161 Iowa 289 | Iowa | 1913
I. An instrument purporting to be the last will and testament of Ole J. Cleven was offered for probate in the district court of Winnebago county. Objections to the instrument were filed, raising no question as to the competency of the testator, but going to the legal effect of an attempted disposition of his property made in paragraphs 2 and 6. The objections were filed by Vernie Belle Cleven, who averred that she was the daughter and sole heir at law of decedent; her relationship as stated by appellant in argument being as that of - ‘ ‘ one who has been declared as the result of judicial proceedings, in which testator was a defendant, to be his daughter.” She was not recognized as such in the will por was any bequest made to her, Excepting some small
Sixth. All the rest and residue of my property real and personal of every kind and nature of which I may die seised or possessed I give devise and bequeath to S. II. Larson as trustee for the following purpose or purposes, to wit: It is my will and desire that my said trustee shall establish my farm in Center township said county described as southwest quarter (]4) and the southwest one-fourth (%) of the southeast (14) of section (27) and the northwest one-fourth (%) of the northwest quarter (%) of section thirty-four (34), all in township ninety-nine (99) north of range twenty-three (23) west of the fifth P. M. and containing about two hundred and forty acres, as a home for poor old people. All the buildings on said premises to be used thereon for said purpose and all other personal property not otherwise disposed of herein to be used in the equipment and maintenance of such home. Said farm and property is to be managed by said S. II. Larson as trustee and I hereby give him power to substitute some one or more to take his place and to manage said property as trustee or trustees and to provide for a trusteeship that shall be perpetual and carry out the manifest object of this bequest including to provide rules for admission to said home. In ease said S. II. Larson as trustee, resigns, becomes disqualified or for any reason fails to act as trustee or to provide for a perpetual trusteeship of said property to carry out my object in making this bequest, then it is my will and desire that T. A. Kingland of Forest City, Iowa, shall appoint one or more persons not to exceed three in number,*292 whom he shall think suitable to manage such property and to provide for their successors. It is further my will and desire that said T. A. Kingland act as the legal adviser and counsellor of said S. H. Larson trustee in establishing and providing for the maintenance of such old people’s home. It is my will and desire that all of said real estate shall be kept intact for such purpose and not be incumbered, but that only so many old poor be kept thereon or provided for as can be supported from the rents and profits of said farm and other property devised herein for said object.
S. H. Larson, named as trustee, was also designated as executor.
The objections filed by contestant charge: (1) That the designation both of the beneficiaries and of the persons who are to hold the legal title is too uncertain and indefinite and thereby renders such paragraph void. (2) That there is an attempt to vest in the trustee the right to designate the beneficiaries, and also to choose his successor, and in the event of vacancy the power to choose the trustee is vested in a third person, all of which provisions are alleged to be contrary to the law in the creation and execution of trusts. (3) Such paragraph is in violation of our statute against perpetuities. (4) The will is void as to three-fourths of the value of the estate, under Code, section 3270. The objections filed amplified the above propositions, but concretely they are as stated.
II. The subject of charitable trusts has had recent and full consideration by this court; some of the decisions to which we shall later refer being controlling as to many of the questions now presented.
The rule of public policy which forbids estates to be indefinitely inalienable in the hands of individuals does not apply to charities. These, being established for Objects of public, general, and lasting benefit, áre allowed by law to be as permanent as any human institution can be, and courts will readily infer an intention in the donor that they should be perpetual. Perin v. Carey, 24 How. 465 (16 L. Ed. 701); King v. Parker, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 82; Dexter v. Gardner, 7 Allen (Mass.) 246; Phillips v. Harrow, 93 Iowa, 92. This particular question is fully considered in Phillips v. Harrow, supra, and is decided against the contention now made by appellant. It is controlling here.
From the conclusions thus reached it follows that the