112 N.Y.S. 599 | N.Y. Sur. Ct. | 1908
David N. Brown died, intestate, February 7, 1905, leaving him surviving his widow, six children and one grandchild, his heirs at law and next of win. At the time of his decease he possessed a small amount of personal property, and real estate of the value of $6,000. Letters of administration upon his estate were issued, February 25, 1905, to the widow, who now presents her accounts for final judicial settlement, to which various objections are filed.
It is asserted on the part of the contestants that the administratrix has failed to account for all the assets of the estate, but such claim is not sustained by the evidence. Decedent was married to the administratrix, his second wife, in 1872. He was then fifty years of age, actively engaged in business, apparently financially prosperous; and, during the succeeding years, he accumulated property to a considerable extent. For a year or more immediately preceding his decease, he was incompetent, in consequence of ill health, and the administratrix assumed the general control of his business affairs, and the estate, for reasons not fully explained, has greatly decreased in value; but there is absolutely no proof which would justify charging the administratrix with any other assets than those accounted for by her.
The account filed contains a Schedule “ O,” showing funeral expenses and disbursements of administration, and Schedule “ D,” showing the debts of the decedent actually paid by the
In this schedule is set forth an itemized statement of the personal claim of the administratrix, for taxes paid by her upon the real estate of the decedent and for moneys expended by her for miscellaneous expenses prior to decedent’s death, to the amount of $451.66. She subsequently filed a supplemental personal claim to the amount of $2,759.98 for premiums paid by her upon two life insurance policies upon the life of decedent. This schedule also contained an itemized statement of the claim of Ohloe Brown and of Olive Brown, two daughters of decedent, for $135.60 and $599.45, respectively, for moneys alleged to have been expended by them in the support and maintenance of the family for several years preceding the death of decedent. The controversy upon this accounting relates to these claims.
The daughters’ claims will first be considered; and, as the facts are the same in regard to both, they will be considered together.
It appears from the evidence that these claims were never formally presented to the administratrix by written statement, verified or otherwise; nor does it appear that either of the daughters, has ever demanded or requested payment of her claim. The only recognition of either, in the course of administration, is the statement in Schedule “ E ” in relation thereto.
It is contended, on the part of the claimants and of the administratrix, that such recognition of these claims constitutes an allowance of the same, obviates the necessity of any formal presentation and renders them liquidated demands against the estate, and that the burden of disproving them is upon the con
The Surrogate’s Court has jurisdiction upon an accounting-to determine whether or not a claim has been presented to and paid by the representative; but, if a claim has not been allowed within the legal signification of the term and is disputed, no-jurisdiction on the part of the Surrogate’s Court exists without the filing of the consent provided for by the statute. The law is. well settled that, where a claim has been properly presented, allowed, and paid by the representative, the production of the proper voucher for such payment upon judicial settlement makes a prima facie case for the representative, and the burden of disproving such claim is upon the contestant. Matter of Frazer, 92 N. Y. 247; Matter of Stevenson, 86 Hun, 327; Boughton v. Flint, 74 N. Y. 476.
In the case last cited, Rapallo, J., says: “ The accounting party is not bound to establish payments for which he presents vouchers, unless they are denied by objections and the burden of impeaching such payments is on the contestant.”
In such a case the Surrogate’s 'Court has jurisdiction to determine the controversy; but this rule has no application to a claim which has never been presented to, allowed or paid by the-representative but which the representative, of his own volition, incorporates in the schedule of unpaid debts.
The personal representative of an estate is a trustee of the-assets for the benefit of creditors and distributees. The rights-of creditors, being prior to those of next of kin of legatees, the first duty of the representative is to ascertain and liquidate the indebtedness. The statute provides an expeditious and satisfactory mode of procedure in developing the indebtedness-
In Niles v. Crocker, 88 Hun, 315, the rule enunciated in the Morton case is cited, approved, and applied. In Ulster County Savings Inst. v. Young, 161 N. Y. 33, Martin, J., says: “ The almost universal practice in presenting claims to representatives of an estate, to public officers, or public boards, whether executors, administrators, assignees, receivers, supervisors, aldermen or auditors, has been to present them in writing, properly verified by the claimant. In many of the instances mentioned, this is specially required. In this case there is no such explicit requirement, but the language of the statute clearly indicates that the claim exhibited must be in writing. Public policy and certainty in the administration of estates also require the enforce-
Nor is the duty of the creditor fully performed upon due presentation of his claim; he should see that the representative takes some affirmative action in regard thereto. In Butler v. Tohnson, 111 N. Y. 204, Andrews, Ch. J., says': “ In view of the power and duty of an executor or administrator, the inference from his silence, merely, of an agreement on his part to pay a debt so situated, would be unreasonable; the statutory system for the presentation and adjustment of claims against the estate of a decedent, furnishes a summary and inexpensive method by which claims can be adjusted without action or by reference; the executor or administrator on being satisfied of the justice of a claim presented, may admit it, or if he doubts its justness he may reject it and leave the creditor to his remedy by action if a reference is not agreed upon; but this presentation of a claim, the executor or administrator neither rejecting nor admitting it, does not, we think, bind the estate as upon an account stated; it may be claimed that the executor or administrator ought, in the fair discharge of his duties, both to the creditor and the estate, to examine the claim within a reasonable time, and make known his position in respect to it; but it would be hazardous, in view of the ignorance and inexperi
Where the creditor properly presents his claim and procures the same to be allowed by the representative he derives the advantage of having his claim thereby prima facie established as a liquidated demand against the estate; and, if under such conditions the claim be paid by the representative, he has the full benefit of the rule enunciated in Boughton v. Flint, supra. If, however, the representative, ignoring the statutory procedure, substituting in place thereof his supposed personal knowledge of the claim, pays the same, he does so at his peril and thereby assumes the burden of proof in case the validity of such claim is challenged. If, as in this case, his only affirmative action in regard to the claim is to incorporate it in the schedule of unpaid debts, he has not improved the status of the claim, because, upon objection being filed thereto, the Surrogate’s Court is deprived of jurisdiction and the claimant is remitted to his legal remedies to enforce the same.
The claims of Olive and Chloe Brown have not become liquidated or established against the estate; and, being disputed, no authority exists for their allowance upon this accounting. They must be disallowed, not upon their merits, but for want of jurisdiction to determine the same, without prejudice, however, to their right to resort to such legal remedies as they may desire to enforce the same.
The next subject for consideration is that portion of the personal claim of the administratrix which arises from her having paid premiums upon the life insurance policies of the decedent. It appears from the evidence that the decedent, in his more prosperous days, procured two policies of insurance upon his life, in regular life insurance companies, for $5,000 each, in
The equities of this demand are not easily discernible. It is difficult to understand upon what theory it can be contended that the next of kin ought to contribute from their distributive shares in the estate this sum of $-2,759.98, the expense of maintaining the insurance upon the life of the decedent, which inured to the sole benefit of the administratrix to the extent of $10,000.
The principle is rudimentary that, where one voluntarily pays the debt of another, without request or promise to repay on part of the original debtor, the amount so paid cannot be recovered. National Bank of Ballston Spa v. Supervisors, 106 N. Y. 488; Matter of Bronson, 44 App. Div. 615.
In the case last cited, Goodrich, J., says: “No person can make himself a creditor of another by voluntarily discharging a duty which belongs to that other to perform, and no debt can be implied in law from a voluntary payment of the debt of another. (Danforth, J., Nat. Bank of Ballston Spa. v. Bd. of Suprs., 106 N. Y. 488, 494.) In City of Albany v. McNamara (117 N. Y. 168, 172), the court said: ‘It is an elementary principle in such actions that money voluntarily paid out by one for another cannot be recovered back.’ ”
The payment of these premiums by the administratrix does
It appears from the evidence that, during several years immediately preceding decedent’s death, taxes were levied upon real estate owned by him and not paid by him. They were-paid by the administratrix from her individual funds. It does not appear that such payments were made at the request of the-decedent, nor under any express promise on his part to repay the same; and it is contended in opposition to this portion of the claim that such payments were purely voluntary and that, under the authorities above cited, she cannot recover. Such contention is not sustained by any equitable considerations. While the widow had an inchoate right of dower in the lands
For several years preceding decedent’s death, in consequence of his infirmities, the administratrix had to a considerable extent the management and control of his business affairs; in many instances she attended to the collection of outstanding obligations due decedent, and expended portions of the proceeds therefrom in the support of the family. From the 26th day of May, 1901, down to the date of the decedent’s death, she contributed from her individual means to the payment of such expenses. The disbursements incurred by her in this line are fully detailed in Schedule “ E ” of her account. The daughter Chloe testified that upon several occasions she heard the decedent say to the administratrix, in substance, that his money was all gone, or nearly so, and that she and the girls (Chloe and Olive) would have to take care of him in his old age, and that she should keep an account of it and it would all be paid back out of the estate. This evidence was offered solely in relation to the claim of the administratrix, and not as bearing upon the claim of the witness.
The claim of the administratrix, so far as it consists of moneys expended by her from her individual funds for the maintenance of the family, should be sustained. Cromwell v. Benjamin, 41 Barb. 558; Arnold v. Allen, 9 Daly, 198; Langbein v. Schneider, 27 Abb. N. C. 228; Keller v. Phillips, 39 N. Y. 351; Hatch v. Leonard, 1 id. 435; Wanamaker v. Weaver, 176 id. 75.
The disposition of the other minor subjects in controversy fully appears from the findings of fact and conclusions of law-filed in connection herewith.
Decreed accordingly.