No. 8022SC468 | N.C. Ct. App. | Jan 20, 1981
We consider first the requirement that the respondents post a bond. In foreclosure proceedings a clerk may require a bond by an appealing respondent pursuant to G.S. 45-21.16(d), and a superior court judge may require a bond upon appeal from that court pursuant to G.S. 1-292, In re Simon, 36 N.C. App. 51" court="N.C. Ct. App." date_filed="1978-04-18" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/in-re-the-deed-of-trust-of-simon-1416416?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="1416416">36 N.C. App. 51, 243 S.E.2d 163 (1978). G.S. 45-21.16(d) provides in part as follows:
The act of the clerk ... may be appealed to the judge of the district or superior court having jurisdiction at any time within 10 days after said act. Appeals from said act of the clerk shall be heard de novo. If an appeal is taken from the clerk’s findings, the appealing party shall post a bond with sufficient surety as the clerk deems adequate to protect the opposing party from any probable loss by reason of appeal; and upon posting of the bond the clerk shall stay the foreclosure pending appeal.
G.S. 1-292 provides in part:
If the judgment appealed from directs the sale or delivery of possession of real property, the execution is not stayed, unless a bond is executed on the part of the appellant, with one or more sureties, to the effect that, during his possession of such property, he will not commit, or suffer to be committed, any waste thereon, and that if the judgment is affirmed he will pay the value of the use and occupation of the property, from the time of the appeal until the delivery of possession thereof pursuant to the judgment, not exceeding a sum to be fixed by a judge of the court by which judgment was rendered and which must be specified in the undertaking.
As we read these two statutes, each provides protection for the foreclosing party by giving the clerk in one case and the judge in the other the power to require the appealing party to post a bond. If the bond is
In the case sub j udice, the trustee could have proceeded with the foreclosure since the respondents did not post a bond as required by the clerk or judge. The superior court did not have the power to require the respondents to post a bond as a condition to the appeal, and it was error for the superior court to dismiss the appeal when the bond was not posted.
We next address the question of the correctness of the order in the superior court that the trustee be authorized to proceed with the foreclosure. The appellants do not contend the court did not find sufficient facts to authorize the foreclosure sale pursuant to G.S. 45-21.16(d). They do contend the evidence does not justify the findings of fact. They argue that the evidence shows there was not an advancement on the note of 13 December 1976. The respondents say the advancements were made on the “shuck note” which was not secured by deed of trust and the foreclosure sale should not have been authorized. We hold that the testimony of Mr. Deal that the advancements were made on the note, and the “shuck notes” were used as evidence of the advancements on the original note, was testimony from which the court could find that advancements were made on the note dated 13 December 1976. The evidence supported the findings of fact by the superior court, and we are bound by them. See In re Cooke, 37 N.C. App. 575, 246 S.E. 2d 801 (1978).
We reverse the order of the superior court dismissing the appeal for the failure to post a bond. We affirm the order of the superior court which authorized the trustee to foreclose under the deed of trust.
Reversed in part; affirmed in part.