Opinion by
Rоger Trout (husband) appeals from post-decree orders with respect to maintenance,
I.
Husband first contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to modify maintenance because the record showed that wife’s income had increased since the date of decree, while his income had decreased and his debt obligations remained the same. We are not persuaded.
Thе fact that a spouse enjoys increased income does not necessarily require the conclusion that an initial award of maintenance has been rendered unconscionable. Whether a change is so substantial and continuing as to render the prior order unconscionable requires examination of the totality of the circumstances.
In re Marriage of Udis,
Here, the extensive findings of the trial court demonstrate that it evaluated the entire circumstances of the parties under the appropriate standard.
See In re Marriage of Anderson,
Further, the cоurt’s conclusions that the wife’s need for maintenance is real and continuing and that husband earns enough income to pay the sum of $250 per month are sufficient to support the order denying modification. In re Marriage of Udis, supra.
II.
Husband next asserts that the trial court’s award of attorneys fees to wife is not supported by the required findings and that the record is devoid of any evidence thаt the amount awarded was reasonable. We agree that the award must be reconsidered.
In its November 1993 order, the trial court originally ordered that husband bear one-half оf the wife’s attorney fees since it determined that those fees had been incurred in connection with the motion to modify maintenance. However, the court later granted wife’s motion to amend the order as to the award of attorney fees. In its January 14, 1994 order, the court ruled that attorney fees would be liquidated and entered judgment against husband for the sum of $1,972.88, which represented one-half the fees incurred by wife. Husband filed an amended notice of appeal from that order.
A trial court may consider a party’s actions in initiating unwarranted proceedings when determining whether to award attorney fees.
In re Marriage of Peterson,
Here, the award of attorney fees was apparently based entirely upon the conclusion that husband’s motion to modify maintenance was denied. This was an impermissible basis, alone, upon which to award attorney fees.
Further, although the rеcord contains copies of the billings that wife received from her attorney, which were admitted without objection and which the court presumably considered before еntering its latter order, the court made no specific findings showing how it arrived at the amount ordered. Nor was the reasonableness of the fees awarded established.
Accordingly, the award of attorney fees in neither order can stand, and the matter must be remanded for reconsideration and for further findings to support any specific award that is made.
See In re Marriage of Sarvis,
III.
Husband also contends that the triаl court abused its discretion in directing the parties to divide the federal tax exemptions without hearing any evidence or making appropriate findings on that issue. We agreе.
Further, § 14-10-115(14.5), C.R.S. (1994 Cum.Supp.), which became effective August 1, 1992, provides that:
Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, the court shall allocate the right to claim dependent children for income tax purposes betweеn the parties. These rights shall be allocated between the parties in proportion to their contributions to the costs of raising the children. A parent shall not be entitled tо claim a child as a dependent if he or she has not paid all court-ordered child support for that tax year or if claiming the child as a dependent would not result in any tаx benefit.
Here, the trial court modified the allocation as requested by wife in her closing argument without finding any substantial and continuing changed circumstances that would justify modification of the existing order, which awarded both exemptions to father. Nor did the court make the findings required by § 14-10-115(14.5) with respect to such entitlement.
Therefore, the order allocating the exemption to the parties in alternating years must be reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court with directions to reconsider whether a change in the allocation of the tax exemption is warranted and, if so, to make all appropriate findings as required. The court may take additional evidence as it deems necessary.
See In re Marriage of Lee,
IV.
Husbаnd also contends that the trial court erred in ordering that “the parties shall automatically adjust child support for any cost of living increase which [husband] receives.” He arguеs that neither the evidence nor the law supports an automatic modification based solely on a possible increase that he might receive in the future. We agree.
Section 14-10-115(3)(b)(II), C.R.S. (1994 Cum.Supp.) provides that the parties may agree, or the court may require them, to exchange financial information once a year, or less often, for the express purpose of updating and modifying a child support order without a court hearing.
Further, § 14-10-122(l)(b), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6B) provides that application of the child support guidelines tо circumstances which result in less than a ten percent change in the amount of support per month shall be deemed not to be a substantial and continuing change of circumstances. However,' a party may establish facts and circumstances that justify deviation from the guideline based on other substantial and continuing circumstances.
In re Marriage of Ford,
Thus, we concludе that the court is without authority to create a presumption of changed circumstances that alone would require modification of a support order.
Cf. In re Marriage of Davis,
Here, the court’s order, in effect, creates such a presumption only as to husband’s income. Thus, while the court can order both parties to exchange relevant financial information, it may not order an automatic increase in child support based solely upon a cost of living raise that husband might receive.
Accordingly, that part of the order requiring an automatic adjustment based solely upon husband’s income is reversed. Because this causе is being remanded on other issues, the court may reconsider whether to order the exchange of financial information under § 14 — 10—115(3)(b)(II).
V.
Finally, husband asserts that the trial court erred in determining thаt, because a
Under § 14-14-107(5)(b), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6B), the statute applicable here, a wage assignment could not be activated unless by request of the obligor or by agreement of the pаrties, or unless the obligee filed an advance notice of activation to enforce a support order.
Cf.
§ 14-14-lll(2)(b)(I), C.R.S. (1994 Cum.Supp.) (effective January 1,1994, a wage assignment may automatically be ordered as part of a child support order). And, § 14-14-107, C.R.S. (1994 Cum.Supp.) sets forth the procedures required to activate a wage assignment.
See In re Marriage of Watters,
Here, a review of the record, which according to the designation included all pleadings and orders in the ease, shows that § 14-14-107(5)(b) was not complied with. Accordingly, we agree that the order for activаtion of the wage assignment was in error.
Those portions of the orders awarding attorney fees, activating a wage assignment, ordering an automatic adjustment of child suppоrt for cost of living increases received by husband, and allocating the federal tax exemptions are reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the views set forth in this opinion. In all other respects, the orders are affirmed.