43 Misc. 468 | N.Y. Sur. Ct. | 1904
In this proceeding, to judicially settle the accounts of Mr. Tuttle, one of the executors of the testatrix, the question in controversy is .as to whether Mr. Tuttle should he charged for the waste and conversion of assets by a co-executor. The facts are as follows:
Lucinda Dougherty died September 1, 1889, leaving a will, which was proved September 10, 1889, and letters testamentary thereof were then issued to her son, Theodore M. Dougherty, and' to her sons-in-law, Peter Forrester and Theodore M. Tuttle. Her estate consisted almost entirely of cash, coupon bonds and stocks of corporations, and amounted to nearly $38,000. Shortly after the executors had qualified they attended together at the Stuyvesant Safe Deposit Company, where a box
Theodore M. Dougherty, one of the executors, died in September, 1897, and thereafter, on February 21, 1898, an account of their proceedings as executors was filed in this court by the surviving executors, Mr. Forrester and Mr. Tuttle, with a petition for its judicial settlement. All parties in interest were duly cited in the proceeding, which ended in a decree dated March 30, 1898.
The negotiable bonds and corporate stocks of the estate were, in the early part of 1897, taken by Mr. Forrester from the box in the safe deposit vault in the presence of all of the executors,
This account was in all respects a joint account of Mr. Forrester and of Mr. Tuttle, and was signed and verified by both of them. Uowhere upon its face does it appear that one more than the other had been active in the performance of the duties imposed upon both of them. Schedule A was stated by them to contain “ a statement of all the property of the deceased which has come into our (their) hands,” and is a list of money and securities representing the entire capital of the estate. In a summary statement of the account they jointly charge themselves with the full amount of this property, with all accretions, and they jointly demanded credit for all disbursements. By their joint deposition they declared that the said account contained, to the 'best of their knowledge and belief, “ a full, a true statement of all of our (their) receipts and disbursements on account of the said estate.” The decree made upon this account, on the motion of the attorneys for the accounting executors, and without opposition, charged them jointly with the balance of the estate shown and admitted to be in their hands, and directed that they distribute it as therein set forth, reserving to themselves their lawful commissions.
The moneys then due to the parties in interest were honestly
About the fall of the year 1899 Mr. Forrester stated to Mr. Tuttle that he desired to collect the mortgages, so as to invest the money on “ better property.” On this request, and without inquiring, as to what was the trouble with the securities then on hand, or what new investments were contemplated, Mir. Tuttle from time to time joined with Mr. Forrester in satisfying or assigning the mortgages, and indorsed the checks for the proceeds, or otherwise permitted Mr. Forrester to obtain possession of them. Payments of income were thereafter made by Mr. Forrester, until about January 1, 1903; but in the early spring or summer of that year it was learned from the confessions of Mr. Forrester that he had used the entire assets of the estate to promote a private speculation of his own, and that all had been lost, and that he was insolvent.
From the beginning to the end of the history of the estate I do not find any fact which reflects unfavorably upon the moral purpose of Mr. Tuttle. Mr. Forrester was supposed by every one to be worthy of trust, and Mr. Tuttle never had cause to suspect him of dishonesty, and never did so suspect him until after the catastrophe, which left nothing to conjecture. The evidence tending to show the contrary was fully answered and is unworthy of consideration. He was, however, negligent, and he failed to perform the duties of an executor. Just a little prudence on his part would probably have sufficed to prevent the utter wreck of this estate, and, possibly, to have saved Mr. Forrester from, a temptation which proved too strong for him. The principle applicable has been stated by high authority m follows: “But where one executor or trustee re
I cannot agree with the learned counsel for the executor in his contention that Mr. Tuttle never had possession of the assets of the estate. Such possession was obtained when all of the assets were put into a strong box, to which neither Mr. Forrester nor any other person in the world could obtain access without Mr. Tuttle’s consent; it was continued during the seven or eight years while such assets were continued to be kept in that box, and were inspected by him semi-annually; it was acknowledged by his joining in the formal account; it was adjudged by the decree of this court made upon the footing of this account, and that decree cannot now be reversed or disregarded. The facts in this case are much stronger than they were in Matter of Hunt (88 App. Div. 52), which is the most recently reported ease of the kind, and which is binding upon me.
I cannot refuse to apply a plain legal rule, and the account of the executor will be surcharged with the full amount of the estate, 'but in every matter of discretion I feel that I should deal leniently with the executor. It Was proper to permit Mr. Forrester to collect and pay out income, since that was a convenient method of administration (Purdy v. Lynch, supra). I will, therefore, charge interest only from the date of the discovery of Mr. Forrester’s default, and will fix that date as
Decreed accordingly.