111 N.Y. 404 | NY | 1888
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It is conceded that the right of Mrs. Lockwood to share in the distribution of the assets of the estate of Charles B. Gray, in the hands of his administrator, is governed by the rules by which courts of equity are guided in distributing the separate estate of an insolvent, as between his separate creditors and the creditors of a copartnership of which he was a member. The general rule in such cases is that the separate creditors are entitled to be first paid, on the ground that their debts were contracted on the credit of the separate estate, while partnership debts are contracted primarily on the credit of the joint estate. But as a partnership debt is regarded in equity as both joint and several, there is an apparent inconsistency in excluding in equity the right of the partnership creditor to share with the separate creditor, where, as in this case, there is no joint estate and the surviving partner is insolvent. But the doctrine stated is the settled law of this state, and is not open to question. The main debt of Mrs. Lockwood never in form, at least, was the copartnership debt of Gray and Lockwood. In February, 1875, Gray and Lockwood, in their individual names, and not in the *409
name of the firm, executed, together with Mrs. Lockwood, their joint and several promissory note for $2,000, payable to one Farnum, in consideration of a loan for that amount made by the payee to Gray and Lockwood at that date. Mrs. Lockwood signed the note at the request of the other makers for their accommodation, and as between themselves she was a surety merely. She was subsequently compelled to pay the note, which is the foundation of her principal claim against the estate. It is found that the money was procured for the use of the firm of Gray Lockwood, and was used in the firm business, and that this was known to all the parties. Upon these facts is it a conclusion of law that the debt represented by the note was a firm debt, or that the claim of Mrs. Lockwood is to be ranked on the distribution of the separate estate of the decedent as a firm debt and excluded from participation until the concededly separate debts are paid? We are of opinion that no rule of marshaling assets requires such a determination. The payee of the note had a right to prescribe the security which he would accept for the loan. He chose to take the joint and several individual note of the parties, with the name of Mrs. Lockwood added. By the contract it was made the several debt of each of the makers, and we perceive no ground, in abstract justice, why Farnum, or his successor in interest, cannot have the benefit of the security according to its terms, and the right to prove the debt against the separate estate of the decedent, and share equally with the other separate creditors in the distribution. The fact that he knew that the money was borrowed for the use of the firm makes, we think, no difference. If he had required separate security by mortgage, or otherwise, on the individual property of one of the firm, there could be no doubt that it would be valid against the separate creditors of the individual partner, notwithstanding he knew for what purpose the money was borrowed. (Meech v. Allen,
All concur.
Order affirmed and judgment accordingly.
