ½ of the 1988 option, which was then fully exercisable; ½ of ½ of thе 1990 option; ⅜ of ¾ of the 1991 option; and ½ of 26% of the 1991 grant. The husband retained the right to exercise the options, and the wife was tо receive her part of the profits or proceeds from the exercised options, dividends paid, and granted stoсk when it became unrestricted, net of taxes and associated costs.
The wife contends that the stock options and rеstricted stock grant are a form of employee benefits which are deferred compensation and thus entirely marital property. We disagree.
Marital property subject to division does not include property acquired after the dissolution. Section 14-10-113(2), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6B);
In re Marriage of Faulkner,
The wife asserts that “the husband’s contractual rights to the stocks have already been established,” and “thе only contingency which remains is that he continue in employment with [the company] until the required time elapses.” However, it is thаt contingency that distinguishes the compensation fully earned
(hiring
the marriage, which is marital property subject to division, from that еarned
after
the marriage, which is not marital property.
See In re Marriage of Faulkner, supra; see also In re Marriage of Grubb,
Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that those portions of the options and restricted stock grant which may become available because of the husband’s continued employment after the dissolution do not constitute marital property. Rather, those portions are сonsidered future income, not subject to division. See In re Marriage of Anderson, supra.
The court’s division of stock options and the restricted stock grant, which we herе approve, is fully in accord with Colorado law regarding the division of other future interests in property earned during the marriаge but deferred until after dissolution.
See In re Marriage of Grubb, supra
(employer-supported pension plans);
In re Marriage of Gallo,
Several cases from other jurisdictions are in accord with our approach to determination and distribution of deferred compensаtion as marital property.
See,
e.g.,
In re Marriage of Hug,
The wife also contends that: “Once the waiting period has expired, [she] should be allowed tо exercise her share of the stock options upon payment of the option price and taxes due, at her discretion.” However, she provides no argument or authority to support that statement, so we do not address it.
See Nicoloff v. Bloom Land & Cattle Co.,
The judgment is affirmed.