5 F. 599 | S.D.N.Y. | 1881
This is a petition filed by the owner of the steam-boat Seawahnaka for the benefit of the acts of Congress for limiting the liability of owners of vessels.
The original petition alleged that the petitioner is a New York corporation owning and running a line of steam-vessels for the carriage of freight and passengers between the city of New York and Eoslyn, and intermediate points and places all in the state of New York, and that its vessel the Seawahnaka was one of said line, and was duly enrolled at the office of the collector of New York; that on the twenty-eighth day of June, 1880, while said vessel was on her regular trip from New York to Eoslyn with a large number of passengers, and a large and valuable cargo belonging to several persons, and when near Hell Gate, she was found to be on fire, and it became necessary to beach her, which was done on Eandall’s island, where she burnt to the water’s edge and became an utter wreck; that the cargo and other property on board were thereby lost and destroyed, and many of the passengers were killed or drowned or seriously injured, and that no freight had been received on said cargo; that the fire happened, and the loss and damage was done and incurred, without the design, neglect, or fault of the petitioner, and without its privity or knowledge; that certain claims have been made and certain suits have been commenced against the petitioner by persons .claiming to have sustained damage as owners, shippers, or consignors of cargo, or as passengers, or representatives or relatives of passengers killed by said disaster, and that said claims far exceed the value of said wreck.
The prayer of the petition is for the appointment of a' trustee to receive a transfer of the said wreck, for a monition to all parties having claims to come in and make proof thereof and answer, for a decree determining the liability of the petitioner and limiting its liability, if found liable at all, to the value of said wreck, for the distribution of its proceeds among the claimants if entitled thereto, and for an order restraining all suits pending the final determination of this proceeding.
Upon filing the petition a trustee was appointed, to whom
Upon the return-day of the monition serveral parties appeared, who fded exceptions to the petition, or moved to dismiss the petition for want of jurisdiction in the court, or to set aside the monition and vacate the restraining order on various grounds, some of which are of general application to all the claims and some are applicable to particular claims. One of the points made against the jurisdiction of the court was that the petition showed that the vessel was engaged only in commerce between ports of the state of New York. The petitioner, upon the hearing of the motions and exceptions, asked leave to amend the petition, and aver that although the service of said steam-boat was between ports all in the state of New' York, yet it formed a link in the chain of commercial intercourse between this state and other states and foreign countries, and that said vessel was engaged in the transportation over the waters of Long Island sound of merchandise coming from foreign coun tries and from other states, and destined to points in this state on the route of said steamboat, and in the transportation over said waters of goods shipped within this state, destined for and addressed to ports and places in other states of the United States and foreign countries, and also in the transportation of passengers destined to and coming from other states.
Some of the claimants who have appeared have answered the amended petition, and, upon the hearing, the right of all parties appearing to answer was reserved till a day to be fixed after the decision of the court upon the motions and exceptions. So far as the question of jurisdiction rests upon the point that the vessel was, upon the averments of the petition, engaged exclusively in the commerce of the state of New York, and therefore that the limited liability act, considered as a regulation of commerce, has no application to the case, on the conceded principle that the power of congress to legislate for the regulation of commerce is limited to the passage of law's for the regulation of commerce between the states and
Article 3, § 2, of the constitution declares that the judicial power shall extend to “all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” Two of the principal classes of “cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,” everywhere recognized and
It is contended, on behalf of some of these claimants who have commenced suits under a state statute giving the administrator or the relatives of a person killed by the negligence of another the rig]it to recover damages caused by the negligent act which resulted in death, that their causes of action are not maritime nor cognizable in this court. I think in this they are mistaken. The cause of action is still maritime, however the right of the party entitled to sue upon is derived. Neither congress nor a state can make a contract maritime which is not so, nor take from a maritime contract its maritime character. The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624. The same principle manifestly applies to torts. The cause of action in these cases is a wrong committed and consummated on navigable waters. This stamps it as a marine tort.
In reference to the rule of limitation of liability on surrender of the vessel and the freight being already the rule of
The constitution provides that “the judicial power of the United States shall extend * * * to all cases of adrai
Aside from this power of congress to prescribe what remedies suitors in the courts of the United States may enjoy, it has been suggested by the supreme court that perhaps congress may adopt by legislative act, as part of the maritime law of the United States, a rule or principle of the general maritime law not before adopted as part of our maritime law.
The court then refers to the power of congress to regulate commerce, and its authority under that power, if no other, to-introduce such changes as are likely to he needed, and refers to the laws for the registry of vessels, recording bills of sale and mortgages of vessels, the rights and duties of seamen, the limitation of the responsibilities of ship-owners, and “many other things of a character truly maritime,” as illustrations of legislation within the power to regulate commerce, modifying the maritime law of the United States. It is in the same-
Coming, then, to the question of the actual construction to be given to- this statute, the question is whether it is to be held to be merely a regulation of commerce, interstate and foreign. There is nothing-in the act itself, it seems to me, that indicates that it was intended by congress to be so rer strieted in -its operation. The cases excepted out of its operation—“any canal-boat, barge, lighter, or any vessel of any description whatsoever, used on rivers or inland navigation”— are not cases of vessels engaged exclusively in commerce of a single state. It has been held that vessels navigating the great lakes are not within the exception. Moore v. Nav. Co. 24 How. 1. So far as the exception indicates a general purpose to distinguish between different waters, as those within and those without the operation of the act, the line is drawn between the external waters of the country, the sea and bodies of waters so vast as to be like the sea for purposes of navigation, and their immediately-connected waters on the one hand, and strictly fluvial or interior waters on the other hand, or between waters adapted to sea-going vessels and waters not so adapted. That the waters of Long Island sound are not within the exception is too plain on authority and on the reason of the thing to admit of discussion. Moore v. Nav. Co. ut supra; The Epilson, ut supra; Norwich Co. v. Wright, ut supra. This exception, so far as it has any bearing on the intention as- to the general operation of the act, seems to me to indicate that the purpose was to extend the act to all external waters, and to all sea-going vessels navigating them, to which the power of congress to legislate in this respect extended. The maxim expressio unius, exclusio alterius applies. As the terms of the act purport to extend generally to all vessels navigating the navigable waters of the United
Uniformity in the maritime law is one of its peculiar charteristics,—one of the tilings which makes it most beneficent in its operation; and the great benefits to result from such uniformity in the maritime law, as administered in the courts of the Union, ivas one of the inducements to the adoption of the constitution, and the controlling reason for conferring on the general government the exclusive jurisdiction of all admiralty and maritime causes,—as well those arising in the commerce of the state on navigable waters as those arising in interstate and foreign commerce. It is true that it has
If, however, the views of the power of congress above expressed are mistaken, and congress has no legislative power in that respect, so that, as positive enactment and proprio ■vigore, the statute must be construed simply as a regulation of commerce, still the question arises whether it has not indi
Other illustrations exist of the modification of the law of the sea in this mode. The rules as to the lights which vessels should carry at sea at night are purely artificial. They have their origin in the absolute necessity from reasons of safety for some general rules to be adhered to by all maritime nations. This is true as to the rule of the port helm, and generally as to the rules for the steering of vessels to avoid collisions in meeting or crossing, though these rules are not
The objections that these objecting parties are entitled to have their cases'tried by a jury, and that the right is reserved to them as part of their common-law remedies by the judiciary act, (Bev. St. § 563,) are clearly answered by the sugges
It was argued that the arrangement of the statute into sections in the Bevised Statutes showed more clearly than the original statute an intention to except out of its operation injuries to the person. Such an inference as to the construction from the arrangement of the statutes in sections is inconsistent with Bev. St. § 5600; and, in general, in the construction of the Bevised Statutes an intention to change the existing laws,-which this revision purports to re-enactor codify, is not to be presumed from trifling changes of phraseology. The presumption is against an intended change of construction, unless that intention to change the law is clearly apparent. Bev. St: §§ 5595-5601.
But it is still insisted, as to the restraining order, that whatever may be the jurisdiction of this court it is prohibited by Bev. St. § 720. This section is a re-enactment, with some
The suggestion that the court which first obtains jurisdiction of a matter has the right to go on and determine the cause, has no force in a case where by a valid statute a court subsequently obtaining jurisdiction is vested with exclusive jurisdiction. And the further suggestion, that the state courts are competent to give the relief to which the owners are entitled, has no force, because no such jurisdiction is given to
These considerations dispose off all the questions presented. Exceptions overruled. Motions to dismiss petition and sot aside monition and vacate restraining order denied. All parties who have appeared and have not filed formal claims, or have not answered the amended petition, may file claims and answer within two weeks after notice of the entry of this order.