100 N.Y.S. 485 | N.Y. Sur. Ct. | 1906
Michael Kinsella died in the town of Rewfane in Rovember, 1902, leaving a last will and testament, which was admitted to probate in this court in December of the same year. Margaret Kinsella, his wife, was named therein as executrix and to her was bequeathed all of testator’s personal estate and a life use of his real estate. In Rovember, 1904, substantially two years after her appointment, Margaret Kinsella died, leaving a last will and testament which has also been admitted to probate in this court; and letters testamentary thereon have been issued to Michael Hogan, the respondent in this proceed
I do not believe that, against the protest of her executor, the law will permit such an appropriation to be made of the personal estate which Michael Kinsella bequeathed to his widow. Her executor, the respondent herein, has filed an answer to the petition alleging that Margaret Kinsella, in her lifetime, paid all
Upon the payment of her husband’s debts and funeral expenses, she could not be compelled to render an account of her proceedings, because she herself was then the only one interested in the personal estate. This then would seem to be the test: If she could not be compelled to account in her lifetime, how can her executor be compelled to account now ? The situation has not been changed by her death, so far as the right of any of the heirs or legatees of Michael Kinsella to make claim to his personal estate is concerned. Could this petitioner, being a devisee of the real estate in remainder, on the facts alleged here, have compelled Margaret Kinsella to account in her lifetime ? If so, upon what ground ? If he could not, then on what principle can her executor be compelled to account now? It appears to me that, upon the facts disclosed by the papers in this proceeding, there was no occasion for the appointment of an administrator with the will annexed. The personal estate had been fully administered, and as to the real estate the will was self-executing. Petitioner could not have compelled Margaret Kinsella to use her own money to pay the transfer tax on his remainder in the real estate, or the expense of determining what such tax might be. Under the transfer tax statutes it is possible, hut by no means certain, that Margaret Kinsella could have voluntarily instituted in Surrogate’s Court a real estate proceeding to sell petitioner’s reversion in the real estate to pay
If petitioner felt that, by being appointed administrator with the will annexed, he could thereby relieve his real estate of any possible claims that might be made against it, there was, perhaps, no objection to his taking such precautionary steps; but when he seeks to make some one else bear the expense of such a proceeding, there is neither equity nor justice in his position.
His application, therefore to compel respondent to account is denied, with ten dollars costs.
Application denied, with ten dollars costs.