14 Mills Surr. 236 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1915
Lead Opinion
The executors of the will of Mary Jane Spence, of Watkins, N. Y., deceased, on their final accounting asked the surrogate to construe the paragraph of the said will designated as “Twenty a.” This paragraph reads as follows: “I give, devise and bequeath to the Methodist Episcopal Church for missionary or evangelistic purposes the sum of three thousand dollars in memory of my father and mother, Abraham
The learned surrogate, after hearing evidence to the effect that the deceased had previously been a member of the local Methodist church at Watkins, and that she and her family had left the same after some difficulty with other members of that church, and had affiliated with the local Presbyterian church, decided that the bequest was intended for the Ohio corporation known as the “ Trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Church,” and which appears to have been organized for the purpose of taking property in trust for the uses of the Methodist Episcopal church at large. The residuary legatees under the will of Mary Jane Spence appeal from this part óf the decree.
The executors do not here appeal. Only the residuary legatees appeal, and their appeal cannot be sustained unless they have been aggrieved by the decision. If, therefore, the will creates a valid gift which may be enforced, either by the “Trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Church,” or by one of their missionary societies, or by the court itself, this judgment must be affirmed. Under subdivision 1 of section 12 of the Personal Property Law (Consol. Laws, chap. 41; Laws of 1909, chap. 45) it is provided: “No gift, grant or bequest to religious, educational, charitable, or benevolent uses, which shall in other respects be valid under the laws of this State, shall be deemed invalid by reason of the indefiniteness or uncertainty of the persons designated as the beneficiaries thereunder in the instrument creating the grant. If in the instrument creating such a gift, grant or bequest there is a trustee named to execute the same, the legal title to the property given, granted or bequeathed for such purposes shall vest in such trustee. If no person be named as trustee then the title to such property shall vest in the Supreme Court.” That this is a bequest to religious and benevolent uses cannot be questioned, and it was the purpose of this statute to protect and validate such bequests. Upon the appeal by the residuary legatees only it is unnecessary for us to determine by what corporation or association this bequest shall be administered. The Methodist missionary societies are content that the money should go to
All concurred, except Woodward, J., dissenting in opinion, in which Howard, J., concurred.
Dissenting Opinion
The executors of the will of Mary Jane Spence, deceased, of Watkins, N. Y., on their final accounting, asked the surrogate to construe the paragraph of the said will designated as “Twenty a.” This paragraph reads as follows: “ I give, devise and bequeath to the Methodist Episcopal Church for missionary or evangelistic purposes the sum of three thousand dollars in memory of my father and mother, Abraham and Martha Voak, my husband Wm. A. Spence, and my brother Job Voak, deceased.”
The learned surrogate, after hearing evidence to the effect that the deceased had previously been a member of the local Methodist church in Watkins, and that she and her family had left the same after some difficulty with other members of that church, and had affiliated with the local Presbyterian church, decided that the bequest was intended for the Ohio corporation, known as the “ Trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Church,” and which appears to have been organized for the purpose of taking property in trust for the uses of the Methodist Episcopal church at large. The residuary legatees under the will of Mary Jane Spence appeal from this part of the decree.
While it is undoubtedly true that a mere error in a name of a legatee, whether individual or corporate, would not be permitted to defeat the purpose of a testatrix if it was shown by competent evidence who was in fact intended, it is carrying this rule a long way to make it fit the facts of this particular case. There is not a line of evidence in the record to show that Mary Jane Spence ever knew that there was a corporation known as the “Trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Church; ” much less that she had any intention of making a bequest to a corporation having its principal place of business
Assuming, however, that there was ground for supposing that the testatrix had this Ohio corporation in mind, and that by a gift to the Methodist Episcopal church she intended to make the bequest to this corporation, there is still the difficulty that this corporation is not shown to have capacity to take the property for the purposes to which the testatrix attempted to dedicate it. The language of the will is that "1 give * * * to the Methodist Episcopal Church for missionary or evangelistic puiposes the sum of three thousand dollars,” etc. We have here a direct and simple gift made in terms that exclude any idea of a trust; there is not even a direction to invest the principal and expend the income. (Bird v. Merklee, 144 N. Y. 544, 549.) It is not to be doubted that such a gift, made to a corporation capable of taking and administering the gift, is lawful; the fact that the testatrix has designated the purpose for which the bequest must be used does not indicate a desire upon her part to create a trust. It was entirely proper for her to apply her bounty to the whole or any one or more of the various purposes for which a corporation was authorized to hold property (Bird v. Merklee, supra), but a gift to a corporation which did not have authority to take for the purposes to which the gift was limited is void. (Fosdick v. Town of Hempstead, 125 N. Y. 581.) In the present case the charter of the Ohio corporation clearly does not authorize it to take and administer a gift for “ missionary or evangelistic purposes,” whatever these may mean. It is limited by its charter to the taking and holding of property
It is clear that the “ Trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Church,” an Ohio corporation, has no power or authority to accept of a gift for its own use; it is not authorized to take money to be used for “ missionary or evangelistic purposes,” and the testatrix has not attempted to give the money in trust “in behalf of and for the benefit of the Methodist Episcopal Church.” -She says she gives it to the Methodist Episcopal church and if this did not refer to the local Methodist church, we have seen that the Methodist Episcopal church at large has no legal existence. It is not incorporated and has no power to take property for any purpose. If the bequest had been made to the “ Trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Church,” and had been for some or all of the corporate purposes of such corporation, there could have been no question about its validity (Matter of Griffin, 167 N. Y. 71, 78), but it was not given to this corporation by its name, nor has that corporation any power or authority to receive this direct gift, even if properly named, because it is not for any of the corporate purposes of the “Trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Church,” as defined in its articles of incorporation. (Matter of Griffin, supra, 79.)
Nor is this case one coming within the purview of chapter 701 of the Laws of 1893,
While the above discussion leads irresistibly to the conclusion that the decree of the learned surrogate is founded in error, and should be reversed, it may be proper to indicate that in the discussion I have not intended to convey the impression that any local Methodist church is entitled to this fund. The intent of the testatrix, to make a gift to the Methodist Episcopal church at large is manifest. Moreover the evidence indicates that she would not be likely to attempt to make a gift to the Methodist church of Watkins, from which she had withdrawn long years before on account of a church quarrel, and the language of the gift, limiting it to “ missionary or evangelistic purposes ” — matters not within the purview of local church congregations as a rule, though often made use of as agencies in the collection of funds for such purposes — unmistakably evidences the purpose of the testatrix to give to the church, as
Howard, J., concurred.
Decree affirmed, with costs.
Now Pers. Prop. Law (Consol. Laws, chap. 41; Laws of 1909, chap. 45), § 12, asamd.—. [Rep.
See R. L. of 1813, chap. 60, § 3.—[Rep.