*1 right. But not re- some does section 910.2 Iowa Code defendant. redounding a civil to the penalty resti- include sentencing court order the quires individual, such as of an a forfei- if defendant benefit for court costs tution interest. argues ture of pay. Brady “reasonably is able” makes mandatory is and language that this (5th Dictionary Law ed. Black’s a for costs reimbursement a defendant’s Moreover, practice, in it could lead actual purposes of rule “punishment” of form example, if For to absurd results. 8(2)(b). case, surely lost prosecution a criminal we argument say not suffered a criminal Brady his would it had cites P.2d the costs as- Wyoming, punishment v. because the case Keller Keller, argument reject en- to We that (Wyo.1986). In the court sessed it. 8(2)(b) was this case and rule violated colloquy with the defendant gaged a therefore affirm. concerning minimum maximum receive, could it but sentence the defendant Brady’s note that attack this sen We matter restitution. did not mention the narrow; only quite is he contends tence held was er- Wyoming court that this “guilty plea” is defective оn the that ror, that punishment ground the court costs were of a a viewpoint defendant 8(2)(b). not argue [f]rom rule He does under payment of restitution criminal payment consequence” of costs is a “direct payment as of a fine. penalty as much a cases, which, under our must be discussed payment money. require Both See, plea in a by guilty colloquy. the court consequences plea. are of the State, Both direct Saadiq N.W.2d 325- e.g., v. by are law. punishments 1986); Rand, Both authorized State therefore, Restitution, part (Iowa 1979). express no view provided by that, possible penalty suggest “maximum question latter but cases, purposes guilty plea proceed Rule law” courts in 15(c) trial requires impact ings fully we hold that Rule inform defendants provisions a Code judge inform defendant the restitution Iowa power chapter to order restitution. 910. Keller, 723 at 1246-47. P.2d AFFIRMED. reasoning. agree
We do not noted, (which in restitution
the Keller court more be- case much substantial restitution) re-
cause it included victim money, a fine
quires payment just
does, are fine and restitution both a plea. of a But consequences guilty direct OF Thomas MARRIAGE agree not with its conclusion that we do August and Diana FRANCIS by punishments Francis, authorized “[b]oth Mora Payment money a court under law.” Upon Petition of order, alone, make it standing does not did, punishment. judgment If it a civil Francis, August Appellant, compensatory damages could considered be punishment. be Francis, Appellee. Mora gen- does fit the Assessment of costs 88-1188. No. erally punishment, definition understood to be which said Supreme of Iowa. Court fine, in- [a]ny penalty, or confinement 14, 1989. June upon by authority of person flicted Rehearing July Denied judgment sеntence the law and the court, some or offense crime him, or for committed his omission duty deprivation law. A enjoined *2 admitted to medical he was
On
proposed
school,
Thomas Francis
appellant
Diana Mora Francis.
appellee
them, they
couples
Like countless
before
*3
support
their
to one another
pledged
years
to a shared future. Six
commitment
later,
their mar-
children
and two
Tom stands
riage
at an end. And while
physician
of his career as
at the threshold
pon-
family practice,
specializing
vantаge point of
ders her future from
helped support
family
has
one who
and two
through medical school
generated
residency
the modest income
on
by her in-home
care business.
issue,
by the trial
fighting
as framed
ap-
court and reiterated
any,
if
compensation,
peal, is this: What
for her contribution
Diana receive
earning capacity due
increased
to Thomas’
during the mar-
to his education received
this court has
riage? For over a decade
recognized
spouse’s
that a
contribution
earning potential is a factor
that increased
in the award of alimo-
properly considered
ny
equitable division
and an
Horst-
assets. See
1978).
mann,
263 N.W.2d
ac-
each dissolution
precisely
Yet
because
unique
on its
facts
must be decided
tion
circumstances,
predictable method
no
distributing
of valuing that contribution or
potential has
of that increased
the fruits
upon.
been settled
awarded Diana a
the trial court
Here
payable
award
$100,000lump
property
sum
installments,
annual
interest
in ten
three-year rehabilitative аli-
along
awith
Phelan, Tucker,
L. Walker of
appeal
Bruce
totaling
On
mony award
Mullen,
appellant.
City, for
Iowa
Boyle &
Thomas concedes
judgments,
from these
something but
is entitled to
that Diana
Hayek & Hol-
Hayek Hayek,
Peter
C.
and nature
challenges the size
land,
appellee.
City, for
Iowa
first,
grounds:
principal
awards on three
that the court based its
legal
erroneous
conclusion that a medical
NEUMAN, Justice.
pur-
education
constitutes
asset for the
distribution;
pose
equitable
second,
thorny econоmic
involves the
appeal
This
the trial
court based its award on calcula-
surrounding
has come
be
what
issues
speculative, incomplete,
tions that were
degree/divorce de-
“advanced
called the
third,
and,
misleading;
that the record
does
action.
dissolution
cree”
Haugan
Haugan,
Wis.2d
cynical,
Court
206,
apt,
label derived
but somewhat
1. An
(1984).
Supreme
the Wisconsin
from one coined
891;
Diana’s need for rehabilitative
Berger,
2d
at
388 —
Stewart,
Additionally,
challenges
alimony.
direct the trial courts to
such con
consider
awarding
property
tributions
of
guide
I.
well settled rules
Several
spousal support.
Code
See Iowa
598.-
Principal among
our decision.
is the
§§
them
21(l)(e), (3)(h)
(1987).
(j)
degree
rule that
profession
an'advanced
or
al license in and
is
an asset
of itself
remembered, however,
It must be
Janssen,
property
purposes.
division
purposes
property
of
division and
253; Horstmann,
With these parties. er the contentions alimony was Rehabilitative conceived economically de- way of an a by begins asserting II. that the Thomas spouse through period a limited pendent erroneously court characterized his trial retraining following di- re-education or as marital medical education license vorce, op- thereby creating incentive subject equitable divi- properly assets spouse to become self- portunity in We find no merit contention. sion. Krauskopf, supporting. Rehabilita- See specifically The trial found that Alimony: and Abuses Limit- “degree tive Uses obtained ... [is] 573, Fam.L.Q. Alimony, 21 correctly Duration property.” It then went on to ed Estlund, (hereinafter Janssen, (1988) Krauskopf); Horstmann, Saekett cite Munyon, A Tra- proposition potential Alimony: that it is Retreat & from degree] distinguished light in and of precedent in this from the [as earlier cited 2. itself, appeals’ a value fixed and opinion, the asset to which we differ with court of added.) Wagner, (Emphasis We find suggestion Marriage divided.” recent in In then Horstmann, 372, (Iowa App.1988) in conflict with such a view direct 435 N.W.2d not, "potential earning capacity N.W.2d at increase in $100,000as “windfall to Spousal Concepts Support, ditional (herein- (1985-86) any return equitable L.Rev. far in excess of Drake Sackett); during In re after see also she made on the contributions Bevers, marriage.” We turn to the record to thus light in evaluate the size of award self-sufficiency is the Because presented. the facts goal rehabilitative the duration be limited or extend may of such award legally May married realistic depending ed needs together but had lived since the birth tempered economically dependent spouse, son, Michael, in of their November 1980. goal facilitating the economic marriage, party time of At the their neither ex-spouses. independence of See employed neither significant had Fam.L.Q. Krauskopf, 21 at 582. any completed assets kind. Thomas had alimony, payable for case of “traditional” degree year grad- his bachеlor’s long spouse incapable life or so as a study. completed uate Diana had all but self-support, (e.g., re change status required her thesis and examination oral marriage) may support picture alter the degree early for a master’s childhood and warrant a modification. See development. She received that Shima, child, June 1983. The second Mel- (Iowa 1985) (remarriage shifts the burden issa, was born in March 1984. recipient prove extraordinary circum their marriage, From outset of Thom- requiring alimony). stаnces continuation of agreed as and Diana that Diana care would *6 alimony, “Reimbursement” for their children earn for income hand, predicated upon other which is eco family by caring people’s other children spouse nomic sacrifices made dur arrangement in their home. This continued ing directly enhance the throughout marriage except for a brief other, earning capacity future period shortly after Melissa was born. subject should not be to modification Meanwhile, Thomas enterеd medical compensation termination until full University in school Southern Illinois award, property achieved. Similar to a but year fall After one he transferred capacity based rather University Springfield of Illinois at tangible assets, than division a it should he where obtained his medical be fixed at the In time the decree. 1986,graduating top twenty-five per- recognition personal nature family cent of his class. The then moved laws, award the current tax a City so Iowa that Thomas could enroll spouse’s obligation reimbursement University’s three-year residency pro- upon recipi must terminate gram physicians specializing family (Tax 71(b)(1)(D) ent’s death. See I.R.C. § practice. 1986); Reform Act of Green v. Com cf. missioner, (6th Cir.1988). F.2d By parties November were ex- periencing marital difficulties. June exemplifies We think the case us before petitioned Thomas for dissolution of calling the situation for an reim- marriage. Trial held in June 1988. bursement than rather only settlement. Not does such award marriage through From the date of their closer bear a resemblance to than a trial, parties the date of supported assets, alimony division carries tax bene- variety themselves on income from a the payor fits to and assurance to the During sources. the summer before medi- payee that the award will not be dis- began, gar- cal school Thomas worked aas charged in bankruptcy. See I.R.C. § dener and approximately earned $1200. 523(a)(5). 11 U.S.C. The trial court’s de- § roughly per earned year Diana from cree must be accordingly. modified day her in-home care business. Thomas’ parents $11,500 III. Whether as a property classified di- contributed and Diana’s objects gave $12,000. vision or to the mother them Student loans $45,500 earning capacity, six-year pe- not the value of over the accounted Thomas’ medical license: riod. background analysis, his economic medical de- Thomas obtained his Once Dr. took the facts Stevenson into account substantially. earnings up gree, his went age, related previously concerning the edu- $8700, salary he earned while his cation, experience work and finanсial con- for 1987 was At the time parties. figures tributions To those per earning approximately $3000 he was sum of he added the for the esti- from a of resident’s month combination present mated value Diana’s homemaker emergen- salary “moonlighting” as an (at per hour) services over the six- $6.70 cy physician. room Adding year period. to her this sum dispute their rel- strenuously earnings, capital care investment rearing to child ative contributions obtaining eq- Thomas’ medical education housekeeping throughout the mar- tasks approximately fifty percent ualled riage. Thomas he contributed claims that capital total committed. thirty fifty percent of those services figures upon reported Based in a credited for child that Diana not be journal surveys of medical economics that homemaking hours in during care or those earnings by physicians' speciality and other caring she was children as which for other (such as geography, type classifications argues as her own. that Thom- well experience, etc.), practicе, age, Dr. Steven- studies, to his as dem- as’ devotion medical son calculated after-tax value by his a success- onstrated class rank and family prac- Thomas’ future income as a residency, greatly ful limited his available physician $1,615,735. to be He then tice time at home. $807,206, figure the sum of subtracted specifically The district found representing the estimated future income testimony credibility lacking in the 30-34 age of a male bracket with a regard alleged to his con- substantial undergraduate five-year degree. The dif- to the of thе house- tribution maintenance ($808,529)represents ference the additional *7 however, conclude, hold. It did that Thom- accruing income as a of the medical result loans, the as’ educational combined with degree. parties’ income he has the earned since ratio, Applying a 30/70 capital to labor separation, has furnished the bulk thirty Dr. then determined that Stevenson family’s support. financial From our re- percent present of Thomas’ value record, view of the we discover no reason $242,559, earnings, оr future is attributable findings. to differ with these capital acquiring to contributed the edu- to figure by cation. He then reduced that argument principal The reflect to one-half to Diana’s contribution testimony
over the
of Dr. Richard Steven
to
capital
“the
needed
the medical
obtain
son,
acting
professor of finance and
trea
family
the
until
education and
He
University
surer of the
of Iowa.
filed.”
the divorce was
Thus his estimation
Diana,
words,
engaged by
in his
“to value
future
of Diana’s contribution to Thomas’
capital
the
that
Mrs.
was contributed
earning capacity equals
Francis to the medical education received
during
recognized
Dr. Francis.”
that Dr.
The district
figure
objected
Thomas’ counsel
to the introduc
final
was based
Stevenson’s
ground
assumptions
prediction
his
testimony
many
tion of this
that
that
expert’s analysis placed
earnings
value on the
Thomas’ future
could not be
itself,
Moreover,
that the
degree
contrary to the dictates
exact.
court noted
Horstmann,.
not
professor
renews that conten
did
consider
benefit
Thomas
convinced,
appeal.
gained by
how
Diana
her achievement
tion on
We are
ever,
calculations,
during marriage.
degree
that Dr.
Con-
Stevenson’s
master’s
award,
compensate
for her
sequently,
district court’s
were
“to
Diana
ultimate
on Diana’s contribution to Thomas’
contribution to Thomas’ increased
based
porting spouses solely for
earning capacity,”
expense
court ordered Thom-
$100,000,
itself.
pay-
sum of
pay
as to
Diana ’the
$10,000
able in
each
annual installments
We
in the
find no error
formula usеd
commencing July
earning
here
to measure
capacity and Diana’s contribution to its at-
trial court’s award
Thomas attacks the
tainment.
concedes a willingness
Thomas
virtually every aspect
challenging
of Dr.
$60,000
her
Diana
contribution.
But for his own
Stevenson’s calculations.
figure
The trial
finds
opinions,
offered no evi-
Thomas
ample support
record
in the
and we are not
assumptions upon
dence to controvert
persuaded to
or overturn
reduce
it. See In
He cer-
which the calcuations
basеd.
Wiedemann,
re
challenge
tainly did
the estimated annu-
1987);
In Marriage
re
projections,
al
reduced to
income
Bare,
(Iowa 1973);
begrudges
merely
value. He
Diana her
Griffin,
contribution to the accumulation of that
App.1984).
income.
prior
IV. Just
Horstmann,
approved
an award
we
program
learned of a
in St. Louis that
represented
cost of the
education
would train
pre-school
her Montessori
degree.
towards an advanced
See Horst
theory
thereby
re-entry
enhance her
mann,
noted,
Like the district 1, 1988, alimony commencing August program as a reasonable tive Montessori Louis re-entry into the affirmed modified reduction facilitating Diana’s way of guaranteed year increase amount to $1000 force. In view work judgment court’s program, per how- month. The trial placement feature of attorney request ali- fеes is affirmed. Diana’s ever, one-year’s rehabilitative we think attorney appeal must be fees on is denied. mony is decree sufficient against this action assessed accordingly. Costs modified appellant. Finally, conten- address Thomas’ V. we required he not be to con- AFFIRMED AS MODIFIFED. tion that fees, attorney Diana’s tribute towards appeal. except
trial or on All Justices concur CARTER ANDREASEN, JJ., partially who attorney fees Ordinarily, dissent. the trial rests the sound discretion of appeal and will be disturbed on CARTER, part). (dissenting Justice Mar- an аbuse of discretion. In re absent I believe the trial court was correct Schissel, 292 N.W.2d riage of concluding type spousal reim- that the 1980). controlling factor is abili- primary which is the issue on bursement pay ty to the fees. appeal this has all of attributes Muelhaupt, settlement. I it as would treat characterizing rather than it as alimo- such had At time of ny. $720; monthly earnings of course, Thomas, the mar leaves $2068. J., ANDREASEN, joins partial this great riage deal of debt. burdened with dissent. year residency, how salary His first out ever, to be at least anticiрated field, though professionally
Diana’s chosen
rewarding, far less financial se furnishes
curity. account, into
Taking factors we these trial no abuse of discretion in the
find to- requiring Thomas to PROFESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON attorney Diana’s fees. view wards ETHICS AND CONDUCT OF alimony upheld awards the substantial ASSOCIATION, BAR STATE IOWA appeal, reject we Complainant, appeal. fees on attorney claim for See *9 Dahl, (Iowa App.1987). HAVERCAMP, Respondent. Alan R. In lieu Summary. VI. No. 89-353. in Di- judgment entered the trial court Supreme of Iowa. Court favor, that the trial court ana’s we direct order Thomas to Diana reimburse- 14, 1989. June $10,000 per year for a ment commencing July period of ten percent the rate of ten
1989. Interest at any payment
per annum shall accrue thirty days of due date.
made within its subject shall judgment
This not be