In re the Marriage of: Abdihafid Hariri Hassan Yusuf, petitioner, Appellant, vs. Neama Omar Y Al Somali, Respondent. ...
Maria E. Maier, St. Paul & Ramsey County Domestic Abuse Intervention Project, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
In this pro se appeal, appellant-father appeals from two district court orders determining that father was a frivolous litigant and denying his motions to modify
FACTS
Appellant-father, Abdihafid Hariri Hassan Yusuf, and respondent-mother, Neama Omar Y Al Somali, were married in October 2019. The parties have one joint child who was born in 2020.
The parties separated in June 2021, and both filed petitions for an Order for Protection (OFP) for themselves and on behalf of the child against the other party. Father petitioned for a dissolution of the marriage in June 2022. The parties have a history of extensive litigation in this dissolution matter and the related OFP matters.
In June 2021, father’s request for an ex parte OFP was denied and mother’s request for an ex parte OFP was granted. In January 2022, after consolidated evidentiary hearings on both OFP petitions, father’s petition was dismissed because the district court found that his allegations were not proved. And an OFP was issued for mother against father with findings that father committed acts of domestic abuse against mother. That order granted mother temporary sole legal and physical custody of the child.
In orders from February, March, and June 2022, the district court denied father’s repeated motions to modify custody in the OFP matter, determining that father had no basis to modify custody and was instead attempting to relitigate the OFP. In orders from April and June 2022, the district court denied father’s motion to modify child support in the OFP matter, finding that father was voluntarily underemployed. Father then filed another motion to modify the OFP seeking the same relief. Father also moved to disqualify the
In April 2024, after a two-day trial in this dissolution matter, the district court entered a dissolution decree granting mother sole legal and sole physical custody of the child, granting father supervised parenting time at FamilyWise, and ordering father to pay child support.1 As is also relevant to this appeal, the district court ordered that father complete specific requirements to receive unsupervised parenting time, including requiring that father attend nine consecutive months of consistent supervised parenting time at FamilyWise. The district court found that father was voluntarily underemployed and imputed to him a gross monthly income of $2,783. And the district court awarded mother the right to claim the tax dependency exemption for the parties’ child because father had less than ten percent of the overall parenting time.
In May 2024 father appealed the district court’s dissolution decree. We affirmed the district court’s dissolution decree on appeal. Yusuf v. Al Somali, No. A24-0880, 2025 WL 826285, at *1 (Minn. App. Mar. 17, 2025).
In June 2025, father filed an ex parte motion for emergency relief alleging that mother’s brother posed an immediate threat to the child. In that motion, father also sought an order preventing the child from being removed to Saudi Arabia by mother, a stay of his driver’s license suspension, and an order vacating the dissolution decree based on a due-process violation. The district court denied the motion. One week after the denial of the first ex parte motion, father filed a second ex parte motion seeking the same emergency relief. The district court denied that motion. The day following the denial of the second ex parte motion, father moved to disqualify the referee.
In July 2025, mother moved to deem father a frivolous litigant in this matter. In August 2025, father filed an amended motion and affidavit seeking to decrease child support, alleging that his gross monthly income was $1,200 and that he was enrolled in a master’s program, which he claimed was a bona fide career change. Mother filed a responsive motion and affidavit, and father filed what looked like a reply brief in which he repeated his same arguments about custody, child support, parenting time, and child endangerment. In that filing, father also responded to mother’s claim that he was a frivolous litigant.
Later that month, the district court held a motion hearing on mother’s frivolous-litigant motion and father’s various requests in the amended motion. At the motion hearing, father’s counsel clarified that father was withdrawing his request to disqualify the referee and that the only relief father was seeking was what was stated in the amended motion and affidavit filed by counsel.
In October 2025, the district court granted mother’s motion to deem father a frivolous litigant in this dissolution matter and ordered that father either furnish a bond of $5,000 or be represented by an attorney to file any further motions. And in November 2025, the district court denied father’s amended motion seeking a modification of parenting time and child support, as well as an award of the tax dependency exemption and an order prohibiting mother from allowing the child to be alone with her brother and prohibiting the child from travelling to Saudi Arabia.
Father appeals these orders.
DECISION
Father seeks reversal of the district court’s order determining that he was a frivolous litigant, and the district court’s order denying his amended motion.
Father is a self-represented litigant. “Although some accommodations may be made for [self-represented] litigants, this court has repeatedly emphasized that [self-represented] litigants are generally held to the same standards as attorneys and must comply with court rules.” Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App. 2001). Self-represented litigants, like those represented by counsel, must support their claims with “either arguments or citations to legal authority.” State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 22 (Minn. 2008). An assignment of error in a brief based on “mere assertion” and not supported by argument or authority is waived “unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971); see also Fannie Mae v. Heather Apartments Ltd. P’ship, 811 N.W.2d 596, 600 n.2 (Minn. 2012) (“Summary arguments made without citation to legal support are waived.”). Nor do we presume error on appeal, and “the burden of showing error rests upon the one who relies upon it.” Midway Ctr. Assocs. v. Midway Ctr., Inc., 237 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn. 1975). And we may decline to address inadequately briefed issues. See State, Dep’t of Lab. & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (declining to address an inadequately briefed question).
With these principles in mind, we consider the many arguments raised by father on appeal. He argues that the district court erred by: (1) concluding that he was a frivolous litigant; (2) denying his request for a modification of parenting time; (3) denying his
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that father was a frivolous litigant.
Father first challenges the district court’s frivolous-litigant determination.
We review a district court’s determination that a party is a frivolous litigant for an abuse of discretion. See Szarzynski v. Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d 285, 290, 294-95 (Minn. App. 2007) (noting that the district court’s failure to apply the proper frivolous-litigant standard found in
- A person who, after a claim has been finally determined against the person, repeatedly relitigates or attempts to relitigate either
- the validity of the determination against the same party or parties as to whom the claim was finally determined, or
- the cause of action, claim, controversy, or any of the issues of fact or law determined or concluded by the final determination against the same party or parties as to whom the claim was finally determined; or
- A person who in any action or proceeding repeatedly serves or files frivolous motions, pleadings, letters, or other documents, conducts unnecessary discovery, or engages in oral or written tactics that are frivolous or intended to cause delay; or
- A person who institutes and maintains a claim that is not well grounded in fact and not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law or that is interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigating the claim.
After notice and hearing on a motion to have a person declared a frivolous litigant, a district court may, if it determines the person to be a frivolous litigant, require the frivolous litigant to post security or impose preconditions that the frivolous litigant must meet to serve or file any new claims, motions, or requests.
In determining that father was a frivolous litigant, the district court considered each of the seven factors and provided detailed reasoning. The district court explained that (1) father repeatedly filed “motion after motion asking to modify custody, child support,
Father contends that the district court abused its discretion by deeming him a frivolous litigant. Father argues that the district court failed to adequately consider the availability of lesser sanctions, and that it “conflate[d] the number and lack of success of his filings with a lack of good-faith basis.” He asserts that, instead, “[a] review of the record demonstrates each cluster of motions was grounded in fact, warranted by law, and filed for a proper purpose.”
But here, father does not dispute the district court’s factual findings, which the record supports. Instead, father essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence on appeal, which this court cannot do. See Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988). Moreover, father’s argument that the district court failed to consider the availability of lesser sanctions is contradicted by the district court’s order. The district court specifically noted that denying his prior motions had been insufficient to stop father from attempting
Father also argues that the imposition of the $5,000 bond violates his constitutional right to due process and his fundamental parental rights. Specifically, he asserts that his due-process rights were violated because the bond is disproportionate and essentially punishes him for having a low income. And he asserts that his fundamental parental rights are violated because he cannot file emergency motions related to the child’s safety, health, or welfare.
But father failed to raise these arguments at any time before the district court. Father therefore may not assert these arguments on appeal. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating that appellate courts generally address only those questions previously presented to and considered by the district court).
In sum, based on our review, we are satisfied that the district court considered the seven factors under
We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its frivolous-litigant determination.
Father next challenges the district court’s denial of his request to modify parenting time.
We review a decision about the modification of parenting time for an abuse of discretion. Suleski v. Rupe, 855 N.W.2d 330, 334 (Minn. App. 2014). “A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d at 506 (quotation omitted).
“District courts have broad discretion on matters of custody and parenting time.” Hansen v. Todnem, 908 N.W.2d 592, 596 (Minn. 2018). But a district court’s parenting-time determination must be guided by the best interests of the child.
In seeking a modification of parenting time, father argued that supervised parenting time at FamilyWise was prohibitively expensive because he was only earning $1,200 a month and was in school to earn a master’s degree in accounting and hoping to become a certified public accountant (CPA). He therefore argued that his economic circumstances should not prohibit him from seeing his child. Father also argued that he completed many of the district court’s requirements to receive unsupervised visitation with the child.
On this issue, the district court noted, and the record supports, that father conceded that he had failed to exercise supervised parenting time as ordered. The district court explained that father was asking for unsupervised parenting time but had not fulfilled the requirements in its initial decree that would permit father to be granted unsupervised parenting time—that father complete “nine consecutive months of consistent supervised parenting time at FamilyWise.” The district court also reasoned that father’s argument that he could not afford to participate in FamilyWise was not “convincing given that he is currently underemployed.” And the district court also explained that father’s request to have his brother supervise parenting time was not in the child’s best interests because father’s brother was not neutral and “would not be able to ensure that Father would not say negative things to the child about Mother.” The district court therefore denied father’s request to modify parenting time.
On appeal, father contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request to modify parenting time. Father argues that the district court failed to conduct
New Best-Interests Analysis
Father first asserts that the district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct a new best-interests analysis.
But in considering a motion to modify parenting time, the district court only has to consider the relevant best-interests factors and is not required to make specific findings on each factor. See Hansen, 908 N.W.2d at 599. Although the district court here did not identify any specific best-interest factors in denying father’s request to modify parenting time, the court explained that the requested modification was not in the best interests of the child. The district court also explained that father failed to abide by the terms of the initial decree in which the district court determined that supervised parenting time was in the best interests of the child. The district court’s reasoning therefore implies that it considered relevant factors and was guided by the best interests of the child. See
We therefore discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s best-interests analysis.
Father next argues that the “financial impossibility” of the supervised visits was a proper basis for modification.
Father generally relies on
Although father generally argued in district court that his financial circumstances prevented him from engaging with supervised parenting time, father did not argue as he does now that
For these reasons, father failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request to modify parenting time based on his alleged financial circumstances.
Remaining Arguments
As to father’s remaining claims—that the district court failed to consider his brother as a reasonable alternative, and that the district court improperly relied on father’s past conduct without considering the steps he had taken to address its concerns related to that conduct—his arguments are unsupported by any citation to legal authority.
While father purports to cite caselaw to support his remaining arguments, the cases cited do not exist and we are otherwise unable to locate those cases. Absent any other citation to legitimate legal authority, father’s remaining claims that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request to modify parenting time are not properly before us, and we decline to address them. See Ganguli v. Univ. of Minn., 512 N.W.2d 918, 919 n.1 (Minn. App. 1994) (declining to address allegations unsupported by legal analysis or
In sum, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s parenting-time determination. And father has failed to carry his burden to show that the district court otherwise erred by denying his request to modify parenting time. See Midway Ctr. Assocs., 237 N.W.2d at 78.
We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying father’s request to modify parenting time.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying father’s motion to modify child support.
Father next challenges the district court’s denial of his request to modify child support.
The district court may modify a child-support order if there has been a substantial change in circumstances that renders the terms of the order unreasonable and unfair.
As is also relevant here, a parent moving for a modification of child support may not rely on decreased income resulting from voluntary underemployment to show a substantial change in circumstances that renders the original award unreasonable and unfair. Ulrich v. Ulrich, 400 N.W.2d 213, 217 (Minn. App. 1987). But a parent is not voluntarily underemployed upon a showing that the “underemployment, or employment on a less than full-time basis is temporary and will ultimately lead to an increase in income,” or “represents a bona fide career change that outweighs the adverse effect of that parent’s diminished income on the child.”
Whether a parent is voluntarily underemployed is a factual finding that we review for clear error. Welsh v. Welsh, 775 N.W.2d 364, 370 (Minn. App. 2009). When reviewing for clear error, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings and “will not conclude that a fact[-]finder clearly erred unless, on the entire evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221 (quotations omitted). We do not reweigh the evidence, and we defer to district court’s credibility determinations. See id. at 217; Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at 210.
In denying his request to modify child support, the district court noted that it previously found father was voluntarily underemployed in its initial decree and that father previously sought a modification to child support based on his enrollment in the same master’s program. The district court also observed that an individual is not voluntarily underemployed if they show that underemployment is based on a bona fide career change. But the district court reasoned that father’s affidavits failed to show that his career change outweighs the adverse effects of the diminished income and that the amount of expected earnings was also unknown. The district court also explained that, although child support may be modified based on a change in child care expenses, father provided no information to establish the changed cost of child care. And the district court therefore concluded that father failed to carry his burden to demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances that would support a modification of child support.
Bona Fide Career Change
Father first argues that the district court erred by finding that his pursuit of a master’s degree was not bona fide career change.
The district court found that father failed to show that his career change outweighed the adverse effects of the diminished income and the amount by which father expected his earnings to increase based on his new career. That finding is supported by the record—nothing in father’s affidavit attached to his amended motion or his May 2025 child-custody related motion, adequately addressed these matters. Although father’s amended motion included a statement that he expected to receive an increase in income upon becoming a licensed CPA, the supreme court has held that a parent does not establish that underemployment will lead to an increase in income when the “assessment of his future earnings is entirely speculative.” Putz, 645 N.W.2d at 353. Here, father’s assertion that he expects to receive an increase in income, without anything more than his own assertions, is merely speculative.
Erroneous Calculation in Initial Decree and Present Order
Father also argues that the district court erroneously calculated his income in the initial decree and unfairly relied on that finding in its present order.
But father cites no legal authority that would support his argument. See Dieseth v. Calder Mfg. Co., 147 N.W.2d 100, 103 (Minn. 1966) (stating that “[e]ven though the decision of the trial court in the first order may have been wrong, if it is an appealable order it is still final after the time for appeal has expired”); Dailey v. Chermak, 709 N.W.2d 626, 631 (Minn. App. 2006) (applying this aspect of Dieseth in a family-law appeal), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2006). Father’s argument on this issue is not properly before us, and we decline to address it. See Ganguli, 512 N.W.2d at 919 n.1; Melina, 327 N.W.2d at 20.
Modification to Child Care Support
Father lastly argues that the district court erred by denying his request to modify child care support based on the alleged change in child care costs. He argues that the district court erred because he carried his initial burden to show a substantial change in
Father’s arguments fail to persuade us that the district court abused its discretion in denying his request to modify child care support. First, although father alleged that the child was now in school, which he believed would reduce the cost of child care, father provided no specific allegations beyond these mere assertions that the costs of child care had decreased. Father therefore failed to carry his burden of proving both that there has been a substantial change in circumstances and that the change makes the existing order unreasonable and unfair. See Hecker, 568 N.W.2d at 709.
Second, although father generally alleged in his May 2025 motion and amended motion that mother had failed to provide documentation of child care costs, father did not make the argument under
In sum, father failed to carry his burden to show that the district court abused its discretion in denying father’s request to modify child support or child care support. See Midway Ctr. Assocs., 237 N.W.2d at 78. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of father’s request to modify child support.
Father next challenges the district court’s factual findings related to his request for an order regarding the child’s safety.
We review a district court’s findings of fact for clear error, “giving deference to the district court’s opportunity to evaluate witness credibility.” Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Minn. 2008). “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous where an appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (quotation omitted).
In his amended motion, father requested an order prohibiting mother from allowing the child to be alone with her brother and prohibiting the child from traveling to Saudi Arabia. In denying father’s request, the district court found that father presented no credible evidence that mother’s brother is a danger to the child or that the child must be prohibited from traveling to Saudi Arabia with either parent. The district court therefore denied father’s request.
On appeal, father argues that the district court ignored credible evidence that the brother was a danger to the child and that the child should be prohibited from traveling to Saudi Arabia. He thus asserts that the district court clearly erred by finding that he presented no credible evidence.
To the extent that he argues that the district court ignored his credible evidence, he essentially asks this court to reweigh the evidence on appeal, which this court cannot do. See Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at 210. Based on our review of the record, we are not left with a
We affirm the district court’s denial of father’s request for an order prohibiting mother from allowing the child to be alone with her brother and prohibiting the child from traveling to Saudi Arabia.
V. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying father’s request for tax-dependency-exemption status.
Father next challenges the district court’s denial of his request for a tax-dependency exemption under
We review a district court’s allocation of an income-tax dependency exemption for an abuse of discretion. See Ludwigson v. Ludwigson, 642 N.W.2d 441, 449 (Minn. App. 2002) (“The allocation of federal-tax exemptions is within the [district] court’s discretion.”). “A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d at 506 (quotation omitted).
Under
On appeal, father does not dispute that he has less than ten percent parenting time. Instead, he argues that the district court’s application of the statute was “[o]verly [r]igid” and ignored the court’s “broader equitable powers in dissolution cases.” He asserts that the district court “should have engaged in an analysis of which parent would derive the greater financial benefit from the exemption” and that allocating the exemption to father “[w]ould [p]romote the [c]hild’s [w]ell-[b]eing.”
Father’s arguments fail to persuade us that the district court abused its discretion in denying his request for a tax-dependency exemption. The district court reasoned, based on evidence in the record, that father continues to have less than ten percent parenting time. Indeed, father acknowledges that he has not seen his child in 18 months. The district court therefore correctly determined that father was not entitled to a tax-dependency exemption under
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying father’s request for a tax dependency exemption under
VI. We do not reach the merits of father’s due-process argument raised for the first time on appeal.
Father next contends that the district court relied on factual inaccuracies and translation errors in its orders and initial decree which violated father’s “due-process right to a fair and accurate proceeding and renders the [district] court’s findings clearly erroneous.”
Father’s amended motion, however, included no due-process claims. And the district court’s orders from which father appeals did not consider whether father’s due-process rights had been violated. As a result, this court may not consider his arguments on this issue. See Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582; see also In re Welfare of C.L.L., 310 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Minn. 1981) (declining to address father’s due-process argument and noting that appellate courts generally will not consider constitutional issues not raised below).
VII. We do not reach father’s service-related due-process argument raised for the first time in his reply brief.
Finally, father contends that his due-process rights were violated because he did not receive service of process of mother’s frivolous-litigant motion.
But father did not raise this issue in his principal brief on appeal. Instead, father raises this argument for the first time in his reply brief.4 We generally do not reach issues raised for the first time in a reply brief. Emerson v. Sch. Bd. of Indep. Sch. Dist. 199, 809 N.W.2d 679, 687 (Minn. 2012). We therefore decline to address father’s service-related due-process argument.
Affirmed.