75 Misc. 2d 239 | N.Y. Sur. Ct. | 1973
The central question which the court must answer upon this application is whether the ancient legal citadel which surrounds and preserves the indestructibility of spendthrift trusts (Matter of Wentworth, 230 N. Y. 176, 185; EPTL 7-1.5) has been breached, altered or impaired by virtue of the enactment of EPTL 3-3.10 by the Laws of 1971, which became effective on November 3, 1971.
This will, executed on May 20, 1965, was duly admitted to probate on March 21, 1972, following the testator’s death on
Within one year after the' will was admitted to probate, a renunciation, in proper form, was filed in this court on March 8, 1973, under which the beneficiary of the trust renounces and refuses to accept the legacy under the aforesaid paragraph of the will; and expressly states in such instrument of renunciation that: “ This legacy shall become the property of the remainder-men of the trust, namely ’ ’.
The named remaindermen now seek immediate distribution to them of their eventual estate, upon the theory that by virtue of the express provision of EPTL 3-3.10 (subd. [c]) such renunciation has the same effect as though the renouncing trust beneficiary had predeceased the testator, thereby bringing about the acceleration of the remainders. Petitioner claims support for such contention in Matter of Schloessinger (70 Misc 2d 206), which cites Matter of Fordham (235 N. Y. 384), for the proposition that the death of a life tenant before a will can take effect does not destroy the remainders but accelerates such eventual estate. In the Fordham case (supra) the life tenant actually predeceased the testatrix. In the Schloessinger case (supra) the precise question raised upon this application is neither discussed nor reviewed although the factual pattern recited in the opinion of that case appears closely analogous. Similarly, the Fordham case was not presented with this precise question since the earlier death of the life beneficiary actually occurred so that the acceleration of the eventual remainder estate did not come about by any voluntary and deliberate act of the life beneficiary.
Research by the court has failed to reveal any probative writings or memoranda bearing on the consideration or intentions, if any, of the Legislature with respect to the effect of BPTL 3-3.10 (entitled: “ Renunciation of testamentary dispositions ”) upon the doctrine of the indestructibility of spendthrift trusts and BPTL 7-1.5, which provides for inalienability of rights to income by trust beneficiaries. It has been said that the public policy of this State makes every testamentary trust a spendthrift trust. (Matter of Connor, 56 Misc 2d 10, 15.) Prom the Practice Commentary to such sections (McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N. Y., Book 17B, EPTL 3-3.10, 7-1.5), it appears the concern
“ Statutory language, however strong, must yield to what appears to be intention and that is to be found not in the words of a particular section alone but by comparing it with other parts or provisions of the general scheme of which it is part.” (McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N. Y., Book 1, Statutes, § 97.)
Indeed, it is a well-established principle in the construction of statutes that when a statute makes special provision for one class, a general provision that might be applicable to that class will not be deemed to include it, but it will be assumed to be the legislative intent that the specific provision shall be applied to the class to which it refers, and the general provision to all other classes for which specific provision has not been made. (Hoey v. Gilroy, 129 N. Y. 132; Matter of Button v. Slater, 198 Misc. 1, and cases cited.) Thus, the inalienability of trust interests specifically provided for in EPTL 7-1.5, in the absence, as here, of an explicit and expressed contrary intention of the Legislature, must be considered in the nature of an exception to the general provisions of EPTL 3-3.10 respecting the general ability of any testamentary beneficiary to renounce all or part of his interest and thereby bring about a result (in the absence of a contrary provision in the will), as though the renouncing person had predeceased the testator. (82 C. J. S., Statutes, § 347; People ex rel. Knoblauch v. Warden, 216 N. Y. 154, 157.)
The foregoing construed intention of the Legislature and the expressed intention of the testator lead the court to hold that, while the right of a beneficiary of a trust to renounce is established beyond question, he may not thereby effect a termination