*1 IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
LUCILE B. SNYDER, Deceased. No. DA 08-0538. July Submitted on Briefs September Decided
Rehearing
Denied October 2009.
For Robert J. Attorney at Great Falls. Opinion JUSTICE delivered NELSON of the Court. again presented We are Snyder, with the will of B. who children, to her two 18,1992, devising her entire estate died November 25, 1992, Court admitted the District Lois. On November Neil and personal appointed and Neil was probate, will to the outset as to disagreed from representative. Neil Lucile’s shares particular, of Lucile’s estate-in proper *2 Inc.) Falls, 40 (Synder’s, in family-owned drugstore Great the 16 County-and over the last undeveloped of land in Flathead acres Lois) (to in quote litigation years, they engaged have in “acrimonious” Court, County, concerning the Eighth the Judicial District Cascade will. construction of Lucile’s P.3d 238 Snyder, 2000 MT 299 Mont. In In re Estate of in I), shares we the distribution ofLucile’s
(Snyder addressed or control of give ownership to Neil Inc. We noted Lucile’s intent him and Lois. Drug equally her estate Snyder dividing entire I, that was to take Lucile’s Snyder 15. We thus concluded Neil ¶ estate assets of in store and Lois was to receive interest the I, Snyder 16-17. comparable value. ¶¶ Snyder, re 2007 MT In In Estate of the still (Snyder II), addressed the issue of whether we in be and distributed based appraised the estate should
upon death or its current market value. its value at Lucile’s approach; we adopted District Court had latter Lucile intended to have the estate distributed determined that death, accordingly and we reversed pursuant its value her II, Snyder this issue. 35-37. We also reversed ¶¶ her in the Flathead compelling quitclaim court’s order Lois to interest II, Snyder 41-42. The County property back Lucile’s estate. Snyder appeal District Court had reasoned that Lois’s successful “upset adopted by of distribution” court entire scheme flexibility January that to order 1998 and needed “the County] in kind by partition, property... [the distribution distribution[,] proceeds” probate sale and in order to or I, II, 17; Snyder also pursuant I. See see ¶ the estate opined highly unlikely ti]t that District Court had also is ¶ the exact interest in the Flathead Lois will receive II, presently in her See 17. But we concluded stands name.” circumstances, unlikely fact including under the that Lois was estate, the District Court’s to receive less than one half of Lucile’s unnecessary step in the court’s resolution added an approach simply II, the estate. hearing remand, evidentiary the District Court conducted an On outstanding findings on all issues the case and thereafter entered First, of fact and conclusions of law. The court determined as follows. (which date-of-death value shares were I) distributed to Neil in accordance with Neil $187,440.00 in deposited has an escrow account the Cascade ‘TP]ayment County Clerk of Court. ofthe outside Estate order to balance distribution not inconsistent with Lucile’s intent Thus, provide for parties equal her children.” are on “an footing starting point residuary or distribution of the estate.” Second, County the date-of-death value of the Flathead property was $160,000.00, but its value To present least”$5 is “at million. distribute entirely Lois “would create significant inequity expressed which Lucile several times she desired to avoid.” Because Lucile intended her estate distributed pursuant death, its precludes value at her the application §72-3-902(2)(b), (any family homestead or allowance devise of a money kind, stated sum of provided satisfied property distributed in kind is fair valued at market value as of the “[ujnless distribution, date of its intention is indicated will”). However, “this does preclude not a distribution of the *3 County Flathead to both property parties as tenants in common.” Thus, Lucile’s desire to have her estate distributed “requires Lois and Neil that and both Lois Neil take equally the County and property by that same be held jointly Lois and Neil, as tenants in Lastly, residuary common.” the the remainder of estate, consisting primarily of accounts, may financial be divided equally between Lois and Neil. The District accordingly Court ordered pay that Neil Lois
$187,440.00 and that County the Flathead property “equally” be held by Lois and Neil “as tenants in common.”The court further ordered any necessary Neil and Lois to execute deeds to comply its order. The subsequently issued a Nunc Pro Tunc correcting Order the amount payment of Neil’s the Snyder’s, Lois for Inc. shares $187,488.00. Lois appeals, arguing now that the District Court’s order violates the terms of Lucile’s will and the law of the case established Snyder and Snyder I II. Lois challenges also that observation the Flathead County property is “at worth least” $5 million. judicial law-of-the-case doctrine is policies based
economy finality judgments. and Under a prior resolving decision of this parties an issue between same 316, 11, Frank, MT Muri v. relitigated. binding and not be District Court was argues that the Lois II, Snyder Snyder and Neil I and the law stated required follow (i.e., the law-of-the-case that no argument presents under decision now to the District Court’s apply does not doctrine apply). review, the doctrine should exception an noted, I was to take Lucile’s Snyder held in that Neil As this Court Lois was to receive estate assets Snyder Drug interest in and entire I, 16-17; II, Clearly, Snyder accord value. comparable (the $187,488.00 value of by Neil of date-of-death payment a cash stock) does constitute an “estate asset.” not Lucile’s Furthermore, property held II that the this Court its value at her upon is to be and distributed based appraised estate Thus, County distributing ofwhether question death. significant inequity” “a entirely to Lois would create because substantially years ago now worth more than was worth it is matter, For proper is not a consideration here. when died supposed inequity exists not acknowledged it must be itself, the values of her of the terms of will but because virtue beneficiaries, Lois, Neil and changed assets have while the two litigation years and for the last 16 protracted acrimonious persisted Had estate been simply over who entitled which asset. (an §72-3-1015, timely manner, in a MCA estate should distributed see years appointment within two from the date of generally closed values, at see personal representative), date-of-death §72-3-607(1), “as (requiring the decedent’s be valued death”), ‘inequity” date of no such would exist. of the the decedent’s That, however, point, is that at this is water over the dam. fact I not established in dispute Neil does law case of Lucile’s estate. controls Under law of the case established in Inc., II, were valued Neil received all of the shares of (date-of-death value). $187,488.00 to estate assets was entitled $187,488.00, any being estate assets divided equaling was The date-of-death value of the Flathead equally. *4 Accordingly, property, Lois is entitled value, totaling plus additional estate assets that date-of-death (likewise death), there $27,488.00 date of Lucile’s unless valued at the distributed, in case to be which are insufficient estate (i.e., for the payment entitled cash from Neil for the balance Lois is to a assets). $27,488.00 with estate of the that cannot satisfied portion Snyder II holding argues takes issue our Dissent rather, but, here apply that we should not the law-of-the-case doctrine Dissent, Neil, should “overturn” II. 18. has by failing II is effectively controlling respond, conceded argument authority, argument and citations Lois’s in her law of opening brief that District Court violated the the case. See Co., MT 132, 33, 321 Harland v.Anderson Ranch Mont. ¶ (Under 12(2),an App. appellee’s P.3d 1160 M. R. P. brief “must contain succinct, summary arguments posited by a clear and accurate of the argument a party, containing followed well reasoned citations authorities, statutes, pages to the relied upon.”). record distributing further Dissent contends the Flathead Lake “unconscionable.”Dissent, property at its date-of-death would be value Yet, 15. apparently the Dissent would affirm the District ¶ allowing pay decision Neil to Lois the value of the date-of-death ($187,488.00), Neil though Inc. stock distributed to even stock’s appreciated roughly $715,554.00 by value had December Applying date-of-death to the value stock but present-day to the County property only value is not inconsistent, internally statutory but also requirement a decedent’s “as of be valued the date of the decedent’s (“If §72-3-607(1), MCA; §72-3-609, death.” See e.g. any see also original inventory knowledge not included in the to the comes personal representative of a personal representative or if the learns description inventory any value or indicated in the original item personal representative is erroneous or misleading, shall make a supplemental inventory appraisal showing or the market value date decedent’s death of the item or new the revised descriptions market value or appraisers other data relied added)). upon, any.” (emphasis if The disposition only set forth in 8 is above distribution that
follows the of the case I law established and in II. While, values, at present this distribution inequitable seem Neil, court, Dissent, to the trial and to the I our decisions in require Muir, and in this outcome. proceedings
¶12 Reversed and remanded for further consistent with this Opinion. LEAPHART,
JUSTICES MORRIS and concur. RICE JUSTICE COTTER dissents. my Court, dissent. It view that the District in each instance estate, it had to evaluate and reevaluate distribution of this
269 and, in in this Court evaluated got each instance which right it the District decisions, got wrong. I would affirm District Court’s we appeal respects. all presently Court Order on intent that her estate First, Lucile’s will did not reflect an for federal value at her death calculated pursuant to its distributed notwithstanding. Her tax our decision purposes, estate applied tax pursuant to federal state intention to value estate the time of only unincorporated at in the event was death, happenstance her that did not occur. erroneously in this we regard;
reached the correct decision doing, disregarded II. we reversed that decision in In so will, meaning language provisions clear of her and the of §72-3- MCA, is 902(2)(b), requires which that unless a intention will, shall be by be distributed in kind indicated as of of its at the fair market value the date distribution. valued reverse, now the District In its most recent decision which we that to Court said distribute significant inequity, expressed create a several
“would right. anything is she desired to avoid.”The District Court is If times face), it (though clear the will is its from will submit clear on her equal regard, children held her in and that that her were intent was see that her distributed ultimate estate on ignored them. In we her intention my judgment, result, one valued three occasions now. As a child will $187,488.00, property arguably at the other will receive worth estate This is plus million additional $5 unconscionable. disagreement general no with the discussion of I have However, not a hard my judgment,
flaw of the case”doctrine.
this is
resulting in a
presents
rule when
a clear error
application
fast
its
Zimmerman,
injustice.
manifest
In State v.
573
conviction,
(1977),
notwithstanding
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we vacated a
application for a writ
opposite decision in the same case on
Granted,
citing
control.
we
an
supervisory
exception
did so
that,
must
general rule of flaw of the case”to
effect
where the case
proceedings
be remanded to the district court
further
because
issue,
an
take the opportunity
reversal on
unrelated
Zimmerman,
Mont.
manifest
in its former
opinion.
correct a
error
it does
precisely
point,
The law of the case “grounded which is in the principle of stare decisis” and “akin to the judicata” doctrine of res generally “prohibits the reconsideration ofissues which have been adjudicated previous in a appeal the same case.” Previous decisions on such questionable issues-even decisions-become the Taw the case”and should not be reconsidered on remand or in a subsequent appeal except ‘Where there exist ‘exceptional circumstances’ presenting a ‘clear error constituting ” injustice.’ manifest [Emphasis added.] *6 Accord, Pipeline Four-Four, Mid-American Inc., Co. v. 2009 UT 352; Dept. Miss. Human McNeel, Services v. 10 So. 3d State, 35. See also Brown v. 1998), (Wyo. which the Supreme Court of Wyoming said: ‘The law of the case [doctrine] is a discretionary rule which does not constitute a limitation on the court’s power but merely ‘expresses practice of courts ” generally to reopen refuse to what has been decided.’ I agree with this statement. The important, does not limit a court’s power to previous reverse a decision if it is a clear error and results in a manifest injustice. I therefore respectfully disagree with the Court’s conclusion here that the doctrine compels the outcome we reach. Opinion, 8.¶ my view, (and In if we are free is evident from our are)
jurisprudence that we previous overturn decisions ofthis Court in other cases justice where so requires, we should be free and willing to do so where we have made a manifest error in a former decision in the same case. I believe we have done so in these cases, and I rule, would so notwithstanding the Taw of the case” doctrine. I would affirm the District Court’s decision put an end to litigation, giving effect to Lucile’s intention that her children equal distribution ofher estate. I dissent from our refusal to do so.